





INDONESIA
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2001

Towards a new consensus

Democracy and human development in Indonesia





The diagram on the cover page depicts the correlation between democracy and human development. The white dots locate different countries according to their attainments on the human development and democracy indices. Indonesia's position is indicated by the yellow circled dot.

INDONESIA
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2001

**Towards
a new consensus**

Democracy and human development in Indonesia

BPS-Statistics Indonesia
BAPPENAS
UNDP

BPS



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Towards a New Consensus: Democracy and Human Development in Indonesia

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Foreword

This is the first National Human Development Report for Indonesia. It has been preceded by National Human Development Index Reports in 1996, 1997 and 1999. As before, this has been a collaborative effort between the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), Statistics Indonesia (BPS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The National Human Development Report is being published at an important juncture in Indonesia's history, when the country is consolidating its nascent democracy while simultaneously striving to overcome the economic and financial crisis that overtook much of East Asia in 1997. The timing of this Report has dictated its concerns and contents. The primary focus is on the interrelationships between human development, democracy and economic progress in Indonesia. This Report is an ambitious and innovative undertaking compared to many other national human development reports, which focus on a single theme.

This Report poses a question that is very much on the agenda of policy-makers in Indonesia: How can Indonesia achieve steady progress in all indicators of human development as it restructures its economy, refashions its governance institutions, and devolves decision-making to regions and localities?


The answer, this Report argues, lies in building a new social consensus for Indonesia - a consensus that renews a shared commitment to human development, establishing that all Indonesians - as citizens of Indonesia - are entitled to nationally mandated standards of human development. Despite the odds confronting Indonesia, which this Report spells out in some detail, it is optimistic that current challenges can be surmounted.

The Report is enriched by a wealth of new statistical tables. These include the Human Development Index, along with its complementary measures: the Human Poverty Index, the Gender-related Development Index, and the Gender Empowerment Measure. These data are now available not just at the national but also at the provincial and district levels, allowing key human development issues and priorities to be publicized and debated throughout the country.

These detailed statistics will be invaluable as Indonesia decentralizes much of the responsibility for development planning and policy to hundreds of individual districts. As with all such composite measures, however, the various human development indices need to be applied with care. Although they offer broad signposts toward human development needs and priorities, they must also be supplemented with all other quantitative and qualitative information that local authorities should have at their disposal.

This Report owes much to the many people and institutions that have taken part in numerous consultations contributing to its contents. Not all will agree with all of the argument or conclusions presented here. But we hope that readers will find the contents of this Report a compelling contribution to the policy debate on human development in Indonesia.

Jakarta, 17 October 2001



Kwik Kian Gie
State Minister for Development Planning/
Chairman of BAPPENAS



Soedarti Surbakti
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Resident Representative
UNDP Indonesia

The analysis and policy recommendations of this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of BAPPENAS, BPS-Statistics Indonesia or UNDP. The Report was commissioned by UNDP under project INS/99/002 commonly known as UNSFIR (the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesia Recovery). The principal partner and executing agency of this project within the Government of Indonesia is Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS). The present report is the outcome of a series of open consultations around an initial draft prepared by an UNSFIR team led by Satish C. Mishra. The statistical tables of the indicators and indices presented in this Report were computed by a team of BPS-Statistics Indonesia.

This Report has been prepared jointly by
a UNDP-Bappenas Project commonly known as UNSFIR and BPS-Statistics Indonesia

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Abbreviations

BAPPENAS	: <i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i> - National Planning Board
Bimas	: <i>Bimbingan Masal</i> - Mass (Agriculture) Extension Programme
BMI	: Body Mass Index
BPS	: <i>Badan Pusat Statistik</i> - Statistics Indonesia
GEM	: Gender Empowerment Measure
GNP	: Gross National Product
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GDI	: Gender-related Development Index
GRDP	: Gross Regional Domestic Product
HDI	: Human Development Index
HDR	: Human Development Report
HPI	: Human Poverty Index
Inmas	: <i>Intensifikasi Masal</i> - Mass (Agriculture) Intensification Programme
Inpres	: <i>Instruksi Presiden</i> - Presidential Instruction
NGO	: Non-Government Organization
PKK	: <i>Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga</i> - Family Welfare Movement
Puskesmas	: <i>Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat</i> - Health Centre
Sakernas	: <i>Survei Tenaga Kerja Nasional</i> - National Labour Force Survey
Susenas	: <i>Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional</i> - National Socio-Economic Survey
SSN	: Social Safety Net
UNDP	: United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	: United Nations Children's Fund

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Towards a new consensus

This report puts people first. It argues that progress in human development is not just essential in itself but also lays the foundations for a stable and unified democracy, and promotes the transition towards a rules-based market economy that can permit sustained economic growth. In a country as large and diverse as Indonesia, however, this can only be achieved through extensive national and regional consultations – leading to a new consensus and a shared commitment to human development.

Until the onset of the financial crisis Indonesia had taken enormous strides in many aspects of human development. From 1975 to the second half of the 1990s the country's human development index (HDI) rose steadily, until the sudden dip in 1998. But the HDI tells only a part of the story. If it also reflected the extent of human rights and freedoms, the trajectory would look much less impressive, because for three decades the New Order regime had forced Indonesians to trade political freedom for economic progress.

The purpose of this National Human Development Report is to assess Indonesia's democratic and economic transitions – to demonstrate why the country is unlikely to make enduring economic progress, or consolidate its democracy, unless it can make a firm commitment to human development. A consensus among the regions on citizens' rights to human development can also act as a centrifugal force for national unity.

Achievements and challenges

Over the past three decades Indonesia has had laudable achievements in human development. These range from reductions in poverty and inequality to increases in life expectancy and literacy. Infant mortality, for example, declined substantially, following improvements in access to health care and sanitation. At the same time there have been considerable improvements in the status of women: male-female gaps have been narrowing at all levels of education, and women's earnings have been increasing as a proportion of earned family income. Meanwhile disparities between the provinces have also been shrinking.

The sudden and unexpected crisis of the late 1990s dealt a serious blow to Indonesia's journey to progress. For most people the immediate and sharpest impact of the crisis has been through inflation. Between 1997 and 1998 inflation surged from 6% to 78%, while real wages fell by around one-third. As a result there was a sharp increase in poverty. Between 1996 and 1999 the proportion of people living below the poverty line jumped from 18% to 24%. At the same time, poverty became more severe as the incomes of the poor as a whole fell further below the poverty line.

The crisis seems to have affected women and children more adversely. For many families where both men and women were working before the crisis, women were forced to work longer hours as men lost their jobs. Declines in income also reduced families' access to health care and other basic services. There is some evidence of increased domestic violence due to economic stress following the crisis.

The overall impact of the crisis was reflected in the deterioration of Indonesia's human development index (HDI) – largely the result of the drop in real incomes. Meanwhile, although the Human Poverty Index (HPI) remained stable, there were reductions in access to health services.

In the aftermath of the economic crisis, Indonesia faces serious challenges of human development. The long-term outlook for public services is poor. Because of the decision to bail out the banks the government is now deep in debt. Effectively the population as a whole has assumed a massive burden that will require them to pay higher taxes and have less effective public services.

In the short-term, the tight-budgetary situation poses a threat to social spending. Any cut in social spending will have serious long-term implications, especially since Indonesia has historically lagged behind her neighbours, and a large number of people remain vulnerable to poverty.

Consolidation of Indonesia's democracy

Indonesia has already experienced several forms of government, and different shades of democracy – the most recent change being the collapse of the autocratic New Order regime and the successful elections

of June 1999. Is this just another swing of the pendulum, to be followed soon by another swing backwards? Certainly there is no cause for complacency: The twentieth century saw dozens of democratic openings that were extinguished by coups and military takeovers. But the tide of history is in the other direction. Now that Indonesia has joined the democratic fold, the proportion of world population enjoying democratic government has risen to 63%.

However, Indonesian democracy still remains fragile. The political parties are weak and inexperienced. Several provinces are being torn apart by social conflict. Added to this is the country's ambitious schedule for decentralization that will make government an even more complex affair.

The political parties are weak because they are based not on distinctive principles or policies but on sectional interests and personalities. Different governing coalitions seem therefore to be alternative permutations of wise individuals. Party formation is also weak in the country at large, and there are few channels through which people can bring pressure to bear on the institutions of the state, especially the state bureaucracy.

In these circumstances, people vent their frustrations in other ways. In such a large and diverse country there is always the danger that conflicts over employment, or land, or other natural resources will cleave along ethnic or religious lines. When the New Order government disappeared, a new political landscape opened up, allowing many old disputes to resurface. This is having a deeply corrosive effect – undermining confidence in political institutions and damaging the prospects for continuing Indonesia's economic reforms.

It might be argued that the most practical option is for Indonesia to unite once more behind a single charismatic figure. But this could prove even more dangerous. Rather than ensuring national integrity a military-backed autocrat is more likely to provoke the kind of determined resistance that will sever national ties across the archipelago forever. And the economic implications are equally chilling. The international companies on which Indonesia's economy depends are now under intense consumer pressure on labour rights. If Indonesia's international human rights ratings take a dive, so too will its economy. Nowadays it is human development grounded in democracy that pays economic dividends.

Understanding Indonesia's transformation

Until the outbreak of the economic crisis in 1997, Indonesia was one of East Asia's miracle economies, combining high growth with an equitable distribution of income – first with the green revolution in rice in the

mid-1970s, then with a rapid expansion of labour-intensive industries in the mid-1980s, and later with the establishment of a manufacturing export base in the 1990s.

At the outset Indonesia had the advantage of a relatively equitable distribution of income. In the rural areas this was because land ownership had traditionally been fragmented. But urban areas were not much wealthier. Although nominal incomes were higher these were offset by high housing costs.

Moreover this income distribution was largely maintained. Even in the late 1980s when growth averaged over 8% annually, there was no serious increase in inequality. Meanwhile, standards of education and health had been rising, thanks in part to the government's efforts to protect the development budget even when its income fluctuated along with the price of oil. The government's food policy also helped reduce poverty and inequality – on the one hand establishing a floor price to support farmers, on the other hand stabilizing prices at a reasonable level for urban consumers. This combination of rapid economic growth and equitable distribution of income resulted in a steep reduction in income poverty – from over 40% in 1976 to 11% in 1996.

By the second half of the 1990s, however, there were already signs that the golden age of Indonesian economic growth was coming to a close. There were two main sets of issues: the first was the changing production environment; the second the changing macroeconomic environment.

A changing production environment

Indonesia's former structure of production could no longer be relied upon to produce steady growth. Neither agriculture nor industry could continue in the same fashion.

- *Stagnating agriculture* – One of the features of the earlier period was a steady increase in agricultural productivity. But land is now scarcer, and it will be difficult to drive rice yields up much further.
- *More capital-intensive production* – Many industries, including textiles, wood products and food are becoming steadily more capital intensive.
- *Slower export growth* – By the end of the 1980s the trading environment was becoming tougher, partly as a result of recessions in the importing countries, as well as fiercer competition from other low-wage economies.
- *Growth of the formal labour market* – The increase in formal employment has raised new issues of social protection. Without unemployment insurance, people who lose their jobs can also see their skills erode if they have to resort to work in the informal sector or agriculture.

A new macroeconomic environment

At the same time Indonesia was increasingly exposed to the demands and moods of the international money markets.

- *Savings and investment* – In the 1990s Indonesia's savings-to-GDP ratio reached an upper ceiling of around 29%. Further investment will probably have to come from foreign portfolio investment – with the attendant risks of volatility.
- *Exchange rate management* – The more Indonesia depends on foreign capital the more its exchange rate and its growth rates will fluctuate.
- *Monetary and fiscal policy* – Efforts to control inflation have concentrated on constraining public expenditure – with serious implications for human development. It might be better to accept a higher level of inflation which might hurt the poor less than cuts in public services.

Rebuilding the Indonesian miracle

If Indonesia is to rekindle both economic and human development, it will have to build a different economic structure. Thus far the government has resisted the temptation to try to insulate itself from global pressures and has shown a resolute determination to maintain open regimes. This is the only feasible option. If Indonesia is to progress economically it will have to engage in a third round of industrial diversification, stepping up the technology ladder to produce goods that embody higher levels of productivity. And most of this innovation will have to come from the stimulus of foreign investment and technology transfer.

With an open and more capital-intensive economy, however, Indonesia is almost certainly going to see a further increase in inequality. And if the current pattern of distribution of industrial activity remains the same – with most concentrated in Java – then there are likely to be greater disparities between different provinces and districts.

Rekindling Indonesia's economic miracle will mean achieving higher levels of productivity but also doing so within the kind of stable social and political environment on which productive enterprises rely. Fortunately both objectives can be achieved through the same basic policy – substantial and sustained investment in human development. Without a more highly qualified workforce, Indonesia will be unable to benefit even from the lower-level spin-off effects of higher technology production. And without delivering better standards of health and other social services, social unrest is likely to persist.

This will require much greater investment in education. Indonesia is spending only around 1.4% of GNP on

education, compared with a global average of 4.5%. Health should also be a priority. This is not just a question of providing better health services. Even some of the more basic needs like sanitation are not being met – compromising not just the health but also the nutritional standards of Indonesia's children. Another emerging issue is social protection, and in particular some form of unemployment insurance.

Indonesia now has to pursue human development, while deep in debt, restructuring its economy, and coping with a more competitive and unstable economic environment. The key, however, is to recognize how all these issues connect – the social, the economic and the political – and to bring this recognition to the forefront of public consciousness.

Putting people first: A compact for regional decentralization

Indonesia urgently needs to build a new social consensus. Already there has been a fundamental shift in values and perceptions – and an explosion in expectations: millions of people sense the possibility for a different kind of future both for themselves and for Indonesia in the world. In short they have become more aware of their rights – not just political rights but 'economic' rights – to food, say, or to health, or to work. When people emphasize their regional or ethnic identity they are not just demanding greater autonomy or political freedom, they are also saying that some of their most basic social and economic rights have yet to be fulfilled.

How can the Government of Indonesia possibly afford to fulfil such rights? Similar doubts have arisen in poor countries all over the world, where the promotion of economic rights has foundered on the hard question of who has a duty to fulfil them. But all rights do not have to be paired with corresponding duties. A better approach is to see the assertion of rights as the first step towards fulfilment and of building acceptance and support.

In future, more of these rights are going to have to be fulfilled at the district level. Indonesia has embarked on a radical programme of decentralization that has raised a host of difficult questions – particularly about the fiscal relationship between the centre and the regions – as well as the prospect of widening gaps if the better endowed districts can pull further ahead of the rest of the country.

How can Indonesia ensure that decentralization does indeed cement national cohesion and deepen national commitment to human development? One option is to establish a new social compact: an agreement that all Indonesians – as Indonesians – are entitled to nationally mandated standards of human development. With these

in place, regional cultural and ethnic diversity are not divisive elements but rather the building blocks of a strong and coherent nation.

Such a compact should be based on a clear mission statement that establishes the primacy of human development, while highlighting the importance of a productive partnership between central and regional governments.

The compact must also be based on a set of standards to which all districts should aspire. The best approach would be to adopt the international standards and norms that have been established as a result of a series of United Nations conferences held during the 1990s – on poverty, for example, education, gender disparities and health.

Indonesia has already incorporated many of these into its national plan documents. Now these goals could be regionalized and merged with other important universal goals – to achieve 100% literacy, for example, and 100% access to safe water. Another possibility is to include Indonesia's stated intention to have all children complete nine years of basic education.

Extrapolating from recent progress suggests that Indonesia as a whole could reach these targets within the

international target date of 2015. But when broken down by region the picture is less optimistic: in the case of poverty, for example, 18 provinces will miss the 2015 target date. This underlines the importance of drawing up a human development compact. If these are basic rights then they must be achieved by all Indonesians.

Democratic values and norms can only emerge from deep and extensive consultation, especially when vital decisions are scattered across more than three hundred districts of a vast archipelago. One way to trigger such deliberations would be to hold a 'National Social Summit' – to agree on national standards, the entitlements for each region, and the necessary plan of action.

In sum, Indonesia faces enormous and diverse challenges – consolidating democracy, addressing regional conflicts, and regenerating the economy. But a common thread runs through them all. They will only be achieved if they are based on common values and a new consensus – on a shared commitment to human development.

Human Development Challenges in a Democratic, Decentralized Indonesia

The outbreak of the economic crisis in late 1997 triggered a comprehensive economic reform programme in Indonesia. The elections of 1999 turned economic reform into a systemic overhaul. Three major challenges came to characterize the Indonesian transition: the consolidation of democratic governance, political and economic decentralization and the creation of a non-patrimonial, rules-based market economy. By undertaking all three, in a simultaneous and interwoven series of reform measures, Indonesia is launched on an endeavour as challenging as any attempted by countries emerging out of the tunnel of the cold war and authoritarian socialism in countries of the former Soviet Union. The National Human Development Report for Indonesia, therefore, focuses on the contribution of both the idea and practice of Human Development in each of the constituent elements of the Indonesian transition.

July 1999 saw the successful completion of free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia. Thus Indonesia entered, for the second time in less than fifty years, the ranks of those countries whose political systems make this century unique in human history. The “Democratic Century”¹ is now considered by many to be the most significant feature of our age, a somewhat surprising claim given the major technological and communication progress over the last quarter of the century. This assessment reflects not only an appreciation of just how truly remarkable the advent of democracy as a political system across a wide spectrum of countries is, but also a re-evaluation of the intrinsic worth of human rights and freedoms in the modern world².

A major tenet of the recent advent of democracy in many developing countries, the so called ‘third wave’³, is that democratic governance is not a luxury good suitable only for the richer industrialized nations of the world. It is a system with universal appeal and application. Amartya Sen captures this change in perception as follows:

In earlier times there were lengthy discussions on whether one country or another was yet ‘fit for

democracy’. That changed only recently, with the recognition that the question was itself wrong-headed: a country does not have to be judged fit for democracy, rather it has to become fit through democracy. This is a truly momentous change⁴.

The notion of a universally applicable political system has, as UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR) 2000 points out, a close affinity with the recognition of a universal structure of human rights.⁵ This acknowledgement is not only a theoretical or philosophical conjecture. It is now embodied in a series of international conventions and agreements ranging from Rights of the Child to those on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

This human rights approach to development has a close affinity to the ideal of human development enshrined in successive Human Development Reports since 1990. The implications are spelled out in HDR 2000 :

Rights also lend moral legitimacy and the principle of social justice to the objectives of human development. The rights perspective helps shift the priority to the most deprived and excluded, especially to deprivations because of discrimination. It also directs attention to the need for information and political voice for all people as a development issue – and to civil and political rights⁶ as integral parts of human development⁷.

The National Human Development Report for Indonesia builds on the now considerable literature on the contribution of human development to the consolidation of democracy and economic growth. It argues that in the current Indonesian context, human development represented by an irreducible core of universally available public goods (such as basic education, access to safe drinking water, access to basic health services and so forth) will directly strengthen the foundations of Indonesia’s new democracy⁸. This will create a secure base on which reform of economic institutions can be sustained. These in turn will lend certainty to property rights, create an impartial judicial system, and curb the private misuse of public resources – all essential ingredients in the alchemy of prolonged economic growth.

Attention to the promotion of human development in a democratic polity also sheds new light on the possible

design and course of decentralization. This approach is used here to establish both the feasibility and the desirability of a “social compact” for Indonesia by which every province and district is brought to a nationally agreed threshold of human development. The social compact therefore seeks to balance claims of equality of opportunity (typically made by Indonesia's richer provinces) with the universality of human rights and capabilities, and contributes to national cohesion⁹.

Overall, the National Human Development Report seeks to add to the new, emergent, development paradigm. This nascent consensus, while recognising the contribution of free markets to economic prosperity, emphasises the contribution of economic institutions, democratic governance and social capital in nurturing durable, free and competitive markets. Such a multidimensional approach to the successful solution to ‘*the Indonesian problematique*’ also spells a realisation that such deep and potentially socially divisive transitions require broad public participation and support over a considerable period of time¹⁰. Forensic investigations over the causes and remedies for one or other policy choices need to be filtered through the lens of public consent and interest¹¹ before they can be part of a democratic policy arsenal. This sentiment lies at the heart of the new development paradigm. That is the spirit that permeates this particular Human Development Report for Indonesia. It is a spirit that was spelled out by Mahbub ul Haq as early as 1992 as follows:

The central thesis of these reports is that it is people who matter – beyond the confusing maze of GNP numbers, beyond the curling smoke of industrial chimneys, beyond the endless fascination with budget deficits and balance of payments crises – it is people who matter.

In sum, we put a shared commitment to human development at the core of democratic consolidation, sustained economic prosperity and national unity in diversity.

Achievements in human development

Indonesians can derive confidence from past successes. Until the onset of the financial crisis Indonesia had taken enormous strides in many aspects of human development. Between 1960 and 1999 the infant mortality rate dropped from 159 to 45 per thousand live births, and the adult illiteracy rate fell from 61% to 12%. There had also been a dramatic boost in incomes – average per capita income more than quadrupled.

This progress is captured graphically in Indonesia's human development index (HDI) – a composite measure that reflects not just income, but also life expectancy and

Figure 1.1
Human Development Index (HDI), 1975-1999





Figure 1.2
Indonesia: human development indicators



educational attainment. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The longer time series in this figure is based on the data in the global human development report and shows an uninterrupted ascent from 1975 to the second half of the 1990s. The second line is calculated by Statistics Indonesia, *Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS)*; this uses different and more recent data and better captures the damage done by the economic crisis after 1997.

Figure 1.2 provides trends in some individual

components of the HDI, namely life expectancy at birth, adult illiteracy and infant mortality for an in-depth appreciation of the enhancement of human development. Life expectancy at birth increased from 41 years in 1960 to 66.2 years in 1999. Over the same period, both the infant mortality rate (the number of infants who die before reaching one year of age, per thousand live births) and the adult illiteracy rate (the proportion of people over the age of 15 who cannot read and write) declined dramatically from 159 to 48 and from 61% to 11.6%, respectively.

Poverty

Perhaps the most powerful indicator of Indonesia's achievement in human development is the degree of poverty reduction. The trend is shown in Figure 1.3. There has been some controversy about the calculation of the poverty line, notably about whether it adequately reflects non-food consumption. And in 1996 BPS changed the poverty line to take this into account. Recalculating the figure for 1996 increased the estimate of the proportion living in income poverty from 11% to 18%. Applying the

same criteria to previous years would have shifted the line up by a similar amount. Even applying this correction, however, the period 1970-96 clearly produced a steep decline in poverty. This is a commendable result, but there are some qualifications. The first is that in Indonesia many people are clustered just above the poverty line, so a marginal change in the poverty criteria would push even more people into poverty. The second that this outcome was probably more a by-product of economic growth than a deliberate strategy of poverty alleviation. The third is that, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the reduction in poverty was tapering off because growth was by then being concentrated in the more capital-intensive industries that absorbed fewer workers¹². Finally, these indicators do not measure the "severity" of poverty. Poverty is much severe for those who are at the very bottom end of the income/expenditure distribution and significantly below the poverty line. For example, 22.4 % of households in the lowest quintile of the expenditure distribution have children without basic education as opposed to the national figure of 12.5 %. Likewise the ratios of access of the

Box 1.1

What human rights add to human development

Assessments of human development, if combined with the human rights perspective, can indicate the duties of others in the society to enhance human development. For example, to assert a human right to free elementary education is to claim much more than that it would be a good thing for everyone to have an elementary education—or even that everyone should have an education. In asserting this right we are claiming that all are entitled to a free elementary education, and that, if some persons avoidably lack access to it, there must be some culpability somewhere in the social system.

This focus on locating accountability for failures within a social system can be a powerful tool in seeking remedy. It certainly broadens the outlook beyond the minimal claims of human development, and the analysis of human development can profit from it. The effect of a broader outlook is to focus on the actions, strategies and efforts that different duty bearers undertake to contribute to the fulfilment of specified human rights and to the advancement of the corresponding human development. It also leads to an analysis of the responsibilities of different actors and institutions where rights go unfulfilled.

If a girl is not schooled because her parents refuse to send her to school, then the responsibility for the failure—and the corresponding blame—can be placed on the parents. But if she cannot be sent to school because the government forbids her going there (as, regrettably, some governments have excluded girls), then the blame can come down not on the parents but on the government. The failure may be more complex when the girl cannot go to school for one, or some combination, of the following reasons:

- The parents cannot afford the school fees and other expenses.
- The school facilities are inadequate. For example, the school may be unable to guarantee that teachers will be regularly present, so that the parents think that it would be unsafe for the young girl to go there.
- The parents can afford the school expenses but at the cost of sacrificing something else that is also important (such as continuing the medical treatment of one of their other children).

The attribution or sharing of blame can be quite important here, and it is important to recognize how the effects of different inadequacies in a social system tend to aggravate one another. The willingness of parents to make sacrifices for their children's schooling will often be diminished when they have reason to doubt that this schooling will significantly benefit their children. The sacrifice of human development is much the same in all these cases, but the analysis of rights, duties and responsibilities must be quite different. In this respect, concern with duties enhances the ways of judging the nature and demands of progress. Since the process of human development often involves great struggle, the empowerment involved in the language of claims can be of great practical importance.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report, 2000


poorest section of the population to that of the richest to adequate water sources, adequate sanitation and electricity are 0.33, 0.18 and 0.71, respectively¹³.

The recent poverty assessment literature has increasingly focused its attention on techniques that try to delineate the non-income dimensions of poverty by drawing attention to such basic needs as access to safe water, education and health care. Thus, a broader measure of poverty is UNDP's human poverty index (HPI) which combines indicators on life expectancy, illiteracy, malnutrition, and access to safe water and health services. As annex 1.2 shows, the HPI fell from 27.6% in 1990 to 25.2% in 1995, and kept steady at this level until 1998. It should be noted that the HPI is not a 'headcount' index. This is because the underlying indicators do not correspond to the same groups of people: those who are illiterate are not necessarily those without access to safe water (for example, one could be an illiterate millionaire). Since the overlap between these different groups of people is unknown a composite HPI of 24.2% cannot be interpreted to mean that 24.2% of the population are living in human poverty. Nevertheless the HPI does offer a valuable indication of trends in human poverty over time. It also permits comparisons between countries, and between different provinces in the same country. Within Indonesia the HPI ranges from a high of 47.7% in the district of Jaya Wijaya in Irian Jaya, to a low of only 8.3% in North Jakarta.

Inequality


One of the hallmarks of East and Southeast Asian economic transformation was the reduction in inequality¹⁴. The conventional measure of inequality is the Gini

Figure 1.3
Trend in poverty, 1970-1999



coefficient, which varies from zero (absolute equality) to one (one person owns everything). In the case of Indonesia, the Gini coefficient declined from 0.35 in the early 1970s to 0.32 in the late 1980s (Figure 1.4). As in the rest of East and Southeast Asian economies, the Gini rose during the early 1990s¹⁵. However, it dropped again to 0.32 in 1998.

Figure 1.4
Trends in interpersonal inequality of expenditure 1975-1999




Note:
This shows the Gini coefficient calculated by BPS based on Susenas data, as quoted by Booth (2000) and Dhanani and Islam (2000)

Gender disparity

There has also been commendable progress in gender related issues. For example, between 1990 and 1999 the share of females in the labour force increased from 25% to over 37%. The labour force participation ratio of female to male rose from 0.4 in 1970 to 0.7 in 1997¹⁶. The female illiteracy rate declined from 69% in 1961 to 17% in 1994 (Figures 1.5a-b). The mean years of schooling for females also rose, from 4.7 years in 1990 to 6.1 years in 1999. The female enrolment ratio at the primary level reached 100% in 1980. Between 1980 and 1996, the gross enrolment ratio of females at the secondary and tertiary levels rose from 23% and 35% to 41% and 50%, respectively. In 1996, female students constituted 48%, 45% and 35% of the total students at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, respectively. The gender gap in education declined at all levels. The number of females per 100 male students rose from 85.9 in 1976 to 92.8 in 1996 at the primary, from 65.1 to 95.0 at the secondary and 56.7 to 88.2 at the tertiary levels¹⁷. The proportion of female teachers at the primary level rose from 33% in 1980 to 52% in 1996. The figure stood at 40% for the secondary and 30% for the tertiary level in 1996.

Figure 1.5.a
Percentage of illiterates by gender (total)




Source: BPS

The pre-crisis female labour force participation rate of around 40% in Indonesia stood out quite well compared with the average of 38% in middle-income countries (that include Indonesia), 33% in South Asia and 26% in the Middle East and North Africa. According to *SUSENAS* 1997 statistics, 39% of women in urban areas and 51% in rural areas were economically active. But only 0.3 % had managerial and administrative responsibilities, 4% did clerical and related work, 5% were professionals, 12% were factory workers and 23% worked as sales persons. In the early 1990s, women held roughly a third of the civil service positions including some at the very highest levels. Women's representation at the ministerial level was about 6% in 1999 which is comparable with Thailand and Singapore. However, Indonesia lags behind other countries in the region in female representation in the lower house of parliament (8% as opposed to 10%-11% in the Philippines and Malaysia).

Despite these achievements the status of women in the society still generally remains a matter of concern. As noted in a recent *BAPPENAS/UNICEF* study, there is a lack of political will to implement gender-sensitive issues¹⁸. The country's paternalistic culture still regards men as the primary decision-makers in the household, exercising authority over decisions in matters such as family planning,

Figure 1.5.b
Percentage of illiterates by gender (age 10-14)



Source: BPS

and pregnancy services which affect women. Domestic violence of one form or other is also an issue of concern. In a survey of husband-wife relations in 1997, about 11% of the 339 male respondents admitted having abused their wives; 19% admitted to psychological intimidation. The 362 female respondents reported on being beaten (16%), kicked (9%), spat on, or burned by a cigarette¹⁹. Child (less than 16 years of age) marriages are quite prevalent, and were as high as 16% in West Java according to the 1998 *SUSENAS*. Estimates of the maternal mortality rate range from 350 to 390 per 100,000 live births. Women also face high risks of maternal morbidity due to inadequate access to health facilities and poor maternal nutrition. Pregnant women also face discrimination at the workplace. The *BAPPENAS/UNICEF* study also notes that working women and girls face harassment and abuse, low wages and occupational health and safety risks. In 1997, only 18% of women received wages higher than Rp. 300,000 a month compared with 31% of men.

Inter-Provincial Disparity

Provincial level data show that the fruits of economic progress were more equitably shared among the regions. The regional disparities in most components of the HDI either declined or remained unchanged. For example, regional dispersions, measured by the co-efficient of variation, in life expectancy declined from 0.059 to 0.045 and that for the literacy rate dropped from 0.10 to 0.082 between 1990 and 1999. Regional dispersions in infant mortality and mean years of schooling remained mostly stable during 1990-99. District level dispersions in human development indicators also declined.

We also find that improvements in HDI rank correlate well with improvements in the gender-related development index (GDI) across the provinces²⁰. This implies that gains in regional human development have generally translated into gains in gender equality.

Decomposition of inequality shows that between districts (*Kabupaten/Kota*) inequality accounts for only 20% of total inequality. This implies a modest district level income disparity. If the incomes from oil and gas sectors are excluded, regional output inequality drops significantly. For example, the Gini ratio based on district-level (excluding 13 enclave districts) differences in non-oil, non-gas gross regional domestic product (GRDP) drops to 0.26 in 1998 as opposed to 0.41 when oil and gas incomes and the enclave districts are included²¹. This shows the sensitivity of output inequality to oil and gas incomes.

Human Development Indices

The first Human Development Report, in 1990, defined human development as the process of enabling people to have wider choices. Income is one of those choices, but it is not the sum total of human life. Health, education, a good physical environment and freedom of action and expression are just as important.

The 1990 Report also designed a new measure for socio-economic progress: the human development index (HDI). Since then three supplementary indices have been developed: the human poverty index (HPI), the gender-related development index (GDI) and the gender empowerment measure (GEM). The concept of human development, however, is much broader than the HDI and these supplementary indices. It is impossible to come up with a comprehensive measure - or even a comprehensive set of indicators - because many vital dimensions of human development, such as participation in the life of the community, are not readily quantified. While simple composite measures can draw attention to the issue quite effectively, these indices are not substitute for full treatment of the rich concerns of the human development perspective.

Human development index

The HDI measures the overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development - longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living. It is measured by life expectancy, education attainment and adjusted income per capita in purchasing power parity. The HDI is a summary, not a comprehensive measure of human development.

Human poverty index

While the HDI measures overall progress in a country in achieving human development, the HPI reflects the distribution of progress and measures the backlog of deprivations that still exists. The HPI measures deprivation in the same dimensions of basic human development as the HDI.

The HPI in developing countries focuses on deprivations in three dimensions: longevity, as measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40; knowledge as measured by the adult illiteracy rate; and overall economic provisioning, public and private, as measured by the percentage of people without access to safe water, people without access to health facilities, and the percentage of children under five who are underweight.

Gender-related development index

The GDI measures achievements in the same dimensions and uses the same indicators as the HDI, but captures inequalities in achievement between women and men. It is simply the HDI adjusted downward for gender inequality. The greater is the gender disparity in basic human development, the lower is a country's GDI compared with its HDI.

Gender empowerment measure

The GEM reveals whether women can take active part in economic and political life. It focuses on participation, measuring gender inequality in key areas of economic and political participation and decision-making. It tracks the percentages of women in parliament, among legislators, senior officials and managers and among professional and technical workers - and the gender disparity in earned income, reflecting economic independence. Differing from the GDI, it exposes inequality in opportunities in selected areas.

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2001

Impact of the Crisis

Despite variations in estimates by various researchers and BPS, they all indicate a rapid rise in the incidence of poverty during the crisis²². BPS estimates show that the incidence of poverty rose from 19% in February 1996 to 37% in September 1998 at the height of the crisis. The increase in poverty in the urban areas was more marked than in rural areas. However, there two aspects here - inflation-induced and recession-induced (loss of job) increases in poverty²³. Since the BPS measure of the poverty line is consumption-based, it is sensitive to the loss of purchasing power due to both inflation and recession. Once inflation was brought under control, the

incidence of poverty declined to 23% in February 1999. But the incidence of poverty is likely to remain high so long as people at the bottom end do not find employment on a durable basis.

The crisis also caused sharp increases in the severity of poverty. One estimate shows that between February 1996 and February 1999 the number of people falling below 65% of the poverty line increased by 73% and 63% in urban and rural areas respectively²⁴. More recent data show that the urban severity index dropped back to the pre-crisis level, although the rural severity index remained above the pre-crisis level.

Figure 1.6
Relationship between rank of HDI & GDI,
1990 and 1996




Table 1.1 shows how this translates into the actual number of people below the poverty line – and also the percentage increase for different population groups.

Table 1.1
Population below selected poverty lines,
1996-99

	February 1996	February 1999	Change	
	Millions	Millions	Millions	%
Below standard poverty line				
Urban	11.1	19.1	+8.0	+73%
Rural	26.6	36.7	+10.1	+38%
Total	37.7	55.8	+18.1	+48%
Below 80% of poverty line				
Urban	5.1	9.0	+3.9	+78%
Rural	12.8	17.4	+4.6	+36%
Total	17.9	26.3	+8.5	+47%
Below 65% of poverty line				
Urban	1.8	3.1	+1.3	+73%
Rural	3.8	6.3	+2.4	+63%
Total	5.6	9.4	+3.7	+66%

Source: Dhanani and Islam (2000)

This highlights first how the proportional increase in people below the poverty line was much greater in urban than rural areas. This table also looks at the very poorest – those living below 80% of the poverty line. The proportional increase of those below 80% was roughly similar to the total figure, but it seems that those below 65% in the rural areas were hit harder – with a 63% increase in their total numbers as opposed to a 38% over all increase in rural poor.

Estimates based on the *mini-Susenans* of December of 1998 of some robust measures of inequality such as the Gini ratio, the Theil index and the L-index show that inequality fell during the economic crisis. This finding is consistent with the trend observed during the past Latin American economic crises. However, more recent

evidence suggests that the findings of a decline in inequality during the crisis failed to distinguish between nominal inequality and changes in the distribution of income adjusted for the differential impact of inflation on poor and non-poor households²⁵. In any case, data for mid-1999 indicates that whatever decline there has been in inequality during the crisis, it has been reversed.


It is too early to offer an assessment of the long-term consequences of the crisis on such aspects as health and education as it takes time for these effects to surface. If the incidence of poverty remains high, its long-term effects on basic health and education will be quite adverse. Thus, while much of the gains in human development during the rapid growth phase remained by and large unaffected by the crisis, it cannot be guaranteed to remain so. (More on this in Chapter 4).

Challenges of Human Development

Indonesia's progress in human development has undoubtedly been very impressive. But that should not be a cause for complacency. A number of concerns need to be kept in mind in formulating policies for the future. First, there is still a vast group of near poor who remains vulnerable²⁶. Second, Indonesia's achievements should be placed in the regional context. Its achievements in literacy, health and access to media are still below other second-tier newly industrialising Southeast Asian countries.

Figure 1.7 shows the extent of underperformance of Indonesia in 1995. This underperformance is captured in the human development index (HDI) (see Figure 1.8).


Figure 1.7
Selected social indicators in 1995



Notes:
Education Expenditure % of govt. budget, for Indonesia 1998, news papers copies & radio receivers per 1000 inhabitants

Sources: ADB (2000) and UNESCO (1998)


Figure 1.8
Human Development Index of
selected ASEAN countries



Source: ADB (2000)

Starting from a lower base, Indonesia made faster improvements in HDI than Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, and there had been a converging trend until about late 1980s. But it has tapered off since 1990. Third, Indonesia consistently had underspent on education and health relative to regional norms (Figures 1.9 & 1.10). Finally, there is a lot to be done in improving the status of

Figure 1.9
Public expenditure on health 1996-98
(as % of GDP)




Note:
Data are for most recent year available

Source: UNDP (2000)

women in the society, as “the development of human resources must begin in the womb”.

As Indonesia struggles to move out of recession and aspires to become a knowledge-based economy in a new era of democratization and decentralization, human development must take centre stage. As outlined earlier, human development plays a critical role in the three challenges – democratization, rekindling the economic miracle and decentralization – that Indonesia faces today. However, the Indonesian government is saddled with a huge debt – a direct consequence of the economic crisis. Protecting social expenditure in the face of acute pressure to bring government debt to a sustainable level remains a serious challenge and requires much imaginative policy making. The challenge becomes much harder when the political climate remains uncertain, and public trust in political leaders and national institutions is dented by the legacy of widespread corruption and centralized control.

Figure 1.10
Public Expenditure on Education 1996-98
(as % of GNP)



Note:
Data are for most recent year available

Source: UNDP (2000)

Box 1.3

Women in Indonesia

The rights of women in Indonesia were enshrined in the 1945 Constitution which states that “all citizens have equal status before the law” (Article 27). Indonesia ratified the UN Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women (in 1990) and ILO Convention No. 100 pledging equal pay for equal work. In 1978, the guidelines of state policy for the first time included a chapter specifically addressing the role of women in national development, and created a junior ministry for women's affairs which became a full department in 1983. The marriage law of 1974, and enabling statutes adopted in 1975, provided for a minimum age at marriage, protected women from marriage against their will, and gave wives rights to divorce equal to those of husbands.

However, officially sponsored images of femininity during the New Order portrayed women as subordinate to men, within the family and the state. They tried to impose a homogenizing view of female social roles on the diversity of gender relations across the archipelago. This is very much reflected in the way Indonesian women are commemorated on the occasions of Mother's day and Kartini Day. They highlight women's differences and distinctiveness as mothers and wives rather than promote equality between men and women. There is also a bias in official documents and policies. For example, official surveys assume that household heads are men even when widows are actual heads. However, there were some changes in the official policy rhetoric in the early 1990s featuring a commitment to gender equality defined as “companions on the same level” (*Kemitrasejajaran*) or “harmonious gender partnership”.

Thus, the achievements of women in Indonesia cannot be regarded solely as deliberately policy driven, but are largely outcomes of overall economic growth. One must also note the negative impacts of economic transformation. One of them is sexualized images of femininity in the media. The increased participation of women in the labour force while it gave them economic freedom also entrenched gender inequality in the workplace. Prostitution may have represented for some women a preferred alternative or supplement to low paid jobs to meet rising expectations, but it also carried high risks of violence and disease.

Source: Robinson, K. (1999), 'Women: Difference versus Diversity', in D.K. Emmerson (ed.), *Indonesia Beyond Suharto*, New York & London: M.E. Sharpe.

Box 1.4

Impact of the Crisis on Women

The impact of the crisis on women cannot be discerned from the unemployment data. In fact, the open female unemployment rate declined. This perhaps is due to the fact that females work at the bottom of the wage scale and employers responded to the crisis by retrenching at the upper-end. This also implies that for many families where both husband and wife worked, after the crisis there was only one earning member. The increased burden on females for earnings can also be deduced from the increase in the female labour force participation rate from around 40% in 1995 to 55% in 1999. Between 1997 and 1998, the number of women having wages less than the poverty line doubled from 11% to 22%, and across Indonesia in 1998, women's real wages were a third lower than men's. Thus, the immediate impact of the crisis on females was long working hours and extra work to make ends meet. For example, according to a Jakarta-based foundation, Yayasan Kusuma Burana, the red-light districts absorbed 50 to 100 new comers every month in 1998.

The 1997 crisis in Indonesia may have worsened the problem of malnutrition among many women of reproductive age. An analysis of data from 30,000 households by Helen Keller International (HKI) and Diponegoro University showed that, a year after the onset of the crisis, the mean BMI (Body Mass Index) among women in rural Central Java had decreased from 21.5 to 21.0 kg/m². Consequently maternal malnutrition increased from 15% to 17.5%. A more recent post-crisis health and nutrition survey funded by the Social Safety Net (SSN) programme was conducted in East Java among 19,850 men and women. Data collection was done from December 1998 to January 1999. The findings indicated that 18.4% of the women suffered from chronic under-nutrition, as indicated by an average BMI of less than 18.5 kg/m².

Sources: BAPPENAS/UNICEF (2000), *Challenges for a New Generation: The Situation of Children and Women in Indonesia*, 2000, Part III. ESCAP (1999), *Social Impact of the Economic Crisis*, mimeo, obtained from PovertyNet website of the World Bank.

Annex 1.1
TRENDS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL, 1990 - 1999

Province	Life expectancy (years)			Infant mortality rate (per thousand live births)			Literacy rate (%)			Mean years of schooling			Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)			HDI		
	1990	1996	1999	1990	1996	1999	1990	1996	1999	1990	1996	1999	1990	1996	1999	1990	1996	1999
11. Aceh	66	66	68	46	37	39	85	90	93	5.7	7.0	7.2	511	576	563	62	69	65
12. North Sumatra	66	66	67	46	37	41	91	95	96	6.2	7.5	8.0	559	577	569	67	71	67
13. West Sumatra	61	64	66	64	51	48	90	92	95	6.0	6.9	7.4	572	587	577	66	69	66
14. Riau	66	67	68	43	33	38	89	93	96	5.6	6.9	7.3	563	579	580	67	71	67
15. Jambi	64	66	67	51	39	43	88	92	94	5.4	6.5	6.8	566	580	574	66	69	65
16. South Sumatra	65	64	66	48	34	48	89	90	93	5.4	6.1	6.6	548	581	564	65	68	64
17. Bengkulu	64	64	65	52	36	49	87	92	93	5.6	6.6	7.0	565	581	577	66	68	65
18. Lampung	66	65	66	46	34	46	88	90	92	5.0	5.9	6.4	511	577	567	62	68	63
31. Jakarta	71	70	71	26	20	24	96	97	98	7.9	9.5	9.7	573	592	593	74	76	73
32. West Java	62	63	64	64	47	53	85	90	92	5.3	6.4	6.8	565	592	584	64	68	65
33. Central Java	67	65	68	40	29	36	78	81	85	4.8	5.5	6.0	566	595	584	65	67	65
34. Yogyakarta	72	70	71	22	17	25	77	80	85	6.0	6.9	7.9	571	612	598	69	72	69
35. East Java	62	64	66	61	52	48	74	78	81	4.7	5.5	5.9	568	594	579	61	66	62
51. Bali	67	68	70	40	30	31	73	79	83	5.3	6.3	6.8	568	609	588	64	70	66
52. West Nusatenggara	54	55	58	101	75	81	64	68	73	4.1	4.6	5.2	548	580	566	52	57	54
53. East Nusatenggara	61	62	64	64	51	56	75	79	81	4.4	5.2	5.7	417	544	577	49	61	60
61. West Kalimantan	62	63	64	61	50	54	74	80	83	4.2	5.2	5.6	482	571	571	54	64	61
62. Central Kalimantan	67	68	69	39	30	32	90	94	95	5.6	6.6	7.1	507	579	565	64	71	67
63. South Kalimantan	60	60	61	72	55	67	88	90	93	5.4	6.1	6.6	562	587	577	63	66	62
64. East Kalimantan	65	68	69	47	38	33	88	90	94	6.1	7.2	7.8	557	586	578	66	71	68
71. North Sulawesi	67	67	68	40	31	37	95	97	97	6.2	7.3	7.6	575	582	578	70	72	67
72. Central Sulawesi	60	61	63	72	57	60	88	90	93	5.6	6.6	7.0	551	581	569	62	66	63
73. South Sulawesi	65	65	68	49	35	36	75	80	83	5.0	6.1	6.5	563	581	571	63	66	64
74. Southeast Sulawesi	65	64	65	48	34	50	79	86	87	5.2	6.6	6.8	473	569	572	57	66	63
81. Maluku	63	63	67	58	47	40	91	93	96	5.9	7.1	7.6	540	574	577	64	68	67
82. Irian Jaya	63	63	65	58	51	52	65	67	71	4.4	5.0	5.6	446	567	580	50	60	59
Indonesia	63	66	66	56	44	45	82	86	88	5.3	6.3	6.7	555	587	579	63	68	64

Note:

- The Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figures, weighted by population.
- The number before each province is the official area code.

Source: BPS - Statistics Indonesia, special tabulation

Annex 1.2
MONITORING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN POVERTY INDICATORS, 1990 - 1999

Indicators	National Level			Provincial Variation ^{a)}			Rank Correlation		
	1990	1996	1999	1990	1996	1999	1990&96	1996&99	1990&99
Human Development Index	63.4	67.7	64.3	5.9 9.3%	4.1 6.0%	3.6 5.6%	0.87	0.92	0.85
Life Expectancy (year)	63.2	66.4	66.2	3.7 5.9%	3.2 4.9%	3.0 4.5%	0.89	0.94	0.88
Infant Mortality Rate	56.0	44.0	44.9	15.9 28.3%	12.6 28.7%	12.8 28.5%	0.94	0.81	0.88
Literacy Rate (%)	81.5	85.5	88.4	8.7 10.7%	8.1 9.5%	7.3 8.2%	0.95	0.97	0.96
Mean Years of Schooling	5.3	6.3	6.7	0.8 14.9%	1.0 15.6%	0.9 14.1%	0.95	0.98	0.96
Purchasing Power Parity (Thousand Rupiah)	555.4	587.4	578.8	42.8 7.7%	13.2 2.2%	8.7 1.5%	0.85	0.54	0.58
Human Poverty Index^{b)}	27.6	25.2	25.2	5.5 19.8%	4.6 19.3%	5.1 20.2%	0.87	0.95	0.88
People not Expected to Survive to Age 40 (%)	15.2	18.3	15.2	4.3 28.6%	3.7 30.0%	5.0 33.2%	0.91	0.82	0.84
Adult Illiteracy rate (%) ^{b)}	18.5	14.4	11.6	8.7 47.1%	7.8 53.7%	7.3 63.3%	0.95	0.97	0.96
Population without Access to Safe Water (%) ^{b)}	54.7	53.1	51.9	10.3 18.9%	11.7 22.2%	10.8 20.9%	0.70	0.91	0.79
Population without Access to Health Services (%) ^{b)}	14.0	10.6	21.6	10.2 72.5%	8.6 81.5%	9.7 45.1%	0.86	0.57	0.73
Under-nourished Children Under the Age of Five (%) ^{b)}	44.5	35.4	30.0	8.0 18.0%	7.2 19.9%	5.6 18.5%	0.61	0.54	0.46

Note:

^{a)} Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation (in percentage);

^{b)} The 1996 and 1999 data referred to 1995 and 1998 data

Source: Calculated from BPS data

Consolidating Indonesia's democracy

Indonesia is going through a dramatic period of flux and uncertainty. But this is also a time of tremendous opportunity – a chance for Indonesians to rebuild their economy and society. Achieving this with a shared commitment to human development will build new forms of national consensus and consolidate a vital democracy.

Indonesia over the past four years has been the setting for a ceaseless drama – sometimes shocking, sometimes heartening, often surprising. The twists and turns in this story are being watched closely around the globe. What happens over the next few years in the world's third largest democracy matters not just to its 200 million people but to its immediate neighbours, and to people all over the world who are anxiously following events.

In some respects the news agenda, both national and international, is predictable – relaying those events guaranteed to seize the attention: threats of secession, eruptions of inter-ethnic violence, fresh attacks on the currency, continuing struggles for political ascendancy. These are certainly central parts of the drama, but they are not all of it.

Far from the political spotlight, away from the parliament, and the ethnic and religious confrontations, millions of people are also simply struggling to survive – to find work and make a decent living, to keep their children clothed and fed, to achieve some kind of economic security in desperately difficult times.

None of these events take place in isolation, all are enmeshed and interlocked – the political, the military, the economic, the social – each reverberates through all the others. Political uncertainty undermines confidence in the economy. Poverty provokes struggles over land and other resources that emerge as ethnic or religious clashes. A legacy of centralized control along with widespread corruption has eroded faith in political leaders and national institutions. In many ways and in many places Indonesia's national consensus is steadily ebbing away.

All of this is putting hard-won human development gains at risk. Human development in its fullest sense does not simply refer to better standards of health, say, or

education. The standard definition of human development is that it is a 'process of enlarging people's choices'. This certainly means expanding their capabilities to lead a long and healthy life, to grow in knowledge and understanding, and to be able to achieve a decent standard of living. But human development goes much further. People have multiple needs and aspirations. They want to live in a secure environment and they want to be able to exercise their human right to participate freely and actively in the decisions that affect their lives. The current cascade of crises impinge on all these choices, threatening to narrow many of these possibilities.

That is one perspective. But there is another. Just as a crisis in one area impacts on all the others, so achievement in one area is transmitted to many others through a series of positive knock-on effects. Each small victory triggers a sequence of successes. Indonesia's democratic opening, for example, has opened public debate, and stimulated the production of a plethora of new media. This in turn has raised new questions of public ethics and standards. Corruption may still be extensive but it is far less acceptable – and no longer considered inevitable.

It could be argued too that the economic crisis itself provoked many positive responses – not least the determination to build a safety net, including effective food and education programmes, that enabled people to weather the initial onslaught – along with Indonesians own spirit of mutual self-help, *gotong-royong*, that allowed millions of households under pressure to rely on the support of family and community.

Human development is driven by positive effects at every level – national, institutional, personal. Some four million children are born each year in Indonesia. Of all those children that survive, well fed, with the security of a supportive family and the stimulus of a full education – every one is a fresh source of confidence and optimism.

As elaborated in the previous chapter, Indonesia made commendable progress in human development, measured by standard indicators, such as the HDI. But the HDI tells only a part of the story, as with most indices it can measure only what can readily be quantified. So it can measure the span of human life and the extent of human knowledge.

Crucially, however, it does not reflect the extent of human rights and freedoms. Were it to do so the human development trajectory would look much less impressive – for over the same two decades Indonesian's democratic choices were far more confined.

Trading freedom for progress

The New Order regime forced Indonesians to trade political freedom for economic progress – and managed to do so over a period of thirty years. But this eventually had to come to an end. Over the same period Indonesia had steadily been going through a whole range of economic and social transformations that were destabilizing the autocratic model. It was no coincidence that crony capitalism and dictatorial rule foundered in quick succession, since one propped up the other²⁷.

Even so, many people have yet to shake off the old assumptions, believing that the current period of political and social unrest shows that Indonesia is not yet ready for full democracy – that the threat of political chaos or national disintegration yet again demands a firm and autocratic response.

That is yesterday's solution. Times have changed, not just nationally but also internationally. The new generation of Indonesians have higher aspirations. They are better educated, better informed, and more sceptical of simplistic promises. Meanwhile the outside world too is far less tolerant of dictatorships. The cold war is receding into history, and the rich countries see no advantage in supporting autocratic regimes. Indeed in an era when human rights are asserted universally, the performance of not just governments but also corporations are coming under far closer scrutiny. At the beginning of the 21st century respect for human rights and democracy is not just essential in itself it also pays economic dividends.

Can Indonesia display democratic credentials? Like other countries engaged in similar transitions, Indonesia is discovering that democracy cannot be put on like a new suit of clothes. Participatory democracy involves a complex package of ideals, institutions, skills, and practices that have to suffuse the body politic. And they must constantly evolve to meet ever changing circumstances.


The same is true of the economy. A flourishing modern economy does not suddenly emerge phoenix-like from the rubble of collapsing banks and failing conglomerates. Indonesia's business leaders are largely the same people who occupied the board rooms last year and the year before. The lawyers and judges are mostly those who presided over a legal system that the previous regime had thoroughly corrupted. Achieving a clean 'rules-based' economy demands far more than publishing new sets of

regulations, it requires a painstaking and thorough effort to transform the ethos and culture that previously led Indonesia down such a slippery slope.

The road to democracy

Indonesia is certainly not starting from scratch. In its first half century as a republic the country experienced several forms of government and different shades of democracy. First a brief and unstable parliamentary era from 1945 to 1957. Then a period of 'guided democracy' under Soekarno from 1957 to 1967. Then the autocratic New Order regime from 1967 to 1998. And now a fresh democratic opening invigorated by the remarkably successful elections of June 1999.

Figure 2.1
Urbanization and literacy, 1930 - 2000



Note:
Data for 1950 are estimates
Source: BPS

All of these periods have left their marks – some positive, some negative – that continue to condition political life today. Indonesia's parliamentary system dates back to 1950. Initially, however, the seats were filled by appointment, and the first elections were not held until five years later. The 1955 elections were carefully prepared. Over the previous two years the government had developed the laws and carried out an extensive radio information campaign to inform people of their rights and duties as voters²⁸. This was an ambitious undertaking since at that point the population, although only half what it is now, was living largely in the rural areas and the literacy rate was only around 30% (Figure 2.1).

Nevertheless the parties worked hard to gather popular support and the elections were duly held in September 1955. A remarkable 91% of the electorate turned out to

vote. But they did not give a majority to any single party. Instead four parties emerged dominant – a result strikingly parallel to that in the 1999 election (Table 2.1). At the same time voters had also chosen the members of a Constituent Assembly who were charged with producing a new Constitution.

Though the voters had played their part, the politicians were less successful. The first governments were driven by factionalism and involved a series of unstable coalitions. Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly failed to convene until November 1956 – and dissolved three years later without having drafted a Constitution. At this point the electorate were in no position to exert much pressure on the politicians. Under the Dutch, and later under the Japanese, Indonesia had acquired much of the ethos of an authoritarian paternalistic state. Largely illiterate, and scattered over a vast archipelago the mass of the population had no effective means of demanding accountability²⁹. Gradually and inexorably Indonesia's first democracy started to fall apart.

The first president, Soekarno, proposed an alternative, a 'guided' democracy based not on confrontational liberal democracy but on traditional Indonesian principles of extensive consultation and consensus, in which the government would be advised by a national council of 'functional groups', representing, for example, the youth, workers, peasants, and religious groups³⁰. In 1957,

Soekarno, dissatisfied with the performance of the political parties and also with his own limited opportunities within this system brought the brief period of parliamentary democracy to a close when he declared martial law. In 1959 he decreed that Indonesia would henceforth have a presidential system. Soekarno's regime was popular but marked by economic chaos and regional strife, and in March 1967, the army forced the parliament to appoint the army commander as president.

The new president set aside any calls for democracy and established his New Order regime. Backed by the army, this was a highly centralized 'developmentalist' administration, which soon stabilized the economy and helped stimulate economic growth. But based as it was on the power of patronage, it also provided fertile ground for corruption, collusion and nepotism. Politics, business, and governance became so thoroughly intertwined that they choked off most routes for accountability, causing formal legal, political, and commercial disciplines to wither and decay. So when the economic shock came in 1997, the whole edifice buckled. Following the May 1998 riots, within two months of being re-elected for a sixth five-year term, the president had resigned.

Indonesia had many previous economic crises. The New Order regime itself had faced a number of challenges as a result of sudden falls in international oil prices. But this was of a different order of magnitude, more akin to the situation in 1965 that had provoked the downfall of

Table 2.1
Elections in Indonesian history

Parties	First parliament	New Order*		Reformasi**
	1955	1971	1977-97 5 elections	1999
Total number	130	10	3	148
Contesting election	118	10	3	48
With seats	28	10	3	21
	75% of votes and 77% of seats held by 4 largest parties	63% of votes for Golkar	62%-73% of votes for Golkar	79% of votes and 76% of seats held by 4 largest parties

1955				1999			
Party	% Vote	Seats	% Seats	Party	% Vote	Seats	% Seats
PNI	22%	57	22%	PDI-P	34%	153	31%
Masyumi	22%	57	22%	Golkar	22%	120	24%
NU	12%	45	18%	PKB	13%	51	10%
PKI	17%	39	15%	PPP	11%	58	12%
Others	24%	58	23%	Others	21%	80	16%
				[Military]	-	38	7%
Total	100%	257	100%	Total	100%	500	100%

Note:

* Total number of seats in the parliament were 460 up to 1982 election. After the 1987 election, this rose to 500 seats. 100 seats were allocated to military and police.

** 38 seats are still allocated to military and police.

Source: Source: Feith (1999), Haris et. al. (1998), Zed, Utama and Chaniago (1998) and UNSFIR database

his predecessor – another period of currency collapse and surging inflation. This time, however, the political outcome was the reverse, not the stifling of democracy but its rebirth.

Is this just an arbitrary swing of the pendulum from right to left, to be followed soon by a mighty swing backwards? Certainly there is no cause for complacency. The democratic history of the twentieth century was scarred by dozens of coups and military takeovers. According to one study, between 1900 and 1985 non-democratic regimes replaced democratic ones 52 times – among them a number in southeast Asia, including Indonesia in 1967, as well as the Philippines, Thailand and The Republic of Korea³¹.

The democratic tide

But the tide of history is clearly towards freedom and democracy. This is evident from Figure 2.2, which shows the proportion of countries, along with their share of world population, that are elected by universal suffrage. There is no column for 1900 because the figure in both cases was zero.


The democratic transitions began for developing countries after the Second World War, with Indonesia among the first. Then during the 1960s and 1970s the process accelerated as dozens of countries in Asia and Africa gained their independence. In many cases, these democracies foundered within a few years. But towards the close of the century, especially with the end of the cold war, democracies once again started to flower and to flourish. Indonesia is now one of 120 democratic countries, and its large population has helped boost the proportion of world population enjoying democratic government to 63%³².

For Southeast Asia the final decades of the twentieth century were also a period of spectacular economic and social transformation. In less than a human lifespan most countries of the region had transformed themselves from poor agrarian societies to newly industrialized economies – a speed of development unrivalled in human history.

What part did democracy play in all this? Apparently very little. For most of the period of rapid expansion these countries had autocratic governments. Indeed their leaders argued that this had been one of the keys to their success: freed from the pressures of democracy, and the need to respond to fickle voters, they could single-mindedly promote industrial modernization. Rather than cultivating their electorates therefore they developed a closer working relationship with the business community which, in return for favourable treatment by the government, duly delivered rapid economic growth.

The styles of government in East and Southeast Asia

Figure 2.2
Global picture of democratic governments elected by universal suffrage



Source: Freedom House (1999)

may have been similarly autocratic, but there were considerable variations in efficiency. Singapore and Taiwan (China), for example, had relatively strong states that managed to insulate themselves from distributional pressures and were sufficiently well organized to pursue coherent and effective policies³³. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, and particularly in Indonesia, the states were far weaker, and often suffered from incompetence and corruption³⁴.

Yet weak and strong state alike achieved rapid growth. How? This was probably because they were at a stage in social and economic development that was well suited to autocracy. At the early stages of industrialization, coordination is simpler – the pool of skilled technocrats and sophisticated entrepreneurs is so small that they inevitably get to know each other well. This offers considerable advantages in countries where the legal systems are nascent and where property rights are difficult to enforce. Instead, personal relationships among a relatively small group can be used to bypass formal channels while still ensuring a degree of trust. These close relationships enable financial institutions to assess potential borrowers' ability to service and repay loans. Where banks do make mistakes they can always quietly use more profitable loans make cross-subsidies³⁵. In any case, the decisions that governments and entrepreneurs have to make are more clear-cut at this stage since the opportunities for profitable investment are quite high while investment funds are limited³⁶.

But this system eventually becomes more impractical. As the economy develops and the number of entrepreneurs and technocrats expands – along with the pool of investible funds – the scale of commercial activity overburdens the patrimonial system which starts to crumple under the weight. In a larger and more complex economy, robust and sustainable business activity has to be based less on

personal relationships and more on clear and enforceable regulations, with property rights and contractual agreements ultimately guaranteed by the force of law. At this point the government has to stand further back – rather than itself choosing investment priorities or directing commercial activities it must instead concentrate on creating a stable macro-economic and regulatory environment.

This kind of transition is essential for the construction of a modern market economy and the longer it is delayed, the greater the danger that the economy will degenerate further into the opaque and sterile morass of crony capitalism. The New Order regime in Indonesia was in the end a victim of its own success. The intricate cross-linked structure it had painstakingly assembled was strong enough to survive while the going was good, but it was built on a narrow basis with few external checks and balances and when the economy was shaken by a massive crisis the whole edifice toppled over.

Democracy under strain

Nowadays most people acknowledge the importance of having a cleaner and more open system in which

everyone plays by the same rules. But there are still serious doubts that Indonesia is yet up to the task of administering such a system. This is understandable. Indonesia's democracy is still in a fragile condition. The political parties are weak and inexperienced. Several provinces are being torn apart by social conflict. And on top of this there is the likely upheaval entailed in the country's ambitious schedule for decentralization which will devolve many important functions to more than 340 districts.

All of these factors tend to aggravate an already difficult situation, making it hard to build the kind of resilient social consensus on which democracies ultimately depend. This is a disturbing scenario and is worryingly similar to the situation in the mid-1950s when Indonesia's previous democracy was extinguished.

Weak political parties

Many of Indonesia's current problems stem from the character of its political parties. The essential building blocks of representative democracy are freely constituted political parties that can organize people who share a common interest or purpose. Well organized and well disciplined parties produce strong governments that have

Box 2.1

Democratic transitions in Southeast Asia

The governments of East and Southeast Asia have had many similarities. They all embarked on their processes of industrialization with autocratic regimes, and gradually became more democratic. However there have also been striking differences between them—notably in the effectiveness of their governments. At the risk of simplification, this can be represented in the choice matrix below. Taiwan (China), and the Republic of Korea started in section G and moved to section I. Malaysia and Singapore remained in E and H, respectively. Thailand and the Philippines started in section A and have moved to F. Indonesia following the economic crisis moved from A to C. Clearly the most desirable destination is section I, but there is no guarantee that a country will reach this, and there is always the risk of a reverse movement.

	Non-democratic	Fairly-democratic	Democratic
Weak governance	A	B	C Indonesia
Stronger governance	D	E Malaysia	F Thailand Philippines
Strong governance	G	H Singapore	I Taiwan (China) Rep. Korea

a clear sense of direction. In parallel, well organized opposition parties serve as a line of defence against totalitarianism.

Indonesia is still some way from achieving this. For most of the New Order period, only three political parties were allowed to operate: the government party, *Golkar*, and two others that had been formed under government supervision. The government exerted strict control over these political parties and their selection of candidates, so there was never any question that *Golkar* would retain power, and that its elected representatives would re-elect the president.

When these restrictions were removed after 1998 the number of parties mushroomed – to 158. Of these, 48 were allowed to contest the election but almost 80% of the votes for the legislative assembly, the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR) were cast for the four main parties – the PDIP, *Golkar*, PKB and PPP, who between them received 382 of the seats. Another 44 went to 14 other parties, and the remaining 38 were allocated to the military and the police. This pattern of vote distribution was remarkably similar to that in the 1955 elections.

A relatively small number of parties holding most of the seats should in theory make for strong government. The problem is that these parties have been based not on distinctive principles or policies but around sectional interests and personalities. During the campaign they all took fairly populist positions, promising to attack corruption and to engage in general programmes of reform. But they had little specific to say about the economy, or human rights, or the risks of secession.

This makes government a more unstable and more unpredictable business. Rather than building a programme based on compromises between clearly delineated competing interests, it tends instead to make proposals that reflect the views of a small number of influential figures. Governing coalitions therefore seem but alternative permutations of wise individuals, and cabinet changes do not signal changes in policy but merely reshuffles in personnel.

This tends to diminish the role of government itself. Rather than using the power of the state to establish the primacy of public interest over sectional demands, government is reduced to management of bureaucracy.

If party formation is weak at the centre it is even weaker in the country at large. The New Order government had decreed that there could be no political activity below the district level, except by *Golkar*. And even today most of the parties have little or no local organization, or any clear mechanism through which individual members can influence policy. As a result there are few channels through which people can transmit their views to members of

parliament or bring pressure to bear on the institutions of the state, especially the state bureaucracy.

The escalation of social conflict

In the absence of effective democratic channels of representation, many people express their frustrations in other ways. Indonesia is a vast and diverse country with more than 300 ethnic groups. And although more than 87% of the population are Muslim, there are also significant numbers of Christians, Buddhists and Hindus. Under these circumstances there is always the danger that conflicts over employment, or land, or other natural resources will cleave along ethnic or religious lines. The New Order government was alert to these dangers and was determined to enforce stability. To achieve this it stationed the army in territorial units across the country ready to intervene as required – and they often did so with considerable ferocity.

The disappearance of the New Order government opened up a new political landscape. The strong central figure had departed the scene and the military no longer seemed so invincible. This allowed many old disputes to resurface, and some new ones to appear. Newspaper headlines report with depressing detail the violence in Aceh, Maluku, Kalimantan and in many other parts of the archipelago.

Although there is no doubt that the scale of violence has increased, it has been very difficult to monitor the trend in a systematic way – or to compare the current situation with that prevailing under the New Order period or before. One attempt to do this is shown in Table 2.2 which classifies the forms and extent of violence during the three different eras of Indonesia's recent history.


Table 2.2
Social violence, 1945-1999

	1945-1965		1965-1998		1998-1999	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1. Inter community	30	46	72	46	97	74
2. Community against state	0	0	35	22	22	17
3. State against community	0	0	34	22	6	5
4. State against state	27	42	1	1	0	0
5. Mixed	8	12	16	10	6	5
Total	65	100	158	100	131	100

1. Conflict or violence between community groups between ethnic groups, for example, or indigenous groups versus migrants.
2. Violence by communities against state institutions, including the police, the parliament or the courts.
3. Violence by the state against the community by the police, army or other institutions.
4. Conflicts between the centre and the regions, including regional rebellions or separatism.

Source: Djajadi (2000).

Figure 2.3
Democracy and income



Source: Freedom House (1999) and UNDP (2000)

Such a table will inevitably reflect not just a change in the extent of violence but also more thorough reporting, either through the media or through other organizations of civil society that are better able to record and document these events. Nevertheless it does indicate a clear change in the pattern and particularly a surge in violence between communities. Each of these events has its own distinctive cause making it difficult to generalize on the overall situation. But the current scale of inter-community violence may well have been amplified by the expansion of the overall population and particularly by the growth of more articulate and demanding urban communities.

The demise of social consensus

The last three years have seen a steady unravelling of Indonesia's social consensus. During the New Order period social consensus was achieved by a combination of patronage, fiat, and military force. In the democratic era some of those elements remain. But they are much weaker and have yet to be supplemented with strong institutions of a democratic society.

This is having a deeply corrosive effect. Many people are losing confidence in political institutions. They appreciate the freedoms that democracy brings, but they are in danger of losing sight of these advantages. Faced with the immediate pressures to earn a living, and to try to ensure minimum standards of health and security, they see no urgent need to bolster democracy.

The demise of consensus also undermines the prospects of continuing Indonesia's economic reforms. The economic and political crises have brought to the surface many latent distributional conflicts. Not only have they

raised tensions between the regions and the centre, they have also divided the investor community into competing sections – debtors and creditors, large and small, domestic and foreign.


Similar weaknesses were evident back in 1955. At that point they contributed to a failure to consolidate democracy. Is Indonesia doomed to repeat its history, to open the door to democracy only to reluctantly close it again? Some would argue that this is now inevitable – that the experience of the past three years demonstrates only too clearly that Indonesia has neither the financial nor human resources for a fully functioning democracy.

Is democracy a luxury?

Is democracy a luxury that only the rich can afford? Certainly the richest countries are all democracies. But they are not alone. Democracy is not a prerogative solely of the wealthy. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3 which plots the positions of the 174 countries for which data are available along the axes of democracy and income. The democracy index is that established by the American NGO Freedom House. Although any such index will always be contested, according to the weight it gives to different symptoms of democracy, and the scores it accords to individual countries, this index does offer a useful overall picture³⁷.

Figure 2.3 confirms that the vast majority of high-income countries are democracies. But it also shows that the low-income countries – those with a per capita GDPs under \$PPP 10,000 – are scattered all along the democracy spectrum. Democracy seems to be possible at any level of income – and Indonesia, with a per capita GDP in 1998 of \$PPP 2,360, is positioned around half way.

Figure 2.4
Democracy and the human development index



Source : Freedom House (1999) and UNDP (2000)

Principles of good governance in Indonesia

Casting a vote is only one step towards the creation of a resilient democracy. People must continue to have a strong and influential voice in the decisions that affect their lives. National and local administrations must, therefore, govern in a fair and open fashion and ensure continuous participation from the population as a whole. In May 2001, officials from central and local government attended a seminar to consider the elements of good urban governance in Indonesia - though most of their conclusions apply at all levels of government. They recommended the following set of principles:

1. Participation

To encourage all citizens to exercise their right to express their opinion in decision-making processes, directly or indirectly.

2. Law enforcement

To assure that law enforcement and legal security are fair and impartial (non-discriminating) and support human rights by taking account of the values prevalent in society.

3. Transparency

To build a mutual trust between the government and the public, the government administrators must provide adequate information to the public and easy access to accurate information when needed.

4. Responsiveness

To increase the responsiveness of government administrators to complaints, problems and aspirations of the people, without exception.

5. Equity

To provide equal opportunities for all citizens, without exception, to increase their welfare.

6. Strategic vision

To formulate an urban strategy, supported by an adequate budgeting system, so that city residents have a feeling of ownership and a sense of responsibility for the future progress of their city.

7. Effectiveness and efficiency

To provide services meeting the needs of the general public by utilizing all resources optimally and wisely.

8. Professionalism

To increase the capacity, skills and morals of the government administrators, so that they will have the empathy to provide accessible, fast, accurate and affordable service.

9. Accountability

To enhance public accountability of decision-makers in government, the private sector and community organizations in all areas (political, fiscal, budgetary).

10. Supervision

To enforce stricter control and supervision over public administration and development activities by involving the public as well as community organizations.

What about the other question? Does Indonesia have the human resources to consolidate and build a democratic system? One way of assessing this would be to plot the democracy index against the human development index. Although the concept of human development itself incorporates the ideas of freedom and choice, the HDI does not incorporate any measure of political freedom, being limited to measures of income, health and knowledge. How is Indonesia placed here? As Figure 2.4 illustrates, there is an interesting correlation between democracy and the human development index: as the HDI rises so more countries are democracies (a correlation coefficient of 0.6). In this case Indonesia is again towards the middle

of the pack. From this chart one could conclude that Indonesia is already moving in the right direction and is well placed to make progress in the future.

Figure 2.4 does not, however, indicate cause and effect. Does democracy lead to higher standards of human welfare, or does having a healthier, wealthier, and better nourished population enable people to participate more effectively and build a more resilient democracy? Most likely, the causality works both ways – democracy and human welfare go hand in hand, each reinforcing and stimulating the other to produce higher levels of overall human development.

The democratic dividend

Indonesia's elections of 1999 were a remarkable achievement. The country has reached a watershed. But as with any watershed, the river can flow in one of several directions – backwards towards the discipline of autocracy or down the opposite slope towards a more thoroughly grounded democracy. In the long-term Indonesia will be a fully democratic country. The only question is: when? The wrong choices now could set back both democracy and human development in Indonesia for a generation.

It might be argued that the simplest, and most practical, choice is for Indonesia to again unite behind a single charismatic figure who will command respect in many parts of the country – and overcome opposition elsewhere with military power. But while the concept is simple the practice is fraught with difficulty. Indonesia has moved far beyond the conditions of 1967, and a government that opts for the autocratic path has no guarantee of success.

There are huge obstacles on both the political and economic fronts. Politically this would involve turning back a democratic tide that has surged both at national


and international levels. And although it might seem the best way to ensure national integrity it is more likely to foster a culture of determined resistance that will ultimately sever national ties across the archipelago. Such a route will also court international isolation.

The economic implications are equally chilling. While some national entrepreneurs would welcome the opportunity to do business with a compliant regime, international capital is more likely to take flight. There are now enormous pressures on the kinds of consumer goods companies on which Indonesian investment crucially depends. If Indonesia's international human rights ratings take a dive, so too will its economy.

Nowadays the most productive opportunities lie elsewhere. Now it is human development grounded in democracy that pays dividends. Human development not only fulfils people's essential human rights but, as the following chapter emphasizes, also lays the foundations for the kind of modern, productive economy on which Indonesia's future depends.

Democracy, in the conventional literature, is seen as a luxury good. That is, demand for democracy rises with a rise in per capita income. Related to this is the 'cruel choice' hypothesis between two "Ds" – democracy and discipline. Since democracy at the initial stage of development is inimical to rapid economic growth, what a country needs instead is discipline³⁸. The conventional wisdom also has a 'trickle down' hypothesis which argues that that rapid economic growth will percolate to human development. Once the cake grows and becomes bigger then a society can spend more on human development. On the basis of these two hypotheses the link between human development, democracy and economic growth becomes a linear, unidirectional one, where the driving force is economic growth. Diagrammatically, this relationship can be shown in Figure A.2.1


Figure A.2.1

Cruel choice and trickle down

The evidence on both cruel choice and trickle down hypotheses is not very convincing. For example, India with a low to moderate economic growth has a durable democracy whereas some faster growing economies of East Asia until very recently had autocratic regimes. Similarly, Benin and Belize, which are not high growth countries, are ranked very highly on indices of democracy. And countries such as Sri Lanka, Costa Rica and Trinidad & Tobago have achieved greater human development with much lower rate of economic growth. Thus, while faster economic growth and high income certainly make it easier to devote resources to human welfare, they are not essential. This is also revealed by Indonesia's achievement in HDI; it ranks higher on HDI (number 102) than GDP (number 105). Its per capita income is less than half that of Botswana, yet is ranked 12 places higher.

The endogenous growth model provides an alternative framework for examining the relationship between human development, democracy and economic growth. It postulates that advancements in infant mortality, and primary school attainment positively contribute to economic growth. Economic growth, in turn, substantially raises the probability that political institutions will become more democratic over time. A cross-country study by Barro finds a causal link from infant mortality and education to economic growth which also follows from the human capital theory³⁹. By establishing that link, Barro effectively rejects the trickle-down hypothesis that high human development can only be achieved through economic growth. However, in his framework, democracy still remains a luxury good with the implication that poor countries cannot (or perhaps should not) have democracy. The Barro framework can be presented in Figure A.2.2.


Figure A.2.2

Endogenous growth and democracy

Bhalla⁴⁰ brings another perspective to this debate. He finds a positive effect of democracy on growth. The rationale for this is that democratic regimes are more likely to protect property and contract rights which are essential for a well-functioning market economy driven by the private sector. Although Bhalla does not directly examine the link between economic growth and human development, by reversing the causality, his findings imply a trickle-down approach to development. The emphasis here is on the durability of democracy. Once democracy becomes durable and well functioning, economic growth will accelerate which will percolate to human development.

Bhalla's 'virtuous circle' can be represented in figure A.2.3.

Figure A.2.3


Bhalla's 'virtuous circle'

This National Human Development Report for Indonesia has argued that human development is an essential ingredient for the consolidation of democracy. Thus, the facts revealed in Figures A.2.2 and A.2.3 and the arguments contained in this document enable us to complete the link between human development, democracy and economic growth, where all three variables interact with one another to create a virtuous triangle (Figure A.2.4).

In this virtuous triangle, human development positively affects economic growth both directly and indirectly via democracy. The "direct effect" of human development on growth follows from now a vast empirical literature on human capital theory and the endogenous growth model. Research by both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank find that high literacy, low infant mortality, low inequality and poverty contributed positively to rapid economic growth in East and Southeast Asia⁴¹.

The "indirect effect" of human development on growth comes via consolidation of democracy. High levels of literacy, good health and equality of opportunity allow people to participate in the political process and help build national consensus on goals and trade-offs. These

Figure A.2.4
Virtuous Triangle



are essential factors required for political parties and organisations to be issue-based rather than personality-based as is found in many developing countries with low levels of literacy. Participatory democracy provides an effective vehicle for voice and conflict resolution, and hence promotes social and political stability. If effectively implemented, it creates significant pressures for the containment of corruption in public life.

By empowering local communities and initiatives it also serves to raise the efficiency of investment choices and service provision. Open public discourse and freedom of speech encourage transparency and access to information. This in turn reduces the probability of repeating past mistakes of undertaking dubious investments under a system of political patronage. It also sets the stage for a country to move from a factor and investment-driven phase to a new, innovation-driven phase of development characterised by the creation of a knowledge-intensive economy

Indonesia's economy was already changing course long before 1997. In many respects the crisis came as a traumatic interlude in an ongoing transformation.

Until the outbreak of the economic crisis in 1997, Indonesia was one of East Asia's miracle economies, combining high and sustained economic growth with an equitable distribution of income – achieving the economic ‘holy grail’.

Previously it had been assumed that the initial stages of development in any country would inevitably cause incomes to diverge – with a sharp rise in inequality. This divergence would be both an outcome of rapid development, and a necessary condition. It would be an outcome since the rich would be in a more powerful position to seize the benefits of growth. But it was also thought to be a necessary condition since only the rich would be in a position to accumulate the savings needed for continuing investment.

The newly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, seemed to have defied both these assumptions. Having embarked with a relatively equitable distribution of income they managed to sustain this balance for a long period. Yet these countries also maintained a fairly high rate of savings, so that a substantial proportion of funds for investment came from their own citizens.

How did they manage this? Some commentators say it was because these countries promoted macroeconomic stability while maintaining open, export-oriented economies. Others say it was because governments intervened to promote the most promising export industries, or enforced political stability and labour discipline. More controversially, this success was ascribed to cultural factors encapsulated as ‘Asian values’.

Some or all of these will have contributed to some extent in each country. But the essential common factor throughout was investment in human development. Having started with a fairly equitable distribution of income they then sustained this through public spending on health and education. This investment in ‘human capital’ soon paid economic dividends, as healthier and more skilled workers

became steadily more productive. This further raised output which could again be invested in human development in an upward and virtuous circle. In retrospect their success does not seem so unlikely, though the speed with which this strategy worked took the world by surprise.

Almost as surprising as the miraculous flowering of these economies was their spectacular fall from grace. Scarcely anyone saw this coming. True there had been notes of caution. A few voices had argued that the expansion would inevitably tail off because the boost in output had come to a large extent not from increasing productivity but just by injecting extra capital and by transferring people from agriculture to industry – a process that was running into natural limits⁴². Unless these economies invested more in technological innovation so as to boost productivity they would therefore inevitably experience diminishing returns. Others, including the World Bank, had pointed to weaknesses elsewhere, notably in the banking systems – an outcome of the wave of bank liberalization in the 1980s. By 1997, Indonesia alone had 238 banks, many of whom paid scant attention to the norms of prudent banking – making many loans of dubious merit and holding too little capital to back their loan portfolio.

Even so, the crash came with an unexpected scale and severity. Hopes that the problem was merely that currency markets had overshot with their correction and would recover to a more realistic equilibrium rates – were soon dashed. Only later did people appreciate the full extent of the crisis – exactly how bad it was and how long it was likely to last.

Just as there were many explanations for the Asian miracle, so there were multiple diagnoses of the ensuing collapse. Some people blamed the herd instincts of international institutional investors. Others said that this was fundamentally a failure of governance: governments and businesses were too closely intertwined, allowing entrepreneurs to operate and manoeuvre outside the normal disciplines of market forces.

Based on these analyses and others, governments and international institutions undertook a number of measures


of rescue and reform. Although some of these treatments were less successful than others, most of the patients have subsequently revived. The currencies of the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Malaysia are now more stable, and investment and growth have revived. Indonesia is in a more precarious position – although growth is again positive the country is failing to attract much new investment.

What does this imply for Indonesia's future? How badly has human development been damaged by the crisis and what part will it play in future economic growth? Can Indonesia again expect to achieve rapid and equitable growth and if so how?

The subsequent three decades saw a dramatic turnaround. Indonesia managed to diversify its production base – in a series of stages: first with the green revolution in rice in the mid-1970s; then with a rapid expansion of labour – intensive industries following trade liberalization in the mid-1980s, and later with the establishment of a manufacturing export base in the 1990s.

The process was by no means smooth or linear. There was setback in the period 1982-86, for example, following the fall in international oil prices. Nevertheless the period as a whole saw a fundamental shift in the structure of the economy. Over the period 1971-96 agriculture's contribution to GDP fell from 45% to 15%, while manufacturing rose from 8% to 25%.

Figure 3.1
Long-term real GDP growth (1951-2000)



Note :
1960-65 from 1960 weights, 1978-93 from 1983 weights and 1994-99 from 1993 weights.

Source: Woo, Glassburner and Nasution (1994) and BPS


Decades of transformation

Indonesia's economic achievement over the final three decades of the twentieth century is evident in the growth rates shown in Figure 3.1. For much of the period between the second half of the 1950s and the end of the 1960s annual growth averaged only 2% – less than the rate of increase in population. Indonesia remained a predominantly agricultural economy. The government had made some efforts to promote heavy industry behind tariff barriers within an elaborate regulatory framework. But this had produced scant results: by the mid-1960s manufacturing still only accounted for 10% of GDP. At this point per capita income was less than \$50 per year – placing Indonesia firmly in the ranks of the world's least developed countries. Worse, Indonesia was descending into economic chaos. The government was losing control over many of the islands on which the country's wealth depended. By 1966 inflation approached 640% and the economy was deep in crisis.

This also signalled a geographical shift in the economy's centre of gravity towards the major industrial centres. By the early 1990s the lion's share of Indonesia's modern industry, and much of its infrastructure, was to be found in Java's three metropolitan areas – Greater Jakarta, Bandung, and Greater Surabaya. Overall, Jakarta and West and East Java generated around 60% of the country's non-oil and gas manufacturing revenues.

Labour-intensive industry expanded rapidly in the early-1980s, following trade liberalization in 1983 and a 28% devaluation of the rupiah. Between 1982 and 1984, earnings from the labour-intensive sector, which includes clothing, woven fabrics, footwear, furniture, toys and sporting goods increased from \$323 million to \$826 million; and by 1992 they had reached \$9,963 million. Meanwhile the traditional labour-intensive industries such as food processing that were geared largely towards local demand became steadily less important – between 1975 and 1991 they fell from 41% to 25% of total industrial output⁴³.

Figure 3.2
Employment by sector



Source : Irawan et al (2000)

Employment

Despite the shift towards manufacturing and labour-intensive industries, agriculture remained a vital source of employment. Throughout the 1980s it continued to employ over 50% of the population. As Figure 3.2 indicates, it was only towards the end of the 1980s, with the rise of labour-intensive manufacturing industry, that agriculture's share began to fall – from 55% in 1985 to 50% in 1990 and to 44% by the late 1990s⁴⁴. This means that even today around 35 million Indonesians work in agriculture, with another 17 million in trade and restaurants.

Income inequality

One of Indonesia's advantages at the outset of the period of rapid economic growth was a relatively equitable distribution of income. Although the available data is fragmentary, it is possible to piece together a picture by combining household surveys (*Susen*as), labour force surveys (*Sakernas*), and the agricultural survey⁴⁵. Probably the most important contribution to a relatively equitable distribution of income in the 1970s was the distribution of land. Landholding had traditionally been very fragmented and remained so. The agricultural census of 1973 found that for the country as a whole, 46% of holdings were less than half a hectare. This proportion rose to 57% in Java. This picture of fragmentation was confirmed by the *Sakernas* in 1976 which found that only 49% of households operated above 0.2 hectares of land⁴⁶.

Nor were disparities very wide in the urban areas. Urban workers had little opportunity for high-productivity employment in the industrial or commercial sectors. Their best chance of earning more was to work for the government – an option open only to those with higher levels of education. In these circumstances the most reliable way for households to get a higher income was to have more people working. In addition to equality within urban and rural areas there was also a fair degree of equality between them. One survey for 1969/70 found that rural-urban disparities were less in Indonesia than in ten other countries – including India, Malaysia, and the Philippines⁴⁷. This was essentially because urban incomes had been depressed. Urban dwellers had been hit hard by the rapid inflation in the 1960s, and unlike people in the rural areas most of them did not have the option of retreating into subsistence production. Urban dwellers were also faced with escalating housing costs which increased more than twenty-fold between 1966 and 1977, while costs in the rural areas increased far less⁴⁸.

As a result, people in the rural areas had relatively little incentive to migrate to the cities and when they did so they did not go far. The 1971 population census found that fewer than 5% of the Indonesian population were living outside the province of their birth. The 1973 '*Leknas*' migration survey confirmed this, finding that in seven of the 14 cities surveyed in Java over three-quarters of migrants came from elsewhere in the same province.

Despite subsequent rapid economic expansion, especially in the later 1980s when it averaged over 8% annually, there does not seem to have been any serious increase in inequality. Quite the reverse, in fact. As highlighted in chapter 1, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s the Gini coefficient fell – most steeply in the rural areas (Figure 1.4). Since then the pattern has been more variable, rising in the early 1990s until the crisis, then falling, then rising again. Much the same could be said of distribution across the regions. Table 3.1 shows the trend in Gini coefficients across the provinces. This shows that the pattern in many of the provinces matched the national picture.

Education

An important contributor to equitable development in Indonesia, as in the other 'miracle economies' of East Asia, was investment in education. This is indicated in Figure 3.3 which shows a rising development expenditures on education as a proportion of the development budget. The government engaged on a massive schools building programme: between 1973 and 1991 it more than doubled the number of primary schools⁴⁹. The outcome is clear in Figure 3.4. Not only did gross primary enrolment climb

Table 3.1
Indonesia: Gini ratio of household expenditure across provinces, 1976 - 1999

Province	1976	1990	1993	1996	1999
Aceh	0.30	0.22	0.29	0.26	0.27
North Sumatra	0.28	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.27
West Sumatra	0.27	0.27	0.31	0.28	0.25
Riau	0.34	0.26	0.27	0.30	0.27
Jambi	0.29	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.26
South Sumatra	0.31	0.27	0.30	0.30	0.27
Bengkulu	0.31	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.28
Lampung	0.33	0.27	0.26	0.28	0.29
Jakarta		0.31	0.42	0.36	0.46
West Java	0.30	0.32	0.30	0.36	0.29
Central Java	0.31	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.27
Yogyakarta	0.37	0.35	0.33	0.38	0.34
East Java	0.33	0.30	0.33	0.31	0.29
Bali	0.23	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.28
West Nusatenggara	0.31	0.30	0.27	0.29	0.25
East Nusatenggara	0.38	0.30	0.25	0.30	0.28
West Kalimantan	0.32	0.28	0.30	0.30	0.27
Central Kalimantan	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.27
South Kalimantan	0.29	0.25	0.27	0.29	0.27
East Kalimantan	0.24	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.29
North Sulawesi	0.41	0.28	0.29	0.34	0.28
Central Sulawesi	0.38	0.27	0.29	0.30	0.30
South Sulawesi	0.35	0.30	0.27	0.32	0.28
Southeast Sulawesi	0.34	0.30	0.27	0.31	0.28
Maluku	0.38	0.27	0.30	0.27	0.29
Irian Jaya	-	0.33	0.36	0.39	0.44
Indonesia	0.35	0.32	0.34	0.36	0.33


Note:
Figures represent Gini coefficient for household expenditure derived from Susenas.

Sources:
1976 data from Islam and Khan (1986), 1999 data from IHS (2000) and the rest from BPS.

steeply it also outstripped that in other countries in the region. The proportion goes above 100%, indicating that children outside the normal primary age group were enrolled in primary classes, either starting below primary age, or more likely having to repeat classes. Even so, the outcome is impressive. As a result there was a steady decline in adult illiteracy, which between 1961 and 1990 fell from 44% to 11% for men and from 69% to 17% for women (Figure 1.5a). This impressive result was possible despite a low proportion of GNP (about 2%) being devoted to public education. There could be two plausible explanations for this. First, 2% of a growing GNP meant a substantial amount in absolute terms. Second, the bulk of educational expenditure (over 80% at its peak in the early 1980s) was devoted to the primary education. Thus, although this period also saw a rise in secondary enrolment, from 10% to around 40%, Indonesia lagged far behind the Philippines at around 70% and Malaysia at 60%. There is also some concern about the quality of education in Indonesia.

Indonesia's investment in basic education was to set the stage for the industrial diversification that began from the second half of the 1980s. However, the relative neglect of the higher education sector meant the prolongation of the low-technology phase despite the growing signs of its limitations.

Figure 3.3
Education and health expenditure, 1969 - 1998



Health care

Improvements in education were accompanied by better standards of health. The clearest indication is the reduction in infant mortality which had fallen from 132 in the late 1960s to 90 by 1980 and to 47 by 1999. Over the same period there was also a steady rise in average life expectancy, from 42 years to 65 (Figure 3.5). While this improvement was welcome, it was no more than what might have been expected from the general rise in income and here too Indonesia fell behind other Asian countries:

Figure 3.4
Primary enrolment in Southeast Asia, 1965 - 1990





Figure 3.5
Infant mortality and life expectancy



Source : World Bank World Development Indicators (2000)

in 1999 the infant mortality rate was 35 in the Philippines, 33 in Thailand and 11 in Malaysia.

During this period, Indonesia had established a network of health centres, the *puskesmas*, and sub-centres. But although these were numerous they were not of a particularly high quality, and poorer families were often deterred by user charges or the need to pay prescription charges and meet other out-of-pocket expenses. Higher up the system, too, hospital beds were in short supply. The World Bank noted in 1990 that the availability of hospital beds, at 0.6 per thousand population, ranked Indonesia among the lowest of all developing countries regardless of their income level – it was also distributed very unevenly: 1.24 in Jakarta, for example, but only 0.18 in Lampung⁵⁰. The growth of health services did increase the possibility of modern treatment for the poor, but they got only a small share of this. At the end of the 1980s only 5% of the bottom decile of the population benefited from hospital treatment, compared with around 40% of the top decile⁵¹. One of the most disturbing aspects of the poor standard of health care is the lack of attention for pregnant mothers. As indicated in Figure 3.6, Indonesia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the region – 450 deaths per 100,000 live births.

Food policy

An important contributory factor to the achievement of growth with equity was the official food policy. The government gave a high priority to agriculture and in the late 1960s, aimed for national rice self-sufficiency. For this purpose by the 1970s it had created an entire industry to support the rice sector. This policy had two main strands. The first was to boost the production of rice through the intensive use of fertilizers and irrigation. For


this it supplied farm inputs through the ‘*Bimas*’ and ‘*Inmas*’ programmes – the latter operating through a network of village cooperatives that drew on credit from the specialized state-owned agricultural bank. The second strand, complementing these efforts, was to stabilize prices through a food price support agency, Bulog, to buy and sell rice.

The emphasis on agriculture was reflected in the first national plan, *Repelita I* (1969-74), in which agriculture and irrigation consumed over one-third of the entire development budget. The drive for self-sufficiency was stepped up after 1972, following a series of indifferent harvests and increases in the price of rice.

These policies really began to pay dividends in the latter part of the 1970s. Rice production increased from 23 million tons in 1977 to 28 million tons in 1980 and to 38 million tons in by 1984. As a result rice imports fell dramatically. In the late 1970s Indonesia was importing up to one-third of the world's traded rice, but between 1985 and 1990 it imported no rice at all. Since then the dream of food self-sufficiency has faded and around 10% of rice has had to be imported.

Food policy had a lasting impact on poverty reduction – on the one hand establishing a floor price to support farmers, on the other hand stabilizing prices at a reasonable level for urban consumers.

Figure 3.6
Maternal mortality



Source : ISEAS “ASEAN Statistical Indicators” (1997)

Protection of the development budget

Another important contribution towards poverty reduction was the way that the government managed to protect development expenditures – even when its income fluctuated along with the price of oil. During the 1970s the government had benefited from windfall profits as a result of the oil-price boom and decided to plough these into infrastructure particularly for agriculture, education and transport via a series of flexible ‘*Inpres*’ grants. These were designed to integrate national markets while reducing regional disparities. These grants also offered considerable employment for unskilled labour: in 1970 *Inpres* grants generated around a quarter of a million labour days, rising by 1982 to 1.5 million – around 2.7% of the total labour force. Even in the difficult period 1981-86 when oil prices fell, the government protected expenditure – not just as an isolated reaction in a situation of overall fiscal stringency, but rather as part of a deliberate strategy to ensure that economic growth did not worsen income distribution. Even when investment was falling the government managed to ensure that consumption was maintained.


As a result the income inequality that the New Order government had inherited remained largely intact. And as physical capital accumulated, people steadily moved from agriculture to industry. While this meant some migration to urban centres of Java and Sumatra, the *Inpres* grants helped maintain wages on some of the smaller islands and prevent any worsening in regional disparities.

Income poverty

As noted in chapter 1, an inevitable consequence of the combination of rapid economic growth and equitable distribution of income was a steep reduction in income poverty (Figure 1.3). It also noted that by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the reduction in poverty was tapering off. However this did not lead to a steep rise in income for formal sector workers. Since the state controlled the trade union movement workers had few opportunities to bargain up wages. As Figure 3.7 indicates, over the period 1986-96 when GDP was rising by around 7% per year real wages virtually stood still.

By the beginning of the 1990s Indonesia had already enjoyed a quarter of a century of economic growth. It had transformed its economy from one reliant on agriculture and minerals to one where the cutting edge of economic prosperity was provided by non-oil manufacturing. The government had also managed to contain regional disparities by investing in infrastructure and services. This all helped to dampen down regional discontent – a stability bolstered where necessary with military force.

Figure 3.7
Real and nominal wages in manufacturing,
1986 - 1989



Source : Irawan, Ahmed and Islam (2000)

Indonesia's stable and inexpensive workforce made the country a very attractive destination for foreign investment, and allowed aggregate investment to rise to around 30% of GDP, over twice the proportion of most countries in the developing world.

The disappearing miracle

By the second half of the 1990s, however, there were already signs that the golden age of Indonesian economic growth was coming to a close. Agricultural productivity was stagnant, export growth was slowing, and there was increasing pressure on wages. Moreover the competition for labour-intensive manufacture was growing as other countries – this time from South Asia – joined Asia's ‘flying geese’ formation. It was time for Indonesia to graduate from the easier first stages of industrialization to a higher productivity stage based not just on assembly skills but on technological innovation.

From the mid-1960s Indonesia had enjoyed a happy interaction of official policy and good luck that had produced fairly equitable growth. But by the mid-1990s this model was slowly being eroded. There are two main sets of issues: the first is the changing production environment; the second the changing macroeconomic environment.

A changing production environment

Indonesia's former structure of production could no longer be relied upon to produce steady growth. Neither agriculture nor industry could continue in the same fashion.

- *Stagnating agriculture* – One of the features of the earlier period was a steady increase in agricultural productivity. This ensured that agricultural incomes did not fall too far behind those in industry. But there are clear limits to this process. One problem is that there is less land available as more and more is given over to housing and industry. Another is that it is difficult to drive yields up much further. By 1989 average rice yields had peaked at 3.97 tons per hectare and since then total production has fluctuated. Rice yields in Java are already very high by world standards so technological advance is unlikely to lead to a further doubling of output. In any case the government does not have the funds to invest in agriculture to the same extent as before⁵². Other food crops, such as corn, cassava, sweet potato, peanuts and soybeans have also been stagnating. And smallholder production too has made little progress: their yields of coffee and cloves now appear to be lower than in the late 1960s⁵³.
- *More capital-intensive production* – In the 1990s a number of manufacturing industries became steadily more capital-intensive. In textiles, for example, the large handloom sector disappeared as production switched to artificial fibres and yarns. Meanwhile the wood and timber products sector shifted in favour of plywood and pulp whose output is more mechanized. There were corresponding changes in the food and tobacco industries, particularly with the mechanization of the large *kretek* cigarette industry⁵⁴.
- *Slower export growth* – By the end of the 1990s exports of labour-intensive products had slowed markedly. This was partly because the one-off boost from the devaluations in the 1980s had eventually worn off as relative prices and market shares settled down and adjusted to the new exchange rates. Another factor was that by the end of the 1980s Indonesia was reaching the limits of its export quota under the Multifibre Arrangement⁵⁵. Meanwhile there was also greater competition from lower-wage economies such as China and Viet Nam. Finally, towards the end of the 1980s recession in some developed market economies depressed the demand for Indonesian products. As a result, by the end of the 1980s industries such as textiles, garments and even plywood were declining or stagnating. In the case of textiles, for example, an industry that between 1986 and 1991 had shot up from \$0.3 billion to \$2.7 billion then merely hovered for the next five years between \$2.3 billion and \$2.9 billion. This deceleration in export growth would not have mattered so much if the slack could have been taken up by local consumers. But this does not appear to have happened, so as exports of footwear, woven cloth, yarn and thread decelerated so did overall output.
- *Growth of the formal labour market* – The majority of the Indonesian workforce, have always worked in agriculture or the informal sector. Nevertheless the

expansion of manufacturing meant that by the early 1990s around 30% of the workforce was in the formal sector. This shift reflects first a decline in the rate of employment growth in agriculture – from 4% annually in the period 1980-85, to below 1% in 1985-90 and to minus 2% in the 1990s. Meanwhile employment growth in the industrial sector accelerated from 5% to 7% from the early to late 1980s, only falling to 6% in the first half of the 1990s. Employment growth in the service sector fluctuated between 3% and 4% in the 1980s, rising to around 5% in the 1990s. While the increase in formal employment helps to boost income it also raises problems when workers need to transfer from declining industries to growing ones. Many formal-sector workers have to endure long periods of unemployment – averaging 10 months according to some estimates. This is likely to involve considerable hardship. On the one hand they can get no unemployment insurance and on the other hand the cosmopolitan urban environment is fast eroding many of the traditional coping systems. They were also losing the option of returning to the rural areas at times of economic hardship: many people who had migrated to Java from the outer islands had rented out their land or ceded their rights to other members of the family. Changing jobs in the formal sector and transferring to more productive employment also means developing new skills. But most people were working such long hours – around 60 per week – that they had little opportunity to gain additional qualifications or upgrade their skills, especially if they also had to spend much of the day commuting.

A new macroeconomic environment

While the production environment was changing, Indonesia was also having to cope with a new financial environment that exposed it more to demands and moods of the international money markets.

- *Savings and investment* – In the 1990s Indonesia's savings-to-GDP ratio reached an upper ceiling of around 29%⁵⁶. This is high by the standards of most developing countries but substantially lower than that achieved in several other East Asian economies. If the country is to step up investment it will therefore have to rely more on savings from overseas through foreign portfolio investment – with the attendant risks of volatility demonstrated only too vividly in the 1997 crisis⁵⁷.
- *Exchange rate management* – If the government wants to have a stable exchange rate while also depending on external flows of capital it has correspondingly less freedom to adjust interest rates so as to stimulate domestic savings and investment⁵⁸. Dependence on external capital has a number of other consequences. It is, for example, much more difficult to defend the country against currency speculators. The Central Bank has at times attempted to 'sterilize' sudden flows of foreign capital by intervening

in the foreign exchange markets. When it has tried to reduce the exchange-rate impact of an inflow of dollars by selling rupiah, however, this has led to soaring foreign exchange reserves. But holding such reserves for long reduces the capital available for investment⁵⁹. Ultimately it has to be accepted that the more Indonesia depends on foreign capital the more its exchange rate and its growth rates will fluctuate. As the experience of neighbouring countries demonstrates, even having sound economic fundamentals does not guarantee that capital flows will be stable. Given the sheer volume of mobile international capital, no country can accumulate sufficient reserves to protect the exchange rate against a determined speculative attack.

- *Monetary and fiscal policy* – Since it can no longer sterilize large capital inflows in any convincing fashion, the government is going to have to reassess its mix of fiscal and monetary policies⁶⁰. Most governments nowadays want to keep inflation under control but the floods of foreign capital make it difficult for Indonesia to exert much control over the money supply. The area where it has most control, however, is fiscal policy and it has attempted to use this to control inflation by reining in public expenditure so as to keep a balanced budget. This

has meant cutting back spending on health and education as well as on investment in infrastructure – with serious implications for human development in general and poverty reduction in particular. In these circumstances there is perhaps a case for Indonesia accepting a higher level of inflation. This too hurts the poor, but arguably less so than cuts in public expenditure. Conceding a higher inflation rate would also permit lower real interest rates, which would help boost investment and growth.

In the first half of the 1990s therefore, Indonesia was faced with a new and more complex environment that was bound to affect income distribution and make it more difficult to pursue equitable human development. Agriculture was stagnating, manufacturing was becoming more capital intensive, and the macro-economic environment was becoming inherently riskier⁶¹. When the crisis came it demonstrated the extent of these developments and constraints. At the same time the crisis itself further reshaped the economic and social environment. Evaluating the prospects for social justice and equity will therefore mean first taking stock of the economic and social consequences of the events of the past four years.

Rebuilding the Indonesian miracle

Refashioning Indonesia's economy in the democratic era – rekindling the miracle – will mean steering a new and more productive course, and an even stronger commitment to human development.

In the first half of the 1990s Indonesia's economy was already starting to struggle. But when the present crisis hit in late 1997, it was unexpected, swift, and devastating. The government's first priorities were to try to halt the slide in the currency and to rein in runaway inflation. This meant borrowing huge sums to support the balance of payments – efforts mediated and monitored by the IMF – and also making draconian cuts in public expenditure.

Then it had to deal with the generic bankruptcy facing both the banks and the industrial conglomerates. In the years preceding the crisis, many corporations had unwisely borrowed short in dollars and lent long in rupiah. With the sudden collapse of the rupiah in 1997 they could no longer service their debts – a situation compounded by the rapid contraction of the domestic market. As a result, debtors and the banks that had unwisely lent to them were nominally bankrupt. The government could of course have let them suffer the fate they deserved. But without a viable banking sector Indonesia had no prospect of recovery, so in the second half of 1998, it embarked on its efforts to recapitalize the banks and to restructure the failing conglomerates.

The government's third main task was to reform itself. Successive New Order administrations had steadily blurred the distinctions between politics, economics, and business, instead weaving a complex mesh of inter-related interests. Within the government a small and privileged political elite had overseen a three-way collusion between businesses, banks and state functionaries. This environment allowed monopolies to flourish, froze out potential competitors and treated standard rules of disclosure and due diligence as mere formalities.

Meanwhile the authoritarian regime also cut off most routes of protest. It had banned independent trade unions and confined political opposition to two parties which it

had created by fiat and which it monitored closely – leaving most effective political activity the monopoly of the government party, *Golkar*, which had grown into a 'banyan tree' of inter-dependent interest groups. Just as bad, the New Order regime had suborned the legal system to its own ends and the courts and the judiciary were deeply corrupt.

Just as business had penetrated government so many public institutions had penetrated the business world and turned themselves into enterprises. The military and police, for example, had developed a wide range of business interests which they used to finance around 70% of their budgets. Corruption extended through most aspects of public life – civil servants, judges, doctors, teachers, the police and district heads, all spent much of their official time on private business, effectively 'hollowing out' government. In this corrupt and debilitating environment around 30% of government expenditure 'leaked away'.

Taking this into account, Indonesia's true ratio of public spending to GDP was around 13% – one-third of the average for OECD countries. By mid-1999 as the public and the media found out more about the New Order era the enormity of the problems was becoming clear. From then on the new imperatives were to reform institutions in general and governance in particular.

A collapsing economy

Meanwhile the economy had nose-dived. The economic and financial turmoil that swept through East Asia in the late 1990s took its toll on many countries but Indonesia was by far the worst-affected. The economy contracted by more than 13% in 1998 – twice the drop experienced in Malaysia or Thailand, and per capita GDP fell by around 15%. This was a shocking reversal: prior to that the economy had been growing by about 7% annually, and per capita income by around 4.5% annually. Effectively therefore the crisis cost around three years' growth. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.1 which shows the projected trajectories of real GDP per capita assuming that the economy would otherwise have continued to grow at 7% annually.

Box 4.1

Indonesia's financial crisis in historical perspective

The magnitude of the post-1997 economic crisis bears comparison with the impact of the great depression following the 1929 stock market crashes in the USA and Europe. This is illustrated in the next figure which maps the value of the Jakarta Stock Exchange between January 1997 and October 2000 over a corresponding time period in the early 1930s. For the Jakarta Stock Exchange the base date is December 1996, for the UK the base is 1924=100. For the United States, the base is 1926=100. In the United Kingdom, for instance, share prices moved from an index of 116 in January 1926, to a peak of 149 in January, 1929, to a low of 73 in June 1932 before recovering to 101 by June 1933.

For Indonesian economy as a whole the crisis-induced contraction was greater than in any years of the great depression in the United Kingdom.





Figure 4.1
Per capita GDP growth scenarios



Note : Assumes continuation of the 1990-97 per capita GDP growth rate of 5%
Source : Calculated from BPS data

On this assumption, by 2010 total GDP will be more than 20% below what it might otherwise have achieved.

Worst affected were the financial and construction sectors which contracted by around 39%. The country's future growth potential was also weakened by a sharp slowdown in investment: between 1997 and 1998 gross capital formation fell by 41%. Meanwhile the stock of goods was piling up: over the same period unsold inventory more than doubled.

Shrinking employment and incomes

Despite the severe drop in output this was not accompanied by a steep rise in unemployment. In August 1997, just before the crisis, the unemployment rate was 4.7%. Then, following the crisis it rose to 5.5% in 1998 and in 1999 it rose to 6.4%⁶². However, open unemployment in Indonesia is always a poor indicator of the real situation. In the absence of any social security or unemployment benefit few people can afford to be out of work for long and if they lose a formal-sector job they will generally return to the informal sector or to agriculture. This is clearly what happened as a result of the crisis

when about one million people are thought to have returned to the countryside.

The main damage to household incomes was done by inflation, which between 1997 and 1998 surged from 6% to 78%. Meanwhile nominal wages failed to keep pace. In the rural areas the return of many people to agriculture further depressed agricultural wages as well as the earnings of petty traders and others in the informal sector. And in the urban areas wages in the formal sector grew only slowly. This combination of high inflation and slow growth in nominal wages resulted in a steep drop in real wages. On average these fell by around one-third between 1997 and 1998 but in some places the drop was far steeper – 45% for industrial workers in Jakarta, for example.

Income distribution maintained

Data from Susenas suggest that the crisis did not increase inequality, indeed if anything inequality declined. Thus the Gini coefficient for household expenditure, which was 0.36 in 1996 fell to 0.32 in 1998 and only rose to 0.33 in 1999. One plausible explanation is that the sharp decline in the urban industrial economy hit the higher wage earners harder, thus compressing the upper end of the income distribution.

It also seems that the crisis did not greatly increase inequality between the regions. This is illustrated by the ‘L-index’, an index that permits the calculation of separate measures of inequality within and between provinces, and adds these to give a total measure (Table 4.1). Again this shows total inequality to have fallen over the period 1996-98, but to be rising again in 1998-99. It also highlights the fact that inequality within the provinces is much more significant than inequality between them, typically accounting for around 80% of the total.


Table 4.1
L-index of per capita household expenditure
1990 - 1999

	1990	1993	1996	1998	1999
Between provinces	0.030	0.036	0.045	0.038	0.040
Within provinces	0.193	0.203	0.171	0.134	0.150
Total	0.223	0.239	0.216	0.172	0.190

Source: Calculated for earlier years by BPS and for 1999 by Irawan and Romdiate (2000)

A similar conclusion is evident from the district-level information illustrated in the ‘Lorenz curve’ shown in Figure 4.2. This is produced by ordering the districts according to per capita GDP from lowest to highest and then accumulating their GDPs and population from left to right so that they ultimately add up to the total national GDP and total population. If every district had the same

Figure 4.2
Inter-district disparities, 1998, Lorenz curves



Source : Tadjoeeddin, et.al. (2000)

per capita GDP then this would produce a straight diagonal line. The extent to which the actual line is bowed indicates the extent of maldistribution between the regions. The bigger the bow, the bigger the distortion. On this representation, the Gini coefficient is the area between the bowed line and the straight line divided by the total area under the straight line.

As elaborated in chapter 1, the incidence of poverty rose due to the crisis. There are two other ways of looking at what was happening to the poorest. One is to divide the population up into the poor and non-poor, within urban and rural areas, and to calculate separate Gini coefficients for each of these four groups. The result is shown in Figure 4.3. This shows first of course that inequality is much greater within the non-poor since this group also includes the very rich, though the contrasts are greater in the urban areas. The crisis appears to have an equalizing effect among the non-poor in both rural and urban areas. This once again shows that the crisis hit the higher wage earners harder.

The situation is different for the poor. First, their Ginis are far lower, and there is not much difference between urban and rural areas – a graphic demonstration that there

Table 4.2
Poverty severity index, 1996 - 1999


	Feb 96	Dec 98	Feb 99	Aug 99
Urban	0.85	1.27	0.93	0.74
Rural	1.06	1.48	1.18	1.17

Source: Dhanani and Islam (2000)

is greater equality in poverty than in wealth. However, in the case of the poor, the effect of the crisis was actually to increase the disparities. The Gini coefficients for the poor rose in both rural and urban areas.

The impact of the crisis on those living below the poverty line is also evident from trends in the 'poverty severity index'. This measures the distance that the average income of the poor – as a group – lies below the poverty line, as well as the extent of disparities among the poor. Table 4.2 shows the change in the poverty severity index during the crisis. This indicates first the severity of poverty is greater in rural areas, and also that there was a sharp increase during the worst of the crisis.

Figure 4.3
Gini coefficients above and below the poverty line, 1996 - 1999



Source : Irawan and Romdiati (2000)

A dip in human development

The most direct and immediate effect of the crisis was on incomes, whether because of the loss of jobs or the sudden burst of inflation. But what about other aspects of human development, such as educational attainment or health, or nutrition? Figure 1.1 in chapter one shows a sharp dip in the human development index (HDI) from 0.69 to 0.64. The HDI is a composite measure that reflects income, educational attainment, and health. In fact, the drop in the HDI was entirely due to a drop in the income components. The life expectancy index stayed more or less the same while the education index actually showed a marginal improvement. This is not surprising since a deterioration in standards of health and education would be unlikely to show through for some time.

Table 4.3
Number of teachers (thousands)

	1995-6	1996-7	1997-8	1998-9
Primary				
Public	1,089	946	936	932
Private	83	74	76	75
Junior Secondary				
Public	245	252	259	281
Private	167	158	155	151
Senior secondary				
Public	136	139	140	145
Private	191	187	185	187

Source: Oey-Gardiner (2000)

Keeping Children at School

So far the crisis has been more evident in public expenditure than in outcomes. The government's overhang of debt has reduced the amount available for public services. Between 1996/97 and 1997/98 public spending on education fell from 1.4% of GDP to 0.7%⁶³. This will almost certainly lead to a further deterioration in quality. One possible consequence is the reduction in the number of primary school teachers evident in Table 4.3. The average number of teachers per primary school has now fallen from 8 to 7.

Nevertheless the available data do not show any immediate impact on attendance. Analysis by UNICEF of the results of a regular sample survey of 100 villages found that primary school attendance was maintained at around 80% during the crisis. Indeed by May 1999, both at primary and lower and upper secondary levels attendance was marginally higher than before the crisis. Table 4.4

Table 4.4
School enrolment and adult literacy 1993 - 1998

	Pre-Crisis		Crisis		
	1993	1996	1997	1998	1999
Net Enrolment ratios					
Aged 7-12 (primary)	93%	94%	95%	95%	95%
Aged 13-15 (jun. secondary)	69%	76%	78%	77%	79%
Aged 16-18 (senior secondary)	43%	48%	49%	49%	51%
Illiteracy (age 10 and above)					
Male	9%	8%	7%	7%	6%
Female	19%	17%	15%	14%	14%
Total	14%	13%	11%	11%	10%

Source: Welfare Statistics, Annual National Socio-economic Survey Susenas, various years, BPS

shows that overall enrolment ratios also held up – as did levels of literacy.

One reason why attendance did not fall is that the government's social safety net programme included specific support for education – to offset overall cuts and to protect the poor by introducing additional subsidies. These took the form of block grants to schools in the poorest areas, along with a system of scholarship payments directly to the poorest pupils. The scholarships programme appears to have been quite well targeted, and probably helped parents keep their children at school, particularly at the lower secondary level where they are especially vulnerable to being withdrawn in order to work⁶⁴.

However the main factor keeping children at school was probably parental determination. There is evidence that many parents made considerable sacrifices to protect their children's education. Not only did they sell some of their assets, but in some cases they also went short of food. For such parents, who would have been unable to sustain such efforts indefinitely, the scholarships programme will have been particularly valuable.

Cuts in the health budget

Cuts in public spending on health were even more dramatic. Total realized public expenditure on health fell 8% in real terms in fiscal year 1996/97 and by a further 12% in fiscal year 1998/99. And there is evidence that the resulting decline in quality caused people to make even less use of government health facilities. Between 1997 and 1998 the Indonesian Family Life Survey found that the proportion of adults that had used public health services, including the *puskesmas*, the public clinics, in the previous month fell from 7.4% to 5.6%⁶⁵. While in some cases this may have been because people did not have the money for any kind of health care; in others they were simply going to private clinics.

Worse still was the effect on children. This is indicated in Table 4.5 which shows that between 1997 and 1998

Table 4.5
Children's use of health facilities

	1997	1998
Using any health services	26%	20%
Using <i>puskesmas</i>	7%	6%
Using <i>posyandu</i>	15%	8%
<i>Under five</i>	47%	28%
Using private services	8%	8%
Using traditional	1%	1%

Note:
Data refer to the proportion of children using services in the four weeks prior to interview.

Source: Frankenberg et al (1999)

the proportion of children using health facilities dropped from 26% to 20%. The most serious fall was in visits to the *posyandu*. These local clinics are the main source of preventive care for children – offering immunization, vitamin A distribution and growth monitoring. The decline in usage of the *posyandu*, is partly because of a reduction in public support for the *PKK*, the Family Welfare Movement, but also because the *posyandu* rely on volunteer helpers who as a result of the crisis will have had less time to volunteer.

Another area of great concern is child nutrition. Here the overall national data have not yet shown a clear worsening in standards – though the pre-existing extent of malnutrition was bad enough. In 1999 the national proportion of children under five who were moderately underweight was around 30%. For some districts, this figure was over 50%. Nevertheless there is also evidence that the crisis increased malnutrition. For example, UNICEF-assisted research shows that the prevalence of micro-nutrient deficiencies and of child wasting (low weight-for-height) increased markedly in rural Central Java between 1995-96 and early 1999. The prevalence of wasting among children was found to be very high in early 1999 in the urban slums of Jakarta, Surabaya and Makassar. The prevalence of anaemia and night-blindness among children and mothers in both rural Central Java and in the city slums also increased during the crisis and in the first half of 1999⁶⁶.

Stagnating human poverty

A good way of getting a broad view of the impact of the crisis is through UNDP's human poverty index (HPI). As mentioned in chapter 1, the HPI remain stable at 25.4 in 1999 following the crisis. Despite the stable HPI, a dip into its components reveals a disturbing picture. The main issue seems to be access to health services – between 1995 and 1999 the proportion of the population 'without access to health services' rose from 10.6% to 21.6%. The criterion for 'access' is to live within five kilometres of a health facility – which could be a doctor, or a trained midwife or a paramedic, so there is room for different interpretations, nevertheless the trend and the long term-implications are worrying.

Reworking the miracle

The revival of economic growth in most of the crisis – affected Asian economies – including Indonesia – might suggest that these are temporary setbacks, that Indonesia can expect to resume on an upward trend. Hopefully, Indonesia will be able to rekindle both economic and human development, but if it is to do so it will have to build a different structure on new foundations.

As outlined in the previous chapter, Indonesia by the early 1990s was already markedly different from the Indonesia of 1970s and 1980s. A largely agricultural economy had now become more reliant on industry and services. And many more people were living in urban areas: between 1971 and 1990 the proportion of people living in urban areas nearly doubled: from 17% to 31%. The external environment had also been changing. International competition in labour-intensive goods was increasing, requiring Indonesia to move to more capital-intensive production that was likely to lead to greater inequality. At the same time the integration of global capital markets thrust Indonesia into a much more volatile financial environment that narrowed the opportunities for autonomous action by governments. The international political environment had also changed. The cold war was over and there was much less tolerance, and still less support, for autocratic or military governments. In one sense therefore the economic crisis was just an interlude – albeit a very traumatic one – in an ongoing historical transition.

Nevertheless the crisis itself has clearly intensified and accelerated this process of change, not just in the economy but also in the social and political spheres. Indonesia now has a democratic government that operates in a very different environment from the old autocracy. Expectations are high. People do not consider military-enforced autocracy to be a legitimate system of government. They are demanding freedom and democracy and want to be able to influence policy through public debate, through the legislature, through the media and through the many new institutions and non-governmental organizations of civil society. And with decentralization they will have opportunities to do so at many different levels of administration. Even if constitutional theory is not being changed, activities on the ground are revolutionizing constitutional practice.

This will have a profound impact on social policy. While the New Order administration could take largely autonomous decisions behind closed doors the new democratic government has to balance many competing interests and demands and make its decisions in the full glare of the media spotlight. Awkwardly, just as public expectations and public scrutiny are at their highest, the government has less resources to meet public demand. The days of the oil windfall, substantial *Inpres* grants, and generous food and fuel subsidies are over. Worse still, the government is now deep in debt.

At the height of the crisis the government took decisions on bailing out public companies and banks that will reverberate for years to come. Indonesians are slowly beginning to realize that they have thereby assumed a massive burden that they did not create – one that will

require them to pay higher taxes and will also put enormous pressure on public services. Most of the people who caused the problems remain very well off and the fact that they are not paying for their greed or their mistakes amounts to a massive transfer of resources from poor to rich. Hardly surprising therefore that the public at large are reluctant to pay more for fuel, say, or electricity or public transport⁶⁷.

A further direct consequence of the crisis is that Indonesia now finds it has to respond more directly to the advice of the international financial institutions and of donors. Now that private capital flows have to a large extent been replaced by external development assistance the government is more exposed not just to domestic questioning but also to regular external scrutiny, notably from the IMF.

Coping with globalization

Given that Indonesia finds itself in a very different global economic environment, how should it respond? One temptation would be to try to close off the economy, to protect local producers from international competition, and to insulate the financial sector from currency speculation and sudden mood swings in the financial markets. Thus far Indonesia has rejected this option and shown a resolute determination to maintain open regimes. On the trade front it has been working to lower both tariff and non-tariff barriers, and on the financial front, despite the onslaught of capital flight and currency speculation, it has remained firmly committed to open capital accounts.

Such openness is the only feasible option. If Indonesia is to progress economically it will have to engage in a third round of industrial diversification, stepping up the technology ladder to produce goods that embody higher levels of productivity. This will require investment that cannot come from either the government or the Indonesian corporate sector. For the foreseeable future the only realistic source of industrial innovation will be through external stimulus – international technology agreements and the transfer of technology through foreign direct investment. The economies of the 21st century will increasingly be driven less by manufacturing and heavy industry than by services and information technology. Some of these will be ‘weightless’ goods that can be transmitted by fibre optic cable rather than container ship. Even so, in many other cases, the information is likely to be embedded in the kind of physical goods – from electric ovens, to motor cars and even garments that Indonesia will be producing in the years ahead.

The combination of this openness, and the emphasis on stepping up to higher levels of technology, will also accelerate the trend towards increasing inequality that was evident even before the crisis. The proportion of national

GDP that comes from industry will almost certainly increase inequality between income groups – particularly if those working in agriculture get left further behind. And if the current pattern of distribution of industrial activity remains the same – with most concentrated in Java – then there are likely to be greater disparities between different provinces and districts.

Investing in human development

Rekindling Indonesia's economic miracle will mean operating on two fronts simultaneously. On the one hand seeking to raise the country to higher levels of productivity. On the other hand achieving the political and social stability in which productive enterprises can develop and grow.

Fortunately both objectives can be achieved through the same basic policy – substantial and sustained investment in human development. This is the same conclusion that all the other fast-growing economies in the region have arrived at. They know that only with an alert and highly-skilled workforce will they be able to compete in a global economy. It could be argued that Indonesia is unlikely to become a world leader in chip design, say, or software engineering, so there is little point in making investments in education to achieve industrial advantage. But the problem is that without a more highly qualified workforce, Indonesia will be unable to benefit even from the lower-level spin-off effects of higher technology production.


Table 4.6
Public expenditure on health and education

	Public expenditure		
	Per capita income \$PPP, 1998	Education % GNP, 1995-97	Health % GDP, 1996-98
Average East Asia	3,564	2.9	1.7
China	3,130	2.3	0.7
Indonesia	3,490	1.4	0.6
Korea, Rep	13,590	3.7	2.5
Malaysia	8,140	4.9	1.3
Philippines	3,520	3.4	1.7
Singapore	28,460	3	1.1
Thailand	6,690	4.8	1.7
Average South Asia	2,112	2.3	0.8
Bangladesh	1,050	2.2	1.6
India	1,670	3.2	0.6
Nepal	1,090	3.2	1.3
Pakistan	1,560	2.7	0.8
Sri Lanka	2,490	3.4	1.4
World average	6,526	4.8	2.5

Note:
East Asia health aggregate is for 'East Asia and the Pacific'.

Source: Compiled from UNDP (2000) and World Bank (2000)

Figure 4.4
Access to safe sanitation



Source : ADB, Asia Recovery Information Centre

This was evident in the previous phase of industrial developments when the large-scale export-oriented enterprises had relatively few links with local small and medium-sized enterprises that might have fed them with components or intermediate goods. For electronics and pharmaceuticals, for example, imports were accounting for 90% of export value. But the same was true even of simpler products which also had a high import component: footwear, 53%; garments, 49%; and textiles, 34%. As a result, Indonesia has consistently imported more manufactured goods than it has exported⁶⁸. The danger with the next stage of industrial development is that this process will intensify – leaving small and medium – sized enterprises even further behind.

Stepping up to higher levels of technology will require much greater investment in education. At the very least, Indonesia should aim to increase investment in public education services to something like the international average. The extent of the current gap is indicated in Table 4.6. Indonesia is investing only around 1.4% of GNP on education, compared with a global average of 4.8%. Greater public investment in education will not in itself achieve the kind of transformation required, but it is an essential first step. Beyond this, Indonesia will also need to increase the efficiency of its education services and create much closer links between higher education institutes and the kinds of enterprise that will benefit from higher levels of technology.

Health should also be a priority. This is not just a question of providing better health services. Even some of the more basic needs are not being met. Figure 4.4, for example, illustrates how far Indonesia lags behind other East Asian

countries in providing even the most basic sanitation facilities. Sanitation is also closely linked to nutrition. Many of Indonesia's children are being disadvantaged from their earliest years. In insanitary conditions the youngest children are subjected to bouts of diarrhoea that sap their strength and reduce their capacity to absorb nutrients. Currently around 30% of Indonesian children under five are moderately or severely malnourished. This is not so much because their families do not have enough food to satisfy their children's small appetites, but because they are not receiving adequate care and appropriate feeding. Only if the growth of children is being carefully monitored in the posyandu or at home, can parents and health workers spot that there is a problem and make the necessary adjustments. Without this kind of attention, the physical and intellectual development of Indonesia's children is being compromised from the outset.

The essential point here is that human development cannot be considered independently of economic development – the two have to go hand in hand. Human development is not just an objective in itself it also boosts economic growth, which in turn, can be invested in greater human development. Human development is also key to preventing inequality to rise as this economy moves towards more skill intensive phase. There are many choices to be made all along the route – about the extent and quality of education and health care, and about the distribution of public resources, to ensure a healthy, sustainable and secure environment.

One new issue that Indonesia will have to address if it is to pursue more productive forms of industry is that of

social protection – which has a bearing not just on human welfare but also economic efficiency. Like many other poor countries, Indonesia offers very little social protection to the majority of people. Few can expect a pension, unless they work for the government or in the higher ranks of the private sector, and there is no public system of unemployment benefit. As a result, when workers in the formal sector get laid off – an inevitable part of the permanent process of restructuring that takes place in an advanced economy – they often have little option but to resort immediately to work in the informal sector from which they may never return. This is a serious loss to the economy since their skills are then going to waste. It is normally assumed that any system of unemployment benefit would be impossibly expensive for a country like Indonesia. But this may no longer be true. One estimate suggests that an average contribution of just 0.4% of the payroll between 1991 and 2000 would have been sufficient to provide all insured job losers with benefits for 12 months⁶⁹.

Can Indonesia seriously pursue human development, while deep in debt, restructuring its economy, and coping with more competitive and unstable economic environment – and all this at a time of political uncertainty that includes radical plans for decentralization? There is no choice. The country has to find a way of pursuing all these objectives in tandem. The key, however, is to recognize how all these issues connect, the social, the economic and political and bring this recognition to the forefront of public consciousness.

Putting people first: A compact for regional decentralization

Faced with economic crisis, social unrest, and the daunting prospect of decentralization, Indonesia urgently needs to build a new social consensus. An important contribution to this – establishing common rights and standards for all Indonesians – could be a national compact on human development.

Indonesia's transition has multiple dimensions, social, political and economic. But underlying all these is a fundamental shift in values and perceptions. A more articulate and more assertive population is no longer willing to tolerate domination by a small political elite. A more urbanized society, informed by an ever more diverse range of national and international media, is far less willing to take political pronouncements on trust. Above all there has been an explosion of expectations as people sense the possibility for a different kind of future both for themselves and their families – and for Indonesia in the world.

Many people would see such developments as profoundly destabilizing – and in many respects they are. All the evidence points in that direction. Indonesia will be a more fluid and less predictable country for some years to come. Yet a shift in values can also be an enormous strength and open up fresh possibilities. People who are more conscious of their own rights can also discover common needs and interests – and aspire to ideals that transcend issues of class, or religion, or ethnicity.

In the past, consideration of 'human rights' in Indonesia has typically been confined to demands for political freedom or protection from oppression. These are vitally important. Many Indonesians have themselves been victims of arbitrary arrest and torture. But people can also assert other, 'economic' rights – to food, say, or to health, or to work, or more broadly they might claim a 'right to development'.

While governments are willing to guarantee political rights, they have been more reluctant to take responsibility for economic rights. Political rights, have been seen as 'negative rights' that demand that the state merely desist from infringing on human liberty. Thus they can be fulfilled fairly inexpensively. The economic and social rights, on the other hand, are more 'positive' in that they require the

state to do something – to provide health care, say, or housing, or employment – a more expensive proposition.

How could the government of Indonesia possibly make such generous provision for all its citizens? Clearly it cannot. A rich state, with a per capita income of \$20,000 or more might be able to offer extensive welfare guarantees. But Indonesia with a per capita income in terms of purchasing power parity of \$2,300, and with one-quarter of its population below the poverty line, is struggling to provide even the most basic services.

Similar doubts have arisen in poor countries all over the world, where the promotion of economic rights has foundered on the hard question of who has a duty to fulfil them. Who is supposed to provide the food, or the work, or the health care? But as UNDP's global *Human Development Report* for 2000 points out, people should not be disqualified from asserting their rights simply because these rights cannot easily be fulfilled. All rights do not have to be paired with corresponding duties. Such an attitude is doubly destructive since it denies not only the rights themselves but also all hope of ever achieving them.

A better approach is to see the assertion of rights as the first step towards fulfilment. Simply identifying such rights brings them to the forefront of public consciousness and starts to build acceptance and support. A striking example of the rhetorical value of asserting rights is the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child. Indonesia, along with almost every other government, has ratified this Convention, which commits the government to achieving targets on malnutrition, for example, on water supply, and maternal mortality. These are ambitious goals, and it is clear that many of the targets set in 1990 to be achieved by 2000 have not been fulfilled. But others were, and the promises as yet unfulfilled remain as clear intentions.

In many ways Indonesia's multi-faceted transition has already been driven by an assertion of rights. When people emphasize their regional or ethnic identity they are not just demanding greater autonomy or political freedom, they are also saying that some of their most basic social and economic rights have yet to be fulfilled.

Decentralization

Governments can have many different reasons for decentralizing – to increase the efficiency of public services, for example, or to allow for greater local participation. But in most countries in recent years the principal motivations seem to have been political—to try to quell regional discontent from provinces wanting greater autonomy.

In Latin America and Africa, for example, decentralization has been a part of the democratization process as military or autocratic regimes have been replaced by democracies. Similarly in the transition economies of former socialist states, the disappearance of the central government has given a much stronger say to regional administrations. In East Asia some governments have also chosen this route as a better way of delivering services to large populations.

Conventionally there are three types of decentralization:

Deconcentration - This is the weakest form and often just shifts responsibilities to field administrations or to local administrators who are closely supervised by central governments.

Delegation - This involves transferring decision-making and administration to semi-autonomous organizations. These can be regional bodies but they can also be public corporations.

Devolution - This is the strongest form and entails transferring some authority for decision-making, finance, and management. In this case local governments can elect their own leaders, raise their own revenues, and make their own investment decisions.

Indonesia's decentralization amounts to devolution. Two laws passed in 1999 – 22 and 25 – give much more autonomy and spending power to the regions. These provide for legislative assemblies at both provincial and district level. The district assemblies, the kabupaten and the kota, will then elect the district heads, respectively the bupati or the wali kota.

In future the regions will receive a much larger General Allocation Grant, which will be a minimum of 25% of domestic revenue. The government will give 10% of this to the provinces and 90% to the districts. There will also be some specific grants. In addition, the regions that are well endowed with natural resources, particularly oil and gas, will be entitled to keep a share of these revenues. The World Bank estimates that the regions will ultimately be responsible for 40% of government spending.

Some of the most difficult issues on decentralization concern the abilities of districts to raise their own taxes and to borrow. Already districts anxious about their budgets have been introducing new taxes on local businesses. And there are concerns that if districts start to borrow funds this will further hamper the central government's ability to control the money supply and inflation. There are also worries that the bupati and the wali kota may be reluctant to invest in social services, seeing these as simply adding to their costs while not producing net revenue.

On top of this there are questions of capacity – whether the districts will be able to manage their new responsibilities. There are also concerns for equity, since those regions with more natural resources can now take greater advantage of these to move further ahead of poorer regions.

All these demands are related to the two critical issues that have been raised in this report – the fate of Indonesia's democracy and the prospects for Indonesia's economy. As the previous chapters have emphasized, these are not separate issues. Without an open and transparent democracy, Indonesia is unlikely to be able to attract the kind of investment needed to lift the economy to the next level of production. And without a functioning economy that can offer adequate employment and incomes, the country is likely to suffer from social and political unrest for some years to come.

Democratic freedoms and economic progress are linked in many ways but they converge most clearly when it comes to human development. Only with higher standards of human development will Indonesia be able to weave that intricate web of institutions, attitudes and understandings upon which complex modern democracies depend. Only with higher standards of human development will Indonesia be able to create a broadly-based, productive economy.

Responsibility passes to districts

The Indonesian Government is already party to many international conventions that commit the state as a whole to certain overall development goals. So the fulfilment of rights is generally assumed to be a national issue. But the picture has been dramatically altered by Indonesia's ambitious plans for decentralization. Because even if the central government takes overall responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, in future the responsibility for organizing and delivering the services will fall on over 340 districts.

Decentralization on this scale is a mammoth logistical undertaking. It will probably take some years before the administrative and fiscal relationships between the central government and the regions are clearly established. And will take a similar period to gather at the district level sufficient people with the training and capacity to take on many new responsibilities and duties. Decentralization also poses risks. One concerns equity. Given greater fiscal

Box 5.2

Outcomes of decentralization around the world

	Participation by, and Responsiveness to, the Poor	Impact on Social and Economic Poverty
West Bengal, India	Good: improved participation and representation, improved responsiveness.	Good: positive on growth, equity, HD; evidence lacking on spatial equality.
Karnataka, India	Fairly good: improved representation, but participation of poor less effective and responsiveness low	Neutral: did little to directly help pro-poor growth, or equality; HD and spatial equality indirectly benefited from funding allocation and development programs
Colombia	Fairly good: evidence on participation/representation ambiguous, but responsiveness improved.	Fairly good: little evidence on growth or equity, but good results on HD, spatial equity.
Philippines	Mixed: representation and participation improved through people's organizations and NGOs, but evidence on responsiveness contested, local elites still dominant.	No evidence presented.
Brazil	Little evidence, but thought to be poor as spoils/patronage system run by powerful Mayors and Governors still dominant.	Good on equity, HD in exceptional areas where state or federal programmes combined with decentralization; poor generally on spatial equity.
Chile	No evidence presented.	Mixed: growth. Equity good as result of targeting, but evidence on HD, spatial equity contested, tends to show negative effects.
Cote d'Ivoire	Poor: participation and representation low, responsiveness very low areas.	No evidence presented, but spatial equity probably improved through government allocation to rural areas.
Bangladesh	Poor: some improvement in participation, but very negative on representation of poor, responsiveness low.	Very poor on all criteria, undermined by corruption and political patronage.
Ghana	Fairly poor: participation by poor and community groups improves, limited improvement in representation, but responsiveness low.	Limited evidence shows that resources involved too insignificant to have made much impact. Spatial equity may have improved through government allocation.
Kenya	Very poor: politically-run deconcentration scheme.	Some impact on spatial equity through politically motivated redistribution.
Nigeria	Very poor: low participation and representation, very bad record of responsiveness and lack of accountability.	Poor: very bad record on equity, HD; spatial equity subject to political manipulation and urban bias.
Mexico	No evidence presented, but assumed that party-dominated patronage system remains little changed.	Poor in spite of significant central funding allocations: equity, spatial equity and HD undermined by political patronage considerations and 'basketball court' syndrome.

Sources: Crook and Suerrisson (1999)

autonomy the districts better endowed with physical and human resources could use these to pull further ahead of the rest of the country.

The international experience on decentralization offers salutary warnings and valuable lessons. One study of 12 countries, for example, found little evidence for the contention that decentralization empowers more people, reduces poverty, enhances human development or mitigates spatial equality. The results are summarized in Box 5.2. This and other studies confirmed one of the dangers of decentralization in developing countries – that far from strengthening local democracy, the process can end up reinforcing the power and influence of local elites.

Paradoxically the key to successful decentralization is

the attitude and behaviour of the central government. Is the centre ideologically committed to human development for all regional communities? Does it actively support local political initiatives to challenge the power of elites? Is it prepared to work out a detailed strategy for decentralization and to conscientiously amend this according to local needs and circumstances?

Indonesia's past success in narrowing regional inequalities are a strong basis on which to build. But this achievement may also engender complacency – an assumption that the proclamation of decentralization will on its own be sufficient to move the process in the right direction. As the international experience has shown, this is unlikely.

Applying the Human Development Index in Indonesia

Now that the Government has passed responsibility for most development activities to the districts, many local officials are faced for the first time with the task of promoting human development in their own areas. What should they do?

First, they will need to appreciate the relationship between the human development concept and the human development index. The human development concept is very broad - encompassing almost every aspect of human life - from freedom of expression, to gender equality, to employment, to child nutrition, to adult literacy. The human development index (HDI), on the other hand, has a much narrower scope. Although it does indeed try to measure the state of human development, it can do so only partially. This is mainly because many things, such as community participation, for example, or mental health, are almost impossible to measure or to collect data on, and even then it is difficult to merge data on many different issues into one overall index.

The priority for the regions therefore should be to focus less on the index and instead on the wider concept and central principles of human development. This means that in every aspect of their work local officials should be putting people first - considering them not as the means of development but as the ends. Rather than trying to educate people and keep them healthy simply to provide a better workforce, for example, or to boost economic prosperity, they should instead be helping men, women and children in their region to lead richer and more fulfilling lives. So every activity, be it investing in roads, or granting licenses for mining, or building new health facilities, should aim to enlarge the choices available to the whole population, and to do so in a way that is equitable and sustainable.

The human development index offers some guidance. This Human Development Report has calculated the HDI for each of 294 districts or municipalities across Indonesia. In each case the index is a score from 0 to 100, so the gap between the current index and 100 represents the human development 'shortfall'. This makes it possible to rank the districts from 1 to 294. As can be seen from table 1, this places South Jakarta in first position, with an index of 75 - and thus a shortfall of 25 - while Panaia in Irian Jaya occupies 294th position with an index of 44 and a shortfall of 56. What does this mean? Obviously when it comes to considerations of income, life expectancy and educational achievement - the components embodied in the HDI - the needs of Panaia are far greater than those in South Jakarta. But does it also imply that they are precisely twice as big - that the development budget per capita for Panaia should therefore be around twice that for South Jakarta?

Clearly not. In fact delivering services comparable to those in South Jakarta to remote areas of Irian Jaya would require far more than double the per capita development expenditure. The HDI offers a useful indication. Actual budgeting, resource allocations and development planning will require closer examination of data on transport infrastructure, say, health facilities, or levels of employment and unemployment to establish immediate priorities and opportunities. The HDI represents a huge advance from the previous concentration on income alone, but even so it only offers a general signpost.

It should also be emphasized that the HDI is only as good as the data that is fed into it. The current data set has been much improved by BPS, but even so more work needs to be done to refine and refresh the data. This means that one should not exaggerate minor differences in HDI. Better perhaps to consider districts or municipalities in groups or bands. The global Human Development Report presents countries in three groups - low human development (0 to 49); medium (50 to 79); and high (80 and above). On this classification, all but eight districts in Indonesia would be considered 'medium'.

To distinguish better between regions in Indonesia, one could have three different bands: 'higher' (65 and above); 'medium' (60 to 64); and 'lower' (below 60). On this basis, 125 districts or cities fall into the 'higher' band, 128 in the 'medium' and 44 into the 'lower'. The districts classified as 'lower' here are all rural but they are scattered across most of Indonesia's provinces. This indicates the need to target resources more carefully at the poorest districts. Even so, actual budget allocations, will need to take many other factors into account.

A compact on human development


How can Indonesia ensure that decentralization does indeed cement national cohesion and deepen national commitment to human development? How can Indonesia create the momentum for public action?

One way to ensure that decentralization works in the interest of all Indonesians would be to establish a new social compact: an agreement that all Indonesians - as Indonesians - are entitled to nationally mandated standards of human development. They are entitled to be literate, for example, to be healthy, to be able to earn a decent

income, to have adequate shelter, and to live as one nation in peace and security.

These rights must apply equally across the country. This does not imply uniformity. Indonesia will remain a richly heterogeneous nation. But at the same time it should also have a nationally agreed framework of rights and standards. With these in place, regional cultural and ethnic diversity are not divisive elements but rather the building blocks of a strong and coherent nation. Such a compact could include the following key elements:

Figure 5.1
Literacy rate by province, 1999



Source : BPS

- *A mission statement* – emphasizing the primacy of human development and articulating the basis for a creative partnership between central and local governments.
- *Human development standards* – establishing the levels to be achieved across all regions.
- *Public deliberations* – reinforcing democratic norms and values and exchanging ideas and information across the country.

As well as making a contribution towards national cohesion and consolidating democracy, such a compact could also serve to galvanize policy makers and administrators at all levels, enabling them to renew their commitment to human development.

A mission statement

The mission statement would need to establish the primacy of human development as both a means and as an end in itself. And it should also include a commitment on absolute poverty – not merely on its alleviation, but on its eradication.

Indonesia's future will of course depend on the strength of its economy and of its social and political institutions. But in Indonesia as elsewhere, these are contributions to a larger process – widening the range of choices, economic and social that are available to all citizens, ensuring that they are able to participate fully in the decisions that affect their lives.

The mission statement will also need to highlight the importance of a productive partnership between central and regional governments. There are still many detailed and practical issues to be settled on decentralization – on how resources, human and financial are to be shared between central, provincial and district administrations.

But these can only be worked out through a spirit of partnership that will enable central and local governments to reach their full potential. Once this partnership has been affirmed, and the key ideas are in place, then both the financial arrangements and the necessary action will follow.

Human development standards

There are two ways of setting standards and the various intermediate targets towards achieving them. The first – a more minimalist approach – tries to establish what seems to be feasible in Indonesia at present and merely tries to ensure that this national standard is achieved across the country. The second – the internationalist approach – is based on a more universal vision, taking inspiration from international goals and standards, setting these as the targets to which Indonesia should aspire.

The minimalist approach

The aim here would be to ‘pull up’ weaker provinces and districts to the national average. So the national average becomes a *de facto* national standard. To illustrate how this might work, one could take literacy, which is one of the key components of the human development index. Figure 5.1 shows how literacy varied across the provinces in 1999 and how this distribution relates to the national rate – 88%.

This shows that 10 out of the 27 provinces fell below the national average. If these were raised to the 1999 national average of course the average would go up, so the target subsequently might be higher. This is conceptually similar to a relative poverty line, which is the type normally applied in richer countries where the proportion living in poverty are considered to be those living on less than half the median income. If they become less poor this tends to raise the poverty line. In the case of the ‘literacy line’ this too would slowly rise.

To see what kind of progress could be expected, it is simpler to fix the lines for literacy and for other social indicators at the 1999 averages. Then extrapolation from past trends will suggest how long it might take for all regions to attain these. For the purposes of demonstration this exercise has been carried out using provincial-level data, though the same principle can be applied to districts.

As Table 5.1 indicates, the number of provinces that fall below the national average vary from 9 to 17 depending on the indicator. But if previous performance is a guide, some will take a long time to catch up. West Nusa Tenggara, for example, would take 17 years to reach the 1999 literacy average.

Table 5.1

Years required for provinces to reach 1999 national averages based on past trends

	Life expectancy at birth	Literacy rate	Mean years of schooling	Proportion of households with access to safe water	Infant mortality rate	Proportion of births attended by medical personnel	Proportion of households living in dirt-floor dwellings
Aceh	–	–	–	7.7	–	–	–
North Sumatra	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
West Sumatra	1.4	–	–	5.6	2.1	–	–
Riau	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Jambi	–	–	0.9	12.8	–	0.8	–
South Sumatera	4.9	–	2.1	–	2.3	–	–
Bengkulu	5.2	–	–	17.0	3.1	–	–
Lampung	2.1	–	3.6	1.0	0.8	2.0	14.9
Jakarta	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
West Java	5.4	–	0.7	0.2	4.7	3.5	–
Central Java	–	5.9	6.4	–	–	0.1	10.3
Yogyakarta	–	4.0	–	–	–	–	0.9
East Java	1.6	10.0	7.0	–	2.3	–	7.7
Bali	–	6.1	0.5	–	–	–	–
West Nusa Tenggara	14.4	17.3	13.3	16.9	9.4	6.3	6.3
East Nusa Tenggara	8.7	11.3	8.0	15.5	10.0	9.7	22.4
West Kalimantan	8.1	5.8	8.5	–	7.1	6.5	–
Central Kalimantan	–	–	–	11.6	–	0.2	–
South Kalimantan	28.4	–	2.7	12.6	20.8	1.8	–
East Kalimantan	–	–	–	15.5	–	–	–
North Sulawesi	–	–	–	0.9	–	–	–
Central Sulawesi	8.2	–	–	5.5	7.1	2.4	1.0
South Sulawesi	–	6.2	2.4	8.5	–	2.3	–
Southeast Sulawesi	11.1	2.4	0.6	6.2	4.6	13.8	2.0
Maluku	–	–	–	11.4	–	7.1	9.9
Irian Jaya	5.7	26.4	10.1	9.6	3.0	2.7	–

Notes:

'–' indicates that the region has already surpassed the national average for this indicator.

The time required for provinces to reach the national average was estimated using their average rate of improvement over the period 1990-99.

Source: Calculated from BPS data.

The universalist approach

The minimalist approach does highlight the plight of certain provinces, but in a sense it is arbitrary. In the case of literacy, for example, it is more reasonable to set the target as 100% rather than 88%. The minimalist approach also erodes the right to literacy since it suggests that individuals in each province only have a right to an 88% chance of being literate.

A better way is to start from universal norms and rights. Of course for each district, or province, or the nation as a whole there will be incremental progress as more people become literate, but an individual is either literate or illiterate, so the goal itself can be absolute.

In fact, many such goals have already been set. A sequence of United Nations conferences during the 1990s produced a corresponding series of goals that encompass most aspects of human development. These included:

- *Poverty* – By 2015 the proportion of people living in extreme poverty should be reduced from its 1990 level by at least 50%
- *Basic education* – By 2015 enrolment in primary education should have reached 100%.
- *Gender disparities in education* – By 2005 gender disparities should have been eliminated in both primary and secondary education.
- *Infant mortality* – By 2015 the infant mortality rate should be brought down below two-thirds of its 1990 level.
- *Maternal mortality* – By 2015 to be reduced to below three-quarters of its 1990 level.
- *Primary health care* – By 2015 there should be universal access to primary health care, including access to safe and reliable methods of family planning.

These goals were formulated as international targets, and assumed to be the responsibility of national governments. There was no consideration of how they might be applied at a sub-national level. Such goals have also been accepted at the national level in Indonesia where the government has incorporated them into national plan documents, though again without disaggregating them for use at provincial or district levels⁷⁰.

While this approach is appropriate in small, compact countries, it is less tenable in a country as extensive and diverse as Indonesia. A better approach therefore would be to 'regionalize' the international development goals, and assess the extent to which provinces and districts will be able to reach these goals by 2015. What does this imply? Table 5.2 shows the prospects for attaining a selection of these goals at the provincial level assuming that the rate of progress is similar to that of previous years.

But it would also be possible to add other, universal goals – to achieve 100% literacy, for example, 100% access to safe water, and to have no households living in dwellings with dirt floors.

Another possibility is to include Indonesia's stated intention to have all children complete nine years of school. The time that might be taken to achieve these goals is shown in Table 5.3.

These tables show that if one considered trends for the country as a whole, many of these goals would be achieved within the targeted international timeframe. Indeed as Table 5.2 suggests, Indonesia would achieve all the goals except those for universal net primary enrolment. The picture is similar for the universal goals, except that in this case extrapolation suggest that it would take Indonesia 40 years to achieve universal safe water supplies.

Table 5.2
Time required from 1993 to reach selected international development goals, based on 1993 - 1999 trends

	Poverty (1)		Education (2)		Gender (3)		Infant Mortality (4)		Maternal Mortality (4)	
	Years	Date of attainment	Years	Date of attainment	Years	Date of attainment	Years	Date of attainment	Years	Date of attainment
Aceh	150	2143	11	2004	8	2001	16	2009	6	2005
North Sumatra	122	2115	41	2034	above 100	—	14	2007	12	2011
West Sumatra	86	2079	27	2020	above 100	—	13	2006	6	2005
Riau	73	2066	23	2016	8	2001	17	2010	9	2008
Jambi	13	2006	25	2018	76	2069	16	2009	11	2010
South Sumatera	31	2024	29	2022	9	2002	14	2007	7	2006
Bengkulu	82	2075	12	2005	14	2007	15	2008	7	2006
Lampung	84	2077	14	2007	40	2033	14	2007	10	2009
Jakarta	20	2013	46	2039	above 100	—	13	2006	9	2008
West Java	17	2010	12	2005	7	2000	12	2005	15	2014
Central Java	47	2040	32	2025	13	2006	7	2000	10	2009
Yogyakarta	11	2004	30	2022	7	2000	12	2005	5	2004
East Java	13	2006	41	2034	18	2011	14	2007	10	2009
Bali	24	2017	19	2012	9	2002	11	2004	5	2004
West Nusa Tenggara	130	2123	11	2004	above 100	—	9	2002	19	2018
East Nusa Tenggara	28	2020	63	2056	above 100	—	19	2012	27	2026
West Kalimantan	60	2053	15	2008	80	2073	16	2009	20	2019
Central Kalimantan	23	2016	33	2026	12	2005	9	2001	11	2010
South Kalimantan	19	2012	21	2013	9	2002	23	2016	13	2012
East Kalimantan	13	2006	77	2070	16	2009	8	2001	13	2011
North Sulawesi	29	2022	33	2026	above 100	—	14	2007	12	2011
Central Sulawesi	15	2008	49	2042	81	2073	11	2004	14	2013
South Sulawesi	57	2050	22	2015	above 100	—	6	1999	15	2014
Southeast Sulawesi	90	2083	17	2010	above 100	—	17	2010	25	2024
Maluku	80	2073	75	2068	13	2006	6	1999	24	2023
Irian Jaya	17	2010	76	2069	20	2013	9	2002	18	2017
Indonesia	15	2008	30	2023	10	2003	10	2003	12	2011

Note:

Time required to reach selected international development goals, based on 1993-99 trend assuming that it is linear

(1) The target is to reduce income poverty by 50% between 1993 and 2015.

(2) The target is to achieve 100% primary enrolment by 2015.

(3) The target is to eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary educational enrolment.

(4) The target is to reduce infant mortality rate by two-thirds between 1993 and 2015.

(5) The target is to reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters between 1993 and 2015.

Table 5.3

Time required in years to reach selected universal targets based on 1990 - 1999 trends

	Literacy (1)	Education (2)	Water (3)	Housing (4)
Aceh	8	11	83	16
North Sumatra	8	5	19	8
West Sumatra	10	10	72	14
Riau	6	9	78	6
Jambi	10	15	99	8
South Sumatra	14	18	115	16
Bengkulu	12	13	148	42
Lampung	17	18	27	24
Jakarta	9	-	7	1
West Java	10	13	37	6
Central Java	20	22	21	16
Yogyakarta	16	5	34	5
East Java	24	22	40	14
Bali	16	13	6	3
West Nusa Tenggara	29	30	69	18
East Nusa Tenggara	27	22	57	31
West Kalimantan	16	22	124	13
Central Kalimantan	9	12	50	10
South Kalimantan	14	19	59	11
East Kalimantan	11	6	76	12
North Sulawesi	11	10	22	15
Central Sulawesi	13	13	61	12
South Sulawesi	17	15	69	21
Southeast Sulawesi	15	12	68	19
Maluku	9	7	77	22
Irian Jaya	41	26	71	8
Indonesia	16	13	40	10

Note:

- (1) The target is a 100% literacy rate.
(2) The target is 9 years of compulsory education.
(3) The target is for all household to have access to safe water.
(4) The target is to have no households living in a dwelling with a dirt floor.

Can the regions catch up?

These tables also highlight the importance of considering these targets by region. In the case of poverty, on current trends 18 provinces will not meet the 2015 target date, and some will miss it by a long way. The picture is better for infant mortality and the elimination of gender disparities in education: just two provinces fall short.

But the implications emerges even more clearly when it comes to the universal targets in Table 5.3. Simply extrapolating national trends would suggest, for example, that nine years of compulsory education could be attained within 13 years. But clearly this cannot be achieved nationally until it has also been achieved in every province.

The slowest province is East Nusa Tenggara, so Indonesia cannot achieve the target before this province does so. In that case it is going to take 30 years. The

same reasoning would suggest that universal access to safe water will take not 40 years but rather the discouragingly long 148 years required by Bengkulu.

These figure are intended only to be illustrative, and extrapolating from past trends is a crude way of making such estimates. But this exercise does at least dramatize the importance of drawing up a human development compact with standards that will help the poorest provinces to catch up. If these are basic rights then they must be achieved by all Indonesians.

This raises serious distributional considerations. At present the resource-rich regions are reluctant to cross-subsidize their less well-endowed counterparts. But thus far the discussions have focused only financial transfers. The compact approach helps to shift the debate to the terrain of human rights – to the kind of standards that should be acceptable to all Indonesians wherever they live.

Public deliberation

Democratic values and norms can only emerge from deep and extensive consultation. A clear Constitution, and the holding of free and fair elections are of course the bedrock of a functioning democracy. Indonesia is fortunate to have both. But these are only the starting points. Citizens need many other opportunities for national debate – to establish not just the basic ground rules, but also the values that shape and colour everyday decisions. This is even more vital when the people who take such decisions are scattered across more than three hundred districts of a vast archipelago.

One way to trigger such deliberations would be to hold a National Social Summit – along the lines of the global Social Summit held in Copenhagen in 1995. The preparations for such meeting, and the event itself, could help carve out a vision for a democratic, decentralized Indonesia.

The starting point for such deliberations might be a ‘state of the regions’ survey. The central government in partnership with the provinces and kabupatens could

outline the issues and challenges facing the implementation of decentralized governance. This ‘information blueprint’ could serve as the basis for a National Summit, to be held sometime in 2002. From this could emerge a statement of agreed national standards and an assessment of what the entitlements were for each region. The next part of the Summit would consider the financial implications, the critical policy interventions, and the strategic framework for implementation.

A new consensus

The critical challenges facing Indonesia are complex and diverse – consolidating democracy, addressing regional conflicts, regenerating the economy. But this report has argued that a common thread runs through all these. Achieving a secure and prosperous Indonesia, with a thriving economy, in which each part of the country believes it has a vital stake, will demand considerable skill and commitment from leaders and communities at all levels. It can only succeed if it is based on a new consensus – a shared commitment to human development.

End Notes

- 1 For a survey of global political change in the 20th Century see Freedom House (1999), *“Democracy's Century”*.
- 2 Amartya Sen when asked to evaluate the most significant achievement of the 20th argued as follows:
“the pre-eminent development of the period is the rise of democracy. Indeed, in the distant future when people look back at what happened in this century they would find it difficult, I believe, not to accept the pre-eminence of democracy as the most striking development of this period. It is in the 20th century that the idea of democracy got established as the “normal” form of government to which any nation is entitled – whether in Europe, or America, or Asia, or Africa. We do not have to establish afresh, each time, whether such and such country is ‘ready’ for democracy (the type of question that was prominent in the discourses in the 19th century); we now take for granted.” For a detailed treatment of the subject see Sen (1999), *“Development as Freedom”*.
- 3 A phrase popularised by Huntington (1991) in his book *‘Democratization in the late 20th Century’*. The third wave refers to the spread of democratic systems of government in around 35 countries in Asia and Latin America from the 1970s onwards. The first two waves spanned 1828-1926, and 1943-1962.
- 4 Sen, 1999, p. 1
- 5 For a detailed treatment of different aspects of citizen's rights; civil, political and social see Marshall (1965), “Class, Citizenship and Social Development”. Marshall distinguished the three component of citizen's rights as follows: civil rights protecting individual freedom, political rights guaranteeing participation in the exercise of political power, and social rights, those providing access to material and cultural satisfactions. A similar classification is used to rank democratic states in the Freedom House global survey of freedom.
For a classic treatment of notions of individual freedom, see Berlin (1969), *“Four essays on liberty”*. Berlin's classification of liberty as positive and negative freedoms has now become a standard notion in the literature.
- 6 For an interesting view about the origins of different types of rights, see Tilly (1998), *“Where do rights come from?”* Tilly argues that in the context of European politics, the recognition of social rights was obtained by the exercise of political rights and the consequent struggle between different social groups. The situation in fledging democracies in developing countries with regard to the acceptance of all three types of rights described by Marshall might therefore be more favourable in so far as there is now widespread acceptance of the validity of social rights. These have a direct link with and bearing upon the policy approach to the provision of social welfare services in line with HDI.
- 7 HDR 2000, p. 2
- 8 This is both by helping to rebuild lost human capital as well as creating conditions of ‘trust’ between different social groups. The concept of social capital, attributed to James Coleman, refers to the view now widely accepted that capital today is embodied less in land, factories, tools and machines and increasingly in the knowledge and skills of human beings. The concept of social capital goes further and claims that in addition to skills and knowledge, a distinct portion of human capital has to do with people's ability to associate with each other, that is critical not only to economic life but to virtually every aspect of social existence. As Francis Fukuyama shows, “the ability to associate depends on the degree to which communities share norms and values and are able to subordinate individual interests to those of larger groups. Out of such shared values comes trust, and trust has a large and demonstrable economic value.” (Fukuyama, 1995, p.10)
- 9 The social compact approach has also the merit of helping to dampen social conflict by an explicit recognition of human rights and basic capabilities. According to Fukuyama, lack of such recognition leads social instability. As he writes: “The desire for recognition (as distinct from the aim to maximise utility) is an extraordinary powerful part of the human psyche; the emotions of anger, pride and shame are the basis for most political passions and motivate much that goes on in political life” (See Fukuyama, 1995 for a detailed elaboration of this thesis.
- 10 The role of equity in increasing social cohesion and reducing political conflict is accepted by the IMF's recent analysis of the link between economic policy and equity. As the Fund points out: “To be effective most policies require broad political support, which is more likely to be forthcoming when the distribution of income is seen as fair.” (IMF, 1999,p.20). In situations of systemic transitions triggered by sharp economic declines however, public dialogue and open debates facilitated by democracy, as Sen argues, have an instrumental role. These processes help decide what is fair and not fair in a given social and political context. See Sen (1999), chapter 2 on the Ends and Means of Development.
- 11 There is of course considerable literature on different concepts of democracy (e.g. procedural or deliberative), as well as on the role that public discourse and deliberation might play in defining a national or common interest distinct from specific group interest. See for instance Habermas, (1996), *“Three normative models of democracy”*, and Benhabib's, (1996) *“Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy”*. For an analysis of relative merits of different democratic institutions see Dahl (1989), *“Democracy and its Critics”*
For a set of essays on transitions to democracy see Haggard and Kaufman (1995), *“The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.”*
For a more detailed treatment of deliberative democracy see: Elster (1999), *“The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory”*, and Rawls (1999), *“The Idea of Public Reason”*. For a provocative essay on the need for equality of political opportunity see Knight and Johnson (1999), *“What Sort of Political Equality does Deliberative Democracy Require?”* Rawls illustrates the link between human development, as an enabling condition for public participation in complex ethical decisions, when he notes that public reason “in democratic society is the reason of equal citizens who as a collective body,

exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution. This means that political values alone are to settle such fundamental questions as: who had the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property.” (Ibid. p. 94)

- 12 Booth, A (2000). p. 75.
- 13 World Bank (2000), Poverty Reduction in Indonesia - constructing a new strategy, First Theme, pp 3-4.
- 14 The World Bank (1993) dubbed this phenomenon of growth and reduction in poverty and inequality as “shared growth”.
- 15 See Islam and Chowdhury (2000) for a discussion of trends in inequality in East and Southeast Asia.
- 16 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999, Table 1.3
- 17 BAPPENAS/UNICEF (2000, Table 6.2, p. 96)
- 18 BAPPENAS/UNICEF (2000).
- 19 BAPPENAS/UNICEF (2000, p. 41).
- 20 The Gender-related development index includes male-female differentials in life expectancy, adult literacy rate, mean years of schooling and earned income share.
- 21 Enclave districts have higher levels of resource and industrial base, and can be treated as outliers.
- 22 See Dhanani and Islam (2000, pp. 11-12) for details.
- 23 See Papanek (2000).
- 24 See Dhanani and Islam (2000).
- 25 Skoufias et al (1999)
- 26 The World Bank estimates that between 30% and 60% of households are vulnerable to poverty over a three year horizon (World Bank, 2000c, p. 11)
- 27 Nevertheless hubris is not confined to autocratic governments. What goes up need not necessarily stay up. Sen (2000) makes this point cogently. 'Perhaps the most obvious problem relates to the recognition that the heady days of unmitigated success – with things going up and up and nothing ever falling down – are over. Even though much of Asia is already well on the way to recovery from the crisis that hit it in 1997, the sense of invulnerability has not survived. It could not have. Indeed, it is clear that severe economic crises can occur and disrupt the rushing stream of unobstructed economic progress that many Asian countries took for granted. This is not a kind of "Murphy's Law", a grand claim that if things can go wrong, they will. Rather, it is a very modest claim that dangers of interruption are omnipresent, and no matter how robust things may look, they can - and sometimes will - go wrong. Belief in invulnerability is, in fact, a childish thought: like the way teenage car drivers often assume that accidents cannot happen to them in particular.
- 28 Zainu'ddin (1968) p. 251.
- 29 Ricklefs (1981). p 251.
- 30 On October 28, 1956 Soekarno made a famous speech in which he asked the Indonesian people to “bury the parties”. Two days later, on October 30, responding to accusations that he wanted absolute power for himself, in an address to the Indonesian Teacher's Association he said: “I am not a managing director of the Indonesian republic and I don't want to become a dictator because it is contrary to my conscience. I am a democrat. But I don't desire democratic liberalism. On the contrary I want a guided democracy”. Quoted from Harian Rakjat in Legge (1972), p.279.
- 31 Dahl (1996) p. 337.
- 32 Freedom House (1999)
- 33 Political observers characterise Malaysia and Singapore as semi-democracies. Although both countries have regular parliamentary elections, political and civil rights are restricted, and one party has been dominant from their inception. Democratic transitions occurred in the Philippines and Thailand in 1986 and 1991, respectively. Democratic transitions in Taiwan (China) and the Republic of Korea occurred in the mid-1980s
- 34 Macintyre (1994a)
- 35 Rajan and Zingales (1998)
- 36 This of course does not deny the importance of a policy-mix that is conducive to economic growth. As mentioned earlier, the New Order regime of President Soeharto was developmentalist and its first priority was to stabilize the economy.
- 37 The democracy index combines indices of political rights and civil liberties.
- 38 Lee (1994).
- 39 Barro (1991).
- 40 Bhalla (1994).
- 41 World Bank (1993b), ADB (1997)
- 42 Krugman (1994b).
- 43 Hill (1996), p. 158, quoting BPS data. Also see Hill (1990) for a more detailed discussion of Indonesia's changing industrial structure in the 1970s and the mid 1980s. As the author notes, (p. 90-91) the labour intensive classification included a wide range of industries with textiles, garments, furniture, non metallic mineral industries such as bricks, tiles, ceramics and miscellaneous manufacturing industries such as sporting equipment etc. were the most labour intensive industries, with labour productivity less than half that of the average of non-oil manufactures. The most important anomaly in the labour intensive classification seems to be in the case of “resource intensive” industries which in fact contain a wide range of factor intensities, from the more labour using wood and rubber to rather capital intensive basic metals and cement. United Nations Indonesia (1991) Common Country Assessment.
- 44 By the mid 1970s, five SUSENAS surveys had been carried out: 1963/64, 1964/65, 1967, 1969/70, and 1976. The same year, 1976, saw the publication of a labour force survey: the SAKERNAS. Cost of living surveys of major cities were conducted in 1968/69 and 1970/71. Finally, the Agricultural Census was published in 1973 and provided data on rural landholdings. For an analysis of the results of these various sources see Booth (1981)
- 45 Tabor (1992).
- 46 Jain (1975).
- 47 Booth and Sundrum (1981). p. 205.
- 48 Prijono, O. 1999. p. 161.

- 49 World Bank, 1990, p. 93
- 50 World Bank (1993a).
- 51 Moreover, as Hill (1996) , p. 147, writes: “The large subsidies since the 1970s, in pesticides, fertiliser, irrigation, credit and research and extension services, are also being reduced. In addition, fiscal austerity since the mid 1980s and a reluctance to consider partial or complete divestment have starved many state owned agricultural enterprises of much needed capital injections.”
- 52 For a comprehensive if somewhat selective review of agricultural modernisation in Indonesia see Hill (1996), Chapter 7. For a discussion of regional growth in agriculture see Tabor (1992). Hill summarises the different in economic performance of small and large estates as follows: “...there are various commercial relationships between larger and smaller units, particularly at the processing stages. Some of these linkages have been promoted by the government, especially in the case of state enterprises which are expected to be in their proximity. Physical yields on estates are often significantly higher, especially in the case of rubber, palm oil and tea.... The estates which are state owned, have also received a range of government subsidies”. Hill (1996), p. 140.
- 53 Hill (1996). P.158.
- 54 For much of the last decade, Indonesia had under-utilised this quota. Since the quota was set in physical terms, irrespective of quality improvements, Indonesia benefited from a guaranteed market for its textile and garment exports relative to its competitors.
- 55 Savings ratios have been revised downwards in IMF (1997) compared to IMF (1996). The latter estimated national savings, as distinct from foreign savings, to be 35.4% in 1995/96. The former estimates this to be 29.4% in 1995/96, falling marginally to 29.3% in 1996/97.
- 56 Reliance on FDI as distinct from portfolio capital is arguably one way out of this volatility problem. But this too is not without difficulties. While it is true that direct foreign investment is generally more stable than short-term portfolio capital, as neither is easy to predict over any given length of time. The former is undertaken for many different reasons, including the desire to take advantage of tax and grant incentives, to gain first entry into a growing market, and to benefit from entry into a regional trading bloc. Many countries including those in the OECD area have discontinued the policy of offering special incentives to foreign investors, on the grounds that this merely leads to a loss of revenue without guaranteeing higher volumes of FDI. Moreover, longer-term investment decisions are also affected by volatility in the short-term capital market if this leads to exchange rate instability or a rise in inflation, both of which are likely to make the returns from longer-term investment more uncertain.
- 57 In Indonesia as elsewhere there is an ongoing debate over the policy towards interest rates. Typically the Central Bank has argued in favour of a tight monetary policy and high interest rates to keep inflation in check while the Ministry of Finance argues for a lowering of interest rates. See the Economist Intelligence Unit Report, Indonesia, (1997) 2nd Quarter.
- 58 Despite this, the problem of rising capital inflows and the inflationary threat that these pose has led the Indonesian Central Bank to widen its intervention bands used to support the rupiah. However, wider bands also carry a cost in terms of greater exchange-rate volatility, and the impact on export competitiveness
- 59 For a good overview of the tools available to handle the capital inflows problem see Lee (1996), IMF. As Lee, p. 34, concludes: “The recent experiences of many developing countries reveal that the monetary authorities often lack suitable instruments that can sterilise fully or for long, persistently large capital inflows. In the context of a liberalising environment, their traditional tools of monetary control typically lose effectiveness; at the same time, they cannot fully rely on more advanced instruments of market-based monetary control because various elements of the supporting institutional infrastructure have yet fully to be developed.”
- 60 Mishra (1997) summarised the picture as follows: “The late 1990s Indonesia is therefore confronted with a quite different set of initial conditions with respect to an equitable development programme. The foundations of economic growth are less certain raising questions about sustainability. Economic policy is beset with new problems which it only vaguely knows how to solve. The changing structure of production threatens Indonesia's historically relatively favourable distribution of income and consumption. This in turn reduces the poverty elasticity of economic growth. As a result, similar magnitudes of economic growth as in the past will contribute less to the decline in poverty. At the same time, public expenditure levels are under due to the decline of oil and gas revenues and because of the need to maintain outside investor confidence”.
- 61 Irawan, P., Ahmed, I., Islam, I., (2000).
- 62 World Bank (2000f).
- 63 Stalker (2000). p. 10.
- 64 Frankenberg, E. Thomas, D. and Beegle, K. (1999). p. 21, Table 2.1
- 65 Helen Keller International (1999), cited in UNSFIR (2000a), p. 14)
- 66 McLeod (200) p.13.
- 67 UNIDO (2000).
- 68 Islam, I. (2000).
- 69 In fact the Indonesian government has used the Copenhagen initiative to revisit national commitments to poverty eradication and human development and has reflected them in national plan documents. However, the province-level dimensions have not been explored. See Department of Foreign Affairs, Government of Indonesia (2000). See also UNICEF (2000, Appendix B) which explores the attainment of the 'World Summit on Children's Goals and Progress in Indonesia' at a national level

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The concept and measurement of human development

The concept of human development

"People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives. This may appear to be a simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the accumulation of commodities and financial wealth."

Those opening lines of the first Human Development Report (HDR), published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990, clearly stressed the primary message of every HDR at global, national and sub-national levels – the human-centred approach to development – that places human well-being as the ultimate end of development, not the means of development. Unlike previous concepts of development which have often given exclusive attention to economic growth, on the assumption that growth will ultimately benefit people, human development introduces a broader and more comprehensive concept, covering all human choices at all societies at all stages of development. It broadens the development dialogue from a discussion of mere means (GNP growth) to a discussion of the ultimate ends. It draws its inspiration from the long-term goals of a society and weaves development around people, not people around development.

As defined in the first HDR of 1990, human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Other important choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect. Thus, human development concerns more than the formation of human capabilities, such as improved health and knowledge. It also concerns the use people make of their acquired capabilities – for leisure, productive purposes, or being active in cultural, social and political affairs. Human development has to balance these concerns.

Human development requires freedom. The objective of increasing people's choices cannot be achieved without people actually being free to choose what they want to be and how they want to live. People must be free to exercise their choices in properly functioning markets, and they must have decisive voices in shaping their political frameworks. People who are politically free can ensure their participation in planning and decision-making through democratic rule that leads towards consensus and consolidation rather than being dictated to by an autocratic elite. Here, human development and human rights share a common vision and a common purpose – to secure the freedom, well-being and dignity of all people everywhere (Box 1).

Box 1

Human Development and Human Rights

Human development and human rights share a common vision and common purpose to secure:

- Freedom from discrimination - by gender, race, ethnicity, national origin or religion.
- Freedom from want - to enjoy a decent standard of living.
- Freedom to develop and realize one's human potential.
- Freedom from fear - of threats to personal security, from torture, arbitrary arrest and other violent acts.
- Freedom from injustice and violations of the rule of law.
- Freedom of thought and speech and to participate in decision-making and form association.
- Freedom for decent work - without exploitation

(HDR 2000, page 1)

To avoid any confusion, it is necessary to clearly delineate the difference between this way of looking at development and the conventional approaches to economic growth, human capital formation, human resource development, human welfare or basic needs. The concept of human development is much broader than the conventional theories of economic development.

‘Economic growth’ models deal with expanding the GNP rather than with enhancing the quality of human lives. ‘Human resource development’ treats human beings primarily as inputs in the production process – as means rather than as ends. The ‘welfare’ approach looks at human beings as beneficiaries and not as agents of change in the development process. Finally, the ‘basic needs’ approach focuses on providing material goods and services to deprived population groups rather than on enlarging human choices in all fields.

The human development approach brings together the production and distribution of commodities and the expansion as well as the use of human capabilities. It analyses all issues in society – whether economic growth, trade, employment, political freedom or cultural values – from the perspective of people. It also encompasses the critical issue of gender. Human development is thus not merely the concern of the social sector. It is a comprehensive approach to all sectors.

Human development has four major elements – productivity, equity, sustainability and empowerment (Box 2). Through enhanced capabilities, the creativity and productivity of people must be increased so that they become effective agents of growth. Economic growth must be combined with equitable distribution of its benefits. Equitable opportunities must be available both to present and to future generations. And all people, woman and men, must be empowered to participate in the design and implementation of key decisions that shape their lives.

Box 2

Four essential components of the human development paradigm

The human development paradigm contains four main components:

- **Productivity.** People must be enabled to increase their productivity and participate fully in the process of income generation and remunerative employment. Economic growth is, therefore, a subset of human development models.
- **Equity.** People must have access to equal opportunities. All barriers to economic and political opportunities must be eliminated so that people can participate in, and benefit from, these opportunities.
- **Sustainability.** Access to opportunities must be ensured not only for the present generations but for future generation as well. All forms of capital - physical, human, environmental - should be replenished.
- **Empowerment.** Development must be by the people, not only for them. People must participate fully in the decisions and processes that shape their lives.

(HDR 1995, page 12)

Human development goes beyond economic growth, but it is not anti-growth. From a human development perspective, economic growth is not an end in itself. Rather is a means to an end – enlarging people’s choices. There is, however, no automatic link between income growth and human progress. In the short run, even in the absence of satisfactory economic growth, countries can achieve significant improvements in human development through well-structured public expenditure. However, it is wrong to suggest that economic growth is unnecessary for human development. In the long run, no sustained improvement is possible without growth.ⁱ

Human development concerns are not merely focused on the rate of growth but also on its distribution. Thus, the issue is not only *how much* economic growth, but also *what kind* of growth. More attention should be directed to the structure and quality of that growth – to ensure that it is directed to supporting the improvement of human well being for both present and future generations. The main preoccupation of development policies then should be how such a link can be created and reinforced.

Translating the human development concept into policy

The incorporation of the human development concept into development policies does not necessarily lead to a complete departure from earlier development strategies that aimed at, among others, accelerating economic growth, reducing absolute poverty and preventing a deterioration in the physical environment. The difference, from the human development standpoint, lies in the clustering of all the previous objectives around the central goal of enlarging human choices.

From time to time, the HDRs have made strong policy recommendations for both international and national agendas (Box 3). The primary aim of the global proposals is to contribute to a new paradigm of sustainable human development that is based on a new concept of human security, a new partnership of developed and developing countries, new forms of international cooperation and a new global compact. Meanwhile, the national proposals have focused on the centrality of people in the development process, on the need for a new partnership between the state and the market and on new forms of alliance between governments, institutions of civil society, communities and people.

The human development approach also has tremendous potential for analysing situations and policies at the national level. By 1999 – ten years after the publication of the first HDR – more than 260 national and sub-national human development reports had been produced in 120 countries.

In each country these served to bring together the facts, influence national policy, and mobilize action. The 1998 South Africa human development report, for example, provided information on how the fast-spreading HIV epidemics will affect human development. In India, due to its high level of regional disparities, UNDP India has

supported the preparation of human development reports by state governments.

The human development concept has also caught the attention of Indonesia's policy makers. Compared to the traditional economic approach that primarily focuses on increasing production and productivity, the human

Box 3

GLOBAL PROPOSALS:

The 20:20 initiative (1992):

With the aim of turning both domestic and external priorities to basic human concerns, the initiative proposed that every developing country allocate 20% of its domestic budget, and every donor 20% of its official development assistance (ODA), to ensuring basic health care, basic education, access to safe water and basic sanitation, and basic family planning packages for all couples.

Global human security fund (1994):

This fund would tackle drug trafficking, international terrorism, communicable diseases, nuclear proliferation, natural disasters, ethnic conflicts, excessive international migration and global environment pollution and degradation. The fund of \$250 billion a year would be financed with \$14 billion from a proportion of the peace dividend (20% of the amount saved by industrial countries and 10% of that saved by developing countries through a 3% reduction in global military spending); \$150 billion from a 0.05% of tax on speculative international capital movements; \$66 billion from a global energy tax (\$1 per barrel of oil or its equivalent in coal consumption) and \$20 billion from a one-third share of ODA.

A new global architecture (1994):

A globalizing world needs new institutions to deal with problems that nations alone cannot solve:

- An economic security council to review the threats to human security.
- A world central bank to take on global macro economic management and supervision of international banking.
- An international investment trust to recycle international surpluses to developing countries.
- A world antimonopoly authority - to monitor the activities of international cooperations and ensure that markets are competitive.

A timetable to eliminate legal gender discrimination (1995):

As of December 1998, 163 countries had ratified the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman (CEDAW), but others - including the United States - had not. Women's rights are human rights. There should be a timetable for recognizing legal equality between women and men everywhere, say by 2005, using CEDAW as the framework.

NATIONAL PROPOSALS:

Restructuring Social Expenditure (1991):

Resources should be reallocated to basic human priority concerns through an analysis of a country's total expenditure, social expenditure and human priority spending ratios. The key is to move away from military spending towards social spending - and to shift the focus to primary human concerns: better education, health services and safe water accessible to poor people.

A critical threshold of 30% for women representation (1993):

Women must have a critical 30% representation in all decision-making processes - economic, political and social - nationally and locally. Reaching this threshold is essential to enable women to influence decisions that affect their lives. And to achieve gender equality, social norms and practices must be changed, and women's access to social services, productive resources and all other opportunities made equal to men's.

Pro-poor growth (1996):

The quality of economic growth is as important as its quantity. For human development, growth should be job-creating rather than jobless, poverty-reducing, rather than ruthless, participatory rather than voiceless and environment-friendly rather than futureless. A growth strategy that aims for a more equitable distribution of assets, that is job-creating and labour-intensive, and that is decentralized can achieve such growth.

Agenda for poverty eradication (1997):

People's empowerment is the key to poverty elimination and at the centre of a six-point agenda:

- Empower individuals, households and communities to gain greater control over their lives and resources.
- Strengthen gender equality to empower women.
- Accelerate pro-poor growth in low-income countries.
- Improve the management of globalization.
- Ensure an active state committed to eradicating poverty.
- Take special actions for special situations to support progress in the poorest and weakest countries.

(HDR 1999, page 18-19)

development approach has a closer association to the primary objective of developing every aspect of humanity or “*pembangunan manusia seutuhnya*” as stated in the 1993 state guidelines (*GBHN*). The human development index also offers a more reliable and comprehensive measure of development progress than the single measure of growth in per capita GDP.

Several attempts have been made to introduce the human development concept and to apply this approach to Indonesia’s development process. The first step was to make the data set available. In 1996, the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) published the 1990 and 1993 human development indices for the provincial levels, followed in 1997 by a release of the 1996 index. This inter-provincial comparison attracted a lot of attention, particularly from the high-growth provinces that happened to rank low in human development. This controversy, however, successfully triggered greater regional awareness of the weaknesses of the traditional economic approach to development and has focused regional attention on people-centred development.

In 1997, to promote the adoption of the human development approach into the regional planning process, the Indonesian Government – i.e. the Directorate General of Regional Planning, the Ministry of Home Affairs and BPS – with the support of UNDP Indonesia initiated a pilot programme that covered 9 provinces and 18 districts (Table 1). This 18-month pilot program was integrated into the ‘Eastern Indonesia Decentralized Development Programme’ with the primary aim of orienting regional development planning toward human development, and enhancing the capacity of regional planning agencies (*BAPPEDA*) to coordinate regional development planning. For this purpose, the project provided training, manuals

Table 1
Pilot regions for the development and application of HDI in regional planning

Province	Regency
1. Irian Jaya	Sorong and Jayapura
2. East Timor	Aileu and Baucau
3. Maluku	Central Maluku and Central Halmahera
4. South Sulawesi	Gowa and Polmas
5. East Nusa Tenggara	Southern Part of Central Timor and Alor
6. West Nusa Tenggara	Central Lombok and Sumbawa
7. East Java	Sidoarjo and Lamongan
8. Central Java	Banyumas and Grobogan
9. West Java	Bandung and Tangerang

Box 4

HDI in West Java Vision 2010

The province of West Java was one of the pilot regions for “Development and Application of HDI in Regional Planning” and its provincial government consistently used the HDI as the main indicator for its regional planning. In its 2010 vision, the province aimed to be the most developed province in Indonesia, and to achieve that goal the HDI of the province was targeted to be more than 80 by the year 2010.

This seems an ambitious target given the fact that its 1999 HDI was 64.6 and the province was ranked 15 among the 26 provinces in Indonesia. This was slightly lower than the pre-crisis HDI of 68.2 in 1996 when it was ranked 14. If this province maintains its past trend, it will be able to attain a 100% literacy rate in 10 years, achieve the 9 years compulsory education target in 13 years, reduce infant mortality by one-third in 12 years, and close the gender gap in primary education in 7 years. The hardest challenge is in the provision of safe water. If it followed its previous trend this province would need 37 years to be able to provide all households with access to safe water.

To discuss the adoption of the human development index in its regional development planning, the provincial planning agency organised a 2-day workshop in May 2001. All the sectoral offices at the provincial and district levels of government attended the workshop. There was an extensive discussion of the budgetary implications. While the workshop was fruitful, there was a call for further efforts towards socialization at the district level with the full participation of local legislatures.

and planning consultants to assist the regional government in adopting a human development approach in their planning process. Through this effort the human development approach has been integrated into the existing development planning mechanism – the *P5D* (Guidelines for Planning and Managing Development Process at Regional Level) – and the human development index has been incorporated into the regional planning document – the ‘*Pola Dasar Pembangunan Daerah*’ -.

BPS produced the data set for all provinces and later on, as part of the pilot project, for all districts. This has focused the attention not only of the governments of the pilot regions, but also of the non-pilot regions. However, the internalisation of the human development concept has been hindered by the fact that the central government still tends to use the traditional economic approach which merely focuses on per capita GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product). When the pilot project ended, no further systematic attempt was made to disseminate this concept.

The most recent decentralisation efforts, however, have raised concerns that the regional governments may neglect

Box 5

A new partnership for governance reforms

Indonesia is engaged in a complex series of transitions that will demand new forms of governance. To help the country explore the possibilities and build some of the necessary capacity for these changes, UNDP together with BAPPENAS, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in February 2000 established the Partnership for Governance Reforms in Indonesia. This Partnership is neither government-controlled nor donor-driven, instead it is managed by an independent and diverse group of Indonesians. The Partnership's activities include:

Governance Assessment – Gathering local opinion on governance issues and disseminating the results.

Decentralization – Helping increase capacity at all levels of government for the process of decentralization and autonomy.

Civil Society – Contributing to an enabling environment for the organizations of civil society.

Legal and Judicial Reform – Supporting the reform plans of the National Law Commission for a sector-wide policy and plan. Helping promote dialogue among key actors in the justice sector. Supporting national debate on constitutional reforms.

Police and Security Reform – Helping to clarify and strengthen the role of the police.

Anti-Corruption – Contributing to a phased strategy and programme to combat 'KKN' - corruption, collusion and nepotism.

Electoral Reform – Supporting debate on alternative electoral systems and strengthening institutional capacity for electoral management.

long-term social development, since they have a tendency to focus on short-term economic (revenue raising) activities. It is important therefore to ensure that the human development concept is used as an advocacy tool for sustainable regional development.

Refinements in the statistical measurement of human development

If the human development concept is to be translated into policymaking, it must be easily measured and monitored. Over the years the global HDRs have developed and refined the statistical measurement of human development. Nevertheless there remain many difficulties in reducing the holistic concept of human development to one number. Consequently, it is important to be aware that the *concept* of human development is much deeper and richer than its *measurement*. It is impossible to come up with a comprehensive measure – or even a comprehensive set of indicators – because many vital dimensions of human development are non-quantifiable. A simple composite measure of human development, can certainly draw attention to the issue

quite effectively, but it needs to be supplemented by analyses to capture other important dimensions that cannot be easily quantified.

In the first HDR (1990) the index combined national income (as a proxy of standard of living) with two social indicators – life expectancy (representing longevity) and the adult literacy rate (representing knowledge). The index was thus an approximation that tried to capture the many dimensions of human choice. But it still had some of the same shortcomings as the income measures, notably that its national averages concealed regional and local disparities.

From time to time, efforts have been made to refine the HDI, although the three basic components – longevity, knowledge and a decent living standard – have been maintained to retain the basic simplicity of the original HDI concept. The second HDR (1991) added a new indicator – mean years of schooling – to the knowledge component. This variable was given a weight of one-third, while adult literacy was given a weight of two-thirds. This acknowledged the importance of having a high level of skill formation and also greatly helped in differentiating countries clustered in the higher ranks. In the 1995 HDR, however, this variable was replaced by the combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios because the latter were more readily available and did not need a complex formula for calculation.

With regard to the indicator that represented decent living standards, the first HDR used purchasing power, adjusted for real GDP per capita. This was the most widely available data that could provide an approximation of the relative power to buy commodities and to gain command over resources for a decent living standard. In 1991, the idea of diminishing returns to income was incorporated by giving a progressively lower weight to income beyond the poverty cut-off point, rather than the zero weight previously given. Until 1993, this poverty cut-off point was derived from the poverty-level income in industrial countries, with values updated and translated into purchasing power parity dollars (PPP\$). From the 1994 HDI onwards, the threshold value has been taken to be the current average global value of real GDP per capita in PPP\$.

Besides the refinements in HDI computation methods, the HDRs have also tried to take into account the distribution aspect by measuring income-distribution-adjusted HDIs and gender-disparity-adjusted HDIs. This had the effect of significantly shifting the rankings of some countries depending on their levels of disparity. Meanwhile other indices have also been developed. The 1995 HDR, for example, introduced the Gender related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measures

(GEM) to better capture the extend of gender equality. In 1997, the HDR presented another human deprivation measure – the Human Poverty Index (HPI) – to reflect the extent of progress and highlight the backlog of deprivation (Box 5). In principle, the HDI, GDI and HPI all have the same components – longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living – but use different measurements (Table 2).

Estimating the sub-national human development indices in Indonesia

In 1996, BPS and UNDP Indonesia published, for the first time, the Indonesian inter-provincial comparison of human development indices for 1990 and 1993.ⁱⁱ Since the main data source, the socio-economic survey (Susenas), was not available before 1990, the index was not compiled for earlier periods. Due to the limitation on data availability, this first publication focused only on the human development index and was not yet able to present other indices. In principle, the method used in this first attempt followed the one applied by UNDP in constructing the 1994 HDI. Some modifications, however, were unavoidable, particularly with regard to the construction of provincial standards of living. While UNDP used adjusted real per capita GDP as a proxy for income, this publication used adjusted per capita real expenditure (provincial average), obtained from Susenas and measured in 1988/89 constant prices. This ensured comparability, both inter-regional and across time. A targeted level to be achieved by the end of the second long term development period (2018) was set as the maximum value, and the

selection of the income threshold values was adjusted so as to be suitable for the situation in Indonesia.

A revised version and more complete figures were published in 1997. The Summary of the Indonesian Human Development Report 1996 contained the revised figure for 1990 and the figures for 1996. Besides the HDI figures, this publication also presents provincial GDIs, and GEMs for 1990 and 1996 as well as the HPIs for 1990 and 1995. The HDI figure in this publication, however, is not comparable with the HDI figure in the previous publication because of methodological changes, notably in the base year used in the computation of the adjusted per capita real expenditure. The previous publication used 1988/89 as the base year, while the 1997 publication and this publication have 1993 as the basis. As part of the pilot project for the development of the human development index and its application to regional development planning, in June 1999, BPS and the Directorate General of Regional Development and the Ministry of Home Affairs published district level figures for 1990 and 1996.ⁱⁱⁱ

The 1996 HDI figure presented in the 1997 publication was slightly different from the figure in the 1999 publication and in this publication. This difference is due to the calculation of life expectancy at birth which basically extrapolated the figures on infant mortality obtained from a series of surveys and censuses (see technical note for a detailed explanation). In the 1997 publication, the life expectancy figure is less accurate because it was based on the 1971, 1980 and 1990 Population Censuses, while the 1999 publication, as presented in this report, includes the data from the 1995 Population Survey between

Table 2

HDI, GDI and HP-1 – Same component, different measurements (global HDR norms)

	Longevity	Knowledge	Decent standard of living
HDI	Life expectancy at birth	1. Adult literacy rate 2. Combined enrolment ratio ^{*)}	Adjusted per capita income in PPP\$ ^{*)}
GDI	Female and male life expectancy at birth	1. Female and male adult literacy rate 2. Female and male combined enrolment ratio ^{*)}	Female and male earned income share
HPI-1	Percentage of people not expected to survive to age 40	Illiteracy rate	Deprivation in economic provisioning, measured by: 1. Percentage of people without access to water. 2. Percentage of people without access to health services 3. Percentage of underweight children under the age of five.

^{*)} Minor adjustments in measurements made in the calculation of this indicator as presented in this publication (see the following sub-section for detail explanation).

HDI, HPI-1, GDI and GEM

Human Development Index (HDI)

The HDI measures the overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development - longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living. It is measured by life expectancy, education attainment and adjusted income.

Human Poverty Index (HPI-1)

The HPI-1 measures poverty in developing countries. The variables used are the percentage of people expected to die before age 40, the percentage of adults who are illiterate and deprivation in overall economic provisioning - public and private - reflected by the percentage of people without access to health services and safe water and the percentage of underweight children under the age of five.

(HDR, 1998, page 15)

Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

The GDI measures achievements in the same dimensions and variables as the HDI, but captures inequalities in achievement between women and men. It is simply the HDI adjusted downward for gender inequality. The greater the gender disparity in basic human development, the lower a country's GDI compared with its HDI

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

The GEM reveals whether women can take active part in economic and political life. It focuses on participation, measuring gender inequality in key areas of economic and political participation and decision-making. It tracks the percentages of women in parliament, among administrators and managers and among professional and technical workers - and women's earned income share as a percentage of men's. Differing from the GDI, it exposes inequality in opportunities in selected areas.

Censuses and the 1996 Social Economic Survey. It is also of particular importance to note that the 1999 life expectancy figure in this publication is based on the projection of the 1971, 1980 and 1990 Population Censuses, the 1995 Population Survey between Censuses, and the 1996 Social Economic Survey, in addition to the census data mentioned above. It is also of particular importance to note that the 1999 life expectancy figure in this publication is an estimate based on past trends and does not take into account the possible impacts of the latest economic crisis. A more reliable figure will be published in the next Human Development Report in which the data from the 2000 Population Census will be incorporated.

The methods used in this publication follow the UNDP methods as much as possible, to ensure comparability with the international figure. However, due to data availability and for other substantive reasons, some modifications from the global method are necessary.

Among the differences is the measurement of educational attainment component in the HDI. As mentioned earlier, after 1995 the global report replaced mean years of schooling with the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment rates. This report, however, still uses mean years of schooling. This is for several reasons. First, for time-series comparisons, as reliable data on the combined gross enrolment rate in the

previous year are not readily available. Second, mean years of schooling (MYS) is a better impact indicator than the gross enrolment rate which is usually considered as a process indicator. So the MYS will be more stable than the enrolment rate which tends to fluctuate more. However, the MYS is not sufficiently sensitive to capture the short-term impact of the crisis on school attendance. This would only be captured if the crisis caused permanent dropouts from school. To fill this gap, this report also presents the age groups school participation rate and school drop out rate.

The other departure from global methods is the database used as a proxy of income. The global report uses per capita GDP while this report uses per capita expenditure. This is primarily due to the fact that the per capita GRDP, an equivalent measure of per capita GDP at sub-national level, does not represent the real purchasing power of the community. Inter-regional economic integration is so high that even though the GRDP captures the regional output, it does not guarantee that this output is distributed mainly among local people. In this regard, the per capita expenditure data obtained from the social economic survey is a better proxy of the purchasing power of local people. To ensure that it is comparable across regions and over time, this data is refined using a standard procedure as presented in great detail in the technical note.

What do the human development indices reveal?

The global Human Development Reports have introduced the HDI, the GDI, the GEM and the HPI. These provide summary information about human development in each country. Taking the spirit of the global report, this country report presents all those indices disaggregated at sub-national levels – provincial and district levels. The effort to construct the indices down to the district level is of particular importance given that the ongoing decentralization reform process in Indonesia will potentially transfer the major part of the development process to local government and local society. This will require better understanding on local conditions supported by reliable data for all districts.

There are two important points in using the indices. First, by going beyond income or regional output, these indices provide more comprehensive measures of human well-being than income measures alone. Second, even these composite indices do not provide a complete picture by themselves. They must be supplemented by other indicators of human development.

The Human Development Index

The HDI value ranges from 0 to 100 (see technical note for a detailed explanation on the method for calculating the HDI). The HDI value of a region shows the distance

Figure 1
Indonesia: Human Development achievement: the provinces (1999)





Figure 2
Why the 1999 HDI drop?



that it has to go – the shortfall - to attain the maximum possible value of 100 and also allows inter-regional comparisons. The challenge for every region is to find ways to reduce its shortfall.

The HDI reveals the following state of human development:

- Of the 26 provinces for which the HDI is calculated, none of them is in the global category of high human development (with a HDI value of more than 80). If we divide the global ‘medium’ category into ‘upper’ and ‘lower’, 8 provinces are in the upper-medium human development category (HDI equal 66.00 – 79.99), 18 are in the lower-medium human development category (HDI equal 50.00 – 65.99) and none is in the low human development category (HDI less than 50.00).
- The economic crisis that has hit Indonesia since late 1997 has resulted in the reversal of human development achievements in all provinces. The negative value of the reduction in shortfall in all provinces indicates that, compared to what was achieved in 1996, the HDIs achieved in 1999 are moving farther from the maximum possible value of 100. The province of North Sulawesi records the sharpest drop, followed by Jakarta and Central Kalimantan, while East Nusatenggara experiences the smallest drop. These sharp drops are explained largely by falls in purchasing power parity.
- Of the 294 districts for which the 1999 HDI is constructed, none are in the high human development category, 93 are in the upper-medium human development


Table 3
Who still make progress during the crisis

Regency/City	Province	Reduction shortfall 1996-99
Jaya Wijaya	Papua	2.1
Central Halmahera	Maluku	1.9
Central Maluku	Maluku	1.7
Fak Fak	Papua	1.7
Manggarai	East Nusatenggara	1.5
Bantaeng	South Sulawesi	0.9
Merauke	Papua	0.7
Salatiga	Central Java	0.7
Yapen Waropen	Papua	0.5

category, 195 in the lower-medium human development category and 6 are in the low human development category. Apart from nine districts, almost all of them also experienced a decline in human development over the period 1996-1999. Eight of the nine are located in the outer islands while only 1 is in Java.

- The disparity between the western and the eastern parts of Indonesia still persists. Most districts in eastern Indonesia are in the low and lower-medium human development categories, while the districts in Java-Bali and Sumatra dominate the upper-medium human development category. This inequality is largely explained

Figure 3
The east-west disparity in human development achievement



Note: Western Indonesia includes Sumatera, Java and Bali. The rest is eastern Indonesia

by the disparity in educational attainment, particularly with regard to the adult literacy rate, and to people's standard of living represented by per capita expenditure.

- The disparity between provinces is relatively low and tends to decrease over time. The standard deviation in inter-provincial variation in HDI is less than 10%. However, the inter-provincial disparity in mean years of schooling is relatively high, reflecting the persistence of disparities in the advancement in educational attainment.
- The disparity within provinces can be substantial. Irian Jaya records the widest disparity with the HDI values ranging from 43.6 in Paniai to 69.7 in Jaya Pura. This disparity is probably the result of natural conditions and the poor infrastructure in the inner island that has created isolated enclaves. The province with the second-largest intra-provincial disparity, however, is East Java – a relatively industrialized province with highly developed infrastructure. The district of Sampang in the poor island of Madura has a HDI value as low as 47.3, while the HDI value for Surabaya City, which is only 90 kilometres away from Sampang, is 69.3. While the inequality in natural conditions (soil fertility and climate) might explain some of this inequality, it also reflects the impact of industrialization which has increased the disparity between the industrial area and the surrounding areas. Special policies will be needed to reduce this gap if the fruits of development are to be more evenly translated into better human well-being for the population at large.
- Just like the international phenomenon, the relationship between economic prosperity and human development at the sub-national level does not show any automatic link. The district-level data reveal that it is only in the big cities that the regions' economic prosperity is being successfully translated into better living conditions for


their people. In these regions, the rank in per capita GRDP corresponds to the rank in HDI. For the most remote areas, the rank in HDI is substantially lower than the rank in per capita GRDP, indicating an output leakage.

- The progress in human development differs among regions. Of the 284 districts for which HDI trends between 1990 and 1999 are available, 79 have experienced a reversal in human development and five of them (Kupang, Pekan Baru, Minahasa, Bukit Tinggi and Sabang) have recorded sharp drops of more than an average of 1% per year. This fall is basically due to the slow progress during the early 90s, so that the progress in 1990-96 could not compensate for the sharp drop following the 1997 crisis. The other 205 districts have recorded an improvement in human development and four of them (Lebak, Sangihe Talaud, Sukoharjo and Banyumas) have achieved significant improvements, averaging more than 3% annually, despite the HDI fall during the crisis.
- In every human development category, there are cases of fast progress and slow. The fact that the regions that started from the lower human development class in 1990 have experienced relatively faster growth than ones that started from higher human development classes indicates a tendency towards convergence.

Human poverty and deprivation

The Human Poverty Index uses indicators of the most basic dimensions of deprivation: a short life, lack of basic education and a lack of access to public and private resources. This index uses the deprivation concept of poverty in which poverty is seen as the manifestation of the denial of opportunities and choices. For policy-makers, poverty of choices and opportunities is often more relevant

Figure 4
Within province disparity: East Java and Papua



than poverty of income, for it focuses on the causes of poverty and leads directly to strategies of empowerment and other actions to enhance opportunities for everyone.

The HPI for provincial and District levels indicates the following:

- Of the 26 provinces for which HPI trends between 1990 and 1998 are available, all but five provinces (Aceh, Jambi, Bengkulu, Lampung and Central Sulawesi) managed to reduce their HPI during this period. The deterioration in access to health services and the reduction in people's longevity seems to explain the increasing HPI trend in these five provinces. On the other hand, the success in reducing HPI is largely explained by the improvement in the provision of basic education, access to safe water and the nutritional status of the children under five.

- For the provincial average, the HPI for 1998 ranges from 15.5% in Jakarta to 38.7% in West Kalimantan. This is much lower than the 1990 HPI which ranges from 20.4% in Jakarta to 43.5% in Central Kalimantan. Jakarta records the lowest HPI since 1990, while West Kalimantan also records the highest HPI since 1990 despite minor changes in the ranks of other provinces. This indicates that the relative position between provinces in terms of human poverty did not change very much over the last decade.

- At the district level the variation is wider. The 1998 HPI ranges from 8.3% in North Jakarta to 47.7% in Jaya Wijaya. Of the 294 districts for which the HPI is calculated, 3 regions (Padang Panjang, Central Jakarta and North Jakarta) record HPIs of less than 10%. 126 districts are in the lower-medium category of HPI (between 10% to 25%), 154 districts are in the higher-medium category of HPI (between 25% to 40%), and 11 districts are in the higher rank (more than 40%) although none of them is higher than 50%.

Figure 5
The eight years progress in human poverty:
provincial variation




Table 4
Districts in the lowest and highest rank in 1990 and 1999

The lowest

	1990 Rank			1999 Rank			
	1990 HDI	1996 HDI	1999 HDI	1990 HDI	1996 HDI	1999 HDI	
Jaya Wijaya	35.3	43.9	48.7	Paniai	36.7	48.9	43.6
West Lombok	36.5	51.6	49.9	West Sumba	45.5	57.2	45.4
Paniai	36.7	48.9	43.6	Sampang	40.8	48.2	47.3
Sampang	40.8	48.2	47.3	Jaya Wijaya	35.3	43.9	48.7
Nias	43.2	55.5	50.4	Southern Central-Timor	47.7	55.9	49.2
West Sumba	45.5	57.2	45.4	West Lombok	36.5	51.6	49.9
Central Lombok	45.8	51.2	50.7	Nias	43.2	55.5	50.4
Lebak	46.2	61.6	61.0	Central Lombok	45.8	51.2	50.7
Sintang	47.0	60.3	60.3	Sikka	52.0	58.9	51.5
Dompu	47.0	59.0	56.2	Belu	53.2	59.5	51.8


The highest

	1990 Rank			1999 Rank			
	1990 HDI	1996 HDI	1999 HDI	1990 HDI	1996 HDI	1999 HDI	
Pekan Baru (City)	74.5	75.9	71.7	South Jakarta (City)	74.2	77.2	75.1
South Jakarta (City)	74.2	77.2	75.1	Yogyakarta (City)	74.0	76.1	73.4
Yogyakarta (City)	74.0	76.1	73.4	Ambon (City)	70.3	74.3	73.0
Manado (City)	73.9	76.2	72.5	East Jakarta (City)	73.4	76.4	72.8
Bukit Tinggi (City)	73.7	76.1	70.9	Manado (City)	73.9	76.2	72.5
East Jakarta (City)	73.4	76.4	72.8	Palangka Raya (City)	73.0	76.9	72.3
Central Jakarta (City)	73.2	76.0	71.3	West Jakarta (City)	71.2	76.1	72.2
Palangka Raya (City)	73.0	76.9	72.3	Denpasar (City)		74.6	72.1
Minahasa	72.3	73.7	69.3	Bengkulu (City)	71.8	74.9	71.8
North Jakarta (City)	72.0	74.6	71.5	Pekan Baru (City)	74.5	75.9	71.7

Table 5
The fastest and slowest progress
in human development 1990 - 1999


District	1990 HDI	1999 HDI	Reduction shortfall (1990-1999)
Starting from low human development in 1990			
Fastest progress			
05. Sintang	47.0	60.3	2.77
01. Buton	49.8	62.5	2.80
02. Lebak	46.2	61.0	3.07
Slowest progress			
01. West Sumba	45.5	45.4	-0.03
04. Southern Central-Timor	47.7	49.2	0.32
03. East Lombok	49.0	52.1	0.68
Starting from lower-med human development in 1990			
Fastest progress			
03. North Maluku	59.1	65.5	1.74
04. Banjarnegara	56.8	63.6	1.74
05. Tanjung Jabung	56.7	63.6	1.76
Slowest progress			
03. Kupang	61.9	57.0	-1.44
08. Dairi	63.8	61.1	-0.83
02. Poso	65.0	62.6	-0.77
Starting from upper-med human development in 1990			
Fastest progress			
72. Batam	67.8	70.9	1.07
73. Salatiga	68.1	71.5	1.18
73. Pematang Siantar	66.3	70.9	1.50
Slowest progress			
71. Pekanbaru	74.5	71.7	-1.25
03. Minahasa	72.3	69.3	-1.17
75. Bukit Tinggi	73.7	70.9	-1.17

Figure 6
1999 HPI: the district achievement



can be distributed less equitably in a region with a relatively low HDI. The provincial figures of HPI and HDI reveal this distributional problem in 6 provinces. The provinces of Aceh, Riau and Central Kalimantan, are ranked high in HDI achievement but they are ranked low in HPI. This indicates the importance of directing human development efforts towards the most deprived people. On the other hand, the provinces of East Java, South Kalimantan and South-East Sulawesi are ranked high in HPI (having relatively low levels of HPI) but ranked low in HDI achievement. Policies will certainly play a big part in determining how achievements in human development progress are distributed.


Figure 7
The poverty conditions : 1998 HPI and Poverty Rate



- Income poverty and the HPI do not always go hand in hand as each measures different aspects of poverty. Income poverty, presented as the proportion of population below the poverty line (the poverty rate), measures relative deprivation in achieved standard of living, while the HPI measures the deprivations that might hinder people's opportunity to achieve a better standard of living. Combining these two measures, however, reveals an interesting poverty picture. The district-level data show that the regions with low HPIs also have low poverty rates, while the regions with high HPIs vary in their poverty rate. Of the 11 regions with HPIs of more than 40%, nine of them have relatively low poverty rates. The other two districts – Jaya Wijaya and Paniai – have serious poverty problems on both the HPI and income poverty measures.

- A comparison between HDI and HPI values shows the distribution of achievements in human development progress. For a given HDI, human development can be distributed more equitably in a region with a relatively low HPI and for a given HPI, human development progress

Figure 8
Narrowing the HDI-GDI gap (1996 - 1999)



Disparities between men and women

The HDI is a measure of average achievements and thus hides differences in human development between men and women. The gender-related development index (GDI) captures achievement in the same set of basic capabilities as the HDI – life expectancy, educational attainment and income – but adjusts the results for gender

inequality. The GDI for the provincial level has been calculated for 16 provinces for 1996 and 1999, while the disaggregated data for 294 districts has been calculated for 1999.

- For every region where data is available, the GDI value is lower than the HDI value. This reflects the presence of gender inequality in every society. If there were no gender disparity, the HDI and GDI values would be the same. During the period 1996-1999, the gap between HDI and GDI narrowed, reflecting an improvement in gender equality. Among the 26 provinces, the province of East Kalimantan recorded the largest gap with 15 percentage points in 1996 which decreased to 14 percentage points in 1999. Yogyakarta had the smallest gap of 3.5 percentage points in 1996 and also has narrowed the gap to 2.2 percentage points in 1999.

- Of the 26 provinces, none had a GDI value of less than 50 in 1996 but one province – West Nusatenggara - had a GDI value of less than 50 in 1999. Overall, the crisis had an adverse impact on gender inequality as almost all provinces have experienced reversal in GDI. Only Maluku records progress in GDI during the 1996-1999 period. The sustainability of this progress, however, is questionable given the severe impact of the conflict in this region.

- Of the 294 districts, 54 (18%) have a GDI value of less than 50. 171 districts have a GDI value between 50 and 60, while the rest (69 districts) are just above 60.

The gender empowerment measure (GEM) captures gender inequality in key areas of economic and political participation as well as decision-making. It focuses on women's opportunities rather than their capabilities. The

Figure 9
The GDI reversal, 1996 - 1999: Provincial achievement





Figure 10
Monitoring the GEM: the provincial attainment
(1996 - 1999)



GEM has been calculated at the provincial level for 1996 and 1999 and at the district level for 1999.

- Among the 26 provinces, Yogyakarta is at the top of the ladder in 1999, followed by Bengkulu and South Kalimantan. The relative position of each province with

regard to its GEM value changes significantly between 1996 and 1999, which is partly the result of changes in women's representation in local parliaments. In five provinces (Aceh, East Java, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan and Maluku), the proportion of the parliament's seats occupied by women increased a little, but in the other 21 provinces the proportion fell. South-East Sulawesi marked the largest drop, almost 13%, followed by Central Kalimantan at about 10%.

- Comparing the GEM values in 1996 and 1999 shows a reversal in all provinces. This reversal is primarily explained by the drop in women's representation in parliament. The proportion of women elected to local parliaments in the 1999 election dropped significantly compared to the proportion for the 1992 election as captured in the 1996 data. This shows that a more democratic election does not guarantee an increase in women's representation, reflecting the fact that during Indonesia's transition political parties have yet to establish clear stands on gender mainstreaming.

- Of the 26 provinces, 15 are in the low GEM category with GEM values of less than 50. The rest are in the medium category of just above 50 and none has a GEM value of more than 60. Among the 288 districts for which the GEM is calculated, 76% are in the low GEM category and the rest, 24%, are in the medium GEM category with the city of Semarang having the highest value of 61.1.

ⁱ The correlation between economic growth and human development was intensively explored in the series of HDRs since its first publication in 1990. The 1996 HDR, in particular, is primarily focused on the discussion of this issue.

ⁱⁱ See "Human Development Index (HDI) of Indonesia: Provincial Comparison 1990 - 1993". BPS and UNDP. 1996.

ⁱⁱⁱ This publication is in *Bahasa Indonesia* and the title is "*Indeks Pembangunan manusia Kabupaten dan Kota di Seluruh Indonesia*".

1 Human Development Index (HDI) by Province, 1996 and 1999

Province	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)		HDI		HDI Rank		HDI Reduction shortfall
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996 - 1999
	11. Aceh	66.4	67.6	90.1	93.1	7.0	7.2	576.3	562.8	69.4	65.3	9	12
12. North Sumatra	65.7	67.1	94.6	95.8	7.5	8.0	576.9	568.7	70.5	66.6	7	8	-2.4
13. West Sumatra	63.8	65.5	91.8	94.7	6.9	7.4	587.3	577.3	69.2	65.8	11	9	-2.2
14. Riau	66.9	67.8	93.4	95.5	6.9	7.3	578.6	579.6	70.6	67.3	6	4	-2.2
15. Jambi	65.5	66.6	91.8	93.7	6.5	6.8	580.4	574.3	69.3	65.4	10	11	-2.3
16. South Sumatra	64.1	65.5	90.4	93.4	6.1	6.6	581.4	564.5	68.0	63.9	15	16	-2.3
17. Bengkulu	63.8	65.2	91.5	92.7	6.6	7.0	580.8	576.6	68.4	64.8	12	13	-2.3
18. Lampung	64.5	65.9	89.8	91.8	5.9	6.4	576.5	567.0	67.6	63.0	16	18	-2.4
31. Jakarta	70.2	71.1	96.8	97.8	9.5	9.7	591.7	593.4	76.1	72.5	1	1	-2.5
32. West Java	62.9	64.3	89.7	92.1	6.4	6.8	591.6	584.2	68.2	64.6	14	15	-2.2
33. Central Java	64.8	68.3	81.3	84.8	5.5	6.0	594.5	583.8	67.0	64.6	17	14	-1.9
34. Yogyakarta	69.9	70.9	79.8	85.5	6.9	7.9	612.3	597.8	71.8	68.7	2	2	-2.2
35. East Java	63.8	65.5	77.7	81.3	5.5	5.9	594.3	579.0	65.5	61.8	22	22	-2.2
51. Bali	68.1	69.5	79.4	82.7	6.3	6.8	609.0	587.9	70.1	65.7	8	10	-2.4
52. West Nusatenggara	54.9	57.8	68.0	72.8	4.6	5.2	579.7	565.9	56.7	54.2	26	26	-1.8
53. East Nusatenggara	62.2	63.6	78.9	81.2	5.2	5.7	544.3	576.9	60.9	60.4	24	24	-1.1
61. West Kalimantan	62.9	64.1	80.4	83.2	5.2	5.6	570.7	571.2	63.6	60.6	23	23	-2.0
62. Central Kalimantan	68.3	69.2	93.7	94.8	6.6	7.1	578.9	565.4	71.3	66.7	5	7	-2.5
63. South Kalimantan	60.3	61.0	90.3	92.8	6.1	6.6	586.7	576.7	66.3	62.2	19	21	-2.3
64. East Kalimantan	68.1	69.0	90.3	93.5	7.2	7.8	586.1	578.1	71.4	67.8	4	3	-2.3
71. North Sulawesi	66.6	68.1	96.8	97.2	7.3	7.6	582.4	578.3	71.8	67.1			
72. Central Sulawesi	60.6	62.7	90.4	92.6	6.6	7.0	581.4	569.0	66.4	62.8	3	6	-2.6
73. South Sulawesi	65.0	68.3	79.6	83.2	6.1	6.5	580.6	571.0	66.0	63.6	18	20	-2.2
74. South East Sulawesi	63.6	65.0	86.3	87.1	6.6	6.8	568.8	571.8	66.2	62.9	21	17	-1.9
81. Maluku	63.1	67.4	93.2	95.8	7.1	7.6	573.6	576.9	68.2	67.2	20	19	-2.1
82. Irian Jaya	62.7	64.5	67.4	71.2	5.0	5.6	566.9	579.9	60.2	58.8	13	5	-1.5
Indonesia ^{c)}	64.4	66.2	85.5	88.4	6.3	6.7	587.4	578.8	67.7	64.3	25	25	-1.5

Note:

^{a)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey.

^{b)} This is the annual reduction in shortfall of the HDI, calculated based on the assumption of decreasing rate of growth. For detail explanation see the technical note.

^{c)} Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figure weighted by population.

- The number before each province is the official area code.

Source: BPS special tabulation

2 Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by Province, 1996

Province	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Proportion of labour force (%)		GDI	GDI Rank
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male		
11. Aceh	68.3	64.4	86.2	94.2	6.5	7.5	37.5	62.5	63.6	6
12. North Sumatra	67.6	63.8	92.0	97.2	6.9	8.0	39.4	60.6	65.0	4
13. West Sumatra	65.7	61.9	88.5	95.4	6.5	7.3	40.9	59.1	63.3	7
14. Riau	68.8	64.9	91.0	95.8	6.4	7.4	27.6	72.4	56.4	21
15. Jambi	67.4	63.5	87.8	95.8	5.8	7.1	31.7	68.3	58.8	14
16. South Sumatra	65.9	62.1	86.1	94.6	5.6	6.7	36.0	64.0	58.5	16
17. Bengkulu	65.7	61.9	87.5	95.4	6.0	7.2	41.2	58.8	64.4	5
18. Lampung	66.4	62.6	85.6	93.7	5.4	6.4	35.0	65.0	59.6	12
31. Jakarta	72.2	68.3	95.1	98.6	8.9	10.2	30.7	69.3	63.3	8
32. West Java	64.7	61.0	85.6	93.8	5.8	6.9	30.4	69.6	56.4	22
33. Central Java	66.7	62.8	74.6	88.3	4.9	6.2	40.8	59.2	59.2	13
34. Yogyakarta	72.0	68.0	71.5	88.5	6.0	7.9	45.0	55.0	68.3	1
35. East Java	65.7	61.9	70.0	86.0	4.8	6.2	39.3	60.7	57.9	18
51. Bali	70.0	66.1	71.8	87.3	5.4	7.2	44.6	55.4	65.6	2
52. West Nusatenggara	56.5	53.3	60.2	76.9	3.9	5.4	43.3	56.7	51.5	26
53. East Nusatenggara	64.0	60.3	75.4	82.6	4.8	5.6	43.8	56.2	56.8	20
61. West Kalimantan	64.7	61.0	72.3	88.3	4.5	5.9	38.7	61.3	58.6	15
62. Central Kalimantan	70.3	66.3	91.0	96.2	6.0	7.2	34.9	65.1	65.2	3
63. South Kalimantan	62.1	58.4	85.7	95.2	5.5	6.8	40.3	59.7	61.5	9
64. East Kalimantan	70.0	66.1	85.9	94.5	6.4	7.9	31.7	68.3	55.8	24
71. North Sulawesi	68.6	64.7	96.4	97.2	7.3	7.4	26.1	73.9	58.1	17
72. Central Sulawesi	62.3	58.7	87.1	93.6	6.2	7.0	32.3	67.7	59.8	10
73. South Sulawesi	66.9	63.1	76.0	83.6	5.6	6.6	29.0	71.0	54.8	25
74. South East Sulawesi	65.5	61.7	81.5	91.3	6.0	7.3	35.9	64.1	57.4	19
81. Maluku	65.0	61.2	90.6	95.7	6.6	7.5	33.1	66.9	59.8	11
82. Irian Jaya	64.5	60.7	60.9	73.6	4.3	5.8	40.2	59.8	56.1	23
Indonesia ^{b)}	66.2	62.4	80.5	90.9	5.6	6.9	36.2	63.8	58.9	

Note:

^{a)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey.

^{b)} Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figure weighted by population.

- The number before each province is the official area code.

Source: BPS special tabulation

3 Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by Province, 1999

Province	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Proportion of labour force (%)		GDI	GDI Rank	Reduction shortfall ^{b)} 1996 - 1999
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male			
11. Aceh	69.6	65.6	90.1	96.2	6.8	7.7	38.4	61.6	59.0	8	-2.3
12. North Sumatra	69.1	65.1	93.6	98.0	7.5	8.5	41.1	58.9	61.2	3	-2.2
13. West Sumatra	67.4	63.5	92.6	97.0	7.2	7.7	40.3	59.7	60.7	5	-1.9
14. Riau	69.8	65.8	93.7	97.4	6.9	7.8	30.0	70.0	53.1	24	-2
15. Jambi	68.6	64.7	90.5	96.9	6.1	7.4	31.6	68.4	54.6	18	-2.2
16. South Sumatra	67.4	63.5	90.3	96.5	6.2	7.1	36.7	63.3	52.4	25	-2.4
17. Bengkulu	67.1	63.3	89.4	95.9	6.5	7.5	39.5	60.5	59.4	7	-2.4
18. Lampung	67.9	64.0	88.3	95.1	5.9	6.8	37.1	62.9	57.0	12	-1.9
31. Jakarta	73.2	69.3	96.8	98.9	9.0	10.4	34.5	65.5	61.2	2	-1.8
32. West Java	66.2	62.4	89.2	95.2	6.2	7.3	32.3	67.7	54.6	17	-1.6
33. Central Java	70.3	66.3	78.4	91.4	5.4	6.7	40.8	59.2	57.4	10	-1.6
34. Yogyakarta	72.9	69.0	78.3	93.0	7.1	8.8	45.6	54.4	66.4	1	-1.8
35. East Java	67.4	63.5	74.5	88.6	5.3	6.7	39.1	60.9	53.2	23	-2.2
51. Bali	71.6	67.5	75.4	90.2	5.9	7.7	45.2	54.8	60.4	6	-2.5
52. West Nusatenggara	59.4	55.9	65.4	81.2	4.5	6.0	43.1	56.9	45.9	26	-2.3
53. East Nusatenggara	65.5	61.7	77.4	83.5	5.2	5.9	43.0	57.0	56.8	14	-0.4
61. West Kalimantan	65.9	62.1	76.1	90.2	5.0	6.2	39.6	60.4	55.7	15	-1.9
62. Central Kalimantan	71.2	67.3	92.8	96.9	6.6	7.5	34.7	65.3	57.9	9	-2.8
63. South Kalimantan	62.8	59.1	89.4	96.3	5.9	7.2	41.0	59.0	56.9	13	-2.3
64. East Kalimantan	71.0	67.0	90.0	96.8	7.1	8.5	31.0	69.0	53.5	21	-1.7
71. North Sulawesi	70.0	66.1	97.3	97.2	7.5	7.6	28.5	71.5	53.9	20	-2.2
72. Central Sulawesi	64.5	60.7	90.3	94.9	6.6	7.4	33.6	66.4	54.1	19	-2.4
73. South Sulawesi	70.3	66.3	79.6	87.1	6.0	7.0	31.5	68.5	53.3	22	-1.5
74. South East Sulawesi	66.9	63.1	82.6	91.8	6.2	7.4	36.4	63.6	57.4	11	-0.4
81. Maluku	69.3	65.4	94.2	97.4	7.3	8.0	35.0	65.0	61.0	4	1.5
82. Irian Jaya	66.4	62.6	64.8	77.3	4.8	6.4	41.1	58.9	55.7	16	-1.0
Indonesia ^{c)}	68.1	64.2	84.1	92.9	6.1	7.3	37.2	62.9	55.9		

Note:

^{a)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey.

^{b)} This is the annual reduction in shortfall of the HDI, calculated based on the assumption of decreasing rate of growth. For detail explanation see the technical note.

^{c)} Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figure weighted by population.

- The number before each province is the official area code.

Source: BPS special tabulation

4 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) by Province, 1996 and 1999

Province	Women in the parliament (% of total)		Females in senior official, managerial, and technical staff positions (% of total)		Females in the labour force (% of total)		GEM		GEM Rank	
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999
	11. Aceh	6.1	8.3	45.3	54.4	34.1	38.4	57.3	52.4	19
12. North Sumatra	10.9	2.8	46.1	53.8	33.8	41.1	62.5	47.3	7	16
13. West Sumatra	10.3	6.1	54.3	58.8	33.9	40.3	61.9	51.5	9	8
14. Riau	10.5	2.0	34.2	43.2	23.7	30.0	52.2	38.1	26	26
15. Jambi	16.4	8.0	38.4	37.5	31.2	31.6	64.7	46.8	2	17
16. South Sumatra	9.2	3.2	46.7	52.4	29.0	36.7	58.2	41.7	17	25
17. Bengkulu	12.3	10.0	45.6	45.5	36.8	39.5	66.4	56.5	1	2
18. Lampung	11.9	4.5	40.4	46.1	29.9	37.1	61.4	48.2	10	13
31. Jakarta	14.6	7.9	34.7	34.9	23.2	34.5	56.1	46.4	22	18
32. West Java	10.8	7.8	38.2	36.0	25.5	32.3	55.8	47.7	23	14
33. Central Java	10.7	6.7	40.6	44.7	31.5	40.8	60.5	51.2	12	9
34. Yogyakarta	8.4	7.8	40.2	46.7	37.9	45.6	63.1	58.8	5	1
35. East Java	9.8	11.1	38.4	45.9	32.0	39.1	58.9	54.4	14	4
51. Bali	10.8	6.1	33.9	35.5	37.1	45.2	62.9	50.5	6	10
52. West Nusatenggara	10.1	6.1	34.1	37.2	35.7	43.1	58.7	46.2	16	20
53. East Nusatenggara	9.8	2.1	32.4	35.7	37.1	43.0	56.4	46.4	21	18
61. West Kalimantan	7.3	6.3	38.1	43.2	33.4	39.6	57.5	52.2	18	7
62. Central Kalimantan	12.6	2.5	37.6	46.3	33.9	34.7	63.7	43.5	4	24
63. South Kalimantan	6.8	8.7	40.7	47.1	36.1	41.0	58.9	55.1	15	3
64. East Kalimantan	11.4	12.5	33.9	39.2	21.9	31.0	52.7	49.3	25	12
71. North Sulawesi	13.6	7.5	43.4	54.9	26.6	28.5	60.8	45.1	11	22
72. Central Sulawesi	12.2	7.5	38.8	47.4	33.8	33.6	63.9	50.0	3	11
73. South Sulawesi	11.9	3.8	41.5	47.7	29.9	31.5	59.4	43.9	13	23
74. South East Sulawesi	15.4	2.5	38.2	40.2	30.4	36.4	62.5	46.0	8	21
81. Maluku	6.5	7.5	38.7	55.3	33.5	35.0	56.5	52.7	20	5
82. Irian Jaya	9.7	2.7	27.8	34.2	33.1	41.1	55.8	47.7	24	14
Indonesia ^{a)}							58.8	49.5		

Note:

^{a)} Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figure weighted by population.

- The number before each province is the official area code.

Source: BPS special tabulation

5 Human Poverty Index (HPI) by Province, 1995 and 1998

Province	People not expected to survive age 40 ^{c)} (%)		Adult illiteracy rate (%)		Population without access to safe water (%)		Population without access to health facilities (%)		Under nourished children under age five (%)		HPI		HPI Rank	
	1995 ^{a)}	1998 ^{b)}	1995	1998	1995	1998	1995	1998	1995	1998	1995	1998	1995	1998
	11. Aceh	14.6	12.7	10.7	6.9	61.2	61.5	12.2	37.6	48.9	35.6	28.9	31.4	20
12. North Sumatra	15.8	13.5	6.4	4.2	48.4	47.9	11.9	20.9	37.5	35.3	23.5	24.5	7	11
13. West Sumatra	19.1	16.2	8.1	5.3	54.0	46.4	5.7	21.7	39.3	34.0	24.4	24.4	10	9
14. Riau	13.8	12.4	6.4	4.4	73.4	71.8	12.0	39.2	47.8	27.9	31.1	32.3	22	24
15. Jambi	16.2	14.2	8.9	6.3	65.9	57.3	10.2	21.5	35.6	32.9	26.6	26.3	15	14
16. South Sumatra	18.6	16.2	8.7	6.6	58.3	59.7	16.0	28.9	37.2	26.4	26.9	27.3	16	17
17. Bengkulu	19.1	16.6	10.3	7.4	65.0	59.2	0.5	24.8	25.9	30.0	23.0	27.1	6	16
18. Lampung	17.8	15.4	11.3	8.2	62.0	54.4	9.2	34.5	30.2	29.1	24.8	27.9	12	18
31. Jakarta	9.1	7.9	2.7	2.2	45.0	40.2	2.2	2.0	29.1	23.7	17.9	15.5	1	1
32. West Java	20.8	18.2	9.4	7.8	62.4	62.1	10.6	22.4	33.6	27.2	26.3	26.9	13	15
33. Central Java	17.4	11.7	18.1	15.2	47.6	47.8	11.0	17.1	34.7	30.5	24.0	23.2	9	7
34. Yogyakarta	9.4	8.2	18.1	14.5	53.9	48.9	1.1	8.6	21.9	17.3	19.9	18.5	4	2
35. East Java	19.1	16.2	23.1	18.7	40.8	43.0	5.8	17.1	35.3	30.7	23.6	23.4	8	8
51. Bali	12.0	11.7	21.0	17.3	36.0	34.2	4.2	14.9	22.7	21.0	18.9	18.7	2	3
52. West Nusatenggara	35.4	31.5	30.5	27.2	64.7	62.5	5.1	17.5	44.0	39.7	34.9	33.7	25	25
53. East Nusatenggara	22.1	19.5	21.2	19.6	50.8	41.9	17.1	38.2	49.6	38.7	29.9	29.5	21	21
61. West Kalimantan	20.8	18.6	19.1	16.8	83.8	78.4	35.3	43.3	30.3	42.0	36.0	38.7	26	26
62. Central Kalimantan	11.7	10.4	6.4	5.2	74.8	68.2	26.2	26.2	41.6	30.5	33.1	29.0	24	20
63. South Kalimantan	25.9	24.5	10.1	7.2	50.2	46.7	12.7	16.2	37.4	29.0	26.5	24.4	14	10
64. East Kalimantan	12.0	10.7	9.5	6.5	42.3	35.8	7.9	19.6	32.5	31.9	19.9	20.6	3	4
71. North Sulawesi	14.2	12.0	3.1	2.8	44.7	44.5	9.4	26.1	33.7	25.8	21.0	22.7	5	5
72. Central Sulawesi	25.4	21.2	9.5	7.4	57.7	51.7	10.5	30.2	40.0	34.9	27.8	28.4	18	19
73. South Sulawesi	17.0	11.7	20.4	16.8	55.9	49.1	18.1	26.0	39.8	33.9	28.3	26.3	19	13
74. South East Sulawesi	19.5	17.0	15.5	12.9	38.2	43.6	24.9	21.3	32.8	27.1	24.4	22.9	11	6
81. Maluku	20.4	13.1	6.7	4.2	47.4	52.1	23.2	23.8	40.7	29.3	27.1	24.7	17	12
82. Irian Jaya	21.2	17.8	31.2	28.8	56.1	54.5	25.7	36.0	39.2	28.3	32.8	31.3	23	22
Indonesia ^{d)}	18.3	15.2	14.4	11.6	53.1	51.9	10.6	21.6	35.4	30.0	25.2	25.2		

Note:

^{a)} 1996 figure; ^{b)} 1999 figure; ^{c)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey. ^{d)} Indonesia figure is an average of provincial figures, weighted by population.

- The number before each province is the official area code.

Source: BPS special tabulation

6 Human Development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999

Province District	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)		HDI		HDI Rank		HDI Reduction shortfall
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996-1999
	11. Aceh	66.4	67.6	90.1	93.1	7.0	7.2	576.3	562.8	69.4	65.3	9	12
01. South Aceh	62.8	64.0	83.5	91.3	5.9	6.3	563.7	560.6	64.2	62.1	214	210	-1.8
02. South-east Aceh	66.7	67.8	87.4	90.7	6.7	7.0	561.7	552.8	67.7	63.9	127	154	-2.3
03. East Aceh	66.1	67.3	94.5	93.9	6.9	7.0	566.6	565.5	69.5	65.4	80	107	-2.4
04. Central Aceh	65.5	66.7	92.7	97.2	7.1	7.8	559.9	559.8	68.3	66.0	106	94	-2.0
05. West Aceh	66.9	68.1	87.6	91.2	6.1	6.2	558.0	561.5	67.1	64.3	144	145	-2.0
06. Aceh Besar	68.0	69.2	86.8	94.4	7.2	8.0	557.4	559.6	68.4	66.8	104	76	-1.7
07. Pidie	66.4	67.6	84.7	87.6	6.3	6.7	577.2	567.6	67.8	64.1	125	149	-2.3
08. North Aceh	67.3	68.4	91.6	94.5	7.0	7.3	564.8	524.2	69.5	63.1	81	179	-2.7
71. Banda Aceh	67.1	68.2	96.8	97.7	10.2	10.3	582.4	583.0	74.2	70.5	18	23	-2.4
72. Sabang	67.9	68.6	94.0	94.8	8.0	8.4	552.7	518.2	70.1	63.7	66	162	-2.8
12. North Sumatera	65.7	67.1	94.6	95.8	7.5	8.0	576.9	568.7	70.5	66.6	7	8	-2.4
01. Nias	65.0	66.4	73.3	85.7	4.6	5.7	476.8	413.7	55.5	50.4	283	288	-2.3
02. South Tapanuli	63.1	64.5	97.6	99.3	7.0	7.7	565.7	561.6	68.5	65.2	99	114	-2.2
03. Central Tapanuli	64.1	65.5	92.0	93.8	6.5	6.9	519.2	537.6	63.8	62.1	224	207	-1.7
04. North Tapanuli	63.8	65.2	94.2	96.2	7.8	8.2	555.9	566.9	67.9	65.7	121	103	-1.9
05. Labuhan Batu	64.1	65.5	96.1	96.5	6.4	7.3	562.6	550.9	68.0	64.0	119	150	-2.3
06. Asahan	65.5	66.9	93.9	93.7	6.6	6.9	567.7	567.4	68.9	65.1	91	117	-2.3
07. Simalungun	65.8	67.2	92.4	93.6	6.5	7.1	561.7	563.1	68.2	65.1	114	119	-2.1
08. Dairi	64.0	65.4	94.6	96.8	7.5	7.6	560.3	509.8	68.3	61.1	112	232	-2.8
09. Karo	70.3	70.6	95.8	95.5	7.5	7.9	574.6	576.2	73.2	69.1	29	36	-2.5
10. Deli Serdang	64.6	66.0	94.7	94.0	7.5	7.7	584.2	577.9	70.5	66.1	62	90	-2.5
11. Langkat	65.4	68.8	95.1	97.2	6.7	7.7	557.6	561.3	68.3	67.1	105	70	-1.6
71. Sibolga	67.0	68.4	98.3	98.5	8.7	8.8	564.7	573.1	72.0	68.9	47	37	-2.2
72. Tanjung Balai	65.5	66.9	96.0	97.0	7.5	7.8	601.0	570.3	72.5	66.8	36	77	-2.8
73. Pematang Siantar	68.7	70.1	98.9	98.4	9.1	9.5	568.7	579.9	73.7	70.9	23	17	-2.2
74. Tebing Tinggi	68.1	69.5	97.5	97.8	8.6	8.9	588.1	573.0	74.2	69.5	19	31	-2.6
75. Medan	67.8	69.2	98.7	98.8	9.6	9.9	579.5	579.8	74.3	70.8	16	19	-2.4
76. Binjai	67.7	69.1	97.3	97.3	8.5	8.9	585.5	565.1	73.6	68.5	25	47	-2.7
13. West Sumatera	63.8	65.5	91.8	94.7	6.9	7.4	587.3	577.3	69.2	65.8	11	9	-2.2
01. South Pesisir	62.6	64.3	88.3	93.4	6.2	6.9	571.9	576.0	66.1	64.4	170	143	-1.7
02. Solok	58.6	60.2	89.3	94.7	5.8	6.2	574.9	572.9	64.0	61.6	219	228	-1.9
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	58.7	60.4	87.6	91.7	5.9	7.0	584.5	576.8	64.5	61.9	208	216	-1.9
04. Tanah Datar	65.6	67.2	92.1	93.2	6.7	7.1	575.5	576.2	69.2	66.1	85	91	-2.2
05. Padang Pariaman	62.8	64.4	89.5	93.5	5.8	6.5	585.5	580.0	67.2	64.4	142	139	-2.0
06. Agam	65.6	67.2	91.8	94.2	6.7	6.9	575.5	578.1	69.1	66.3	88	87	-2.1
07. Limapuluh Koto	63.1	64.7	93.3	94.8	6.5	6.8	577.0	574.2	68.0	64.6	118	135	-2.2
08. Pasaman	59.4	61.1	90.0	93.9	5.8	6.6	570.7	570.0	64.2	62.0	213	214	-1.8
71. Padang	67.2	68.8	96.2	97.2	9.2	9.6	591.0	585.4	74.1	70.4	20	24	-2.4
72. Solok	64.7	66.3	94.7	97.6	8.2	8.7	574.9	579.8	70.3	68.0	64	59	-2.0
73. Sawah Lunto	69.7	70.1	95.4	97.4	7.5	7.8	578.6	571.8	73.1	68.8	30	41	-2.5
74. Padang Panjang	67.6	69.2	97.0	97.4	9.2	9.5	579.2	586.9	73.6	70.8	26	18	-2.2
75. Bukit Tinggi	69.7	69.8	98.6	98.7	9.4	9.7	590.2	578.9	76.1	70.9	7	16	-2.8
76. Payakumbuh	65.7	66.8	96.3	97.1	8.0	8.4	579.4	578.6	71.4	67.9	51	62	-2.3

6 Human Development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)		HDI		HDI Rank		HDI Reduction shortfall
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996-1999
	14. Riau	66.9	67.8	93.4	95.5	6.9	7.3	578.6	579.6	70.6	67.3	6	4
01. Indragiri Hulu	63.8	64.8	91.8	92.8	6.3	6.7	570.8	574.2	67.5	64.2	136	147	-2.1
02. Indragiri Ilir	67.1	68.0	94.4	96.8	5.8	6.2	553.7	571.5	68.2	66.3	113	88	-1.8
03. Kepulauan Riau	67.4	68.3	89.3	90.9	6.3	6.6	564.7	585.2	68.5	66.5	101	84	-1.8
04. Kampar	64.8	65.7	93.0	95.7	6.2	6.3	573.9	577.7	68.4	65.3	102	110	-2.2
05. Bengkalis	67.7	68.7	93.0	95.5	6.7	7.0	567.4	570.9	69.9	66.9	71	74	-2.1
71. Pekanbaru	70.0	70.2	98.4	99.5	9.5	10.0	585.2	581.2	75.9	71.7	9	10	-2.6
72. Batam	68.4	69.3	93.5	96.3	7.9	9.1	563.9	596.3	71.1	70.9	57	15	-0.8
15. Jambi	65.5	66.6	91.8	93.7	6.5	6.8	580.4	574.3	69.3	65.4	10	11	-2.3
01. Kerinci	67.1	68.2	93.3	94.9	7.0	7.7	567.1	576.8	69.9	67.5	72	64	-2.0
02. Bungo Tebo	62.4	63.6	89.9	92.4	5.7	6.4	568.2	568.0	65.6	62.7	177	193	-2.0
03. Sarolangun Bangko	65.0	66.2	91.0	92.8	6.1	6.3	579.1	578.2	68.4	65.0	103	124	-2.2
04. Batanghari	64.6	65.7	93.2	95.2	5.7	6.0	574.8	573.6	68.1	64.6	116	136	-2.2
05. Tanjung Jabung	66.6	67.8	87.8	92.1	5.6	5.9	531.0	554.4	64.6	63.6	205	168	-1.4
71. Jambi	67.2	68.4	95.4	95.3	8.6	8.5	582.5	585.1	72.8	68.9	34	38	-2.4
16. South Sumatera	64.1	65.5	90.4	93.4	6.1	6.6	581.4	564.5	68.0	63.9	15	16	-2.3
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	66.4	67.8	90.1	91.5	5.9	6.2	574.9	567.3	68.6	64.7	96	134	-2.3
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	61.1	62.5	87.4	93.4	5.3	5.5	566.6	543.3	64.0	59.8	220	254	-2.3
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	62.4	63.8	91.6	95.4	6.0	6.5	575.7	561.4	66.8	63.1	151	185	-2.2
04. Lahat	61.9	63.3	91.7	96.2	5.6	6.8	557.9	560.4	64.9	63.1	195	181	-1.7
05. Musi Rawas	59.9	61.3	90.0	91.2	5.5	6.2	564.1	559.2	63.8	60.4	227	249	-2.1
06. Musi Banyuasin	65.3	66.7	87.4	93.3	5.1	5.5	512.4	435.7	61.9	53.8	249	279	-2.8
07. Bangka	65.0	66.4	87.1	87.7	5.5	6.0	579.9	575.2	67.2	63.5	139	171	-2.3
08. Balitung	65.5	66.9	90.4	93.5	6.1	6.7	577.9	579.2	68.5	65.9	98	98	-2.0
71. Palembang	66.4	67.8	94.6	95.9	8.3	8.7	586.4	577.4	72.2	68.3	44	51	-2.4
72. Pangkal Pinang	67.9	68.3	94.4	93.4	7.5	7.9	584.6	585.1	72.3	68.0	40	58	-2.5
17. Bengkulu	63.8	65.2	91.5	92.7	6.6	7.0	580.8	576.6	68.4	64.8	12	13	-2.3
01. South Bengkulu	62.5	63.9	87.4	90.4	5.7	6.2	559.5	564.7	64.4	62.0	210	213	-1.9
02. Rejang Lebong	60.8	62.2	93.2	92.5	6.5	6.5	574.7	576.4	66.6	62.7	160	196	-2.3
03. North Bengkulu	64.2	65.6	88.7	90.4	5.5	5.8	561.4	570.8	65.7	63.2	176	178	-1.9
71. Bengkulu	67.9	69.3	98.0	98.3	9.5	10.1	588.2	592.5	74.9	71.8	11	9	-2.3
18. Lampung	64.5	65.9	89.8	91.8	5.9	6.4	576.5	567.0	67.6	63.0	16	18	-2.4
01. South Lampung	63.7	65.1	88.9	91.7	5.6	6.1	572.2	570.7	66.4	63.4	162	174	-2.1
02. Central Lampung	65.4	66.8	86.8	89.2	5.6	6.2	567.1	571.4	66.4	63.9	161	155	-2.0
03. North Lampung	63.7	65.1	90.7	92.2	5.4	5.6	517.4	538.5	62.4	60.7	244	246	-1.7
04. West Lampung	63.7	65.1	92.9	92.4	5.8	6.0	573.3	561.7	67.5	62.8	132	190	-2.4
71. Bandar Lampung	66.3	67.7	95.4	96.3	8.3	8.7	579.8	580.2	71.8	68.5	48	48	-2.3
31. Jakarta	70.2	71.1	96.8	97.8	9.5	9.7	591.7	593.4	76.1	72.5	1	1	-2.5
71. South Jakarta	70.1	71.1	97.7	97.7	9.9	10.0	599.7	623.8	77.2	75.1	1	1	-2.1
72. East Jakarta	70.6	71.5	96.8	98.4	9.7	10.1	590.4	588.5	76.4	72.8	3	4	-2.5
73. Central Jakarta	69.3	70.2	96.6	97.7	9.7	9.7	594.8	585.0	76.0	71.3	8	14	-2.7
74. West Jakarta	70.5	71.4	97.3	97.8	9.3	9.4	589.1	589.7	76.1	72.2	6	7	-2.5
75. North Jakarta	70.3	71.2	95.1	97.1	8.7	9.2	582.8	586.3	74.6	71.5	13	12	-2.3

6 Human Development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)		HDI		HDI Rank		HDI Reduction shortfall
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996-1999
	32. West Java	62.9	64.3	89.7	92.1	6.4	6.8	591.6	584.2	68.2	64.6	14	15
01. Pandeglang	60.2	61.6	91.5	93.2	5.2	5.3	562.4	570.2	63.9	61.2	221	231	-2.0
02. Lebak	60.6	62.0	86.4	90.8	5.0	5.5	546.3	570.3	61.6	61.0	251	233	-1.2
03. Bogor	63.8	65.2	89.8	93.7	6.8	8.0	585.5	587.5	68.5	66.6	97	82	-1.8
04. Sukabumi	61.0	62.4	93.5	96.0	5.4	5.7	583.9	579.2	66.6	63.2	155	176	-2.2
05. Cianjur	62.2	63.6	94.4	95.6	6.0	5.7	580.5	576.5	67.6	63.6	128	167	-2.3
06. Bandung	65.2	66.6	92.6	94.7	6.6	7.0	585.9	584.5	69.8	66.6	74	81	-2.2
07. Garut	58.0	59.4	92.9	96.8	5.7	6.2	568.2	574.4	63.9	61.7	223	223	-1.8
08. Tasikmalaya	64.1	65.5	95.1	96.2	6.0	6.3	578.8	577.7	68.7	65.3	93	109	-2.2
09. Ciamis	62.5	63.9	92.4	93.9	6.2	6.4	592.2	588.9	68.5	64.8	100	127	-2.3
10. Kuningan	63.5	64.9	88.1	91.7	5.8	6.1	589.5	592.6	67.5	65.0	131	123	-2.0
11. Cirebon	61.6	63.0	86.2	86.6	5.4	5.7	574.5	581.1	64.6	61.6	200	227	-2.0
12. Majalengka	61.6	63.0	87.9	88.9	5.7	6.0	587.6	587.0	66.2	62.8	167	192	-2.2
13. Sumedang	65.1	66.5	93.1	95.6	6.4	6.8	590.1	584.6	70.1	66.6	67	79	-2.3
14. Indramayu	61.9	63.3	67.0	66.7	3.8	3.9	588.6	588.1	60.4	56.5	263	269	-2.1
15. Subang	63.6	65.0	82.4	86.2	4.9	5.4	590.0	591.0	65.7	63.1	173	182	-2.0
16. Purwakarta	62.1	63.5	90.7	94.5	5.7	6.2	583.2	585.5	66.8	64.3	148	144	-2.0
17. Karawang	61.0	62.4	80.8	84.8	4.9	5.4	582.5	584.7	63.4	60.9	231	237	-1.9
18. Bekasi	65.2	66.6	90.1	87.6	8.0	6.8	589.8	582.4	70.6	64.7	61	131	-2.7
19. Tangerang	62.4	63.8	88.4	88.7	6.4	6.6	578.5	584.7	66.6	63.5	156	169	-2.1
20. Serang	58.2	59.6	88.3	92.2	5.6	5.9	571.3	577.7	63.1	60.8	238	240	-1.8
71. Bogor	66.3	67.7	97.7	97.4	8.8	9.3	575.3	586.6	72.3	69.7	39	29	-2.1
72. Sukabumi	64.3	65.7	99.0	97.6	9.1	8.6	596.6	590.1	73.4	68.4	27	49	-2.7
73. Bandung	66.8	68.2	97.6	98.3	9.6	9.6	589.8	589.7	74.3	70.7	14	20	-2.4
74. Cirebon	65.7	67.1	95.1	94.6	8.4	8.4	608.3	586.4	73.7	68.1	21	55	-2.8
75. Tangerang	65.7	67.1	86.4	94.3	7.7	8.8	570.2	585.7	68.3	68.3	111	52	-0.4
76. Bekasi	-	66.6	-	97.1	-	9.4	-	-	-	68.7	-	43	-
33. Central Java	64.8	68.3	81.3	84.8	5.5	6.0	594.5	583.8	67.0	64.6	17	14	-1.9
01. Cilacap	63.7	67.2	80.7	84.2	4.9	5.4	582.4	579.9	64.8	63.1	196	186	-1.7
02. Banyumas	64.6	68.1	89.8	91.2	5.8	6.4	585.8	581.0	68.3	66.0	109	95	-1.9
03. Purbalingga	63.9	67.4	81.4	86.2	5.1	5.3	586.8	572.2	65.5	63.0	180	187	-1.9
04. Banjarnegara	63.9	67.4	78.4	85.9	5.1	5.6	580.5	577.9	64.4	63.6	211	166	-1.3
05. Kebumen	63.7	67.2	81.3	87.2	5.2	5.9	581.3	590.1	65.1	64.9	190	126	-0.8
06. Purworejo	64.1	67.7	86.2	86.3	6.1	6.3	590.9	590.5	67.8	65.3	124	112	-2.0
07. Wonosobo	64.1	67.7	83.5	86.5	4.9	5.4	583.0	580.4	65.7	63.9	174	156	-1.7
08. Magelang	64.5	68.0	81.6	86.2	5.9	6.3	584.4	585.9	66.4	65.1	163	118	-1.5
09. Boyolali	67.3	69.4	78.6	81.4	5.7	6.2	586.3	582.0	67.2	64.4	140	140	-2.0
10. Klaten	65.6	69.1	79.1	81.1	6.2	6.7	595.0	589.0	67.5	65.1	135	121	-1.9
11. Sukoharjo	68.8	69.1	80.3	84.0	6.5	7.4	590.2	591.8	69.4	66.5	84	83	-2.1
12. Wonogiri	70.6	71.1	71.6	76.4	4.8	5.6	588.2	584.2	67.0	64.0	146	152	-2.1
13. Karanganyar	69.5	70.1	78.4	78.3	5.7	6.1	584.7	587.6	68.3	64.5	108	138	-2.3
14. Sragen	67.3	70.8	68.6	71.6	4.8	5.3	577.9	581.3	63.7	62.3	230	205	-1.6
15. Grobogan	64.3	67.8	81.9	85.6	5.1	5.6	584.3	585.0	65.7	64.2	175	146	-1.6
16. Blora	66.4	69.9	72.0	74.1	4.5	4.8	577.7	576.4	63.7	61.6	228	226	-1.8
17. Rembang	64.5	68.0	83.2	84.8	5.6	5.9	581.4	588.6	66.3	64.7	166	128	-1.7
18. Pati	68.1	71.6	77.9	80.0	5.1	5.6	591.8	584.8	67.5	65.2	134	116	-1.9
19. Kudus	64.8	67.8	82.9	88.8	6.0	6.9	587.7	586.7	67.1	66.0	143	93	-1.5
20. Jepara	66.1	69.6	82.4	83.1	5.4	6.0	586.8	589.5	67.3	65.3	138	108	-1.8
21. Demak	65.2	68.7	84.9	89.2	5.6	6.1	589.1	583.6	67.6	65.9	129	100	-1.7
22. Semarang	67.6	70.6	87.3	89.4	6.3	6.6	588.4	591.0	69.9	67.9	70	61	-1.9
23. Temanggung	67.2	70.7	88.9	91.0	5.3	5.6	586.8	584.6	69.2	67.1	87	69	-1.9

6 Human Development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)		HDI		HDI Rank		HDI Reduction shortfall
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996-1999
	24. Kendal	62.3	64.7	78.2	84.3	4.7	5.4	580.0	584.9	63.1	62.1	236	208
25. Batang	64.6	68.1	83.9	85.8	4.7	5.1	587.3	579.5	66.3	63.6	165	163	-2.0
26. Pekalongan	63.0	66.5	83.0	84.2	4.9	5.3	583.5	568.9	65.0	61.8	192	219	-2.1
27. Pemalang	61.0	64.5	77.6	82.3	4.6	5.2	577.5	575.8	62.0	60.7	247	245	-1.5
28. Tegal	61.6	65.2	79.4	83.5	5.0	5.6	586.1	583.1	63.7	62.2	229	206	-1.6
29. Brebes	59.8	63.3	72.8	83.0	4.3	4.8	583.1	580.2	60.5	60.2	262	251	-0.9
71. Magelang	66.8	69.1	92.5	93.4	8.3	9.0	589.9	597.5	72.3	70.2	42	25	-1.9
72. Surakarta	70.3	70.9	92.6	92.9	8.7	8.8	587.2	591.9	74.3	70.5	15	22	-2.5
73. Salatiga	66.0	69.5	95.2	95.7	8.7	9.2	572.3	602.7	71.4	71.5	52	11	0.7
74. Semarang	69.9	70.2	90.3	93.6	8.1	8.7	584.0	591.5	72.9	70.2	31	26	-2.2
75. Pekalongan	64.6	68.1	88.6	89.8	6.6	7.1	576.1	577.2	67.8	65.9	123	99	-1.8
76. Tegal	63.1	66.6	86.2	86.5	6.4	6.6	582.7	594.5	66.8	65.3	149	113	-1.7
34. Yogyakarta	69.9	70.9	79.8	85.5	6.9	7.9	612.3	597.8	71.8	68.7	2	2	-2.2
01. Kulon Progo	70.4	71.3	79.2	82.8	6.2	6.8	593.5	583.7	70.0	66.4	68	85	-2.3
02. Bantul	68.5	69.5	79.2	82.6	6.4	6.8	598.2	590.0	69.5	65.8	79	102	-2.3
03. Gunung Kidul	69.9	70.1	66.7	83.0	4.5	7.1	588.3	552.4	65.3	63.6	187	165	-1.7
04. Sleman	70.7	71.6	82.6	85.7	7.8	8.5	602.9	601.5	72.9	69.8	33	27	-2.2
71. Yogyakarta	71.2	72.1	93.6	95.1	9.7	10.3	591.3	598.9	76.1	73.4	5	2	-2.3
35. East Java	63.8	65.5	77.7	81.3	5.5	5.9	594.3	579.0	65.5	61.8	22	22	-2.2
01. Pacitan	68.2	69.8	77.7	80.8	5.0	5.3	586.5	582.8	67.1	63.9	145	153	-2.1
02. Ponorogo	66.0	66.6	73.6	75.7	5.0	5.3	581.7	575.7	64.5	60.4	206	248	-2.3
03. Trenggalek	68.9	69.4	82.5	87.2	5.1	5.7	579.0	579.7	68.0	65.2	120	115	-2.1
04. Tulungagung	70.0	70.1	86.6	85.0	5.8	6.1	593.0	586.5	71.1	65.9	56	96	-2.6
05. Blitar	66.9	68.5	82.5	82.4	5.2	5.7	591.1	581.9	67.9	63.8	122	159	-2.3
06. Kediri	66.2	67.8	79.3	85.6	5.5	6.3	588.1	577.2	66.8	64.2	153	148	-2.0
07. Malang	64.6	66.3	80.9	84.2	5.1	5.5	587.9	577.4	65.9	62.4	172	203	-2.2
08. Lumajang	63.2	64.9	72.6	77.2	4.6	5.2	591.8	575.0	63.2	59.7	234	256	-2.1
09. Jember	58.8	59.7	68.9	72.5	4.4	4.4	581.9	570.4	59.1	54.9	271	276	-2.2
10. Banyuwangi	62.6	64.2	81.4	81.9	5.2	5.6	592.9	583.2	65.4	61.3	185	230	-2.3
11. Bondowoso	57.2	58.8	56.1	63.8	3.7	4.3	589.9	583.2	55.4	53.4	284	282	-1.7
12. Situbondo	59.6	61.3	63.2	64.4	4.3	4.4	595.4	582.3	59.2	54.8	270	277	-2.2
13. Probolinggo	56.8	58.5	65.8	68.3	3.9	4.1	586.2	580.7	57.2	53.8	279	280	-2.0
14. Pasuruan	59.6	61.3	76.1	83.0	4.7	5.3	584.4	571.6	61.5	58.9	252	261	-1.9
15. Sidoarjo	66.3	67.9	93.3	95.4	8.3	8.8	591.4	587.9	72.3	69.1	41	35	-2.3
16. Mojokerto	65.9	67.5	84.7	87.5	5.6	6.2	591.0	580.1	68.1	64.6	115	137	-2.2
17. Jombang	65.0	66.6	85.4	88.5	6.2	7.0	591.7	582.7	68.3	65.1	110	122	-2.2
18. Nganjuk	65.3	66.9	80.6	85.1	5.7	6.1	588.6	576.9	66.8	63.4	152	173	-2.2
19. Madiun	65.2	66.8	76.3	79.7	5.2	5.6	590.9	589.8	65.6	62.8	179	191	-2.0
20. Magetan	69.3	69.6	79.2	81.5	5.5	6.0	585.9	585.4	68.3	64.7	107	130	-2.2
21. Ngawi	65.3	67.0	74.5	79.4	4.6	5.3	593.1	580.5	65.0	61.9	193	217	-2.1
22. Bojonegoro	63.9	65.5	74.7	78.6	4.7	5.4	578.0	560.5	63.1	59.4	237	258	-2.2
23. Tuban	64.2	65.8	65.8	73.8	4.2	4.8	585.1	579.3	61.5	59.5	253	257	-1.7
24. Lamongan	64.8	66.4	76.2	80.3	4.9	5.7	583.3	577.4	64.5	61.8	209	221	-2.0
25. Gresik	65.7	67.3	86.1	91.3	6.3	7.6	587.9	580.1	68.6	66.4	95	86	-1.9
26. Bangkalan	59.2	60.9	56.1	63.0	3.2	3.7	575.0	563.6	55.0	52.4	285	283	-1.8
27. Sampang	55.0	56.7	44.0	54.9	2.1	2.5	562.3	564.3	48.2	47.3	290	292	-1.2
28. Pamekasan	59.4	61.1	65.0	72.7	4.2	4.6	579.6	565.4	58.2	55.5	275	274	-1.9
29. Sumenep	60.5	60.9	61.2	66.8	3.5	3.7	598.5	583.8	58.9	54.7	273	278	-2.2
71. Kediri	66.7	68.4	92.2	92.9	8.0	8.5	588.7	588.8	71.8	68.6	49	45	-2.2
72. Blitar	68.7	69.6	89.3	92.3	7.4	8.2	595.6	588.0	72.4	68.9	38	39	-2.3
73. Malang	64.5	66.2	90.8	94.4	8.4	8.6	595.0	590.0	71.1	68.0	58	60	-2.2

6 Human Development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)		HDI		HDI Rank		HDI Reduction shortfall
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996-1999
	74. Probolinggo	65.8	67.5	84.1	86.2	6.7	7.1	600.5	581.7	69.5	65.1	82	120
75. Pasuruan	62.5	64.1	85.8	87.7	6.5	7.1	596.2	583.0	67.5	63.6	130	164	-2.3
76. Mojokerto	69.7	70.0	92.1	93.5	8.2	8.4	605.1	575.7	74.9	68.6	10	46	-2.9
77. Madiun	68.4	69.1	91.0	91.7	8.3	8.7	599.8	585.3	73.6	68.7	24	44	-2.7
78. Surabaya	66.6	68.3	93.2	93.8	8.7	9.0	583.1	589.4	72.1	69.3	45	33	-2.2
51. Bali	68.1	69.5	79.4	82.7	6.3	6.8	609.0	587.9	70.1	65.7	8	10	-2.4
01. Jembrana	68.4	69.8	81.9	84.7	5.7	6.1	601.7	583.67	69.8	65.5	75	106	-2.4
02. Tabanan	71.2	72.6	83.1	85.4	6.6	7.1	610.5	595.01	72.9	68.7	32	42	-2.5
03. Badung	69.0	70.5	85.5	87.5	7.5	8.1	591.7	588.14	71.5	68.2	50	53	-2.3
04. Gianyar	69.3	70.7	75.5	77.6	6.1	6.3	576.8	582.39	67.2	64.4	141	141	-2.0
05. Klungkung	65.7	67.1	75.0	78.6	5.6	6.1	596.6	587.18	66.3	62.9	164	189	-2.2
06. Bangli	69.0	70.5	79.2	78.5	5.5	5.5	585.0	588.86	68.1	64.4	117	142	-2.3
07. Karangasem	65.0	66.4	63.3	66.1	3.8	4.1	586.6	578.01	61.2	57.5	255	263	-2.1
08. Buleleng	64.6	66.0	75.4	83.2	5.3	6.2	591.1	583.98	65.1	63.1	189	183	-1.8
71. Denpasar	70.2	71.6	91.8	93.8	9.1	9.7	589.8	595.65	74.6	72.1	12	8	-2.2
52. West Nusa Tenggara	54.9	57.8	68.0	72.8	4.6	5.2	579.7	565.9	56.7	54.2	26	26	-1.8
01. West Lombok	53.7	56.5	58.4	63.8	3.4	4.0	562.1	559.23	51.6	49.9	287	289	-1.5
02. Central Lombok	53.2	56.0	52.5	64.4	3.4	4.3	577.5	567.61	51.2	50.7	288	287	-1.0
03. East Lombok	53.2	56.0	66.5	68.6	4.3	4.8	570.4	568.91	54.4	52.1	286	284	-1.7
04. Sumbawa	53.7	56.5	81.7	84.7	5.3	6.0	574.7	568.57	59.2	56.8	269	268	-1.8
05. Dompu	55.1	57.9	80.1	82.0	6.0	6.0	560.7	558.51	59.0	56.2	272	270	-1.9
06. Bima	55.7	58.5	80.5	81.8	6.1	6.4	559.9	565.31	59.4	57.3	268	264	-1.7
71. Mataram	60.0	62.8	83.0	87.8	7.2	7.8	578.2	578.10	64.6	63.1	201	184	-1.6
53. East Nusa Tenggara	62.2	63.6	78.9	81.2	5.2	5.7	544.3	576.9	60.9	60.4	24	24	-1.1
01. West Sumba	60.3	61.7	68.0	69.0	4.6	5.0	547.1	437.64	57.2	45.4	280	293	-3.0
02. East Sumba	57.6	59.0	73.7	77.2	4.7	5.4	561.1	562.96	58.1	55.7	276	273	-1.8
03. Kupang	62.0	63.4	83.5	75.5	6.4	4.9	563.5	557.71	64.2	57.0	215	266	-2.7
04. Southern Central-Timor	63.8	65.2	67.0	67.6	4.2	4.3	512.0	472.90	55.9	49.2	282	290	-2.5
05. Northern Central-Timor	64.8	65.1	77.5	79.5	4.9	5.3	515.6	487.56	59.6	53.7	265	281	-2.4
06. Belu	62.1	63.5	72.1	73.4	4.7	5.0	551.0	494.65	59.5	51.8	266	285	-2.7
07. Alor	61.5	62.9	90.4	89.5	6.2	6.2	521.6	485.96	62.0	55.3	248	275	-2.6
08. Flores Timur	64.6	66.0	78.9	82.4	5.2	5.4	553.0	528.82	62.9	58.1	239	262	-2.4
09. Sikka	64.3	65.7	80.6	84.6	5.0	5.3	500.7	440.01	58.9	51.5	274	286	-2.6
10. Ende	61.3	62.8	82.4	88.8	5.3	5.6	562.6	501.27	62.6	55.8	241	272	-2.6
11. Ngada	63.3	64.7	86.4	92.3	5.7	6.3	552.3	566.54	64.2	63.2	215	177	-1.4
12. Manggarai	62.6	64.1	84.6	83.0	5.0	5.2	509.7	579.38	59.5	60.9	266	235	1.5
71. Kupang	-	63.4	-	94.6	-	9.6	-	-	-	66.6		80	
61. West Kalimantan	62.9	64.1	80.4	83.2	5.2	5.6	570.7	571.2	63.6	60.6	23	23	-2.0
01. Sambas	55.7	56.8	79.0	82.0	4.5	5.1	552.9	569.45	57.4	55.8	278	271	-1.6
02. Pontianak	63.5	64.6	79.5	83.4	5.4	5.6	552.8	570.12	62.5	60.9	242	239	-1.6
03. Sanggau	65.3	66.5	77.4	81.8	4.4	5.1	539.9	567.57	61.3	61.0	254	234	-0.9
04. Ketapang	63.8	64.9	82.4	84.0	4.8	5.1	564.8	569.60	63.8	60.8	225	243	-2.0
05. Sintang	64.8	66.0	79.2	79.6	4.7	4.9	522.8	569.39	60.3	60.3	264	250	-0.5
06. Kapuas Hulu	63.4	64.5	80.1	82.8	5.6	5.8	530.7	570.09	61.1	60.8	257	242	-0.9
71. Pontianak	64.6	65.1	87.0	88.9	7.5	7.9	583.0	578.57	68.7	64.7	94	133	-2.3

6 Human Development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)		HDI		HDI Rank		HDI Reduction shortfall
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996-1999
	62. Central Kalimantan	68.3	69.2	93.7	94.8	6.6	7.1	578.9	565.4	71.3	66.7	5	7
01. West Kotawaringin	68.4	69.4	90.7	93.1	6.5	6.7	571.5	577.60	70.0	67.1	69	71	-2.1
02. East Kotawaringin	67.0	67.9	92.8	93.4	6.1	6.8	575.5	563.69	69.7	65.3	77	111	-2.4
03. Kapuas	68.6	69.6	93.2	95.0	6.2	6.6	555.8	571.51	69.2	67.1	86	73	-1.9
04. South Barito	65.2	66.1	95.9	96.7	6.7	7.1	570.4	571.93	69.4	65.9	83	97	-2.3
05. North Barito	69.4	70.3	94.1	95.4	6.2	6.7	561.1	569.20	70.3	67.4	65	65	-2.1
71. Palangka Raya	71.2	72.1	98.7	98.1	9.8	9.8	585.8	582.24	76.9	72.3	2	6	-2.7
63. South Kalimantan	60.3	61.0	90.3	92.8	6.1	6.6	586.7	576.7	66.3	62.2	19	21	-2.3
01. Tanah Laut	64.5	66.2	85.4	85.8	5.3	5.4	574.3	574.78	66.0	62.5	171	201	-2.2
02. Kota Baru	60.0	61.6	86.1	91.3	5.5	6.1	575.9	576.15	63.9	61.8	222	220	-1.8
03. Banjar	60.7	62.3	94.0	95.5	6.5	7.0	583.7	575.41	67.4	63.7	137	161	-2.2
04. Barito Kuala	56.1	57.8	89.2	90.9	4.9	5.3	560.5	576.11	60.8	59.0	259	260	-1.7
05. Tapin	63.0	64.7	87.3	93.1	5.3	6.0	572.7	574.28	65.5	63.9	181	158	-1.7
06. South Hulu Sungai	59.3	60.9	89.2	92.0	5.8	5.9	580.4	583.29	64.7	61.9	199	215	-2.0
07. Central Hulu Sungai	60.2	61.9	91.2	91.0	5.8	5.9	571.4	575.29	65.0	61.7	191	224	-2.1
08. North Hulu Sungai	57.1	58.8	90.0	93.2	5.5	6.0	577.1	576.22	63.2	60.6	235	247	-1.9
09. Tabalong	59.4	61.0	88.2	91.7	5.9	6.4	574.0	576.70	64.2	61.8	215	218	-1.9
71. Banjarmasin	62.9	64.5	93.9	96.2	8.0	8.5	586.9	587.32	69.9	67.1	73	72	-2.1
64. East Kalimantan	68.1	69.0	90.3	93.5	7.2	7.8	586.1	578.1	71.4	67.8	4	3	-2.3
01. Pasir	69.6	70.5	85.7	86.9	5.4	5.5	576.6	568.61	69.1	64.7	89	129	-2.4
02. Kutai	65.1	66.0	89.7	93.6	6.7	7.4	584.4	578.23	69.1	65.8	89	101	-2.2
03. Berau	66.6	67.6	85.2	90.3	6.0	6.7	576.6	571.41	67.8	65.0	126	125	-2.1
04. Bulongan	70.2	71.2	88.5	91.7	6.7	7.0	578.0	580.90	71.2	68.2	55	54	-2.2
71. Balikpapan	69.1	70.1	91.8	95.5	8.1	8.9	574.2	590.90	72.0	70.6	46	21	-1.7
72. Samarinda	67.6	68.6	93.7	96.1	8.4	9.0	578.5	579.04	72.2	69.1	43	34	-2.2
71. North Sulawesi	66.6	68.1	96.8	97.2	7.3	7.6	582.4	578.3	71.8	67.1	3	6	-2.6
01. Gorontalo	63.6	65.0	94.5	94.3	6.0	6.0	556.1	573.82	66.6	63.3	157	175	-2.1
02. Bolaang Mongondow	68.4	69.8	95.1	96.2	6.3	6.7	571.0	573.99	70.8	66.9	60	75	-2.4
03. Minahasa	69.0	70.4	99.1	99.0	7.6	7.7	580.3	583.92	73.7	69.3	22	32	-2.5
04. Sangihe Talaud	69.6	71.0	94.4	95.4	6.6	7.2	568.4	576.66	71.3	68.0	53	57	-2.3
71. Gorontalo	63.0	64.4	97.4	98.9	8.2	8.7	580.8	583.63	70.5	66.7	63	78	-2.3
72. Manado	70.5	70.7	99.0	99.7	9.8	10.2	581.2	587.29	76.2	72.5	4	5	-2.5
73. Bitung	66.2	67.6	97.0	97.8	7.9	8.0	588.4	580.59	72.5	67.6	37	63	-2.6
72. Central Sulawesi	60.6	62.7	90.4	92.6	6.6	7.0	581.4	569.0	66.4	62.8	18	20	-2.2
01. Luwuk Banggai	61.4	63.5	86.9	91.4	5.8	6.4	572.1	566.72	64.8	62.4	197	204	-1.9
02. Poso	60.4	61.3	94.7	96.2	7.0	7.4	580.7	561.96	67.5	62.6	133	198	-2.5
03. Donggala	58.1	60.2	87.4	89.4	5.8	6.2	566.8	567.55	62.7	60.0	240	253	-1.9
04. Bual Toli-Toli	59.9	62.0	90.6	92.0	6.2	6.4	568.9	566.16	64.8	61.6	197	225	-2.1
71. Kodya Palu	64.3	66.4	96.8	98.2	9.4	9.9	589.2	577.29	72.6	68.9	35	40	-2.4
73. South Sulawesi	65.0	68.3	79.6	83.2	6.1	6.5	580.6	571.0	66.0	63.6	21	17	-1.9
01. Selayar	62.9	66.2	78.0	84.3	5.3	5.6	572.4	572.22	63.3	62.1	232	211	-1.5
02. Bulukumba	65.0	68.4	74.6	79.6	5.7	6.2	574.7	574.26	64.2	62.9	215	188	-1.5
03. Bantaeng	67.5	70.8	63.4	70.5	4.1	4.6	558.2	572.56	60.6	60.9	261	238	0.9
04. Jeneponto	60.4	63.9	62.9	68.8	4.7	4.9	572.3	572.95	58.1	56.9	276	267	-1.4
05. Takalar	63.2	66.7	73.2	76.8	4.9	5.4	576.8	574.23	62.4	60.7	245	244	-1.6

6 Human Development Index (HDI) by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Adjusted real per capita expenditure (thousand Rupiah)		HDI		HDI Rank		HDI Reduction shortfall
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996-1999
	06. Gowa	66.7	69.9	72.6	76.9	5.4	5.9	574.6	571.22	64.5	62.7	207	195
07. Sinjai	66.2	69.5	73.3	78.5	5.2	5.4	533.9	571.76	61.0	62.5	258	199	1.6
08. Maros	65.1	68.6	72.4	76.8	4.7	5.3	567.8	571.52	62.4	61.5	245	229	-1.3
09. Pangkep	63.9	67.1	76.7	82.6	5.2	5.8	569.3	576.33	63.3	62.7	232	197	-1.2
10. Barru	63.2	66.7	82.1	83.8	5.8	6.2	582.7	577.30	65.5	63.1	181	180	-1.9
11. Bone	63.7	67.2	76.7	81.0	5.3	5.8	578.1	568.18	63.8	61.8	225	222	-1.8
12. Soppeng	67.3	70.6	75.8	78.2	5.5	5.6	581.2	581.93	66.1	64.0	168	151	-1.8
13. Wajo	66.5	67.2	81.8	76.1	4.9	5.0	581.8	578.74	66.6	60.9	157	236	-2.6
14. Sidenreng Rappang	66.2	69.5	78.2	82.8	5.2	5.9	584.4	571.20	66.1	63.8	168	160	-1.9
15. Pinrang	65.3	68.5	79.6	82.7	5.6	6.0	575.7	574.22	65.5	63.5	181	170	-1.8
16. Enrekang	68.7	72.0	77.2	89.7	6.1	6.4	550.8	572.78	65.3	67.2	186	68	1.7
17. Luwu	68.1	71.4	87.3	92.0	6.3	7.1	569.5	574.61	68.8	68.0	92	56	-1.4
18. Tana Toraja	69.5	72.8	72.0	73.3	5.5	5.7	564.5	572.98	65.2	63.5	188	172	-1.7
19. Polewali Mamasa	62.5	62.9	77.4	80.9	4.7	5.2	555.8	574.53	61.2	59.4	255	259	-1.7
20. Majene	58.9	62.3	82.7	89.5	5.9	6.7	571.2	573.82	62.5	62.1	242	212	-1.0
21. Mamuju	63.6	67.0	82.8	84.2	5.5	5.6	567.6	574.30	64.6	62.7	201	194	-1.7
71. Ujung Pandang	67.9	71.4	93.0	95.2	9.5	9.9	582.8	582.28	73.3	71.4	28	13	-1.9
72. Pare Pare	68.5	71.8	88.1	94.2	7.8	8.4	583.1	575.47	71.3	69.7	53	28	-1.8
74. South-east Sulawesi	63.6	65.0	86.3	87.1	6.6	6.8	568.8	571.8	66.2	62.9	20	19	-2.1
01. Buton	64.7	66.1	82.5	85.2	6.2	6.6	564.9	565.37	65.4	62.5	184	202	-2.0
02. Muna	62.6	64.0	78.5	83.2	5.4	6.0	551.5	556.85	61.7	59.8	250	255	-1.7
03. Kendari	63.8	65.2	89.6	86.9	7.2	6.3	559.0	570.32	66.8	62.5	150	200	-2.3
04. Kolaka	63.3	64.7	90.6	87.3	6.8	6.7	561.8	563.52	66.6	62.1	157	209	-2.4
71. Kendari	-	65.2	-	97.1	-	9.9	-	-	-	68.3	-	50	-
81. Maluku	63.1	67.4	93.2	95.8	7.1	7.6	573.6	576.9	68.2	67.2	13	5	-1.5
01. South-east Maluku	67.1	63.8	98.2	96.3	7.2	6.7	549.6	578.03	69.8	64.7	75	132	-2.6
02. Central Maluku	60.8	65.8	89.4	96.8	6.1	7.1	564.3	578.10	64.6	66.2	201	89	1.7
03. North Maluku	62.7	65.6	92.8	93.6	6.9	7.3	563.5	577.10	67.0	65.5	147	105	-1.6
04. Central Halmahera	62.6	71.4	88.6	90.3	6.0	6.1	558.1	579.54	64.9	67.3	194	67	1.9
71. Ambon	68.3	71.4	98.1	99.9	9.5	10.6	577.3	582.83	74.3	73.0	17	3	-1.7
82. Irian Jaya	62.7	64.5	67.4	71.2	5.0	5.6	566.9	579.9	60.2	58.8	25	25	-1.5
01. Merauke	56.2	58.0	73.7	79.1	5.0	5.2	551.6	583.32	56.8	57.0	281	265	0.7
02. Jaya Wijaya	62.5	64.4	29.3	36.0	2.0	2.6	495.9	579.50	43.9	48.7	291	291	2.1
03. Jaya Pura	65.4	65.6	83.9	90.3	6.7	7.8	568.3	583.43	66.7	65.6	154	104	-1.5
04. Paniai	64.2	66.0	49.8	49.8	3.5	3.6	475.1	451.70	48.9	43.6	289	294	-2.2
05. Fak Fak	66.1	68.0	88.3	94.9	6.5	7.5	537.7	578.03	65.6	67.3	178	66	1.7
06. Sorong	62.2	64.1	84.0	88.2	6.5	6.9	564.6	587.19	64.6	63.9	201	157	-1.3
07. Manokwari	65.2	66.1	75.6	74.1	5.5	5.3	574.2	579.79	64.4	60.1	212	252	-2.3
08. Yapen Waropen	60.9	62.8	77.8	85.5	5.2	5.4	556.0	578.50	60.8	60.8	259	241	0.4
09. Biak Numfor	63.2	64.1	95.8	94.6	6.9	7.6	584.8	588.93	69.6	66.0	78	92	-2.3
71. Jaya Pura	64.8	66.7	95.0	96.8	8.5	9.8	579.1	590.27	71.0	69.7	59	30	-1.7

Note:

^{a)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey. The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both Regency and City

Source: BPS special tabulation

7 Gender-related Development Index (GDI) by District, 1999

Province District	Proportion of population (% of totals)		Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Share of earned income (%)		GDI	GDI Rank
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male		
11. Aceh	49.9	50.1	69.6	65.6	90.1	96.2	6.8	7.7	30.7	69.3	59.0	8
01. South Aceh	48.5	51.5	65.8	62.0	87.3	95.2	5.7	6.9	24.5	75.5	51.7	226
02. South-east Aceh	50.6	49.4	69.8	65.8	85.7	96.0	6.2	7.8	43.0	57.0	63.0	24
03. East Aceh	48.4	51.6	69.3	65.3	92.3	95.5	6.6	7.3	26.3	73.7	56.7	138
04. Central Aceh	50.1	49.9	68.6	64.7	95.4	99.0	7.4	8.3	28.6	71.4	58.0	108
05. West Aceh	49.1	50.9	70.1	66.1	86.8	95.7	5.6	6.8	27.5	72.5	56.2	146
06. Aceh Besar	49.9	50.1	71.2	67.2	91.2	97.5	7.4	8.5	34.1	65.9	62.6	28
07. Pidie	52.9	47.1	69.5	65.6	83.7	92.2	6.0	7.5	32.7	67.3	57.2	126
08. North Aceh	50.4	49.6	70.4	66.5	91.7	97.6	7.1	7.5	33.7	66.3	58.8	86
71. Banda Aceh	50.1	49.9	70.2	66.3	96.8	98.7	10.0	10.5	23.2	76.8	57.5	118
72. Sabang	49.7	50.3	70.5	66.6	92.6	97.0	8.0	8.7	27.9	72.1	56.0	152
12. North Sumatera	49.9	50.1	69.1	65.1	93.6	98.0	7.5	8.5	32.1	67.9	61.2	3
01. Nias	49.1	50.9	68.4	64.5	81.6	89.8	5.0	6.4	42.1	57.9	49.8	242
02. South Tapanuli	50.1	49.9	66.3	62.5	98.7	99.9	7.4	8.1	44.2	55.8	64.8	12
03. Central Tapanuli	50.5	49.5	67.4	63.5	89.8	97.9	6.4	7.5	41.5	58.5	60.9	50
04. North Tapanuli	48.7	51.3	67.1	63.2	93.7	98.8	7.6	8.9	47.3	52.7	65.9	8
05. Labuhan Batu	49.8	50.2	67.4	63.6	94.4	98.5	6.7	7.8	18.1	81.9	46.8	266
06. Asahan	49.7	50.3	68.9	64.9	90.8	96.7	6.3	7.5	28.5	71.5	57.4	124
07. Simalungun	50.7	49.3	69.2	65.2	89.9	97.5	6.6	7.7	39.4	60.6	63.1	22
08. Dairi	50.2	49.9	67.3	63.5	94.6	99.1	6.9	8.4	50.1	49.9	61.3	47
09. Karo	51.0	49.0	72.7	68.7	92.8	98.5	7.3	8.6	46.9	53.1	69.0	4
10. Deli Serdang	49.0	51.1	67.9	64.0	90.5	97.7	7.1	8.3	28.2	71.8	58.4	97
11. Langkat	49.7	50.4	68.7	64.8	95.6	98.7	7.3	8.1	24.5	75.5	55.1	178
71. Sibolga	49.9	50.1	70.4	66.4	97.5	99.5	8.5	9.1	27.7	72.3	60.4	63
72. Tanjung Balai	49.7	50.4	68.9	64.9	95.2	98.9	7.4	8.2	18.5	81.5	49.5	244
73. Pematang Siantar	49.6	50.4	72.2	68.2	97.4	99.3	9.0	9.9	24.3	75.7	59.4	75
74. Tebing Tinggi	50.5	49.5	71.5	67.5	96.8	98.8	8.6	9.3	25.7	74.3	58.8	87
75. Medan	51.0	49.0	71.2	67.2	98.1	99.5	9.5	10.3	27.0	73.0	60.7	54
76. Binjai	49.7	50.3	71.1	67.1	95.7	99.0	8.5	9.3	28.8	71.2	61.0	49
13. West Sumatera	51.4	48.6	67.4	63.5	92.6	97.0	7.2	7.7	34.2	65.8	60.7	5
01. South Pesisir	49.8	50.3	66.2	62.3	89.8	97.3	6.6	7.3	29.9	70.1	57.5	120
02. Solok	51.1	48.9	62.0	58.3	93.0	96.4	6.0	6.3	38.0	62.0	58.6	91
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	48.8	51.2	62.1	58.5	88.4	94.9	6.6	7.3	36.7	63.3	59.3	80
04. Tanah Datar	52.7	47.3	69.1	65.2	90.9	95.8	6.9	7.2	34.3	65.7	60.3	64
05. Padang Pariaman	52.4	47.6	66.3	62.5	90.9	96.6	6.1	7.0	33.2	66.8	58.2	103
06. Agam	52.3	47.7	69.1	65.2	92.1	96.8	6.7	7.2	37.8	62.2	62.8	26
07. Limapuluh Koto	53.6	46.4	66.6	62.8	93.6	96.1	6.7	6.9	37.8	62.2	60.5	58
08. Pasaman	50.3	49.7	62.8	59.2	91.0	96.9	6.2	7.0	40.9	59.1	60.5	57
71. Padang	51.2	48.8	70.8	66.8	96.2	98.2	9.5	9.7	29.0	71.0	61.8	40
72. Solok	50.3	49.7	68.2	64.3	96.6	98.5	8.7	8.7	30.1	69.9	60.8	53
73. Sawah Lunto	53.4	46.6	72.1	68.2	95.7	99.3	7.7	8.0	29.6	70.4	59.4	76
74. Padang Panjang	53.1	46.9	71.2	67.3	96.5	98.6	9.4	9.7	38.8	61.2	67.3	6
75. Bukit Tinggi	50.8	49.2	71.8	67.9	97.8	99.7	9.5	9.9	29.1	70.9	62.7	27
76. Payakumbuh	51.5	48.5	68.7	64.8	96.0	98.3	8.3	8.5	33.1	66.9	62.1	32

**7 Gender-related
Development Index (GDI)
by District, 1999**

(continued)

Province District	Proportion of population (% of totals)		Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Share of earned income (%)		GDI	GDI Rank
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male		
14. Riau	49.2	50.8	69.8	65.8	93.7	97.4	6.9	7.8	21.1	78.9	53.1	24
01. Indragiri Hulu	48.6	51.4	66.6	62.8	89.8	95.8	6.1	7.3	29.1	70.9	57.4	123
02. Indragiri Ilir	49.4	50.6	70.0	66.0	95.9	97.9	5.9	6.5	17.4	82.6	47.9	253
03. Kepulauan Riau	49.6	50.4	70.3	66.4	87.6	94.4	6.2	6.9	16.5	83.5	46.5	270
04. Kampar	48.8	51.2	67.6	63.7	93.5	97.8	5.8	6.8	24.3	75.7	54.4	187
05. Bengkalis	49.0	51.0	70.7	66.7	93.8	97.2	6.6	7.4	14.1	85.9	44.8	280
71. Pekanbaru	50.3	49.7	72.2	68.3	98.9	100.0	9.7	10.4	19.5	80.5	54.9	181
72. Batam	48.5	51.5	71.4	67.4	94.5	98.3	8.6	9.5	22.2	77.8	57.9	113
15. Jambi	49.6	50.4	68.6	64.7	90.5	96.9	6.1	7.4	24.9	75.1	54.6	18
01. Kerinci	49.9	50.1	70.2	66.2	93.4	96.4	7.2	8.1	24.3	75.7	55.9	156
02. Bungo Tebo	50.2	49.8	65.4	61.6	88.6	96.3	5.6	7.2	30.4	69.6	55.8	157
03. Sarolangun Bangko	49.6	50.4	68.1	64.2	88.6	97.1	5.4	7.1	30.0	70.0	58.0	109
04. Batanghari	50.1	49.9	67.7	63.8	92.1	98.2	5.2	6.7	24.7	75.3	53.3	204
05. Tanjung Jabung	47.0	53.0	69.7	65.8	87.9	95.8	5.3	6.4	15.3	84.7	44.8	279
71. Jambi	50.7	49.3	70.4	66.4	93.0	97.7	8.0	9.0	23.3	76.7	55.6	167
16. South Sumatera	49.6	50.4	67.4	63.5	90.3	96.5	6.2	7.1	24.0	76.0	52.4	25
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	49.2	50.8	69.7	65.8	87.8	95.1	5.7	6.7	31.5	68.5	59.2	83
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	47.9	52.1	64.3	60.5	90.0	96.8	5.0	6.0	24.1	75.9	49.9	241
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	50.1	49.9	65.7	61.9	92.5	98.3	6.0	7.0	20.2	79.8	47.6	256
04. Lahat	49.0	51.0	65.2	61.4	93.4	98.8	6.4	7.3	27.4	72.6	55.0	179
05. Musi Rawas	50.2	49.8	63.1	59.4	87.9	94.6	5.7	6.7	27.6	72.4	51.6	228
06. Musi Banyuasin	49.3	50.7	68.6	64.7	90.7	95.9	5.1	5.9	26.6	73.4	46.7	267
07. Bangka	49.3	50.8	68.3	64.4	82.1	93.0	5.4	6.5	19.5	80.5	47.4	258
08. Balitung	49.6	50.4	68.9	65.0	90.0	97.1	6.2	7.1	16.2	83.8	45.7	276
71. Palembang	51.3	48.7	69.7	65.8	94.0	98.0	8.1	9.3	24.6	75.4	55.9	153
72. Pangkal Pinang	50.6	49.4	70.3	66.4	89.7	97.4	7.3	8.5	21.8	78.2	53.2	205
17. Bengkulu	49.1	50.9	67.1	63.3	89.4	95.9	6.5	7.5	31.6	68.4	59.4	7
01. South Bengkulu	49.4	50.6	65.7	61.9	85.3	95.5	5.5	6.8	37.1	62.9	59.4	78
02. Rejang Lebong	49.2	50.8	64.0	60.2	89.0	95.9	6.0	7.0	34.1	65.9	58.7	89
03. North Bengkulu	48.4	51.6	67.5	63.6	86.8	93.7	5.3	6.3	34.0	66.0	59.5	73
71. Bengkulu	49.6	50.4	71.4	67.4	97.3	99.3	9.7	10.6	27.4	72.6	63.0	25
18. Lampung	48.6	51.4	67.9	64.0	88.3	95.1	5.9	6.8	29.0	71.0	57.0	12
01. South Lampung	48.8	51.3	67.0	63.1	88.3	95.0	5.5	6.6	27.6	72.4	55.4	170
02. Central Lampung	48.3	51.7	68.7	64.8	84.4	93.9	5.7	6.6	30.2	69.8	58.0	107
03. North Lampung	48.9	51.2	67.0	63.1	89.6	94.7	5.3	6.0	31.5	68.5	55.7	161
04. West Lampung	47.8	52.2	67.0	63.1	90.4	94.2	5.4	6.5	27.8	72.2	55.6	165
71. Bandar Lampung	48.8	51.2	69.7	65.7	93.7	98.8	8.2	9.1	27.2	72.8	60.0	69
31. Jakarta	50.2	49.8	73.2	69.3	96.8	98.9	9.0	10.4	25.2	74.8	61.2	2
71. South Jakarta	50.7	49.3	73.1	69.2	96.6	98.9	9.4	10.7	27.1	72.9	64.7	13
72. East Jakarta	49.3	50.7	73.6	69.7	97.8	99.0	9.5	10.7	23.1	76.9	60.3	65
73. Central Jakarta	50.6	49.4	72.2	68.3	96.2	99.2	9.0	10.4	27.5	72.5	61.9	37
74. West Jakarta	50.6	49.4	73.5	69.6	96.8	98.8	8.7	10.2	25.3	74.7	60.9	52
75. North Jakarta	50.3	49.7	73.3	69.4	95.6	98.7	8.5	10.0	23.9	76.1	59.1	84

7 Gender-related
Development Index (GDI)
by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Proportion of population (% of totals)		Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Share of earned income (%)		GDI	GDI Rank
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male		
32. West Java	49.6	50.4	66.2	62.4	89.2	95.2	6.2	7.3	26.1	73.9	54.6	17
01. Pandeglang	48.0	52.1	63.4	59.7	90.9	95.6	4.8	5.8	26.6	73.4	52.9	207
02. Lebak	47.1	52.9	63.8	60.1	87.9	93.6	4.9	6.2	22.2	77.8	49.5	245
03. Bogor	50.3	49.7	67.1	63.2	91.8	95.8	7.5	8.5	25.6	74.4	55.7	164
04. Sukabumi	49.3	50.7	64.3	60.5	94.9	97.2	5.3	6.0	19.8	80.2	47.4	259
05. Cianjur	49.6	50.4	65.5	61.7	93.2	98.1	5.2	6.2	26.3	73.7	53.9	195
06. Bandung	48.7	51.3	68.5	64.6	93.1	96.4	6.6	7.4	24.5	75.5	55.9	154
07. Garut	50.0	50.0	61.2	57.6	95.8	98.2	5.7	6.7	29.1	70.9	54.1	191
08. Tasikmalaya	50.7	49.4	67.4	63.6	95.0	97.5	6.0	6.6	25.8	74.2	54.5	186
09. Ciamis	49.8	50.2	65.8	62.0	91.7	97.1	6.0	6.8	36.8	63.2	62.0	34
10. Kuningan	50.8	49.2	66.8	62.9	87.6	96.1	5.6	6.7	24.9	75.1	53.0	206
11. Cirebon	49.5	50.5	64.8	61.1	81.5	91.9	5.0	6.4	23.5	76.5	49.3	248
12. Majalengka	51.4	48.6	64.8	61.1	85.1	93.0	5.5	6.4	22.9	77.1	48.5	251
13. Sumedang	50.5	49.5	68.4	64.5	93.6	97.7	6.4	7.2	29.2	70.8	58.5	92
14. Indramayu	49.1	50.9	65.1	61.3	55.2	78.6	3.1	4.7	19.9	80.1	40.2	288
15. Subang	50.2	49.8	66.9	63.1	80.6	91.9	4.7	6.0	29.9	70.1	55.7	162
16. Purwakarta	48.3	51.7	65.3	61.5	91.9	97.1	5.7	6.7	28.5	71.5	57.1	130
17. Karawang	50.6	49.4	64.3	60.5	80.1	89.3	4.7	6.0	21.9	78.1	46.1	274
18. Bekasi	47.6	52.5	68.5	64.6	82.4	92.6	6.2	7.4	13.8	86.2	42.6	284
19. Tangerang	49.8	50.3	65.6	61.9	83.9	93.6	6.0	7.3	22.9	77.1	50.4	237
20. Serang	49.3	50.7	61.4	57.8	88.5	96.3	5.2	6.5	24.0	76.0	49.3	247
71. Bogor	49.3	50.7	69.7	65.7	96.4	98.4	8.7	9.8	26.8	73.2	60.6	55
72. Sukabumi	51.6	48.4	67.6	63.7	97.1	98.2	8.1	9.1	25.5	74.5	56.4	144
73. Bandung	50.3	49.7	70.2	66.2	97.2	99.5	9.0	10.3	28.7	71.3	62.4	29
74. Cirebon	50.1	49.9	69.1	65.1	92.1	97.6	7.7	9.2	23.8	76.2	55.7	163
75. Tangerang	50.4	49.6	69.0	65.1	91.7	96.9	8.1	9.5	25.2	74.8	56.9	133
76. Bekasi	48.6	51.4	68.5	64.6	95.7	98.8	8.7	10.1	21.7	78.3	55.4	169
33. Central Java	50.4	49.6	70.3	66.3	78.4	91.4	5.4	6.7	30.4	69.6	57.4	10
01. Cilacap	49.9	50.1	69.1	65.2	77.2	91.1	4.7	6.1	23.3	76.7	50.3	239
02. Banyumas	49.8	50.2	70.1	66.1	86.6	95.8	5.8	7.0	28.0	72.0	57.4	121
03. Purbalingga	49.3	50.7	69.4	65.4	81.2	91.1	4.9	5.8	19.2	80.8	46.7	268
04. Banjarnegara	50.4	49.6	69.4	65.4	81.5	90.3	5.2	6.1	34.9	65.1	59.4	77
05. Kebumen	50.0	50.1	69.1	65.2	82.0	92.5	5.2	6.5	26.9	73.1	55.2	174
06. Purworejo	49.2	50.9	69.6	65.7	81.3	91.5	5.7	6.9	29.4	70.6	58.2	104
07. Wonosobo	48.6	51.4	69.6	65.7	80.8	92.1	5.0	5.8	30.3	69.7	57.9	114
08. Magelang	51.3	48.7	69.9	66.0	80.6	92.3	5.7	7.0	35.2	64.8	60.5	56
09. Boyolali	50.8	49.2	71.4	67.4	74.3	88.9	5.4	7.0	38.8	61.2	61.9	38
10. Klaten	51.6	48.4	71.1	67.2	72.3	90.8	5.8	7.7	37.3	62.7	61.4	45
11. Sukoharjo	51.2	48.8	71.1	67.2	77.6	91.0	6.6	8.2	35.0	65.0	61.8	41
12. Wonogiri	50.7	49.3	73.2	69.2	68.3	85.0	4.8	6.4	33.2	66.8	58.5	95
13. Karanganyar	51.5	48.5	73.2	69.3	70.7	87.0	5.4	6.9	31.9	68.1	58.3	101
14. Sragen	51.2	48.8	72.8	68.9	62.5	81.4	4.5	6.2	31.2	68.8	55.2	175
15. Grobogan	50.2	49.8	69.8	65.8	78.0	93.4	4.9	6.3	31.7	68.3	58.1	105
16. Blora	50.3	49.7	72.0	68.0	66.9	81.5	4.2	5.3	31.5	68.5	55.3	171
17. Rembang	50.3	49.8	69.9	66.0	78.6	91.5	5.4	6.5	28.1	71.9	55.9	155
18. Pati	51.6	48.4	73.7	69.8	72.1	88.9	5.0	6.3	29.8	70.2	56.8	135
19. Kudus	50.8	49.2	69.8	65.8	83.7	94.2	6.3	7.5	32.7	67.3	60.3	66
20. Jepara	49.9	50.1	71.7	67.7	76.0	90.5	5.3	6.6	24.3	75.7	53.4	203
21. Demak	48.1	51.9	70.7	66.8	83.1	95.1	5.3	6.9	30.9	69.1	60.4	61
22. Semarang	51.1	48.9	72.7	68.7	83.9	95.2	5.9	7.3	31.6	68.4	61.1	48
23. Temanggung	50.5	49.5	72.7	68.8	87.5	94.6	5.3	6.0	40.5	59.5	65.5	10

7 Gender-related
Development Index (GDI)
by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Proportion of population (% of totals)		Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Share of earned income (%)		GDI	GDI Rank
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male		
24. Kendal	50.2	49.8	66.6	62.7	77.2	91.6	4.8	6.0	34.0	66.0	57.3	125
25. Batang	51.5	48.5	70.1	66.1	79.8	91.9	4.6	5.5	25.8	74.2	52.1	221
26. Pekalongan	50.2	49.8	68.4	64.5	76.6	92.4	4.7	6.0	27.0	73.0	52.3	217
27. Pemalang	50.3	49.7	66.4	62.6	74.1	90.9	4.6	5.9	30.4	69.6	53.7	199
28. Tegal	50.0	50.0	67.1	63.2	78.0	89.3	5.1	6.1	24.2	75.8	50.2	240
29. Brebes	50.7	49.3	65.1	61.4	75.9	90.3	4.2	5.5	26.4	73.6	49.7	243
71. Magelang	52.1	47.9	71.1	67.1	89.0	98.1	8.2	9.8	33.7	66.3	64.2	17
72. Surakarta	50.8	49.2	73.0	69.1	89.3	96.8	8.1	9.7	35.5	64.5	66.5	7
73. Salatiga	52.0	48.0	71.5	67.6	92.8	98.9	8.5	10.0	41.8	58.2	69.8	2
74. Semarang	51.5	48.5	72.2	68.3	90.3	97.2	8.0	9.4	33.6	66.4	64.6	15
75. Pekalongan	50.4	49.6	70.1	66.1	84.8	95.0	6.5	7.6	28.5	71.5	57.4	122
76. Tegal	49.8	50.2	68.5	64.6	80.4	92.8	5.9	7.3	25.4	74.6	54.3	188
34. Yogyakarta	49.9	50.1	72.9	69.0	78.3	93.0	7.1	8.8	38.7	61.3	66.4	1
01. Kulon Progo	49.5	50.5	73.4	69.5	75.5	90.4	6.1	7.6	39.0	61.0	64.6	14
02. Bantul	49.6	50.4	71.5	67.5	74.2	91.2	5.8	7.8	35.4	64.6	62.1	33
03. Gunung Kidul	49.8	50.2	72.1	68.2	74.6	92.3	6.6	7.7	46.1	53.9	63.5	21
04. Sleman	49.8	50.2	73.7	69.8	78.4	93.0	7.5	9.5	38.3	61.7	67.4	5
71. Yogyakarta	51.2	48.8	74.2	70.4	91.7	98.6	9.6	11.1	36.0	64.0	69.4	3
35. East Java	50.8	49.2	67.4	63.5	74.5	88.6	5.3	6.7	28.7	71.3	53.2	23
01. Pacitan	50.8	49.2	71.8	67.9	72.5	89.7	4.7	6.0	39.2	60.8	61.5	43
02. Ponorogo	51.6	48.4	68.5	64.6	67.4	84.7	4.7	6.0	34.0	66.0	55.0	180
03. Trenggalek	50.4	49.6	71.4	67.5	82.4	92.2	5.3	6.1	40.2	59.8	63.5	20
04. Tulungagung	51.9	48.1	72.1	68.2	79.3	91.2	5.7	6.6	29.5	70.5	57.2	129
05. Blitar	50.7	49.3	70.5	66.5	76.3	88.7	5.3	6.2	31.3	68.7	57.2	128
06. Kediri	49.9	50.1	69.8	65.8	79.1	92.3	5.6	7.1	29.2	70.8	56.5	142
07. Malang	49.8	50.3	68.2	64.3	77.3	91.4	4.9	6.1	28.4	71.6	54.3	189
08. Lumajang	51.2	48.8	66.8	62.9	71.4	83.6	4.7	5.7	25.0	75.0	47.8	254
09. Jember	52.0	48.0	61.5	57.9	63.2	83.1	3.9	5.1	21.6	78.4	39.1	291
10. Banyuwangi	51.0	49.0	66.1	62.3	73.9	90.7	4.7	6.6	32.9	67.1	55.4	168
11. Bondowoso	51.3	48.7	60.5	57.0	53.9	74.6	3.6	5.2	21.7	78.3	37.6	294
12. Situbondo	51.3	48.7	63.1	59.4	55.1	75.0	3.7	5.1	30.0	70.0	46.6	269
13. Probolinggo	50.1	49.9	60.2	56.6	57.9	79.4	3.3	4.9	20.4	79.6	37.7	293
14. Pasuruan	50.2	49.8	63.1	59.4	76.9	89.4	4.7	6.0	29.3	70.7	51.1	231
15. Sidoarjo	51.4	48.6	69.9	65.9	93.2	97.8	8.2	9.4	24.8	75.2	56.7	137
16. Mojokerto	51.1	48.9	69.5	65.5	83.3	92.2	5.6	6.8	29.1	70.9	56.1	150
17. Jombang	50.8	49.2	68.6	64.7	82.9	94.4	6.3	7.8	29.7	70.3	57.2	127
18. Nganjuk	51.3	48.7	68.8	64.9	78.7	92.1	5.4	6.8	28.9	71.1	54.6	184
19. Madiun	51.4	48.6	68.8	64.9	71.6	88.4	4.8	6.3	32.7	67.3	56.4	145
20. Magetan	50.4	49.6	71.6	67.7	72.0	92.0	5.1	7.1	35.1	64.9	60.4	60
21. Ngawi	50.8	49.2	68.9	65.0	70.9	88.1	4.5	6.1	27.1	72.9	51.7	227
22. Bojonegoro	48.2	51.8	67.4	63.5	70.4	86.5	4.6	6.2	22.2	77.8	47.0	263
23. Tuban	50.2	49.8	67.7	63.9	64.4	83.2	4.2	5.5	22.4	77.6	45.5	277
24. Lamongan	50.7	49.3	68.4	64.5	73.2	88.2	5.0	6.3	29.6	70.4	53.9	193
25. Gresik	48.7	51.3	69.3	65.3	87.0	95.6	7.0	8.2	23.9	76.1	55.1	176
26. Bangkalan	52.1	47.9	62.6	59.0	55.9	71.5	3.1	4.5	35.0	65.0	47.3	260
27. Sampang	52.3	47.7	58.3	54.9	46.8	64.4	2.0	3.0	37.6	62.4	43.5	282
28. Pamekasan	50.9	49.1	62.9	59.2	64.5	82.1	3.8	5.5	26.9	73.1	45.4	278
29. Sumenep	52.7	47.3	62.6	59.0	57.5	77.7	2.9	4.6	31.2	68.8	46.4	271
71. Kediri	51.3	48.7	70.4	66.4	88.7	97.6	7.8	9.2	32.2	67.8	62.2	31
72. Blitar	50.0	50.0	71.7	67.7	87.6	97.0	7.5	8.8	28.0	72.0	60.2	67
73. Malang	51.0	49.0	68.1	64.2	91.6	97.4	8.0	9.2	32.6	67.4	62.0	36

**7 Gender-related
Development Index (GDI)
by District, 1999**

(continued)

Province District	Proportion of population (% of totals)		Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Share of earned income (%)		GDI	GDI Rank
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male		
74. Probolinggo	50.6	49.4	69.4	65.5	78.9	94.2	6.3	8.0	30.5	69.5	57.9	112
75. Pasuruan	52.6	47.4	66.0	62.2	82.2	94.1	6.5	7.8	27.0	73.0	52.4	213
76. Mojokerto	50.1	49.9	72.0	68.1	89.7	97.4	7.7	9.1	27.8	72.2	59.9	71
77. Madiun	51.4	48.6	71.1	67.1	87.2	96.6	7.9	9.6	29.7	70.3	60.4	62
78. Surabaya	50.2	49.8	70.2	66.3	90.5	97.2	8.4	9.8	27.1	72.9	59.7	72
51. Bali	50.0	50.0	71.6	67.5	75.4	90.2	5.9	7.7	33.0	67.0	60.4	6
01. Jembrana	49.0	51.0	71.9	67.9	77.8	91.6	5.4	6.9	31.7	68.3	60.1	68
02. Tabanan	50.9	49.1	74.7	70.9	78.8	92.4	6.1	8.0	34.8	65.2	64.1	18
03. Badung	48.3	51.8	72.5	68.6	81.2	93.2	7.1	9.0	28.9	71.1	61.3	46
04. Gianyar	49.0	51.0	72.7	68.8	68.3	86.8	5.4	7.2	29.9	70.1	57.6	117
05. Klungkung	51.8	48.3	69.1	65.1	70.5	87.4	5.1	7.2	35.5	64.5	58.0	106
06. Bangli	48.9	51.1	72.5	68.6	71.8	85.1	4.7	6.3	37.3	62.7	62.0	35
07. Karangasem	49.6	50.4	68.3	64.4	54.3	78.1	3.2	5.0	36.7	63.3	54.1	190
08. Buleleng	51.4	48.6	67.9	64.0	74.9	92.4	5.2	7.3	28.6	71.4	53.8	197
71. Denpasar	50.2	49.8	73.9	69.8	90.7	96.9	9.0	10.4	30.5	69.5	65.1	11
52. West Nusa Tenggara	51.9	48.1	59.4	55.9	65.4	81.2	4.5	6.0	30.2	69.8	45.9	26
01. West Lombok	51.8	48.2	58.1	54.7	55.0	73.7	3.2	4.9	26.7	73.3	39.1	290
02. Central Lombok	52.7	47.3	57.7	54.3	55.2	75.6	3.4	5.4	30.8	69.2	42.4	286
03. East Lombok	54.1	45.9	57.7	54.3	63.5	75.1	4.4	5.3	25.4	74.6	38.8	292
04. Sumbawa	49.2	50.8	58.1	54.7	77.2	91.9	5.3	6.7	32.1	67.9	51.5	229
05. Dompu	49.7	50.3	59.6	56.1	76.7	87.7	5.5	6.5	37.6	62.4	53.8	198
06. Bima	50.7	49.3	60.2	56.7	75.1	89.0	5.9	7.0	33.5	66.5	52.2	218
71. Mataram	50.5	49.5	64.7	60.9	82.1	93.8	6.8	8.9	28.6	71.4	54.6	185
53. East Nusa Tenggara	50.7	49.3	65.5	61.7	77.4	83.5	5.2	5.9	36.7	63.3	56.8	14
01. West Sumba	49.7	50.4	63.5	59.8	64.9	73.2	4.7	5.2	35.0	65.0	42.4	285
02. East Sumba	48.9	51.1	60.7	57.2	72.2	82.0	5.1	5.7	31.8	68.2	50.5	236
03. Kupang	49.3	50.7	65.3	61.5	72.1	78.6	4.6	5.2	35.8	64.2	53.9	194
04. Southern Central-Timor	49.4	50.6	67.1	63.3	64.8	70.3	3.9	4.6	23.9	76.1	39.6	289
05. Northern Central-Timor	49.6	50.4	67.0	63.2	77.4	81.9	5.0	5.5	27.6	72.4	46.4	272
06. Belu	49.7	50.3	65.3	61.5	72.5	74.4	4.9	5.2	30.1	69.9	45.9	275
07. Alor	51.3	48.7	64.7	61.0	86.3	93.0	5.6	6.9	36.2	63.8	51.9	224
08. Flores Timur	54.0	46.0	67.9	64.0	78.4	87.6	5.0	6.0	42.8	57.2	56.2	148
09. Sikka	53.2	46.8	67.6	63.8	83.1	86.7	5.0	5.5	38.1	61.9	48.5	250
10. Ende	53.6	46.4	64.6	60.8	85.4	93.2	5.2	6.2	54.3	45.7	55.8	158
11. Ngada	52.2	47.8	66.6	62.8	90.7	94.4	6.1	6.7	44.2	55.8	62.3	30
12. Manggarai	50.7	49.3	65.9	62.1	78.0	88.8	4.7	5.7	41.2	58.8	59.4	79
71. Kupang	48.3	51.8	65.3	61.5	94.5	96.9	9.3	10.3	26.3	73.7	58.2	102
61. West Kalimantan	49.0	51.0	65.9	62.1	76.1	90.2	5.0	6.2	32.5	67.5	55.7	15
01. Sambas	48.8	51.2	58.5	55.1	74.3	89.8	4.4	5.7	34.7	65.3	52.2	220
02. Pontianak	49.1	50.9	66.5	62.7	75.4	91.0	4.9	6.3	32.4	67.6	55.8	159
03. Sanggau	48.9	51.1	68.4	64.5	74.2	89.1	4.5	5.6	36.9	63.1	58.4	98
04. Ketapang	48.8	51.2	66.8	63.0	77.4	90.6	4.5	5.7	33.9	66.1	56.8	134
05. Sintang	49.1	50.9	67.9	64.0	73.6	85.6	4.4	5.5	28.0	72.0	52.3	216
06. Kapuas Hulu	49.4	50.6	66.4	62.6	77.7	87.8	5.3	6.4	27.5	72.5	52.3	215
71. Pontianak	49.6	50.4	67.0	63.2	82.7	95.2	7.2	8.5	25.3	74.7	54.1	192

**7 Gender-related
Development Index (GDI)
by District, 1999**

(continued)

Province District	Proportion of population (% of totals)		Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Share of earned income (%)		GDI	GDI Rank
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male		
62. Central Kalimantan	48.8	51.2	71.2	67.3	92.8	96.9	6.6	7.5	26.5	73.5	57.9	9
01. West Kotawaringin	49.4	50.6	71.4	67.4	91.1	95.1	6.1	7.3	18.0	82.0	49.3	249
02. East Kotawaringin	48.1	51.9	69.9	65.9	90.5	96.2	6.2	7.3	21.0	79.0	52.0	222
03. Kapuas	48.9	51.1	71.6	67.6	92.9	97.0	6.3	6.9	26.0	74.0	57.7	116
04. South Barito	49.6	50.4	68.1	64.2	94.8	98.6	6.7	7.5	33.9	66.1	61.7	42
05. North Barito	49.4	50.6	72.3	68.4	93.8	97.7	6.3	7.1	35.7	64.3	64.4	16
71. Palangka Raya	48.4	51.7	74.2	70.3	97.7	98.6	9.3	10.2	29.1	70.9	65.7	9
63. South Kalimantan	50.5	49.6	62.8	59.1	89.4	96.3	5.9	7.2	33.2	66.8	56.9	13
01. Tanah Laut	48.5	51.5	68.1	64.2	80.5	91.0	4.8	6.0	29.6	70.4	56.0	151
02. Kota Baru	49.6	50.5	63.4	59.7	87.9	94.5	5.3	6.9	30.3	69.7	55.2	173
03. Banjar	50.3	49.7	64.1	60.4	93.3	97.7	6.4	7.6	32.7	67.3	58.3	100
04. Barito Kuala	50.5	49.5	59.4	56.0	85.2	96.9	4.8	5.8	38.9	61.1	56.6	141
05. Tapin	52.0	48.0	66.6	62.7	89.2	97.1	5.4	6.7	34.6	65.4	58.5	93
06. South Hulu Sungai	51.9	48.1	62.7	59.0	89.3	94.9	5.4	6.4	39.8	60.2	59.5	74
07. Central Hulu Sungai	51.2	48.8	63.7	60.0	87.2	95.1	5.4	6.5	42.4	57.6	60.4	59
08. North Hulu Sungai	51.8	48.2	60.5	56.9	89.4	97.6	5.4	6.7	40.7	59.3	58.5	94
09. Tabalong	51.5	48.5	62.8	59.1	87.0	96.7	5.5	7.3	34.9	65.1	57.0	131
71. Banjarmasin	49.9	50.1	66.4	62.6	94.2	98.4	7.8	9.1	25.6	74.4	56.4	143
64. East Kalimantan	49.1	50.9	71.0	67.0	90.0	96.8	7.1	8.5	21.1	78.9	53.5	21
01. Pasir	46.7	53.3	72.6	68.7	79.4	93.4	4.8	6.2	16.5	83.5	47.2	261
02. Kutai	49.7	50.4	67.9	64.1	90.3	96.7	6.6	8.2	23.3	76.7	53.4	202
03. Berau	48.5	51.5	69.5	65.6	87.4	93.1	6.1	7.2	23.4	76.6	53.5	201
04. Bulongan	47.1	52.9	73.2	69.3	87.4	95.7	6.4	7.5	20.9	79.1	55.1	177
71. Balikpapan	50.7	49.3	72.1	68.2	92.6	98.4	8.1	9.5	18.5	81.5	51.9	223
72. Samarinda	49.3	50.8	70.6	66.6	93.9	98.2	8.3	9.7	24.4	75.6	58.0	110
71. North Sulawesi	49.6	50.5	70.0	66.1	97.3	97.2	7.5	7.6	21.6	78.4	53.9	20
01. Gorontalo	50.6	49.4	66.9	63.1	95.2	93.4	6.2	5.8	25.9	74.1	53.5	200
02. Bolaang Mongondow	48.3	51.7	71.8	67.8	95.2	97.3	6.5	6.9	19.5	80.5	52.4	212
03. Minahasa	48.4	51.6	72.4	68.5	99.0	99.0	7.7	7.6	23.4	76.6	58.6	90
04. Sangihe Talaud	49.5	50.5	73.1	69.2	95.8	95.1	7.2	7.2	32.8	67.2	64.0	19
71. Gorontalo	51.9	48.1	66.3	62.5	99.1	98.7	8.7	8.7	29.9	70.1	59.2	81
72. Manado	50.9	49.1	72.8	68.8	99.6	99.8	9.9	10.5	21.7	78.3	57.5	119
73. Bitung	47.7	52.3	69.6	65.6	97.6	97.9	7.8	8.3	14.2	85.8	46.9	264
72. Central Sulawesi	49.4	50.6	64.5	60.7	90.3	94.9	6.6	7.4	27.1	72.9	54.1	19
01. Luwuk Banggai	48.9	51.2	65.4	61.6	88.6	94.0	5.9	6.9	30.7	69.3	56.6	140
02. Poso	49.5	50.5	63.1	59.4	94.6	97.9	7.1	7.7	28.4	71.6	54.9	182
03. Donggala	49.5	50.5	61.9	58.3	86.1	92.5	5.8	6.6	27.2	72.8	51.2	230
04. Bual Toli-Toli	48.9	51.1	63.9	60.1	90.1	93.9	6.0	6.8	19.5	80.5	46.1	273
71. Kodya Palu	50.1	49.9	68.3	64.4	97.1	99.2	9.3	10.5	26.6	73.4	59.1	85
73. South Sulawesi	51.3	48.7	70.3	66.3	79.6	87.1	6.0	7.0	26.8	73.2	53.3	22
01. Selayar	52.8	47.2	68.1	64.2	79.5	89.8	5.1	6.1	28.6	71.4	52.2	219
02. Bulukumba	52.1	47.9	70.4	66.4	77.2	82.6	5.7	6.8	27.5	72.5	52.7	208
03. Bantaeng	52.2	47.8	72.8	68.9	67.3	74.1	4.4	4.8	29.7	70.3	52.4	214
04. Jeneponto	52.1	47.9	65.8	62.0	65.4	72.5	4.7	5.1	30.9	69.1	49.3	246
05. Takalar	51.1	49.0	68.6	64.7	73.0	81.2	5.0	5.8	31.0	69.0	53.8	196

**7 Gender-related
Development Index (GDI)
by District, 1999**

(continued)

Province District	Proportion of population (% of totals)		Life expectancy ^{a)} (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Mean years of schooling (years)		Share of earned income (%)		GDI	GDI Rank
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male		
06. Gowa	49.3	50.7	72.0	68.0	72.3	81.7	5.5	6.5	29.1	70.9	55.6	166
07. Sinjai	52.1	47.9	71.5	67.5	76.7	80.5	5.2	5.7	26.0	74.0	51.1	233
08. Maros	51.7	48.3	70.6	66.6	73.0	81.1	4.8	5.9	22.3	77.7	46.8	265
09. Pangkep	51.9	48.1	69.1	65.2	78.9	86.9	5.2	6.4	18.6	81.4	43.9	281
10. Barru	52.6	47.4	68.6	64.7	82.9	84.8	6.2	6.3	21.8	78.2	47.2	262
11. Bone	52.5	47.5	69.2	65.2	77.4	85.4	5.4	6.3	28.0	72.0	51.8	225
12. Soppeng	55.0	45.0	72.7	68.7	76.0	81.0	5.3	6.1	25.8	74.2	50.3	238
13. Wajo	53.2	46.8	69.2	65.2	72.3	80.7	4.5	5.7	19.2	80.8	41.8	287
14. Sidenreng Rappang	52.0	48.0	71.5	67.5	78.6	87.9	5.5	6.5	20.9	79.1	47.5	257
15. Pinrang	51.5	48.5	70.5	66.6	77.6	88.3	5.4	6.7	21.6	78.4	48.1	252
16. Enrekang	50.7	49.3	74.1	70.2	84.6	95.0	5.8	7.1	35.1	64.9	63.1	23
17. Luwu	49.6	50.4	73.5	69.6	89.0	95.0	6.6	7.6	24.2	75.8	56.6	139
18. Tana Toraja	48.0	52.0	74.9	71.1	67.5	78.6	5.2	6.1	33.7	66.3	59.9	70
19. Polewali Mamasa	52.5	47.6	64.8	61.0	77.0	85.3	4.9	5.5	32.3	67.7	52.5	210
20. Majene	51.6	48.4	64.1	60.4	86.5	93.0	6.3	7.1	28.0	72.0	52.5	211
21. Mamuju	48.3	51.7	69.0	65.0	78.4	89.4	5.0	6.2	28.2	71.8	55.3	172
71. Ujung Pandang	51.2	48.8	73.5	69.6	92.9	97.7	9.3	10.5	27.3	72.7	61.4	44
72. Pare Pare	51.4	48.6	73.9	70.0	91.7	97.0	7.8	9.0	29.8	70.2	61.8	39
74. South-east Sulawesi	50.1	50.0	66.9	63.1	82.6	91.8	6.2	7.4	32.2	67.8	57.4	11
01. Buton	51.0	49.0	68.1	64.2	81.1	89.9	6.0	7.2	37.0	63.0	59.2	82
02. Muna	50.1	49.9	65.9	62.1	76.6	90.9	5.3	6.8	35.5	64.5	56.2	147
03. Kendari	49.2	50.8	67.1	63.2	81.8	91.9	5.7	6.9	33.8	66.2	58.4	99
04. Kolaka	49.6	50.4	66.6	62.8	83.6	91.0	6.2	7.2	24.2	75.8	50.8	234
71. Kendari	50.8	49.2	67.1	63.2	95.5	98.8	9.3	10.6	25.3	74.7	56.9	132
81. Maluku	50.0	50.0	69.3	65.4	94.2	97.4	7.3	8.0	31.3	68.7	61.0	4
01. South-east Maluku	50.5	49.5	72.2	68.3	95.4	97.3	6.4	7.0	26.2	73.8	57.9	111
02. Central Maluku	50.2	49.8	65.7	61.9	95.6	98.1	6.9	7.3	34.5	65.5	60.9	51
03. North Maluku	49.5	50.5	67.7	63.8	90.8	96.3	6.8	7.9	27.2	72.8	56.7	136
04. Central Halmahera	48.8	51.2	67.5	63.7	85.9	94.6	5.6	6.6	30.1	69.9	57.8	115
71. Ambon	50.8	49.2	73.5	69.6	100.0	99.9	10.5	10.8	36.9	63.1	69.8	1
82. Irian Jaya	48.4	51.7	66.4	62.6	64.8	77.3	4.8	6.4	35.2	64.8	55.7	16
01. Merauke	48.4	51.6	59.7	56.2	75.0	83.0	4.5	5.9	32.9	67.1	52.6	209
02. Jaya Wijaya	48.9	51.1	66.2	62.4	23.7	48.3	1.5	3.7	48.1	51.9	47.7	255
03. Jaya Pura	49.0	51.0	67.5	63.6	86.9	93.5	7.1	8.5	26.3	73.7	56.2	149
04. Paniai	47.5	52.5	68.0	64.1	42.2	57.4	2.9	4.2	46.4	53.6	43.4	283
05. Fak Fak	47.5	52.5	70.0	66.0	94.0	95.7	6.9	8.0	17.9	82.1	50.7	235
06. Sorong	48.6	51.4	66.0	62.2	85.0	91.4	6.1	7.6	27.6	72.4	55.8	160
07. Manokwari	47.0	53.0	68.1	64.2	65.2	82.4	4.4	6.2	25.2	74.8	51.1	232
08. Yapen Waropen	48.9	51.1	64.6	60.9	81.8	89.2	4.7	6.1	30.3	69.7	54.6	183
09. Biak Numfor	49.3	50.7	66.0	62.2	92.0	97.3	6.9	8.3	29.3	70.7	58.8	88
71. Jaya Pura	48.6	51.4	68.6	64.7	94.7	98.7	9.1	10.4	24.1	75.9	58.4	96

Note:

^{a)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey. The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both Regency and City

Source: BPS special tabulation

8 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), by District, 1999

Province District	Women in the parliament (% of total)	Females in senior official, managerial, and technical staff positions (% of total)	Females in the labour force (% of total)	Female population (% of total)	Average non- agricultural wage (Thousand Rp)		GEM	GEM Rank
					Female	Male		
11. Aceh	8.3	54.4	38.4	49.9	271.9	383.4	52.4	6
01. South Aceh	0.0	47.8	32.2	48.5	295.4	433.2	38.5	245
02. South-east Aceh	3.3	41.8	45.2	50.6	340.4	372.6	50.6	62
03. East Aceh	2.2	57.9	30.6	48.4	258.7	319.2	42.5	206
04. Central Aceh	0.0	54.5	41.1	50.1	265.8	463.6	40.6	228
05. Weast Aceh	2.6	37.3	38.7	49.1	219.6	364.6	42.2	212
06. Aceh Besar	0.0	59.3	36.6	49.9	323.3	360.1	43.4	189
07. Pidie	0.0	47.5	45.2	52.9	224.2	380.1	42.4	208
08. North Aceh	8.9	62.6	41.6	50.4	290.9	408.1	50.3	63
71. Banda Aceh	0.0	53.3	31.7	50.1	260.9	401.9	37.4	253
72. Sabang	5.0	58.5	35.7	49.7	219.1	314.7	43.3	191
12. North Sumatera	2.8	53.8	41.0	49.9	261.9	385.6	47.3	16
01. Nias	0.0	45.1	46.1	49.1	342.2	401.8	36.6	261
02. South Tapanuli	2.2	63.2	48.7	50.1	311.6	373.2	49.0	89
03. Central Tapanuli	3.3	51.7	45.1	50.5	337.7	390.7	50.1	67
04. North Tapanuli	2.5	53.9	49.9	48.7	329.7	366.4	52.5	43
05. Labuhan Batu	0.0	52.5	32.0	49.8	242.4	517.5	30.7	284
06. Asahan	2.2	61.1	37.2	49.7	219.1	325.8	42.7	202
07. Simalungun	6.7	59.5	44.5	50.7	252.2	311.1	54.0	29
08. Dairi	3.3	63.4	50.7	50.2	350.5	359.1	46.9	124
09. Karo	0.0	60.4	49.7	51.0	312.4	349.9	48.6	95
10. Deli Serdang	4.4	42.3	38.7	49.0	214.0	344.9	47.5	110
11. Langkat	4.4	54.0	35.0	49.7	291.4	482.5	43.4	190
71. Sibolga	5.0	65.6	35.4	49.9	289.2	412.7	44.3	170
72. Tanjung Balai	4.0	71.7	29.3	49.7	217.8	398.7	31.1	283
73. Pematang Siantar	10.0	49.0	34.9	49.6	205.4	343.2	50.9	59
74. Tebing Tinggi	0.0	56.2	29.5	50.5	265.1	320.2	38.6	243
75. Medan	2.2	54.2	35.8	51.0	282.6	427.2	42.9	201
76. Binjai	0.0	60.9	35.1	49.7	228.6	304.8	40.0	233
13. West Sumatera	6.1	58.8	40.3	51.4	299.6	389.5	51.5	8
01. South Pesisir	2.5	55.4	34.3	49.8	321.5	392.8	45.9	139
02. Solok	2.5	55.1	41.7	51.1	278.2	325.0	49.8	72
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	8.6	52.8	41.0	48.8	331.7	397.2	58.1	5
04. Tanah Datar	0.0	67.8	40.3	52.7	284.1	366.7	40.7	227
05. Padang Pariaman	2.2	45.4	42.5	52.4	257.2	382.7	46.4	135
06. Agam	0.0	71.8	43.9	52.3	317.3	408.2	40.9	224
07. Limapuluh Koto	5.7	74.3	43.0	53.6	263.0	327.1	45.5	146
08. Pasaman	2.2	62.0	42.5	50.3	291.0	310.3	49.1	84
71. Padang	2.3	56.2	34.8	51.2	331.9	433.4	44.6	164
72. Solok	0.0	53.9	35.7	50.3	313.9	404.5	43.0	199
73. Sawah Lunto	0.0	56.2	35.9	53.4	281.1	375.2	40.1	232
74. Padang Panjang	5.0	56.3	42.7	53.1	308.8	363.3	53.1	37
75. Bukit Tinggi	15.0	61.5	39.9	50.8	253.6	411.0	57.2	11
76. Payakumbuh	12.5	58.4	40.6	51.5	247.2	340.9	57.9	7

8 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Women in the parliament (% of total)	Females in senior official, managerial, and technical staff positions (% of total)	Females in the labour force (% of total)	Female population (% of total)	Average non- agricultural wage (Thousand Rp)		GEM	GEM Rank
					Female	Male		
14. Riau	2.0	43.2	30.1	49.2	360.1	579.4	38.1	26
01. Indragiri Hulu	2.5	45.2	35.0	48.6	322.3	423.2	46.2	137
02. Indragiri Ilir	4.4	44.2	27.9	49.4	216.4	397.9	36.6	262
03. Kepulauan Riau	6.7	40.4	27.5	49.6	267.6	511.9	37.9	251
04. Kampar	4.4	39.7	34.8	48.8	263.0	436.2	43.8	176
05. Bengkalis	7.0	47.4	27.0	49.0	218.3	492.4	36.2	266
71. Pekanbaru	0.0	44.0	28.5	50.3	400.0	658.5	33.0	279
72. Batam	--	41.8	31.9	48.5	524.1	861.7	--	--
15. Jambi	8.0	37.5	31.6	49.6	281.6	393.3	46.8	17
01. Kerinci	2.9	51.1	37.9	49.9	289.2	549.0	42.1	214
02. Bungo Tebo	0.0	40.8	30.6	50.2	365.8	370.1	41.4	221
03. Sarolangun Bangko	7.5	35.5	36.0	49.6	279.4	367.3	49.9	69
04. Batanghari	10.0	33.6	32.8	50.1	241.6	359.7	46.9	125
05. Tanjung Jabung	5.0	23.2	22.8	47.0	237.3	387.6	27.5	288
71. Jambi	12.5	44.2	29.4	50.7	283.3	389.3	51.3	55
16. South Sumatera	3.2	52.4	36.7	49.6	214.7	393.7	41.7	25
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	8.9	48.1	36.4	49.2	255.2	317.1	54.8	23
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	11.1	43.8	33.1	47.9	222.4	346.6	50.8	61
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	2.9	49.5	38.7	50.1	246.3	613.9	37.1	256
04. Lahat	4.5	48.2	39.3	49.0	199.8	343.2	46.5	132
05. Musi Rawas	6.7	67.2	38.6	50.2	190.1	313.6	44.3	168
06. Musi Banyuasin	13.6	46.4	39.6	49.3	172.2	311.3	47.9	103
07. Bangka	2.2	49.6	32.1	49.3	228.6	445.2	36.9	257
08. Balitung	3.3	52.8	26.8	49.6	154.6	292.5	34.3	276
71. Palembang	7.0	57.8	36.7	51.3	212.3	377.3	45.6	145
72. Pangkal Pinang	12.0	35.7	32.5	50.6	271.9	470.6	47.0	122
17. Bengkulu	10.0	45.5	39.5	49.1	254.6	360.1	56.5	2
01. South Bengkulu	0.0	22.1	41.6	49.4	276.0	333.5	36.4	265
02. Rejang Lebong	7.7	53.9	41.4	49.2	254.1	346.2	55.4	17
03. North Bengkulu	2.2	49.5	37.8	48.4	294.3	347.4	49.0	90
71. Bengkulu	10.0	48.1	37.0	49.6	243.1	378.2	54.3	28
18. Lampung	4.5	46.1	36.9	48.6	236.2	337.6	48.2	13
01. South Lampung	2.2	46.5	35.8	48.8	216.8	317.4	44.5	167
02. Central Lampung	4.4	47.3	37.2	48.3	238.6	326.3	49.6	75
03. North Lampung	4.4	45.3	37.9	48.9	210.8	279.2	47.7	108
04. West Lampung	0.0	25.1	37.1	47.8	230.5	353.2	34.1	277
71. Bandar Lampung	2.2	49.5	36.5	48.8	250.8	386.7	44.8	156
31. Jakarta	7.9	34.9	34.6	50.2	376.9	593.2	46.4	18
71. South Jakarta	--	40.7	35.7	50.7	385.0	573.4	--	--
72. East Jakarta	--	39.4	30.8	49.3	403.2	596.7	--	--
73. Central Jakarta	--	36.6	38.6	50.6	331.2	549.0	--	--
74. West Jakarta	--	31.0	35.5	50.6	378.1	613.7	--	--
75. North Jakarta	-	23.9	35.2	50.3	353.6	612.3	-	-

8 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Women in the parliament (% of total)	Females in senior official, managerial, and technical staff positions (% of total)	Females in the labour force (% of total)	Female population (% of total)	Average non- agricultural wage (Thousand Rp)		GEM	GEM Rank
					Female	Male		
32. West Java	7.8	36.0	32.4	49.6	284.0	384.4	47.7	14
01. Pandeglang	0.0	35.6	33.9	48.0	238.8	338.5	38.9	241
02. Lebak	6.7	31.3	24.6	47.1	287.6	328.7	42.7	203
03. Bogor	11.1	33.3	30.6	50.3	413.5	529.7	49.3	83
04. Sukabumi	6.7	31.6	31.0	49.3	163.9	298.3	38.4	246
05. Cianjur	11.1	51.2	34.1	49.6	193.1	280.3	53.6	34
06. Bandung	6.7	39.6	30.8	48.7	254.9	348.9	47.1	119
07. Garut	6.7	36.1	35.5	50.0	207.7	278.0	47.9	102
08. Tasikmalaya	6.7	47.6	39.3	50.7	157.7	293.5	47.4	111
09. Ciamis	0.0	44.9	37.6	49.8	282.8	292.3	47.7	105
10. Kuningan	4.4	39.2	34.4	50.8	176.7	278.8	43.2	193
11. Cirebon	8.9	34.1	33.6	49.5	164.4	270.9	45.7	143
12. Majalengka	6.7	59.0	36.5	51.4	176.0	340.3	43.8	177
13. Sumedang	15.6	40.0	33.0	50.5	276.0	330.0	58.6	4
14. Indramayu	2.2	35.6	34.3	49.1	136.9	287.7	35.5	270
15. Subang	6.7	37.9	33.8	50.2	207.1	247.5	50.1	66
16. Purwakarta	2.2	54.4	34.9	48.3	252.8	340.1	46.2	138
17. Karawang	4.4	31.0	27.1	50.6	262.0	348.2	36.7	260
18. Bekasi	6.7	24.4	18.6	47.6	265.3	379.9	28.9	285
19. Tangerang	2.2	25.4	30.7	49.8	289.1	431.6	32.5	281
20. Serang	6.7	22.2	32.4	49.3	223.4	339.5	36.8	259
71. Bogor	8.9	33.0	28.6	49.3	433.7	473.5	48.9	92
72. Sukabumi	6.7	50.9	34.8	51.6	226.7	354.0	47.2	115
73. Bandung	8.9	39.3	35.5	50.3	285.4	389.3	51.9	49
74. Cirebon	0.0	47.1	35.9	50.1	216.0	387.8	38.2	247
75. Tangerang	4.4	31.8	32.8	50.4	330.7	478.9	40.6	229
76. Bekasi	15.6	50.4	27.2	48.6	310.2	418.9	54.9	21
33. Central Java	6.7	44.7	40.8	50.4	186.7	294.7	51.2	9
01. Cilacap	11.1	42.9	37.1	49.9	155.9	302.3	50.2	64
02. Banyumas	8.9	45.0	37.9	49.8	182.9	287.3	52.4	46
03. Purbalingga	8.9	46.4	38.3	49.3	101.7	266.3	44.2	173
04. Banjarnegara	4.4	50.0	37.9	50.4	206.6	235.5	51.6	51
05. Kebumen	6.7	45.5	40.0	50.0	152.9	277.2	49.5	79
06. Purworejo	4.4	45.2	40.2	49.2	178.6	288.2	49.5	78
07. Wonosobo	8.9	60.8	36.9	48.6	180.8	242.9	53.6	32
08. Magelang	2.2	50.9	44.6	51.3	202.8	300.6	49.1	86
09. Boyolali	2.2	33.4	45.8	50.8	197.0	262.2	47.1	120
10. Klaten	8.9	51.5	46.0	51.6	191.1	273.4	58.0	6
11. Sukoharjo	8.9	35.9	42.6	51.2	214.0	294.7	54.4	27
12. Wonogiri	8.9	41.2	40.4	50.7	217.9	297.1	54.9	22
13. Karanganyar	9.1	46.5	45.6	51.5	150.7	270.0	54.7	25
14. Sragen	6.7	42.9	42.4	51.2	169.1	274.0	50.9	60
15. Grobogan	4.4	36.8	39.7	50.2	214.6	303.9	48.0	101
16. Blora	2.2	51.6	39.9	50.3	195.0	281.9	46.7	128
17. Rembang	4.4	41.2	40.9	50.3	199.8	353.5	46.8	127
18. Pati	6.7	57.7	41.5	51.6	199.2	332.3	49.9	71
19. Kudus	11.1	55.7	45.5	50.8	158.9	273.3	57.7	9
20. Jepara	2.2	30.3	39.6	49.9	161.5	329.3	36.9	258
21. Demak	0.0	38.0	40.7	48.1	182.8	280.8	43.6	182
22. Semarang	6.7	49.4	43.7	51.1	185.2	311.3	52.6	42
23. Temanggung	2.2	63.8	40.0	50.5	216.5	211.9	49.4	82

8 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Women in the parliament (% of total)	Females in senior official, managerial, and technical staff positions (% of total)	Females in the labour force (% of total)	Female population (% of total)	Average non- agricultural wage (Thousand Rp)		GEM	GEM Rank
					Female	Male		
24. Kendal	6.7	42.4	39.2	50.2	213.3	267.2	53.6	33
25. Batang	4.4	41.0	38.7	51.5	119.4	216.3	43.1	196
26. Pekalongan	11.1	44.6	39.1	50.2	130.4	226.9	52.8	39
27. Pemalang	0.0	48.3	38.0	50.3	171.7	240.5	43.1	198
28. Tegal	4.4	50.6	37.5	50.0	187.0	350.9	44.3	169
29. Brebes	8.9	41.7	40.4	50.7	156.4	296.2	49.6	76
71. Magelang	12.0	49.5	42.4	52.1	215.1	310.5	59.4	3
72. Surakarta	3.3	40.0	45.0	50.8	245.4	365.6	49.9	70
73. Salatiga	4.0	44.7	45.7	52.0	319.2	373.6	54.8	24
74. Semarang	16.7	36.6	43.6	51.5	225.2	344.6	61.1	1
75. Pekalongan	6.7	54.7	38.0	50.4	201.1	308.7	49.7	74
76. Tegal	2.2	50.0	39.8	49.8	170.6	331.1	43.5	187
34. Yogyakarta	7.8	46.7	45.6	49.9	232.3	308.1	58.8	1
01. Kulon Progo	7.5	54.3	42.5	49.5	230.6	266.5	57.8	8
02. Bantul	6.7	46.0	45.2	49.6	174.4	262.2	55.7	15
03. Gunung Kidul	6.7	76.4	49.8	49.8	283.9	328.8	47.1	121
04. Sleman	6.7	37.2	43.6	49.8	264.6	329.5	55.8	14
71. Yogyakarta	2.5	37.3	46.0	51.2	219.5	332.1	48.6	96
35. East Java	11.1	45.9	39.1	50.8	197.1	314.8	54.4	4
01. Pacitan	6.7	31.2	45.0	50.8	207.0	262.3	51.6	52
02. Ponorogo	6.7	56.1	42.2	51.6	184.6	261.4	52.4	45
03. Trenggalek	4.4	55.2	43.5	50.4	191.1	218.4	53.9	30
04. Tulungagung	6.7	45.5	41.1	51.9	161.3	268.7	49.8	73
05. Blitar	4.4	58.2	36.8	50.7	198.1	253.0	48.7	94
06. Kediri	2.2	44.6	39.0	49.9	163.0	252.4	45.0	154
07. Malang	2.2	46.6	36.9	49.8	147.5	217.6	44.8	158
08. Lumajang	6.7	36.4	35.4	51.2	141.0	231.6	43.6	183
09. Jember	6.7	54.4	37.1	52.0	157.6	337.4	41.9	219
10. Banyuwangi	6.7	34.2	38.7	51.0	207.6	267.4	49.5	80
11. Bondowoso	4.4	30.9	38.9	51.3	135.6	312.2	35.6	268
12. Situbondo	0.0	55.3	38.6	51.3	169.4	248.3	42.3	210
13. Probolinggo	0.0	36.7	37.3	50.1	118.4	274.1	32.2	282
14. Pasuruan	4.4	49.9	39.0	50.2	164.4	253.6	47.7	107
15. Sidoarjo	4.4	50.9	37.7	51.4	209.5	384.0	44.1	174
16. Mojokerto	4.4	33.9	38.7	51.1	177.6	272.9	43.8	178
17. Jombang	6.7	38.8	37.5	50.8	199.1	283.3	49.0	88
18. Nganjuk	2.2	50.4	39.0	51.3	216.2	339.8	44.3	171
19. Madiun	2.2	46.5	39.2	51.4	193.3	256.5	47.5	109
20. Magetan	0.0	48.4	44.4	50.4	195.6	288.8	46.6	129
21. Ngawi	6.7	35.7	37.1	50.8	153.8	243.8	45.8	141
22. Bojonegoro	6.7	28.7	31.1	48.2	184.5	292.5	39.6	238
23. Tuban	6.7	40.2	38.9	50.2	151.7	334.6	43.5	185
24. Lamongan	0.0	49.5	38.8	50.7	201.6	303.5	42.4	209
25. Gresik	4.4	56.3	36.1	48.7	194.3	349.3	44.2	172
26. Bangkalan	4.4	42.8	42.8	52.1	246.8	342.7	48.8	93
27. Sampang	0.0	47.6	45.0	52.3	227.3	308.0	45.4	148
28. Pamekasan	4.5	36.4	45.3	50.9	111.8	251.4	42.4	207
29. Sumenep	4.4	52.2	46.6	52.7	163.9	314.7	48.1	100
71. Kediri	6.7	54.6	42.0	51.3	221.2	337.2	52.5	44
72. Blitar	4.0	53.7	38.9	50.0	188.9	309.1	47.2	116
73. Malang	8.9	47.5	41.3	51.0	212.9	309.1	55.7	16

8 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Women in the parliament (% of total)	Females in senior official, managerial, and technical staff positions (% of total)	Females in the labour force (% of total)	Female population (% of total)	Average non- agricultural wage (Thousand Rp)		GEM	GEM Rank
					Female	Male		
74. Probolinggo	3.3	44.5	34.6	50.6	268.9	324.7	47.2	117
75. Pasuruan	3.3	35.7	36.3	52.6	179.3	276.3	40.3	231
76. Mojokerto	4.0	58.7	37.9	50.1	208.7	331.1	45.4	150
77. Madiun	0.0	52.1	43.0	51.4	222.8	397.6	42.5	205
78. Surabaya	6.7	43.5	37.8	50.2	252.1	411.5	49.1	85
51. Bali	6.1	35.5	45.4	50.0	229.1	387.3	50.5	10
01. Jembrana	0.0	41.9	43.8	49.0	187.3	314.0	44.5	166
02. Tabanan	0.0	49.8	45.8	50.9	221.8	350.5	46.9	123
03. Badung	5.7	45.5	39.1	48.3	274.1	433.3	51.3	56
04. Gianyar	5.7	17.3	45.0	49.0	178.9	342.8	37.2	255
05. Klungkung	8.0	43.5	46.8	51.8	198.8	317.5	55.1	19
06. Bangli	0.0	26.0	47.6	48.9	213.0	323.9	41.3	222
07. Karangasem	2.9	34.0	48.5	49.6	200.2	324.0	47.8	104
08. Buleleng	2.2	31.3	47.4	51.4	148.2	334.1	39.4	239
71. Denpasar	0.0	39.2	44.0	50.2	278.2	498.4	42.9	200
52. West Nusa Tenggara	6.1	37.2	42.9	51.9	177.7	308.6	46.2	20
01. West Lombok	7.5	33.2	42.0	51.8	121.1	240.9	43.1	197
02. Central Lombok	7.5	23.9	47.3	52.7	126.3	254.9	40.5	230
03. East Lombok	7.3	41.5	41.7	54.1	149.5	313.7	43.3	192
04. Sumbawa	5.3	33.7	41.8	49.2	281.3	425.8	47.7	106
05. Dompu	0.0	39.3	42.3	49.7	263.7	320.9	44.8	159
06. Bima	0.0	43.0	42.7	50.7	232.9	345.2	43.4	188
71. Mataram	0.0	37.7	39.0	50.5	214.3	342.5	39.6	236
53. East Nusa Tenggara	2.1	35.7	43.0	50.7	233.6	304.3	46.4	18
01. West Sumba	0.0	37.5	42.9	49.7	261.7	364.8	34.4	275
02. East Sumba	0.0	33.9	40.1	48.9	193.4	278.2	40.7	226
03. Kupang	5.0	30.6	36.6	49.3	293.7	303.6	47.1	118
04. Southern Central-Timor	5.7	30.5	32.7	49.4	189.2	292.0	34.8	273
05. Northern Central-Timor	0.0	43.2	40.1	49.6	186.0	327.2	35.3	271
06. Belu	0.0	36.9	34.3	49.7	190.9	231.5	35.6	267
07. Alor	0.0	29.0	42.6	51.3	184.4	241.3	33.5	278
08. Flores Timur	0.0	35.2	50.2	54.0	176.7	237.7	40.8	225
09. Sikka	6.7	45.0	47.9	53.2	183.7	273.9	43.8	175
10. Ende	3.3	39.9	54.9	53.6	330.1	338.5	46.5	130
11. Ngada	0.0	42.6	48.4	52.2	297.1	351.9	47.4	112
12. Manggarai	0.0	26.2	48.7	50.7	222.1	301.2	41.1	223
71. Kupang	10.0	38.8	30.6	48.3	282.3	348.0	52.6	41
61. West Kalimantan	6.3	43.2	39.8	49.0	288.2	395.1	52.2	7
01. Sambas	0.0	40.7	44.3	48.8	237.6	356.2	45.0	153
02. Pontianak	0.0	51.5	37.8	49.1	301.5	382.3	44.7	162
03. Sanggau	0.0	30.2	39.3	48.9	326.6	362.3	42.0	218
04. Ketapang	0.0	51.3	36.7	48.8	295.2	333.7	45.6	144
05. Sintang	0.0	33.4	42.1	49.1	224.1	418.8	38.1	248
06. Kapuas Hulu	0.0	31.2	42.9	49.4	219.4	434.7	36.5	263
71. Pontianak	0.0	41.2	33.2	49.6	302.0	442.7	38.7	242

8 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Women in the parliament (% of total)	Females in senior official, managerial, and technical staff positions (% of total)	Females in the labour force (% of total)	Female population (% of total)	Average non- agricultural wage (Thousand Rp)		GEM	GEM Rank
					Female	Male		
62. Central Kalimantan	2.5	46.3	43.5	48.8	301.1	447.8	43.3	24
01. West Kotawaringin	0.0	30.9	29.1	49.4	264.7	493.7	27.5	287
02. East Kotawaringin	3.3	42.7	28.5	48.1	302.6	453.4	39.7	235
03. Kapuas	2.2	51.3	39.9	48.9	208.6	394.9	43.2	195
04. South Barito	4.0	58.8	39.6	49.6	299.2	382.7	49.5	81
05. North Barito	0.0	43.3	36.9	49.4	430.3	452.8	45.7	142
71. Palangka Raya	4.0	49.5	33.5	48.4	383.3	471.6	49.0	91
63. South Kalimantan	8.7	47.1	41.1	50.5	281.7	395.6	55.1	3
01. Tanah Laut	3.8	52.9	38.2	48.5	246.3	361.7	48.4	98
02. Kota Baru	2.5	33.3	38.1	49.6	301.6	426.0	43.2	194
03. Banjar	5.9	57.4	41.5	50.3	259.9	379.2	51.3	57
04. Barito Kuala	3.3	50.0	43.6	50.5	312.0	378.8	52.0	48
05. Tapin	0.0	47.9	42.5	52.0	251.8	351.0	44.7	161
06. South Hulu Sungai	4.2	57.7	44.0	51.9	275.1	326.9	52.7	40
07. Central Hulu Sungai	10.0	43.0	45.0	51.2	344.1	382.6	59.7	2
08. North Hulu Sungai	3.3	46.6	47.3	51.8	221.2	289.6	51.9	50
09. Tabalong	0.0	47.2	44.7	51.5	257.7	387.9	45.2	151
71. Banjarmasin	2.2	44.0	33.0	49.9	300.7	430.9	42.6	204
64. East Kalimantan	12.5	39.2	31.0	49.1	300.6	505.1	49.3	12
01. Pasir	3.3	39.5	25.5	46.7	242.9	420.4	35.5	269
02. Kutai	2.2	37.3	31.5	49.7	382.8	578.6	38.6	244
03. Berau	0.0	43.9	32.7	48.5	298.9	475.9	37.8	252
04. Bulongan	3.3	25.6	32.3	47.1	214.0	387.4	34.5	274
71. Balikpapan	13.3	44.2	28.5	50.7	315.1	555.1	47.3	113
72. Samarinda	6.7	40.9	34.0	49.3	265.8	424.1	46.5	133
71. North Sulawesi	7.5	54.9	28.5	49.6	303.9	439.7	45.1	22
01. Gorontalo	7.0	60.0	26.3	50.6	309.8	316.1	46.5	131
02. Bolaang Mongondow	7.5	42.7	24.5	48.3	285.4	383.3	43.5	186
03. Minahasa	17.8	62.6	28.5	48.4	276.1	359.9	56.6	12
04. Sangihe Talaud	7.4	60.5	33.0	49.5	342.0	345.8	52.8	38
71. Gorontalo	4.2	60.3	32.1	51.9	278.8	308.6	46.3	136
72. Manado	7.5	49.3	33.5	50.9	340.9	621.1	44.8	157
73. Bitung	8.0	32.0	23.4	47.7	200.3	369.8	35.2	272
72. Central Sulawesi	7.5	47.4	33.7	49.4	250.9	342.4	50.0	11
01. Luwuk Banggai	0.0	50.0	37.6	48.9	214.9	292.0	43.5	184
02. Poso	5.0	44.8	37.6	49.5	241.8	368.0	47.3	114
03. Donggala	6.8	52.5	31.5	49.5	257.1	316.4	49.1	87
04. Bual Toli-Toli	6.7	30.5	25.0	48.9	198.2	272.5	37.4	254
71. Kodya Palu	3.3	48.6	33.6	50.1	284.6	398.2	44.6	163
73. South Sulawesi	3.8	47.7	31.4	51.3	321.1	401.9	43.9	23
01. Selayar	4.0	53.2	34.4	52.8	241.1	315.6	44.8	160
02. Bulukumba	5.7	38.7	30.3	52.1	353.7	404.7	44.5	165
03. Bantaeng	4.0	46.5	33.7	52.2	299.9	360.7	45.9	140
04. Jeneponto	2.9	46.6	36.2	52.1	312.6	396.1	45.5	147

8 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Women in the parliament (% of total)	Females in senior official, managerial, and technical staff positions (% of total)	Females in the labour force (% of total)	Female population (% of total)	Average non- agricultural wage (Thousand Rp)		GEM	GEM Rank
					Female	Male		
05. Takalar	6.7	51.8	31.8	51.1	301.1	312.0	51.1	58
06. Gowa	5.3	56.8	29.2	49.3	263.6	265.0	48.5	97
07. Sinjai	3.3	54.5	26.9	52.1	342.8	358.1	42.2	211
08. Maros	3.3	41.9	29.0	51.7	229.4	325.6	38.1	249
09. Pangkep	6.7	54.4	23.9	51.9	307.0	421.4	39.1	240
10. Barru	8.0	61.8	23.8	52.6	288.4	323.2	42.1	217
11. Bone	8.9	55.4	28.6	52.5	357.1	367.7	49.5	77
12. Soppeng	3.3	60.0	28.1	55.0	304.6	341.6	39.9	234
13. Wajo	12.5	50.8	30.4	53.2	185.1	339.7	45.1	152
14. Sidenreng Rappang	0.0	45.9	27.1	52.0	215.5	303.4	33.0	280
15. Pinrang	2.9	48.1	28.8	51.5	260.5	382.7	38.1	250
16. Enrekang	8.0	50.0	35.4	50.7	373.5	379.1	55.3	18
17. Luwu	2.9	48.7	31.5	49.6	412.3	593.1	42.2	213
18. Tana Toraja	5.0	38.4	35.9	48.0	309.9	341.2	51.3	54
19. Polewali Mamasa	10.0	51.9	38.5	52.5	232.1	303.9	54.6	26
20. Majene	4.2	49.0	32.1	51.6	338.5	412.6	45.4	149
21. Mamuju	6.7	40.7	30.0	48.3	310.6	339.3	50.1	65
71. Ujung Pandang	7.0	43.0	33.1	51.2	348.4	460.1	48.2	99
72. Pare Pare	8.0	49.0	30.6	51.4	366.7	380.1	51.5	53
74. South-east Sulawesi	2.5	40.2	36.5	50.1	300.9	364.1	46.0	21
01. Buton	7.5	47.9	40.5	51.0	337.2	390.5	54.9	20
02. Muna	10.0	33.2	43.1	50.1	262.8	361.0	53.2	36
03. Kendari	4.4	30.6	36.9	49.2	244.5	279.9	46.4	134
04. Kolaka	6.7	40.6	26.0	49.6	347.2	382.1	45.0	155
71. Kendari	16.0	44.7	31.8	50.8	292.6	401.9	56.3	13
81. Maluku	7.5	55.3	35.0	50.0	333.0	394.4	52.7	5
01. South-east Maluku	3.1	63.0	36.1	50.5	243.7	388.6	41.6	220
02. Central Maluku	2.2	62.3	34.9	50.2	311.3	317.0	46.8	126
03. North Maluku	8.9	50.6	34.1	49.5	343.2	475.3	52.1	47
04. Central Halmahera	0.0	37.5	33.0	48.8	304.8	348.1	42.1	215
71. Ambon	8.6	52.9	38.0	50.8	381.1	400.1	57.4	10
82. Irian Jaya	2.7	34.2	41.4	48.4	490.1	638.2	47.7	14
01. Merauke	5.7	47.9	41.7	48.4	513.5	748.4	53.7	31
02. Jaya Wijaya	2.5	20.1	49.8	48.9	478.2	512.6	42.1	216
03. Jaya Pura	12.0	36.7	30.6	49.0	462.7	572.1	53.3	35
04. Paniai	7.4	47.7	47.4	47.5	581.1	604.5	50.0	68
05. Fak Fak	0.0	29.1	27.7	47.5	531.3	932.6	28.2	286
06. Sorong	3.3	25.6	35.8	48.6	471.0	689.6	39.6	237
07. Manokwari	8.0	24.3	38.1	47.0	287.3	523.8	43.8	179
08. Yapen Waropen	0.0	25.8	34.7	48.9	447.3	546.4	36.5	264
09. Biak Numfor	4.0	29.8	34.1	49.3	411.0	513.2	43.6	181
71. Jaya Pura	3.3	42.0	26.6	48.6	539.1	616.2	43.6	180

Note:

The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City

Source: BPS special tabulation

9 Human
Poverty Index (HPI)
by District, 1998

Province District	People not expected to survive age 40 ^{a)} (%)	Adult illiteracy rate (%)	Population without access to safe water (%)	Population without access to health facilities (%)	Under nourished children under age five (%)	HPI	HPI Rank
11. Aceh	12.7	6.9	61.5	37.6	35.6	31.4	23
01. South Aceh	18.8	8.7	73.7	73.9	30.9	41.7	8
02. South-east Aceh	12.4	9.3	64.6	45.7	35.6	34.0	42
03. East Aceh	13.2	6.1	47.6	40.2	37.7	29.3	100
04. Central Aceh	14.2	2.8	54.5	37.1	21.0	26.5	141
05. Weast Aceh	12.0	8.8	75.5	56.0	53.1	42.8	6
06. Aceh Besar	10.4	5.6	61.3	21.3	49.5	30.7	81
07. Pidie	12.8	12.4	78.8	21.7	41.7	33.3	47
08. North Aceh	11.4	5.5	61.0	45.9	33.6	32.6	57
71. Banda Aceh	11.7	2.3	23.5	0.0	24.9	12.5	281
72. Sabang	11.3	5.2	35.9	25.0	26.3	20.6	229
12. North Sumatera	13.5	4.2	47.9	20.9	35.3	24.5	11
01. Nias	14.6	14.3	48.3	47.7	59.0	36.3	22
02. South Tapanuli	17.9	0.7	66.1	46.9	30.2	33.7	44
03. Central Tapanuli	16.2	6.2	61.6	20.9	33.0	27.4	128
04. North Tapanuli	16.6	3.8	63.7	60.8	32.3	36.6	19
05. Labuhan Batu	16.1	3.5	63.9	41.1	23.6	30.2	87
06. Asahan	13.8	6.3	42.3	12.0	27.1	19.7	240
07. Simalungun	13.3	6.4	38.2	14.4	31.7	20.2	236
08. Dairi	16.2	3.2	50.9	19.8	50.7	28.7	109
09. Karo	8.5	4.5	45.9	18.1	29.2	21.7	209
10. Deli Serdang	15.3	6.0	55.6	13.9	41.4	26.3	144
11. Langkat	14.1	2.8	45.3	23.5	37.3	25.0	164
71. Sibolga	11.5	1.5	10.7	0.0	34.7	11.8	284
72. Tanjung Balai	13.8	3.0	20.9	2.1	26.7	13.4	276
73. Pematang Siantar	9.1	1.7	8.0	10.6	29.3	11.7	285
74. Tebing Tinggi	10.0	2.2	69.2	0.0	23.2	21.6	212
75. Medan	10.4	1.2	28.2	0.0	36.3	15.5	267
76. Binjai	10.5	2.7	63.3	0.0	36.4	23.3	190
13. West Sumatera	16.2	5.3	46.4	21.7	34.0	24.4	9
01. South Pesisir	18.3	6.6	53.9	46.4	32.4	31.4	71
02. Solok	25.3	5.4	34.6	21.7	34.9	24.6	172
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	22.4	8.3	50.9	35.6	32.5	29.1	102
04. Tanah Datar	13.4	6.8	44.4	12.6	38.2	22.6	198
05. Padang Pariaman	18.0	6.5	61.7	33.8	41.0	32.2	61
06. Agam	13.4	5.8	44.1	21.7	39.1	24.7	171
07. Limapuluh Koto	17.4	5.3	47.3	33.7	38.1	28.3	114
08. Pasaman	24.4	6.1	40.2	37.8	32.5	27.8	120
71. Padang	10.9	2.8	55.0	10.3	28.1	21.9	206
72. Solok	14.8	2.4	11.4	0.0	28.5	12.3	282
73. Sawah Lunto	9.2	2.6	29.2	0.0	28.0	13.7	275
74. Padang Panjang	10.4	2.6	16.1	0.0	18.6	9.6	292
75. Bukit Tinggi	9.6	1.3	21.7	0.0	21.0	10.8	288
76. Payakumbuh	14.0	2.9	35.6	0.0	31.8	16.8	257

9 Human Poverty Index (HPI) by District, 1998

Province District	People not expected to survive age 40 ^{a)} (%)	Adult illiteracy rate (%)	Population without access to safe water (%)	Population without access to health facilities (%)	Under nourished children under age five (%)	HPI	HPI Rank
14. Riau	12.4	4.4	71.8	39.2	27.9	32.3	24
01. Indragiri Hulu	17.4	7.2	47.7	58.1	42.9	34.9	34
02. Indragiri Ilir	12.0	3.2	97.5	59.3	32.3	43.8	3
03. Kepulauan Riau	11.6	9.1	59.2	11.8	22.8	22.2	202
04. Kampar	15.8	4.4	67.7	49.0	29.2	34.1	41
05. Bengkalis	11.1	4.5	82.2	48.9	21.0	35.3	27
71. Pekanbaru	9.0	0.5	76.0	6.2	32.9	26.7	137
72. Batam	10.2	3.7	44.5	25.0	25.0	22.1	204
15. Jambi	14.2	6.3	57.3	21.5	32.9	26.3	14
01. Kerinci	11.7	5.1	37.0	21.2	22.8	19.3	244
02. Bungo Tebo	19.6	7.6	60.8	30.8	39.2	31.2	75
03. Sarolangun Bangko	14.9	7.2	65.1	36.5	39.4	33.0	49
04. Batanghari	15.7	4.8	54.3	15.8	34.5	24.9	167
05. Tanjung Jabung	12.4	7.9	94.4	22.2	33.5	34.9	34
71. Jambi	11.5	4.7	28.3	2.0	21.8	13.2	277
16. South Sumatera	16.2	6.6	59.7	28.9	26.4	27.3	17
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	12.4	8.5	54.1	47.0	23.4	29.1	102
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	21.6	6.6	65.6	15.7	29.3	27.2	130
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	19.1	4.6	60.8	46.9	23.2	31.1	79
04. Lahat	20.0	3.8	83.5	36.1	33.3	36.0	23
05. Musi Rawas	24.0	8.8	69.7	41.7	28.6	33.8	43
06. Musi Banyuasin	14.2	6.7	79.5	23.1	26.4	30.2	87
07. Bangka	14.6	12.3	61.5	46.7	25.0	31.4	71
08. Balitung	13.8	6.5	68.0	23.2	20.4	26.3	144
71. Palembang	12.4	4.1	22.8	6.3	33.1	15.4	270
72. Pangkal Pinang	11.6	6.6	57.5	0.0	28.6	20.4	234
17. Bengkulu	16.6	7.4	59.2	24.8	30.0	27.1	16
01. South Bengkulu	19.0	9.6	80.7	16.8	34.0	31.3	73
02. Rejang Lebong	22.2	7.5	56.1	24.9	28.1	27.1	133
03. North Bengkulu	16.0	9.6	47.7	50.0	28.1	29.7	97
71. Bengkulu	10.2	1.7	61.4	5.2	31.4	22.9	195
18. Lampung	15.4	8.2	54.4	34.5	29.1	27.9	18
01. South Lampung	16.8	8.3	58.7	26.9	28.6	27.2	130
02. Central Lampung	14.0	10.8	48.9	24.5	26.5	23.9	184
03. North Lampung	16.8	7.8	52.7	61.3	32.9	34.4	38
04. West Lampung	16.8	7.6	68.0	59.6	33.9	37.7	14
71. Bandar Lampung	12.6	3.7	56.6	2.4	27.2	20.5	233
31. Jakarta	7.9	2.2	40.2	2.0	23.7	15.5	1
71. South Jakarta	7.7	2.9	5.7	1.3	25.0	8.3	294
72. East Jakarta	7.4	1.6	56.5	4.1	24.8	19.9	239
73. Central Jakarta	9.0	2.3	16.4	0.3	17.2	9.0	293
74. West Jakarta	7.5	2.3	26.6	2.2	21.4	11.9	283
75. North Jakarta	7.9	2.3	72.7	0.8	26.2	23.1	191

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(continued)

Province District	People not expected to survive age 40 ^{a)} (%)	Adult illiteracy rate (%)	Population without access to safe water (%)	Population without access to health facilities (%)	Under nourished children under age five (%)	HPI	HPI Rank
32. West Java	18.2	7.8	62.1	22.4	27.2	26.9	15
01. Pandeglang	23.3	6.8	52.6	44.5	39.6	33.0	49
02. Lebak	22.5	9.2	60.6	51.3	23.9	32.7	55
03. Bogor	16.7	6.3	59.0	15.4	29.5	24.9	167
04. Sukabumi	21.7	4.0	56.6	34.6	32.5	29.9	94
05. Cianjur	19.4	4.4	62.2	55.9	31.8	35.3	27
06. Bandung	14.3	5.3	70.8	14.3	21.2	25.1	162
07. Garut	26.9	3.2	64.9	21.2	25.9	28.8	107
08. Tasikmalaya	16.1	3.8	80.0	10.4	30.5	28.5	112
09. Ciamis	18.9	6.1	60.7	13.6	27.7	24.9	167
10. Kuningan	17.2	8.3	65.3	22.4	32.3	28.5	112
11. Cirebon	20.6	13.4	56.9	23.4	33.9	28.1	117
12. Majalengka	20.6	11.1	53.5	12.6	37.3	25.7	155
13. Sumedang	14.5	4.4	59.1	34.3	19.9	26.7	137
14. Indramayu	20.1	33.3	59.7	30.4	25.7	32.5	59
15. Subang	16.9	13.8	70.7	29.3	34.8	32.0	64
16. Purwakarta	19.7	5.5	53.1	22.2	28.9	25.5	156
17. Karawang	21.7	15.2	70.1	26.9	32.5	31.5	70
18. Bekasi	14.3	12.4	51.2	24.3	11.6	21.4	214
19. Tangerang	19.2	11.3	77.3	30.7	20.3	30.7	81
20. Serang	26.5	7.8	63.9	29.1	35.5	31.9	66
71. Bogor	12.6	2.6	68.9	11.3	31.4	26.1	147
72. Sukabumi	15.8	2.4	47.2	0.0	10.9	15.5	267
73. Bandung	11.8	1.7	33.8	4.4	22.9	15.0	272
74. Cirebon	13.5	5.4	17.8	0.0	27.3	12.6	279
75. Tangerang	13.6	5.7	67.8	20.0	18.5	25.1	162
76. Bekasi	14.3	2.9	74.9	0.0	11.6	20.8	224
33. Central Java	11.7	15.2	47.8	17.1	30.5	23.2	7
01. Cilacap	13.4	15.8	58.8	24.3	33.3	27.8	120
02. Banyumas	11.9	8.8	51.0	17.6	21.0	21.3	216
03. Purbalingga	13.0	13.8	68.9	17.1	30.0	27.5	127
04. Banjarnegara	13.0	14.1	63.7	17.1	21.6	24.6	172
05. Kebumen	13.4	12.8	56.3	36.5	32.7	29.6	98
06. Purworejo	12.6	13.7	57.8	12.3	24.1	22.8	197
07. Wonosobo	12.6	13.5	33.8	46.6	33.9	27.1	133
08. Magelang	12.1	13.8	28.9	27.3	28.0	20.7	228
09. Boyolali	10.2	18.6	37.1	20.0	19.1	20.0	238
10. Klaten	10.5	18.9	54.7	17.1	25.3	24.1	182
11. Sukoharjo	10.5	16.0	64.8	17.1	18.6	24.3	181
12. Wonogiri	7.9	23.6	41.3	25.9	17.7	23.0	193
13. Karanganyar	7.9	21.7	58.3	17.1	28.8	26.0	149
14. Sragen	8.3	28.4	40.9	51.3	30.7	31.3	73
15. Grobogan	12.4	14.4	35.0	25.9	20.3	20.2	236
16. Blora	9.4	25.9	24.8	30.1	34.0	24.5	176
17. Rembang	12.1	15.2	20.9	14.9	50.6	21.3	216
18. Pati	7.3	20.0	53.6	29.6	35.4	28.6	111
19. Kudus	12.4	11.2	49.8	14.4	43.0	25.4	158
20. Jepara	9.8	16.9	44.6	31.4	40.0	27.7	124
21. Demak	11.0	10.8	52.3	14.4	28.5	22.6	198
22. Semarang	8.5	10.6	41.6	28.5	32.7	24.1	182
23. Temanggung	8.4	9.0	50.7	17.1	33.1	23.6	187

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(continued)

Province District	People not expected to survive age 40 ^{a)} (%)	Adult illiteracy rate (%)	Population without access to safe water (%)	Population without access to health facilities (%)	Under nourished children under age five (%)	HPI	HPI Rank
24. Kendal	17.5	15.7	48.6	17.1	34.3	24.9	167
25. Batang	11.9	14.2	70.7	17.1	21.9	26.1	147
26. Pekalongan	14.5	15.8	71.3	13.4	33.6	28.3	114
27. Pemalang	17.8	17.7	58.3	17.1	34.4	27.2	130
28. Tegal	16.7	16.5	70.9	10.3	39.6	29.2	101
29. Brebes	20.1	17.0	44.0	23.8	41.5	27.4	128
71. Magelang	10.6	6.6	18.1	0.0	19.2	10.4	289
72. Surakarta	8.1	7.1	39.0	0.0	14.0	12.9	278
73. Salatiga	9.9	4.3	16.8	0.0	21.0	10.1	291
74. Semarang	9.0	6.4	15.3	6.6	29.3	12.6	279
75. Pekalongan	11.9	10.2	62.5	0.0	29.7	22.0	205
76. Tegal	14.4	13.5	21.4	0.0	31.2	15.3	271
34. Yogyakarta	8.2	14.5	48.9	8.6	17.3	18.5	2
01. Kulon Progo	7.6	17.2	39.9	23.7	21.5	21.1	221
02. Bantul	10.0	17.4	53.7	9.6	24.0	21.8	207
03. Gunung Kidul	9.2	17.1	42.9	9.5	7.5	16.6	261
04. Sleman	7.3	14.3	46.4	8.6	18.1	18.1	249
71. Yogyakarta	6.7	4.9	60.5	0.0	11.3	16.8	257
35. East Java	16.2	18.7	43.0	17.1	30.7	23.4	8
01. Pacitan	9.6	19.2	47.8	17.1	19.8	21.7	209
02. Ponorogo	14.3	24.3	35.3	14.2	12.5	20.6	229
03. Trenggalek	10.1	12.8	48.9	10.4	29.9	21.4	214
04. Tulungagung	9.2	15.0	54.7	14.1	17.5	21.0	222
05. Blitar	11.3	17.6	52.2	17.1	26.6	23.6	187
06. Kediri	12.3	14.4	52.3	17.1	17.1	21.3	216
07. Malang	14.8	15.8	39.0	34.2	23.4	23.8	185
08. Lumajang	17.2	22.8	57.2	36.4	34.9	31.7	68
09. Jember	26.3	27.5	44.5	27.1	33.1	30.1	90
10. Banyuwangi	18.3	18.1	60.3	17.1	34.4	27.7	124
11. Bondowoso	28.2	36.2	46.7	34.5	40.0	35.6	24
12. Situbondo	24.0	35.6	60.7	18.3	33.7	33.4	46
13. Probolinggo	28.9	31.7	51.5	17.1	54.3	34.6	37
14. Pasuruan	24.0	17.0	65.7	29.5	29.8	31.2	75
15. Sidoarjo	12.2	4.6	26.6	12.1	33.0	17.3	253
16. Mojokerto	12.8	12.5	40.9	11.1	22.8	18.7	246
17. Jombang	14.2	11.6	49.4	17.1	28.4	22.9	195
18. Nganjuk	13.8	14.9	42.8	17.1	27.9	21.8	207
19. Madiun	13.9	20.3	44.6	17.1	22.6	22.3	201
20. Magetan	9.8	18.5	26.1	17.1	13.4	16.7	259
21. Ngawi	13.7	20.6	43.4	31.7	39.2	28.1	117
22. Bojonegoro	16.1	21.4	38.4	28.1	27.5	24.6	172
23. Tuban	15.6	26.2	38.5	23.9	33.3	26.2	146
24. Lamongan	14.6	19.7	44.2	12.9	39.5	24.5	176
25. Gresik	13.2	8.7	46.7	10.5	29.4	20.8	224
26. Bangkalan	24.8	37.0	43.3	44.7	48.3	37.6	15
27. Sampang	34.1	45.1	48.3	22.8	43.4	39.6	12
28. Pamekasan	24.4	27.3	43.8	29.5	62.9	35.0	32
29. Sumenep	24.8	33.2	44.6	36.4	32.5	32.8	54
71. Kediri	11.5	7.1	64.6	0.0	21.1	20.3	235
72. Blitar	9.8	7.7	70.2	0.0	20.0	21.2	220
73. Malang	15.0	5.6	42.1	0.0	25.9	17.2	254

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(continued)

Province District	People not expected to survive age 40 ^{a)} (%)	Adult illiteracy rate (%)	Population without access to safe water (%)	Population without access to health facilities (%)	Under nourished children under age five (%)	HPI	HPI Rank
74. Probolinggo	12.9	13.8	41.0	0.0	32.1	18.6	247
75. Pasuruan	18.6	12.3	26.6	0.0	30.1	17.1	255
76. Mojokerto	9.3	6.5	55.9	0.0	23.2	18.6	247
77. Madiun	10.6	8.3	49.3	0.0	15.0	15.7	265
78. Surabaya	11.7	6.2	4.5	12.2	25.8	11.6	286
51. Bali	11.7	17.3	34.2	14.9	21.0	18.7	3
01. Jembrana	11.2	15.3	43.9	14.9	24.3	20.6	229
02. Tabanan	6.1	14.6	25.9	14.9	19.3	15.6	266
03. Badung	8.7	12.5	63.0	17.0	20.6	23.8	185
04. Gianyar	8.4	22.4	23.8	36.7	13.7	20.8	224
05. Klungkung	13.5	21.4	27.1	14.9	18.8	19.0	245
06. Bangli	8.7	21.5	28.9	25.5	13.4	19.5	241
07. Karangasem	14.6	33.9	30.4	29.2	24.7	27.8	120
08. Buleleng	15.3	16.8	23.7	14.9	25.1	18.1	249
71. Denpasar	7.2	6.2	43.1	6.2	21.2	16.5	262
52. West Nusa Tenggara	31.5	27.2	62.5	17.5	39.7	33.7	25
01. West Lombok	34.5	36.3	64.7	24.9	44.1	39.0	13
02. Central Lombok	35.7	35.6	52.2	17.5	35.3	35.4	26
03. East Lombok	35.7	31.4	79.5	12.8	38.6	37.6	15
04. Sumbawa	34.5	15.3	58.9	33.9	35.0	34.4	38
05. Dompu	31.2	18.0	42.9	17.5	46.2	30.0	92
06. Bima	28.8	18.2	51.9	37.7	45.6	34.3	40
71. Mataram	20.9	12.2	61.6	0.0	34.8	24.5	176
53. East Nusa Tenggara	19.5	19.6	41.9	38.2	38.7	29.5	21
01. West Sumba	23.2	31.0	48.4	26.6	44.1	32.7	55
02. East Sumba	27.8	22.8	30.8	40.5	31.9	29.1	102
03. Kupang	19.8	24.5	47.5	35.9	49.5	33.2	48
04. Southern Central-Timor	16.6	32.5	44.7	49.1	41.1	35.1	31
05. Northern Central-Timor	16.8	20.5	30.4	62.5	51.8	34.7	36
06. Belu	19.7	26.6	37.9	23.3	55.5	30.5	83
07. Alor	20.8	10.5	40.8	38.2	29.3	26.7	137
08. Flores Timur	15.3	17.6	54.7	29.9	41.8	30.3	84
09. Sikka	15.8	15.4	55.4	53.5	25.7	32.0	64
10. Ende	21.1	11.2	54.6	41.2	38.2	32.2	61
11. Ngada	17.5	7.7	14.4	18.6	32.8	17.6	251
12. Manggarai	18.7	17.0	39.7	65.3	31.9	32.9	53
71. Kupang	19.8	5.4	24.8	0.5	29.3	16.7	259
61. West Kalimantan	18.6	16.8	78.4	43.3	42.0	38.7	26
01. Sambas	33.7	18.0	70.2	33.6	39.3	37.1	18
02. Pontianak	17.7	16.6	87.4	41.3	48.1	41.5	9
03. Sanggau	14.5	18.2	78.6	69.5	51.2	46.5	2
04. Ketapang	17.1	16.0	69.0	48.0	38.2	36.6	19
05. Sintang	15.3	20.4	75.3	57.2	41.2	41.0	10
06. Kapuas Hulu	17.8	17.2	85.8	60.7	39.9	43.7	4
71. Pontianak	16.7	11.1	85.4	0.0	30.5	27.7	124

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Province District	People not expected to survive age 40 ^{a)} (%)	Adult illiteracy rate (%)	Population without access to safe water (%)	Population without access to health facilities (%)	Under nourished children under age five (%)	HPI	HPI Rank
62. Central Kalimantan	10.4	5.2	68.2	26.2	30.5	29.0	20
01. West Kotawaringin	10.2	6.9	40.6	26.2	22.2	20.9	223
02. East Kotawaringin	12.2	6.6	80.5	22.5	30.9	31.2	75
03. Kapuas	9.9	5.0	71.4	31.6	26.8	30.1	90
04. South Barito	15.1	3.3	55.5	42.7	51.7	35.0	32
05. North Barito	8.9	4.7	73.1	60.8	23.6	36.5	21
71. Palangka Raya	6.7	1.9	71.3	0.5	34.2	24.6	172
63. South Kalimantan	24.5	7.2	46.7	16.2	29.0	24.4	10
01. Tanah Laut	15.0	14.2	53.0	29.0	28.2	26.5	141
02. Kota Baru	23.3	8.8	34.6	16.2	19.3	20.6	229
03. Banjar	22.0	4.5	58.9	23.5	27.3	27.1	133
04. Barito Kuala	31.5	9.2	90.4	59.2	30.1	43.5	5
05. Tapin	17.6	6.9	48.8	16.2	29.0	23.0	193
06. South Hulu Sungai	24.7	8.0	64.5	16.2	29.0	27.8	120
07. Central Hulu Sungai	22.8	9.0	57.7	16.2	29.0	26.0	149
08. North Hulu Sungai	28.3	6.8	49.6	28.1	29.0	28.3	114
09. Tabalong	24.4	8.3	43.7	5.3	29.0	22.2	202
71. Banjarmasin	17.8	3.8	4.8	0.0	38.6	14.3	273
64. East Kalimantan	10.7	6.5	35.8	19.6	31.9	20.6	4
01. Pasir	8.6	13.2	55.7	24.7	23.3	24.5	176
02. Kutai	15.3	6.4	43.4	31.4	34.8	26.0	149
03. Berau	12.7	9.7	52.0	21.5	32.3	25.0	164
04. Bulongan	7.8	8.3	62.2	18.9	28.1	25.4	158
71. Balikpapan	9.2	4.5	8.0	0.5	31.7	10.3	290
72. Samarinda	11.3	3.9	18.9	12.0	34.6	15.8	264
71. North Sulawesi	12.0	2.8	44.5	26.1	25.8	22.7	5
01. Gorontalo	16.9	5.7	65.0	39.3	32.5	32.2	61
02. Bolaang Mongondow	9.6	3.8	39.1	16.7	27.4	19.5	241
03. Minahasa	8.8	1.0	33.9	20.7	20.0	17.5	252
04. Sangihe Talaud	8.0	4.6	45.8	42.6	22.7	25.8	154
71. Gorontalo	18.0	1.1	46.1	15.3	30.1	22.5	200
72. Manado	8.4	0.3	38.4	23.9	21.5	19.5	241
73. Bitung	12.7	2.2	35.5	0.0	29.9	16.1	263
72. Central Sulawesi	21.2	7.4	51.7	30.2	34.9	28.4	19
01. Luwuk Banggai	19.7	8.6	36.0	25.0	30.9	23.1	191
02. Poso	24.0	3.8	45.8	43.6	32.7	30.0	92
03. Donggala	25.4	10.6	57.7	34.8	38.9	32.4	60
04. Bual Toli-Toli	22.5	8.0	54.3	35.0	33.5	29.9	94
71. Kodya Palu	14.7	1.9	70.1	5.7	30.9	25.2	161
73. South Sulawesi	11.7	16.8	49.1	26.0	33.9	26.3	13
01. Selayar	15.0	15.8	73.1	20.5	37.5	31.2	75
02. Bulukumba	11.5	20.4	48.5	42.7	33.9	30.2	87
03. Bantaeng	8.3	29.5	42.3	33.9	47.1	31.7	68
04. Jeneponto	19.0	31.2	66.6	22.1	48.2	35.3	27
05. Takalar	14.1	23.2	58.8	33.9	45.2	33.5	45

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Province District	People not expected to survive age 40 ^{a)} (%)	Adult illiteracy rate (%)	Population without access to safe water (%)	Population without access to health facilities (%)	Under nourished children under age five (%)	HPI	HPI Rank
06. Gowa	9.4	23.1	63.9	39.7	44.9	35.5	25
07. Sinjai	10.0	21.5	41.5	27.3	21.5	23.4	189
08. Maros	11.2	23.2	64.7	28.2	34.0	31.0	80
09. Pangkep	13.4	17.4	50.1	45.0	44.1	33.0	49
10. Barru	14.1	16.2	61.8	37.1	26.6	29.9	94
11. Bone	13.3	19.0	50.3	30.8	24.5	26.0	149
12. Soppeng	8.5	21.8	56.2	50.0	31.6	33.0	49
13. Wajo	13.3	23.9	67.2	22.4	29.1	29.6	98
14. Sidenreng Rappang	10.0	17.2	60.8	20.6	31.5	27.1	133
15. Pinrang	11.3	17.3	64.6	19.9	43.0	30.3	84
16. Enrekang	6.9	10.3	51.8	39.7	28.3	27.9	119
17. Luwu	7.5	8.0	44.9	38.4	31.7	26.7	137
18. Tana Toraja	5.9	26.7	22.3	33.1	38.1	25.5	156
19. Polewali Mamasa	20.8	19.1	52.0	33.9	29.0	28.9	105
20. Majene	22.0	10.5	57.1	33.9	33.4	30.3	84
21. Mamuju	13.7	15.9	68.1	66.4	38.2	40.4	11
71. Ujung Pandang	7.5	4.8	18.1	1.9	27.2	11.4	287
72. Pare Pare	7.0	5.8	51.0	0.0	41.3	21.5	213
74. South-east Sulawesi	17.0	12.9	43.6	21.3	27.1	22.9	6
01. Buton	15.1	14.8	43.2	15.6	25.5	21.3	216
02. Muna	18.8	16.8	41.2	27.1	35.6	26.0	149
03. Kendari	16.7	13.1	47.8	48.9	24.4	28.9	105
04. Kolaka	17.5	12.7	45.6	14.5	25.5	21.7	209
71. Kendari	16.7	2.9	31.3	0.0	24.4	15.5	267
81. Maluku	13.1	4.2	52.1	23.8	29.3	24.7	12
01. South-east Maluku	9.1	3.7	62.4	25.5	17.3	24.5	176
02. Central Maluku	19.1	3.2	58.2	16.8	29.3	25.4	158
03. North Maluku	15.7	6.4	54.7	47.4	33.6	31.8	67
04. Central Halmahera	15.9	9.8	42.2	20.3	21.7	20.8	224
71. Ambon	7.6	0.1	29.6	0.0	43.0	17.0	256
82. Irian Jaya	17.8	28.8	54.5	36.0	28.3	31.3	22
01. Merauke	30.9	20.9	65.8	41.2	28.3	35.2	30
02. Jaya Wijaya	18.1	64.0	44.2	44.8	26.3	47.7	1
03. Jaya Pura	16.0	9.7	44.6	31.2	28.3	25.0	164
04. Paniai	15.2	50.2	75.4	35.5	29.2	42.6	7
05. Fak Fak	12.1	5.1	59.1	35.7	28.3	28.7	109
06. Sorong	18.6	11.8	55.2	32.2	32.3	28.8	107
07. Manokwari	15.1	25.9	55.3	71.3	28.3	37.5	17
08. Yapen Waropen	21.0	14.5	69.4	36.0	30.0	32.6	57
09. Biak Numfor	18.6	5.4	50.0	31.2	28.3	26.4	143
71. Jaya Pura	14.2	3.2	25.5	0.0	28.3	14.2	274

Note:

^{a)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey. The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.

Source: BPS special tabulation

10 Health Condition by District, 1999

Province District	Infant mortality rate	Population with health problem (%)	Morbidity rate (%)	Average duration of illness (days)	Population self-medicating (%)	Birth delivery assisted by medical personnel (%)
11. Aceh	39	22.0	11.9	6.8	38.4	75.4
01. South Aceh	54	21.8	13.9	8.4	39.7	53.8
02. South-east Aceh	38	19.6	13.4	5.7	50.0	63.2
03. East Aceh	40	19.4	12.9	8.1	42.4	91.2
04. Central Aceh	43	17.5	13.5	7.1	34.4	62.4
05. Weast Aceh	37	15.8	7.2	7.4	38.8	41.8
06. Aceh Besar	37	18.0	8.0	7.1	26.4	100.0
07. Pidie	39	21.4	9.9	6.4	30.2	85.2
08. North Aceh	35	28.5	13.1	5.6	40.0	72.0
71. Banda Aceh	36	26.1	15.6	5.8	38.4	97.4
72. Sabang	35	31.4	20.2	6.7	39.4	100.0
12. North Sumatera	41	15.8	9.1	5.9	48.4	83.8
01. Nias	44	23.3	10.6	3.6	44.1	48.1
02. South Tapanuli	52	14.3	7.7	6.5	49.6	42.4
03. Central Tapanuli	48	19.6	12.8	7.7	51.2	90.6
04. North Tapanuli	49	17.9	11.0	5.8	46.0	92.9
05. Labuhan Batu	48	18.0	11.8	4.6	62.2	67.7
06. Asahan	42	12.8	8.6	6.9	41.8	81.8
07. Simalungun	41	11.3	8.5	8.5	49.3	92.0
08. Dairi	48	20.2	7.0	5.2	56.6	81.9
09. Karo	26	5.5	4.2	7.5	20.2	95.9
10. Deli Serdang	46	21.0	11.0	4.8	43.7	88.9
11. Langkat	43	15.6	8.7	5.4	58.1	85.9
71. Sibolga	36	16.1	11.0	8.5	43.4	95.0
72. Tanjung Balai	42	11.7	7.7	6.1	27.9	96.5
73. Pematang Siantar	28	11.6	6.6	7.7	53.1	100.0
74. Tebing Tinggi	31	10.8	6.7	5.8	59.3	97.9
75. Medan	32	12.6	7.2	7.1	48.4	97.5
76. Binjai	33	13.0	8.4	6.0	40.3	100.0
13. West Sumatera	48	32.0	19.4	6.9	34.5	77.6
01. South Pesisir	53	20.5	15.1	6.5	29.6	84.8
02. Solok	70	48.5	29.3	6.6	41.5	56.5
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	70	31.9	23.2	7.3	39.5	78.0
04. Tanah Datar	41	32.3	19.2	7.7	25.7	75.6
05. Padang Pariaman	52	35.3	22.5	7.6	35.0	77.4
06. Agam	41	32.4	17.8	7.5	30.2	86.5
07. Limapuluh Koto	51	34.5	23.5	7.0	35.6	91.7
08. Pasaman	67	23.3	14.1	7.8	34.5	50.9
71. Padang	34	24.7	12.3	6.1	32.8	88.7
72. Solok	44	48.4	29.6	5.1	29.5	100.0
73. Sawah Lunto	28	49.8	33.4	6.3	28.3	88.4
74. Padang Panjang	32	44.8	20.1	5.7	44.9	100.0
75. Bukit Tinggi	30	38.9	21.9	5.2	35.0	98.0
76. Payakumbuh	42	43.1	22.9	5.8	36.8	96.2

10 Health Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Infant mortality rate (%)	Population with health problem (%)	Morbidity rate (%)	Average duration of illness (days)	Population self-medicating (%)	Birth delivery assisted by medical personnel (%)
14. Riau	38	17.3	10.7	5.3	53.1	68.3
01. Indragiri Hulu	51	20.5	13.9	5.8	39.8	71.7
02. Indragiri Ilir	37	8.8	5.9	4.8	49.1	40.4
03. Kepulauan Riau	36	23.2	11.2	4.9	36.2	74.4
04. Kampar	47	19.9	12.5	6.2	58.3	32.8
05. Bengkalis	34	22.8	15.1	5.1	64.4	78.7
71. Pekanbaru	28	5.9	3.8	4.8	52.3	90.8
72. Batam	32	13.0	6.8	4.2	46.4	97.0
15. Jambi	43	17.6	11.3	6.1	41.7	60.2
01. Kerinci	36	19.0	16.0	6.8	44.0	83.9
02. Bungo Tebo	56	20.9	15.7	6.1	45.8	49.4
03. Sarolangun Bangko	45	19.5	11.7	5.9	39.0	39.4
04. Batanghari	47	15.2	7.1	6.8	32.8	34.9
05. Tanjung Jabung	38	15.1	10.6	5.6	58.2	44.8
71. Jambi	36	15.5	7.4	5.6	30.9	93.0
16. South Sumatera	48	21.4	12.1	5.1	48.3	73.8
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	38	14.9	8.8	5.5	43.0	85.8
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	61	21.3	12.8	5.5	44.2	43.8
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	55	15.8	10.3	4.9	49.1	73.4
04. Lahat	57	20.4	10.9	5.5	43.4	55.9
05. Musi Rawas	66	14.1	8.6	6.2	46.6	80.1
06. Musi Banyuasin	43	14.9	9.4	4.1	60.4	68.6
07. Bangka	44	19.7	11.1	5.3	39.4	64.6
08. Balitung	42	28.3	13.4	6.5	45.9	78.2
71. Palembang	38	38.1	19.8	4.7	50.9	96.8
72. Pangkal Pinang	36	22.6	10.8	6.0	56.5	88.8
17. Bengkulu	49	17.8	11.3	6.3	37.1	71.0
01. South Bengkulu	55	15.8	9.6	5.5	38.1	56.6
02. Rejang Lebong	62	12.9	8.9	6.6	36.1	71.4
03. North Bengkulu	48	18.0	13.1	6.7	38.4	63.7
71. Bengkulu	32	25.8	13.6	6.1	35.7	91.4
18. Lampung	46	25.6	13.7	5.3	45.8	57.4
01. South Lampung	50	29.0	16.8	5.8	41.7	57.8
02. Central Lampung	42	29.2	13.6	5.1	47.3	46.4
03. North Lampung	50	15.2	8.4	5.8	58.2	30.6
04. West Lampung	50	12.9	6.3	4.9	49.1	97.0
71. Bandar Lampung	39	35.1	20.6	4.6	39.6	59.0
31. Jakarta	24	28.9	15.6	4.6	51.1	93.6
71. South Jakarta	24	24.8	14.9	4.6	49.5	95.1
72. East Jakarta	22	32.5	16.3	4.5	56.6	93.9
73. Central Jakarta	28	36.1	19.1	4.6	52.8	100.0
74. West Jakarta	23	23.2	12.7	4.9	45.1	93.8
75. North Jakarta	23	32.2	17.4	4.2	48.9	87.9

10 Health Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Infant mortality rate (%)	Population with health problem (%)	Morbidity rate (%)	Average duration of illness (days)	Population self-medicating (%)	Birth delivery assisted by medical personnel (%)
32. West Java	53	22.2	12.8	6.1	50.1	51.5
01. Pandeglang	65	15.8	10.4	6.6	43.8	15.5
02. Lebak	63	21.8	12.6	5.3	52.8	11.4
03. Bogor	49	20.9	13.7	6.1	44.4	57.6
04. Sukabumi	61	27.0	13.8	5.5	53.6	18.2
05. Cianjur	56	28.1	18.4	5.8	57.7	30.2
06. Bandung	43	16.8	10.2	6.1	53.4	52.0
07. Garut	74	26.5	16.2	6.3	53.3	22.8
08. Tasikmalaya	48	26.6	14.9	8.0	45.4	44.7
09. Ciamis	55	25.4	10.0	6.8	48.5	44.1
10. Kuningan	51	22.1	16.6	6.5	31.9	73.0
11. Cirebon	59	29.0	15.4	6.7	54.4	59.1
12. Majalengka	59	22.8	14.9	7.4	50.9	63.6
13. Sumedang	44	25.7	15.5	7.7	39.4	64.6
14. Indramayu	57	11.9	7.8	7.1	54.3	51.0
15. Subang	50	21.5	10.9	5.9	57.7	64.3
16. Purwakarta	57	38.0	20.0	5.1	67.4	18.0
17. Karawang	61	28.8	16.7	5.2	62.0	60.9
18. Bekasi	43	20.5	13.0	3.9	51.6	40.0
19. Tangerang	55	17.4	9.5	5.4	49.1	66.0
20. Serang	73	19.1	10.3	6.1	37.5	31.4
71. Bogor	39	15.9	10.0	5.5	49.5	63.6
72. Sukabumi	47	26.2	13.8	5.6	49.4	58.8
73. Bandung	36	25.1	13.6	6.9	47.9	79.0
74. Cirebon	41	29.0	12.6	4.9	47.2	83.2
75. Tangerang	41	22.2	9.5	5.6	36.1	94.9
76. Bekasi		11.4	8.1	5.5	57.1	92.8
33. Central Java	36	28.6	16.0	5.6	46.1	63.2
01. Cilacap	41	29.3	17.2	5.9	52.5	51.0
02. Banyumas	37	30.7	14.0	5.1	55.3	64.2
03. Purbalingga	40	34.9	20.3	5.3	44.8	37.5
04. Banjarnegara	40	20.3	11.7	5.6	40.1	38.0
05. Kebumen	41	31.6	16.6	6.2	51.3	61.1
06. Purworejo	39	22.8	12.6	6.3	37.2	67.2
07. Wonosobo	39	27.8	14.8	5.7	46.7	26.7
08. Magelang	37	26.4	16.0	5.9	43.1	51.3
09. Boyolali	31	21.7	9.7	4.9	37.6	75.5
10. Klaten	32	31.1	16.4	5.8	41.8	91.5
11. Sukoharjo	33	25.2	12.2	6.3	38.2	97.1
12. Wonogiri	24	17.6	9.3	6.5	31.6	80.4
13. Karanganyar	24	38.0	14.9	4.9	45.2	100.0
14. Sragen	25	25.3	14.3	5.9	36.9	78.0
15. Grobogan	38	29.3	18.2	4.8	47.8	57.0
16. Blora	29	25.7	15.1	4.8	49.4	47.2
17. Rembang	37	24.2	15.8	5.3	28.3	51.1
18. Pati	22	32.7	18.3	5.0	41.2	55.5
19. Kudus	38	23.3	15.2	4.2	44.5	45.6
20. Jepara	30	30.9	21.6	6.2	38.6	65.1
21. Demak	34	23.9	14.6	5.5	40.8	44.5
22. Semarang	26	32.1	15.7	5.1	45.0	78.9
23. Temanggung	26	30.6	15.2	5.9	56.7	44.4

10 Health Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Infant mortality rate (%)	Population with health problem (%)	Morbidity rate (%)	Average duration of illness (days)	Population self-medicating (%)	Birth delivery assisted by medical personnel (%)
24. Kendal	51	31.4	15.3	5.8	45.1	89.4
25. Batang	37	26.4	14.3	6.1	51.1	46.4
26. Pekalongan	44	21.2	13.0	6.0	42.2	41.4
27. Pemalang	52	24.6	11.0	6.2	46.4	51.8
28. Tegal	49	34.1	21.2	5.9	54.9	67.6
29. Brebes	57	32.7	21.8	6.0	48.0	64.8
71. Magelang	33	31.7	11.6	7.5	49.2	97.1
72. Surakarta	25	32.2	15.9	5.9	38.8	100.0
73. Salatiga	31	27.7	16.8	6.5	41.8	96.0
74. Semarang	28	29.6	18.0	5.1	52.8	93.5
75. Pekalongan	37	33.6	20.3	5.2	52.8	76.2
76. Tegal	43	41.2	22.0	6.7	53.7	84.0
34. Yogyakarta	25	33.2	15.8	5.7	41.1	84.2
01. Kulon Progo	23	30.0	18.7	5.6	28.4	62.6
02. Bantul	32	33.7	17.7	4.5	44.6	66.1
03. Gunung Kidul	28	49.8	20.8	6.7	37.6	91.4
04. Sleman	22	21.8	10.4	6.0	40.3	91.9
71. Yogyakarta	20	33.4	13.6	5.8	52.7	100.0
35. East Java	48	25.7	15.6	6.2	44.6	67.2
01. Pacitan	29	21.9	11.7	7.4	41.0	51.9
02. Ponorogo	43	22.4	14.0	6.8	37.1	79.4
03. Trenggalek	31	23.5	16.5	8.5	50.9	58.1
04. Tulungagung	28	34.2	19.1	7.0	61.6	90.4
05. Blitar	35	26.2	15.2	6.6	40.2	77.6
06. Kediri	38	27.9	16.2	5.3	47.4	87.7
07. Malang	45	21.7	13.3	6.3	48.9	61.4
08. Lumajang	51	29.8	19.1	6.1	53.2	65.2
09. Jember	73	21.7	12.9	6.7	53.7	38.4
10. Banyuwangi	53	26.0	16.9	6.1	46.2	60.0
11. Bondowoso	77	27.5	17.4	7.3	42.2	50.0
12. Situbondo	66	33.8	17.7	7.1	36.2	64.0
13. Probolinggo	78	36.4	24.5	6.5	39.3	40.2
14. Pasuruan	66	20.8	15.2	6.0	43.1	63.3
15. Sidoarjo	38	23.5	14.5	5.5	28.7	98.9
16. Mojokerto	39	33.5	22.5	5.7	39.6	83.5
17. Jombang	43	34.0	17.9	6.3	43.8	73.5
18. Nganjuk	42	35.6	20.5	6.0	46.9	76.0
19. Madiun	42	28.0	12.8	6.0	44.0	88.6
20. Magetan	30	22.2	11.6	6.5	36.1	85.7
21. Ngawi	42	20.1	13.0	6.1	35.6	88.1
22. Bojonegoro	48	15.2	11.1	5.8	39.9	62.6
23. Tuban	47	27.6	17.9	5.9	48.5	58.4
24. Lamongan	44	24.3	16.3	4.9	32.0	63.1
25. Gresik	40	27.1	16.1	5.2	38.3	90.0
26. Bangkalan	68	15.8	11.8	6.5	36.0	33.3
27. Sampang	86	21.8	16.4	5.5	44.0	14.6
28. Pamekasan	67	23.8	17.2	6.2	44.9	45.7
29. Sumenep	68	17.8	11.3	7.9	38.2	40.7
71. Kediri	36	27.9	16.0	6.1	47.7	96.6
72. Blitar	30	29.0	19.1	6.6	44.5	96.3
73. Malang	45	36.6	17.9	6.5	54.4	88.4

10 Health Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Infant mortality rate (%)	Population with health problem (%)	Morbidity rate (%)	Average duration of illness (days)	Population self-medicating (%)	Birth delivery assisted by medical personnel (%)
74. Probolinggo	39	25.0	16.7	7.1	37.8	68.5
75. Pasuruan	45	31.3	18.9	4.9	41.7	89.3
76. Mojokerto	29	32.6	12.9	6.8	55.2	100.0
77. Madiun	33	33.0	17.9	6.5	53.1	96.3
78. Surabaya	36	25.0	13.1	5.7	49.9	94.8
51. Bali	31	31.3	21.8	5.3	30.1	92.0
01. Jembrana	29	40.1	29.2	5.3	36.3	71.1
02. Tabanan	18	22.0	16.4	5.8	22.8	100.0
03. Badung	27	32.9	25.0	4.3	45.9	99.1
04. Gianyar	26	35.2	21.9	5.5	23.6	100.0
05. Klungkung	41	25.3	16.7	5.6	30.3	94.1
06. Bangli	27	31.3	24.2	5.4	29.5	91.0
07. Karangasem	44	44.3	32.2	4.8	19.3	76.2
08. Buleleng	46	32.0	23.7	6.0	31.9	89.7
71. Denpasar	22	21.2	10.3	4.9	34.7	100.0
52. West Nusa Tenggara	81	33.8	24.1	6.5	32.9	40.5
01. West Lombok	86	37.6	30.9	6.9	32.0	42.9
02. Central Lombok	88	35.5	27.9	7.2	25.6	54.5
03. East Lombok	88	30.5	18.2	5.1	33.8	36.5
04. Sumbawa	86	31.7	20.1	6.4	41.1	42.4
05. Dompu	80	39.8	26.5	6.7	37.2	34.8
06. Bima	78	29.7	24.0	7.1	32.5	28.0
71. Mataram	59	36.3	21.4	5.2	37.5	45.2
53. East Nusa Tenggara	56	36.7	28.3	6.8	30.4	37.9
01. West Sumba	64	37.4	33.2	7.2	33.4	20.9
02. East Sumba	76	50.0	42.3	6.9	36.0	24.3
03. Kupang	57	34.4	29.0	7.0	27.3	23.5
04. Southern Central-Timor	49	24.2	18.1	4.9	19.3	27.0
05. Northern Central-Timor	50	41.9	36.3	6.8	16.7	41.8
06. Belu	57	41.5	38.4	7.8	23.1	44.7
07. Alor	59	36.1	27.3	7.4	37.4	32.9
08. Flores Timur	46	35.6	22.9	6.3	20.1	61.4
09. Sikka	47	37.5	27.7	6.9	30.3	64.2
10. Ende	60	41.2	29.7	7.2	31.2	41.0
11. Ngada	51	42.4	29.6	7.7	24.7	58.4
12. Manggarai	54	34.6	24.4	6.4	40.1	27.0
71. Kupang		37.1	23.4	5.4	48.1	83.0
61. West Kalimantan	54	20.4	11.5	6.0	42.1	50.0
01. Sambas	85	20.9	12.4	7.3	45.6	54.1
02. Pontianak	52	19.7	10.7	6.0	39.9	37.3
03. Sanggau	44	15.7	7.7	6.0	52.7	32.3
04. Ketapang	50	27.4	17.5	5.3	43.1	47.9
05. Sintang	46	14.2	8.7	4.3	36.8	43.6
06. Kapuas Hulu	52	19.7	10.7	5.7	25.9	48.8
71. Pontianak	49	27.1	14.1	5.6	40.4	84.3

10 Health Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Infant mortality rate (%)	Population with health problem (%)	Morbidity rate (%)	Average duration of illness (days)	Population self-medicating (%)	Birth delivery assisted by medical personnel (%)
62. Central Kalimantan	32	16.8	9.6	5.7	53.6	62.4
01. West Kotawaringin	31	21.3	11.4	4.9	50.5	65.0
02. East Kotawaringin	38	12.3	9.0	5.5	40.8	49.4
03. Kapuas	31	15.5	9.2	5.6	62.5	66.7
04. South Barito	45	21.2	11.1	7.2	59.6	57.2
05. North Barito	27	10.7	6.3	6.8	43.5	73.8
71. Palangka Raya	20	28.7	11.8	5.8	56.8	84.1
63. South Kalimantan	67	31.1	17.3	5.4	52.3	58.5
01. Tanah Laut	45	30.8	17.4	5.9	54.8	65.6
02. Kota Baru	65	34.9	22.8	4.8	48.4	47.9
03. Banjar	62	26.8	11.7	5.9	40.5	56.2
04. Barito Kuala	80	28.8	16.7	5.3	58.0	42.5
05. Tapin	51	35.0	21.2	5.0	58.2	47.4
06. South Hulu Sungai	67	37.1	25.8	6.4	48.4	51.6
07. Central Hulu Sungai	63	32.7	20.7	5.0	51.6	57.1
08. North Hulu Sungai	77	31.1	16.6	5.0	52.0	59.2
09. Tabalong	67	31.0	14.7	5.9	57.6	62.8
71. Banjarmasin	52	29.5	14.4	5.2	60.8	80.3
64. East Kalimantan	33	25.6	12.0	5.5	42.3	65.2
01. Pasir	26	24.5	10.5	6.4	41.6	55.2
02. Kutai	46	24.4	11.7	5.4	37.4	64.2
03. Berau	39	31.4	17.9	6.7	40.4	70.9
04. Bulongan	24	20.4	13.1	5.8	37.3	41.0
71. Balikpapan	28	23.5	11.2	4.6	43.0	81.0
72. Samarinda	35	31.0	12.7	5.3	49.4	76.0
71. North Sulawesi	37	23.5	15.0	5.9	41.1	71.1
01. Gorontalo	50	29.7	15.5	5.5	42.8	53.8
02. Bolaang Mongondow	30	21.4	14.9	5.0	48.5	68.7
03. Minahasa	27	26.1	18.3	5.6	34.2	71.7
04. Sangihe Talaud	24	13.5	10.9	9.0	31.3	53.7
71. Gorontalo	53	25.3	18.4	7.3	30.7	71.2
72. Manado	26	14.9	8.6	5.5	55.2	100.0
73. Bitung	39	32.6	22.1	6.3	44.1	92.9
72. Central Sulawesi	60	20.7	13.9	6.9	45.3	53.4
01. Luwuk Banggai	56	19.8	14.8	6.6	45.4	60.6
02. Poso	66	23.3	14.2	6.1	47.2	52.5
03. Donggala	71	17.6	13.2	8.6	36.7	52.5
04. Bual Toli-Toli	63	25.5	16.8	6.1	47.3	25.0
71. Kodya Palu	44	21.1	10.7	4.9	59.5	92.2
73. South Sulawesi	36	24.2	14.1	6.7	44.1	56.9
01. Selayar	45	22.1	16.3	6.8	50.2	66.4
02. Bulukumba	36	11.0	7.6	7.6	54.6	51.0
03. Bantaeng	25	27.5	16.7	6.3	42.5	22.1
04. Jeneponto	55	29.4	15.4	7.0	40.3	27.8
05. Takalar	43	26.5	15.1	7.5	40.4	35.9

10 Health Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Infant mortality rate (%)	Population with health problem (%)	Morbidity rate (%)	Average duration of illness (days)	Population self-medicating (%)	Birth delivery assisted by medical personnel (%)
06. Gowa	29	29.9	22.8	7.6	52.5	60.6
07. Sinjai	31	32.0	22.9	5.2	47.1	48.8
08. Maros	35	24.9	13.4	6.5	23.8	62.3
09. Pangkep	41	24.7	15.1	6.3	41.8	61.9
10. Barru	43	27.9	16.2	7.3	36.1	52.5
11. Bone	41	19.7	11.3	6.4	41.2	61.9
12. Soppeng	26	10.9	5.4	9.2	48.1	73.1
13. Wajo	41	20.1	11.0	7.6	46.9	51.6
14. Sidenreng Rappang	31	53.3	22.7	6.6	44.8	59.9
15. Pinrang	35	25.8	13.7	7.5	54.0	76.7
16. Enrekang	20	16.9	9.3	7.7	40.3	50.8
17. Luwu	23	29.9	15.4	6.2	41.3	59.5
18. Tana Toraja	17	14.5	9.0	9.2	39.0	33.7
19. Polewali Mamasa	59	21.0	13.2	6.4	40.9	30.2
20. Majene	62	23.6	18.9	5.1	45.6	38.8
21. Mamuju	41	21.1	13.9	6.7	50.3	26.4
71. Ujung Pandang	23	22.6	12.7	5.6	45.9	88.3
72. Pare Pare	21	26.3	14.9	6.1	47.0	81.5
74. South-east Sulawesi	50	17.0	10.6	6.5	49.7	35.6
01. Buton	45	18.2	10.1	7.1	50.1	51.6
02. Muna	54	22.1	16.3	7.1	38.4	24.3
03. Kendari	49	15.8	10.9	5.8	50.0	39.3
04. Kolaka	51	13.5	7.9	6.8	58.1	12.8
71. Kendari		15.3	7.3	5.2	59.3	65.3
81. Maluku	40	16.5	11.4	6.8	54.9	48.5
01. South-east Maluku	28	19.9	17.0	6.9	78.8	44.1
02. Central Maluku	55	18.1	10.9	9.1	40.2	45.6
03. North Maluku	47	16.6	12.1	5.0	58.1	53.1
04. Central Halmahera	47	14.6	10.2	6.5	56.8	27.5
71. Ambon	23	10.4	6.4	6.0	53.7	73.5
82. Irian Jaya	52	22.5	14.1	5.5	15.5	57.0
01. Merauke	80	20.9	11.4	4.9	16.9	52.4
02. Jaya Wijaya	53	31.8	18.6	5.6	9.6	35.2
03. Jaya Pura	47	8.4	6.3	5.4	13.4	77.9
04. Paniai	46	30.1	16.8	5.8	10.8	32.7
05. Fak Fak	37	3.7	2.4	3.7	19.6	53.9
06. Sorong	54	16.9	13.8	5.1	34.7	67.8
07. Manokwari	45	26.5	16.1	4.6	12.3	61.5
08. Yapen Waropen	59	22.3	18.1	5.1	11.1	74.0
09. Biak Numfor	54	16.4	9.7	6.5	16.5	80.2
71. Jaya Pura	43	21.2	16.8	6.3	28.2	74.8

Note:

^{a)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey. The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.

Source: BPS special tabulation

11 School Attendance by District, 1999

Province District	School participation rate				School drop out rate		
	age 7 - 12	age 13 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24	age 7 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24
11. Aceh	96.3	81.7	48.4	12.1	3.0	10.4	12.9
01. South Aceh	92.3	77.7	44.7	3.7	6.1	20.6	29.5
02. South-east Aceh	96.7	81.8	55.0	5.9	1.6	8.2	13.0
03. East Aceh	97.0	78.7	47.7	10.3	3.2	11.4	17.8
04. Central Aceh	98.6	83.3	52.4	8.8	2.2	6.6	10.0
05. Weast Aceh	92.0	73.1	38.2	4.7	5.4	19.5	19.0
06. Aceh Besar	99.2	86.6	63.0	23.2	3.0	7.5	8.4
07. Pidie	98.4	84.4	43.7	6.7	1.2	9.0	8.8
08. North Aceh	96.4	83.5	43.2	10.0	2.3	5.5	8.0
71. Banda Aceh	99.1	92.6	75.1	42.7	2.1	6.0	4.6
72. Sabang	98.8	90.7	69.8	7.5	1.8	7.2	14.1
12. North Sumatera	97.2	87.4	63.9	14.9	2.9	11.8	14.0
01. Nias	94.5	76.2	41.0	5.3	5.2	23.2	33.1
02. South Tapanuli	96.5	90.4	57.9	5.0	2.1	7.3	12.0
03. Central Tapanuli	94.5	86.2	57.0	11.2	3.5	19.1	29.4
04. North Tapanuli	98.6	95.7	86.3	19.3	1.3	7.4	16.2
05. Labuhan Batu	96.8	77.9	55.5	5.5	3.5	15.6	20.4
06. Asahan	97.3	77.7	51.1	6.2	4.1	17.6	20.8
07. Simalungun	98.4	90.2	63.0	9.1	2.7	13.5	16.1
08. Dairi	97.7	94.3	70.4	13.1	1.6	8.7	17.4
09. Karo	98.0	94.9	76.0	11.6	1.7	12.8	12.3
10. Deli Serdang	96.1	85.9	59.0	10.9	4.5	16.5	13.1
11. Langkat	98.7	88.8	58.9	13.0	1.6	8.5	10.9
71. Sibolga	98.2	91.5	73.4	10.8	2.3	12.4	18.4
72. Tanjung Balai	96.2	79.4	54.1	6.9	4.3	17.4	20.0
73. Pematang Siantar	98.1	94.3	81.7	15.2	1.3	3.2	8.0
74. Tebing Tinggi	98.5	92.8	73.7	10.2	0.7	3.3	2.3
75. Medan	98.2	91.2	76.8	33.2	2.3	6.3	6.3
76. Binjai	99.3	91.1	77.0	21.5	1.1	7.3	9.9
13. West Sumatera	96.7	84.0	63.9	18.9	4.7	16.6	21.5
01. South Pesisir	97.1	83.8	63.0	11.1	4.7	16.2	20.0
02. Solok	95.7	80.5	46.3	7.2	5.9	32.6	35.0
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	95.3	78.1	55.5	3.9	5.2	27.2	34.7
04. Tanah Datar	97.5	92.0	65.1	12.4	3.3	15.1	20.1
05. Padang Pariaman	95.6	90.5	66.8	15.5	3.2	15.4	20.1
06. Agam	97.1	84.4	68.9	15.0	4.0	12.4	30.2
07. Limapuluh Koto	95.8	80.5	48.7	7.0	6.8	23.1	24.6
08. Pasaman	95.5	68.7	45.3	5.8	8.2	21.8	28.4
71. Padang	99.4	93.2	83.0	41.7	2.2	5.2	9.5
72. Solok	96.3	82.5	74.9	18.8	4.6	16.4	25.7
73. Sawah Lunto	98.2	86.3	81.1	8.2	2.7	8.9	14.0
74. Padang Panjang	98.4	88.2	77.2	24.1	2.8	14.5	18.6
75. Bukit Tinggi	99.1	89.4	82.1	24.3	3.2	6.3	9.4
76. Payakumbuh	96.4	87.3	69.8	14.0	5.0	13.8	22.2

11 School Attendance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	School participation rate				School drop out rate		
	age 7 - 12	age 13 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24	age 7 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24
14. Riau	96.3	85.2	53.4	9.4	2.6	11.2	13.9
01. Indragiri Hulu	97.1	81.0	52.4	12.6	3.4	14.3	13.3
02. Indragiri Ilir	94.8	79.9	38.0	5.5	2.6	13.4	15.0
03. Kepulauan Riau	96.4	85.3	57.4	6.5	3.0	15.1	20.5
04. Kampar	96.2	85.1	42.5	4.5	3.0	15.6	27.1
05. Bengkalis	95.7	83.7	52.3	3.8	2.4	8.5	10.4
71. Pekanbaru	98.1	95.7	76.4	26.8	1.7	4.0	6.4
72. Batam	96.2	93.2	64.5	5.2	1.2	11.6	6.8
15. Jambi	96.2	81.1	49.8	8.1	3.5	11.7	16.1
01. Kerinci	97.2	86.6	58.5	8.1	3.0	5.5	11.6
02. Bungo Tebo	96.1	77.9	48.6	5.9	4.5	14.1	16.5
03. Sarolangun Bangko	95.8	80.8	38.2	5.7	2.1	14.7	15.4
04. Batanghari	94.6	77.2	37.4	4.9	3.2	13.6	22.5
05. Tanjung Jabung	96.6	80.4	39.6	4.4	5.5	18.1	23.1
71. Jambi	97.6	86.7	75.2	18.4	2.2	3.6	8.4
16. South Sumatera	95.2	77.0	47.1	9.3	5.0	18.0	20.8
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	97.1	84.0	52.8	5.6	3.2	14.7	16.0
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	92.5	57.6	25.6	3.0	7.8	30.5	27.5
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	94.8	74.2	39.9	8.0	6.2	19.4	28.5
04. Lahat	95.7	78.4	49.4	6.3	4.5	17.4	22.3
05. Musi Rawas	92.9	72.2	35.6	4.8	7.9	22.9	18.6
06. Musi Banyuasin	95.9	74.0	27.0	1.1	4.0	25.9	28.7
07. Bangka	92.3	72.9	51.1	5.2	6.4	15.5	26.5
08. Balitung	97.0	80.8	54.4	6.0	3.9	13.0	20.2
71. Palembang	97.0	88.7	70.4	24.8	3.4	7.5	11.3
72. Pangkal Pinang	95.9	88.5	72.6	9.9	4.2	15.3	23.1
17. Bengkulu	95.4	82.2	55.6	17.3	3.7	16.8	17.0
01. South Bengkulu	96.7	86.5	57.6	11.6	2.7	20.3	20.3
02. Rejang Lebong	95.3	80.9	54.1	8.5	5.3	21.5	21.2
03. North Bengkulu	92.8	73.2	32.0	4.2	4.4	19.3	18.6
71. Bengkulu	98.6	95.3	86.5	42.2	1.5	5.7	9.4
18. Lampung	95.1	81.0	49.6	9.2	2.9	12.3	15.2
01. South Lampung	94.5	84.1	48.8	10.3	3.2	13.4	18.9
02. Central Lampung	96.7	80.0	47.0	5.9	1.9	10.3	9.8
03. North Lampung	93.0	74.7	38.6	3.6	4.1	16.9	19.7
04. West Lampung	96.3	76.3	49.2	7.5	2.6	8.2	17.2
71. Bandar Lampung	97.3	90.3	71.1	20.9	2.1	9.0	12.3
31. Jakarta	98.4	92.4	73.4	23.6	1.6	5.9	5.5
71. South Jakarta	98.0	93.2	72.4	25.5	1.5	5.5	4.0
72. East Jakarta	98.6	95.6	79.9	22.6	0.6	3.0	3.4
73. Central Jakarta	97.7	91.7	73.5	26.1	2.3	7.8	5.7
74. West Jakarta	99.0	89.9	68.1	23.3	2.0	8.1	7.1
75. North Jakarta	98.0	90.6	72.8	21.8	2.0	6.2	8.3

11 School Attendance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	School participation rate				School drop out rate		
	age 7 - 12	age 13 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24	age 7 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24
32. West Java	95.4	72.2	45.4	11.4	3.3	10.3	11.3
01. Pandeglang	93.2	57.2	24.1	4.6	5.4	19.6	19.6
02. Lebak	93.5	54.9	32.7	2.5	3.3	8.1	12.6
03. Bogor	92.4	78.9	54.9	15.0	5.8	10.9	14.3
04. Sukabumi	94.1	62.8	34.9	3.4	4.5	12.4	13.0
05. Cianjur	94.9	49.3	27.4	2.1	3.0	5.8	8.5
06. Bandung	96.3	73.4	43.2	8.9	3.4	10.3	8.2
07. Garut	95.1	69.5	33.0	3.6	2.7	11.8	13.5
08. Tasikmalaya	95.3	65.6	38.1	2.9	2.6	5.9	7.0
09. Ciamis	98.2	77.4	44.3	5.7	1.4	6.0	3.8
10. Kuningan	95.6	71.5	51.8	6.5	1.6	4.2	6.3
11. Cirebon	95.5	70.6	36.0	10.2	3.2	13.7	15.3
12. Majalengka	96.0	65.9	29.8	3.3	0.8	7.4	6.8
13. Sumedang	96.2	77.1	50.9	7.9	1.7	3.0	6.2
14. Indramayu	94.5	59.2	36.9	3.7	6.5	22.1	31.4
15. Subang	98.3	70.5	37.0	3.7	3.8	12.3	13.8
16. Purwakarta	96.9	70.7	38.9	5.9	3.8	9.9	9.4
17. Karawang	97.5	58.2	29.1	4.8	2.7	13.5	16.4
18. Bekasi	94.7	73.1	54.2	10.6	2.4	10.7	7.3
19. Tangerang	94.6	72.4	47.0	11.7	4.9	15.0	16.6
20. Serang	94.9	73.5	31.8	4.4	1.4	10.3	13.1
71. Bogor	94.2	87.6	71.4	27.6	4.1	9.5	10.8
72. Sukabumi	98.1	91.2	72.4	13.2	1.4	4.8	3.3
73. Bandung	97.5	88.3	64.6	32.6	2.3	6.7	5.1
74. Cirebon	96.9	89.7	76.9	20.9	2.3	5.9	8.7
75. Tangerang	98.5	92.6	64.4	18.9	1.2	7.7	10.8
76. Bekasi	98.2	96.8	76.9	16.3	0.6	4.4	4.4
33. Central Java	97.4	81.5	49.4	10.2	1.6	7.1	9.4
01. Cilacap	98.6	85.8	51.5	7.2	1.0	8.2	18.3
02. Banyumas	98.4	82.8	53.5	10.0	2.2	7.1	10.7
03. Purbalingga	96.9	73.7	49.6	5.4	2.7	7.7	9.5
04. Banjarnegara	96.3	69.1	37.3	5.9	3.0	10.1	13.5
05. Kebumen	97.5	84.3	57.6	7.1	1.5	5.4	11.3
06. Purworejo	98.7	92.8	66.5	9.8	0.8	2.1	8.0
07. Wonosobo	96.2	67.1	35.4	3.4	2.1	3.2	9.9
08. Magelang	97.9	82.4	56.3	9.4	1.1	6.7	10.7
09. Boyolali	98.8	89.0	61.0	14.1	1.1	3.7	4.9
10. Klaten	97.9	91.5	73.9	15.7	0.7	4.3	7.9
11. Sukoharjo	98.8	96.6	69.5	23.4	0.6	3.3	4.5
12. Wonogiri	98.1	90.7	54.2	12.2	0.4	2.6	1.6
13. Karanganyar	99.4	92.5	50.5	10.2	0.2	2.1	3.9
14. Sragen	98.4	88.3	56.6	8.0	1.0	3.6	4.5
15. Grobogan	97.1	83.9	41.7	6.4	0.7	3.0	6.5
16. Blora	98.0	77.7	41.0	3.2	1.2	8.4	9.3
17. Rembang	98.7	82.7	44.3	3.3	1.0	7.4	8.2
18. Pati	99.0	82.8	45.0	7.7	1.1	2.8	6.1
19. Kudus	99.2	89.2	43.8	6.1	0.4	3.5	3.6
20. Jepara	98.6	72.0	37.3	4.3	2.1	8.0	8.8
21. Demak	98.6	78.8	36.6	6.8	1.6	8.9	9.2
22. Semarang	99.3	83.9	54.4	7.2	1.1	5.8	8.1
23. Temanggung	98.3	73.7	34.2	3.9	1.7	9.3	10.4

11 School Attendance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	School participation rate				School drop out rate		
	age 7 - 12	age 13 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24	age 7 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24
24. Kendal	97.9	79.3	44.6	9.6	2.4	9.9	10.1
25. Batang	96.3	74.7	34.8	4.0	3.2	13.0	12.2
26. Pekalongan	97.5	72.6	30.4	4.0	2.6	8.6	16.2
27. Pemalang	94.8	72.4	29.7	4.7	1.9	16.2	11.9
28. Tegal	94.0	77.7	47.7	8.7	2.1	8.5	11.7
29. Brebes	93.1	67.8	32.0	5.5	4.1	16.2	19.2
71. Magelang	98.1	96.2	84.1	23.9	0.3	2.4	4.5
72. Surakarta	97.9	92.8	76.4	34.9	1.3	1.7	6.5
73. Salatiga	99.5	97.2	83.6	39.9	0.9	3.5	3.8
74. Semarang	98.6	90.6	71.4	30.4	0.6	2.8	2.9
75. Pekalongan	96.8	80.9	52.2	11.3	2.3	9.9	13.0
76. Tegal	94.3	80.7	47.7	8.2	4.3	15.4	13.0
34. Yogyakarta	99.2	95.4	80.6	44.0	0.5	3.5	3.9
01. Kulon Progo	99.7	97.0	86.5	19.3	0.3	2.1	2.8
02. Bantul	98.7	92.7	70.1	19.5	1.3	5.5	7.7
03. Gunung Kidul	99.4	97.3	84.7	34.0	0.3	0.4	1.8
04. Sleman	98.9	94.7	82.7	55.0	0.0	5.8	2.8
71. Yogyakarta	100.0	96.0	82.8	62.9	0.0	2.2	4.1
35. East Java	95.4	80.4	50.3	11.3	2.5	9.2	12.0
01. Pacitan	97.4	85.1	42.5	3.7	1.1	3.8	8.8
02. Ponorogo	96.7	94.5	63.3	10.9	0.6	2.0	16.4
03. Trenggalek	97.4	79.9	38.2	4.7	0.5	7.6	4.8
04. Tulungagung	99.6	92.6	63.3	8.1	0.9	4.1	10.0
05. Blitar	97.5	82.8	52.1	5.6	2.1	8.8	10.5
06. Kediri	98.1	85.0	60.3	8.8	1.3	3.6	7.5
07. Malang	95.1	79.2	36.5	9.4	1.4	11.3	11.7
08. Lumajang	93.8	72.2	38.5	4.4	2.7	7.2	13.5
09. Jember	88.5	57.5	31.3	4.9	7.9	18.2	26.5
10. Banyuwangi	96.5	80.5	41.8	5.0	3.0	10.9	13.4
11. Bondowoso	94.9	65.0	32.5	4.8	4.8	24.3	21.3
12. Situbondo	89.1	70.2	36.4	4.1	8.4	22.6	24.9
13. Probolinggo	92.1	50.7	23.8	1.6	5.6	21.0	23.6
14. Pasuruan	96.4	75.5	33.6	6.8	4.2	14.9	19.4
15. Sidoarjo	99.1	95.5	79.5	17.6	0.4	4.0	5.3
16. Mojokerto	98.5	89.7	48.2	5.6	1.2	6.3	9.8
17. Jombang	98.0	91.3	64.4	12.8	1.0	6.9	8.1
18. Nganjuk	98.7	87.3	60.5	12.5	0.7	3.2	5.4
19. Madiun	98.8	94.3	61.2	6.0	0.0	1.5	9.3
20. Magetan	99.1	96.2	73.4	6.0	0.3	1.5	6.7
21. Ngawi	98.7	88.7	54.1	3.1	0.6	5.3	10.2
22. Bojonegoro	98.4	81.4	39.1	4.8	0.7	3.0	4.8
23. Tuban	96.6	73.9	35.0	4.6	2.0	11.1	11.8
24. Lamongan	99.2	92.3	57.8	7.6	1.1	7.3	10.2
25. Gresik	98.5	91.9	64.7	14.2	2.2	4.6	4.9
26. Bangkalan	85.0	54.6	28.2	6.4	4.7	10.6	19.2
27. Sampang	76.8	42.7	11.5	2.6	8.8	36.6	32.4
28. Pamekasan	95.2	57.0	33.9	1.2	4.1	17.2	19.3
29. Sumenep	96.6	71.7	35.4	1.7	4.4	16.9	25.6
71. Kediri	100.0	95.5	78.6	19.1	0.3	2.8	3.1
72. Blitar	100.0	97.7	76.5	14.8	0.3	5.9	10.5
73. Malang	97.5	85.1	68.0	41.9	1.8	5.8	8.7

11 School Attendance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	School participation rate				School drop out rate		
	age 7 - 12	age 13 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24	age 7 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24
74. Probolinggo	92.6	78.4	57.5	8.6	3.5	9.5	8.9
75. Pasuruan	97.1	87.7	59.4	12.5	1.6	11.8	13.5
76. Mojokerto	98.7	94.4	72.2	14.2	0.5	6.1	8.4
77. Madiun	99.5	95.3	84.0	19.8	0.6	2.1	7.6
78. Surabaya	97.1	90.7	69.6	28.0	1.3	6.4	5.6
51. Bali	96.7	83.6	63.4	15.1	2.1	6.9	8.5
01. Jembrana	95.4	82.9	42.7	5.6	2.8	16.6	13.8
02. Tabanan	99.6	92.8	81.2	15.2	0.3	1.3	4.5
03. Badung	98.8	90.3	72.1	14.0	2.0	2.2	5.0
04. Gianyar	98.9	91.6	65.6	14.0	0.4	5.0	6.5
05. Klungkung	97.4	92.6	71.3	8.0	0.8	3.1	9.0
06. Bangli	96.7	73.0	43.0	4.8	3.4	8.1	10.4
07. Karangasem	90.5	74.8	40.8	5.2	3.3	19.2	19.2
08. Buleleng	96.4	79.2	62.2	9.0	2.9	7.7	13.7
71. Denpasar	99.1	88.7	74.9	32.6	1.3	2.8	3.0
52. West Nusa Tenggara	93.0	71.5	41.8	7.3	5.8	21.7	25.5
01. West Lombok	88.4	58.3	25.4	5.5	9.3	30.7	34.8
02. Central Lombok	93.7	64.9	32.4	2.2	5.5	23.9	28.7
03. East Lombok	94.3	70.8	38.3	4.5	5.5	25.0	27.9
04. Sumbawa	97.1	74.1	47.0	3.7	2.3	11.0	19.0
05. Dompu	92.1	77.6	57.8	1.6	7.3	22.1	30.2
06. Bima	91.7	84.7	60.3	5.8	5.8	19.4	23.5
71. Mataram	94.8	82.1	64.0	29.9	3.9	7.3	10.2
53. East Nusa Tenggara	89.0	69.7	34.4	8.1	6.0	29.5	32.8
01. West Sumba	77.4	72.0	35.2	6.4	7.0	39.0	40.4
02. East Sumba	93.6	80.0	54.2	7.1	4.5	27.4	44.4
03. Kupang	85.8	66.5	25.0	4.3	6.9	35.9	35.0
04. Southern Central-Timor	90.9	57.2	26.8	3.7	6.8	27.3	36.4
05. Northern Central-Timor	88.8	70.4	30.1	3.2	3.5	16.4	12.7
06. Belu	83.8	66.9	30.4	1.9	8.4	30.2	30.7
07. Alor	91.8	82.5	48.6	4.9	2.7	20.2	27.6
08. Flores Timur	92.3	69.8	31.6	5.5	5.8	24.7	29.5
09. Sikka	86.9	72.9	29.4	4.5	9.8	41.1	49.0
10. Ende	93.4	77.2	49.9	11.2	6.5	32.3	47.4
11. Ngada	95.0	69.6	30.3	3.1	3.7	28.3	26.8
12. Manggarai	89.7	60.8	13.6	1.3	5.9	35.1	38.6
71. Kupang	96.9	92.4	79.2	43.7	1.6	8.0	8.0
61. West Kalimantan	90.3	76.0	41.0	9.5	5.4	25.2	26.2
01. Sambas	91.3	72.6	39.9	5.3	6.2	27.3	25.7
02. Pontianak	87.3	79.7	41.3	8.6	7.0	31.9	36.6
03. Sanggau	90.0	78.7	36.4	5.7	3.8	17.5	28.9
04. Ketapang	88.4	65.1	25.0	3.4	7.3	35.3	34.3
05. Sintang	91.2	70.8	23.2	4.5	2.4	25.9	25.4
06. Kapuas Hulu	93.1	80.0	43.8	9.2	3.5	18.6	16.8
71. Pontianak	94.8	83.9	69.4	25.1	5.0	12.1	12.0

11 School Attendance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	School participation rate				School drop out rate		
	age 7 - 12	age 13 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24	age 7 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24
62. Central Kalimantan	97.5	80.6	49.5	10.6	3.2	17.0	20.7
01. West Kotawaringin	96.1	80.5	46.2	4.6	4.5	23.2	38.4
02. East Kotawaringin	97.5	77.9	40.9	4.1	2.5	23.7	18.0
03. Kapuas	97.5	80.4	50.4	5.0	3.5	12.6	19.8
04. South Barito	97.7	81.7	51.7	7.5	4.4	16.0	26.3
05. North Barito	98.0	78.6	42.5	9.0	2.3	14.5	15.1
71. Palangka Raya	98.0	90.8	75.3	39.9	2.2	8.3	8.9
63. South Kalimantan	94.7	72.2	43.0	10.0	5.0	16.4	20.5
01. Tanah Laut	91.8	70.2	30.3	2.4	7.2	30.3	35.9
02. Kota Baru	91.3	67.2	33.5	2.9	6.2	18.6	24.7
03. Banjar	94.7	65.4	51.7	17.9	6.8	14.0	18.3
04. Barito Kuala	94.9	63.6	22.1	4.4	5.6	29.1	32.4
05. Tapin	97.1	75.5	38.6	6.6	4.7	11.2	21.1
06. South Hulu Sungai	93.9	66.7	25.7	3.7	5.3	23.7	20.9
07. Central Hulu Sungai	95.0	73.7	36.5	3.4	4.5	10.6	16.4
08. North Hulu Sungai	97.5	62.0	33.2	3.0	3.4	15.8	20.8
09. Tabalong	95.6	75.3	45.9	3.7	3.4	14.5	25.7
71. Banjarmasin	96.5	91.6	66.1	21.4	2.6	8.8	9.9
64. East Kalimantan	97.0	84.6	58.3	13.8	3.1	10.8	14.2
01. Pasir	92.7	71.0	42.6	6.2	7.3	25.6	24.7
02. Kutai	97.4	84.7	50.4	9.8	2.4	10.4	16.0
03. Berau	95.4	71.6	48.1	6.3	4.9	12.8	21.8
04. Bulongan	95.4	76.0	51.2	8.9	4.6	13.2	23.0
71. Balikpapan	99.1	93.8	76.8	14.5	1.1	5.0	6.4
72. Samarinda	98.7	91.1	66.9	22.2	2.3	6.3	10.0
71. North Sulawesi	93.6	76.7	46.5	10.1	6.8	23.2	29.9
01. Gorontalo	86.7	59.9	34.4	5.5	10.6	24.9	37.1
02. Bolaang Mongondow	94.1	71.4	28.3	2.3	8.7	33.5	39.7
03. Minahasa	97.9	89.2	53.3	6.3	2.9	21.2	35.8
04. Sangihe Talaud	94.7	85.4	49.7	5.6	5.1	20.3	27.4
71. Gorontalo	96.2	80.7	55.3	12.2	6.1	26.5	24.7
72. Manado	97.3	88.6	68.2	27.2	4.5	10.4	8.6
73. Bitung	96.7	74.0	36.9	9.1	8.6	46.2	36.4
72. Central Sulawesi	94.6	69.4	38.9	7.4	5.8	23.1	25.0
01. Luwuk Banggai	96.4	66.7	32.2	3.7	5.3	22.3	24.3
02. Poso	97.8	72.2	37.5	5.7	4.1	24.1	24.6
03. Donggala	91.2	66.3	32.4	5.5	8.1	28.7	27.8
04. Bual Toli-Toli	94.4	64.9	28.7	0.9	5.1	31.3	39.9
71. Kodya Palu	96.5	85.1	71.1	25.1	3.8	5.7	7.3
73. South Sulawesi	91.1	69.6	45.0	13.3	6.7	18.9	19.5
01. Selayar	94.0	62.8	35.6	1.5	6.0	16.7	21.8
02. Bulukumba	91.2	68.5	34.5	2.0	6.1	14.6	21.7
03. Bantaeng	74.5	41.3	24.0	1.9	15.5	36.3	35.2
04. Jeneponto	76.9	60.6	33.2	4.3	13.3	30.8	31.9
05. Takalar	91.2	63.4	30.4	5.9	5.4	22.8	27.4

11 School Attendance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	School participation rate				School drop out rate		
	age 7 - 12	age 13 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24	age 7 - 15	age 16 - 18	age 19 - 24
06. Gowa	90.9	66.8	40.6	8.7	6.8	20.0	25.1
07. Sinjai	92.5	63.0	37.4	1.0	7.9	22.0	24.5
08. Maros	92.1	68.7	38.0	9.4	7.8	19.3	24.6
09. Pangkep	93.4	64.1	43.9	8.0	6.0	19.0	15.3
10. Barru	95.2	70.9	51.4	6.9	4.0	12.7	19.4
11. Bone	91.1	60.7	34.1	1.8	6.9	15.1	13.8
12. Soppeng	94.8	73.9	44.9	2.6	5.5	14.1	19.2
13. Wajo	91.1	54.6	31.0	6.0	7.6	19.4	25.4
14. Sidenreng Rappang	94.0	67.3	37.2	5.5	9.6	20.4	29.8
15. Pinrang	94.3	63.8	33.8	3.2	7.0	29.9	20.7
16. Enrekang	96.1	81.3	57.8	6.1	4.9	19.7	22.7
17. Luwu	93.3	80.3	48.6	8.6	5.0	21.4	20.9
18. Tana Toraja	91.6	80.2	65.2	10.3	5.3	16.5	24.7
19. Polewali Mamasa	84.3	53.5	23.8	1.3	9.6	25.7	32.5
20. Majene	90.6	68.2	43.3	4.3	6.9	12.3	14.7
21. Mamuju	85.3	66.5	25.3	2.3	10.8	30.7	35.8
71. Ujung Pandang	95.5	86.0	72.8	40.1	3.2	8.4	5.8
72. Pare Pare	95.0	82.1	63.7	5.6	4.0	12.0	15.4
74. South-east Sulawesi	93.9	77.0	49.9	11.0	5.8	21.4	23.3
01. Buton	95.0	79.6	53.1	8.8	5.2	18.7	23.9
02. Muna	90.4	74.4	51.2	7.4	7.8	27.5	34.5
03. Kendari	94.6	72.6	42.4	7.3	5.7	24.8	28.2
04. Kolaka	92.8	73.9	41.3	5.6	6.9	23.8	18.4
71. Kendari	97.8	92.7	73.0	35.8	1.8	6.5	7.4
81. Maluku	94.4	84.8	61.9	17.8	3.0	14.4	16.3
01. South-east Maluku	93.6	85.8	66.9	2.2	3.1	14.8	23.9
02. Central Maluku	91.1	83.6	62.9	14.8	2.9	16.1	15.9
03. North Maluku	96.8	82.8	50.2	15.4	2.9	14.8	18.7
04. Central Halmahera	93.7	78.7	32.5	4.8	6.2	35.1	29.1
71. Ambon	98.3	97.3	92.4	35.8	1.3	0.0	6.1
82. Irian Jaya	82.8	75.5	50.5	12.9	4.5	20.0	28.5
01. Merauke	78.5	69.0	34.7	6.1	8.8	27.2	46.4
02. Jaya Wijaya	70.8	58.6	30.6	9.0	6.8	28.1	34.9
03. Jaya Pura	91.8	82.8	64.4	23.4	3.8	14.3	23.6
04. Paniai	74.1	80.0	43.0	7.3	1.8	24.1	26.9
05. Fak Fak	91.1	82.5	57.3	10.3	2.7	12.4	12.4
06. Sorong	94.0	90.4	55.6	6.0	1.7	18.7	35.3
07. Manokwari	89.6	65.9	46.5	3.3	5.8	21.7	23.6
08. Yapen Waropen	91.1	77.5	31.0	3.6	1.4	23.6	42.8
09. Biak Numfor	94.8	87.6	69.3	25.6	4.0	22.1	24.5
71. Jaya Pura	96.9	90.8	85.6	33.2	2.4	7.1	11.4

Note:

^{a)} Extrapolation based on Population Census (PC) 1971, PC 1980, PC 1990, 1995 Survey Between Census and 1996 Socio-economic survey. The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.

Source: BPS special tabulation

12 Housing Condition by District, 1996 and 1999

Province District	Households with access to safe water (%)		Households with dirt floor (%)		Households without access to sanitation (%)	
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999
11. Aceh	41.8	38.5	14.1	11.1	34.6	30.4
01. South Aceh	30.7	26.3	8.4	8.1	48.0	45.1
02. South-east Aceh	25.4	35.4	11.4	8.0	35.7	31.0
03. East Aceh	38.3	52.4	22.2	16.6	17.0	10.1
04. Central Aceh	39.5	45.5	15.9	11.4	19.0	8.8
05. Weast Aceh	29.8	24.5	12.0	9.3	50.4	58.4
06. Aceh Besar	38.1	38.7	4.1	2.1	51.2	37.2
07. Pidie	42.6	21.2	17.7	13.0	61.5	52.6
08. North Aceh	48.1	39.0	16.6	14.5	26.6	21.3
71. Banda Aceh	75.5	76.5	1.5	0.5	6.7	5.4
72. Sabang	67.1	64.1	2.6	2.0	34.1	31.4
12. North Sumatera	48.9	52.1	7.5	4.0	20.2	16.8
01. Nias	38.6	51.7	11.1	9.2	37.9	37.1
02. South Tapanuli	25.1	33.9	5.5	0.7	41.4	29.6
03. Central Tapanuli	30.2	38.4	4.6	0.7	61.2	59.6
04. North Tapanuli	33.5	36.3	2.1	1.3	50.3	43.9
05. Labuhan Batu	43.9	36.1	9.9	9.1	8.3	8.0
06. Asahan	56.9	57.7	9.1	5.2	5.7	6.0
07. Simalungun	55.9	61.8	13.6	8.0	34.1	33.8
08. Dairi	40.9	49.1	6.5	3.2	53.5	49.4
09. Karo	54.5	54.1	3.0	2.3	33.9	21.4
10. Deli Serdang	45.5	44.4	9.0	3.9	14.4	8.3
11. Langkat	55.4	54.7	21.2	9.7	6.9	4.6
71. Sibolga	80.1	89.3	0.7	0.7	6.6	11.5
72. Tanjung Balai	74.4	79.1	0.3	0.2	11.6	3.4
73. Pematang Siantar	90.0	92.0	1.3	0.6	6.5	2.8
74. Tebing Tinggi	30.1	30.8	2.3	1.8	3.5	3.0
75. Medan	64.6	71.8	1.2	0.2	1.6	2.0
76. Binjai	36.8	36.7	4.1	2.3	2.0	2.6
13. West Sumatera	49.6	53.6	2.5	1.9	34.9	32.7
01. South Pesisir	49.0	46.1	6.9	4.6	69.8	63.4
02. Solok	54.9	65.4	1.1	0.8	36.4	56.1
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	48.6	49.1	8.1	6.9	47.6	37.8
04. Tanah Datar	58.2	55.6	1.6	0.2	26.0	24.0
05. Padang Pariaman	36.8	38.3	1.3	1.2	34.5	37.3
06. Agam	47.6	55.9	0.4	0.4	8.1	16.9
07. Limapuluh Koto	48.2	52.7	2.1	2.1	19.5	4.4
08. Pasaman	40.3	59.8	2.8	3.0	75.6	53.2
71. Padang	47.2	45.0	1.5	0.7	23.6	18.9
72. Solok	86.2	88.6	2.6	1.6	16.8	17.2
73. Sawah Lunto	81.9	70.8	1.1	1.2	14.9	22.9
74. Padang Panjang	87.0	83.9	0.7	0.8	1.0	3.8
75. Bukit Tinggi	79.7	78.3	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.2
76. Payakumbuh	61.9	64.4	2.4	1.0	2.6	1.4

**12 Housing Condition
by District,
1996 and 1999**

(continued)

Province District	Households with access to safe water (%)		Households with dirt floor (%)		Households without access to sanitation (%)	
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999
14. Riau	32.3	28.2	5.6	2.6	14.7	11.4
01. Indragiri Hulu	52.8	52.3	16.0	2.7	27.1	28.5
02. Indragiri Ilir	7.9	2.5	0.3	0.0	18.1	3.6
03. Kepulauan Riau	44.3	40.8	1.3	1.0	11.9	12.8
04. Kampar	39.3	32.3	9.0	6.8	34.4	26.5
05. Bengkalis	19.3	17.8	5.8	3.5	4.7	5.1
71. Pekanbaru	34.8	24.0	1.2	0.2	0.5	1.3
72. Batam	59.3	55.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.2
15. Jambi	39.9	42.7	11.4	6.2	20.9	20.3
01. Kerinci	49.5	63.0	2.2	2.9	34.6	35.8
02. Bungo Tebo	37.6	39.2	12.8	5.5	26.2	30.9
03. Sarolangun Bangko	33.4	34.9	23.0	13.1	32.3	31.1
04. Batanghari	50.0	45.7	13.4	8.9	21.0	8.6
05. Tanjung Jabung	6.1	5.6	7.0	2.3	9.4	14.6
71. Jambi	63.0	71.7	4.9	2.8	1.7	3.7
16. South Sumatera	39.0	40.3	14.1	11.1	24.1	22.3
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	39.3	45.9	24.1	19.0	21.2	22.0
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	35.2	34.4	18.5	16.7	24.4	18.9
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	25.9	39.2	6.8	4.4	44.4	39.5
04. Lahat	27.3	16.5	4.1	3.4	46.1	44.4
05. Musi Rawas	32.7	30.3	24.5	18.3	33.8	21.6
06. Musi Banyuasin	17.8	20.5	27.3	22.6	10.9	9.6
07. Bangka	40.0	38.5	5.1	2.4	46.1	43.9
08. Balitung	45.5	32.0	0.6	0.2	38.1	42.8
71. Palembang	74.5	77.2	1.7	1.7	1.0	3.7
72. Pangkal Pinang	50.8	42.5	0.6	0.3	9.3	8.4
17. Bengkulu	40.7	40.8	13.3	12.1	32.5	31.1
01. South Bengkulu	35.7	19.3	14.2	7.6	49.7	46.7
02. Rejang Lebong	35.1	43.9	3.7	2.1	32.6	38.9
03. North Bengkulu	49.1	52.3	27.8	29.3	38.1	35.7
71. Bengkulu	39.4	38.6	0.8	1.6	3.6	3.2
18. Lampung	41.4	45.6	43.2	34.4	10.7	12.0
01. South Lampung	48.8	41.3	44.4	35.1	22.9	24.4
02. Central Lampung	39.0	51.1	44.3	33.4	2.9	2.8
03. North Lampung	39.4	47.3	60.2	48.1	7.8	6.0
04. West Lampung	35.9	32.0	37.7	26.9	17.9	35.4
71. Bandar Lampung	37.4	43.4	5.4	3.7	5.2	9.7
31. Jakarta	58.4	59.8	1.1	0.3	1.0	0.8
71. South Jakarta	25.6	27.3	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.1
72. East Jakarta	37.7	43.5	1.4	0.0	1.8	0.2
73. Central Jakarta	75.8	83.6	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.0
74. West Jakarta	77.8	73.4	1.6	0.2	0.2	1.1
75. North Jakarta	93.6	94.3	1.2	0.7	2.1	2.6

**12 Housing Condition
by District,
1996 and 1999**

(continued)

Province District	Households with access to safe water (%)		Households with dirt floor (%)		Households without access to sanitation (%)	
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999
32. West Java	41.8	37.9	10.4	7.1	22.8	20.8
01. Pandeglang	56.7	47.4	18.0	11.4	57.2	60.6
02. Lebak	38.8	39.4	7.1	9.3	55.7	50.6
03. Bogor	39.0	41.0	5.0	2.0	15.1	10.8
04. Sukabumi	34.5	43.4	3.8	2.7	24.4	30.5
05. Cianjur	39.6	37.8	0.5	0.3	28.6	25.7
06. Bandung	35.0	29.2	0.2	0.6	9.4	6.3
07. Garut	30.2	35.1	0.6	0.5	15.0	12.2
08. Tasikmalaya	35.5	20.0	2.0	1.1	10.5	15.0
09. Ciamis	48.8	39.3	8.2	6.6	21.3	8.4
10. Kuningan	41.0	34.7	5.9	3.0	18.7	15.0
11. Cirebon	45.4	43.1	23.7	12.5	39.8	36.7
12. Majalengka	40.7	46.5	7.8	6.0	26.6	25.1
13. Sumedang	47.2	40.9	0.6	0.0	15.2	15.9
14. Indramayu	48.9	40.3	34.0	24.2	48.7	39.4
15. Subang	39.1	29.3	24.9	13.5	35.9	31.3
16. Purwakarta	40.0	46.9	3.3	2.9	17.9	17.5
17. Karawang	39.3	29.9	41.6	30.0	36.1	39.6
18. Bekasi	45.8	48.8	12.9	28.4	5.6	12.0
19. Tangerang	29.8	22.7	20.0	13.6	17.3	21.2
20. Serang	41.4	36.1	16.5	11.2	61.5	56.3
71. Bogor	63.0	31.1	0.5	0.2	3.9	45.5
72. Sukabumi	54.9	52.8	0.7	0.7	0.5	2.4
73. Bandung	64.6	66.2	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.2
74. Cirebon	52.9	82.2	17.2	3.0	37.7	3.3
75. Tangerang	40.2	32.2	4.2	1.4	3.5	6.7
76. Bekasi	-	25.1	-	0.7	-	0.3
33. Central Java	52.6	52.2	47.7	37.8	30.5	30.9
01. Cilacap	40.1	41.2	47.2	34.7	21.9	27.6
02. Banyumas	47.2	49.0	42.3	31.1	39.7	32.9
03. Purbalingga	40.8	31.1	49.7	40.2	57.8	59.4
04. Banjarnegara	38.8	36.3	48.6	38.5	26.7	32.8
05. Kebumen	46.7	43.7	52.8	37.6	30.0	28.6
06. Purworejo	38.3	42.2	42.1	38.7	16.4	27.6
07. Wonosobo	60.7	66.2	44.5	34.5	16.0	14.5
08. Magelang	49.8	71.1	52.8	40.9	26.5	23.5
09. Boyolali	60.5	62.9	60.0	49.7	26.1	19.8
10. Klaten	50.6	45.3	29.1	21.1	40.8	36.2
11. Sukoharjo	62.4	35.2	26.0	20.4	32.6	25.4
12. Wonogiri	54.0	58.7	50.9	34.6	8.0	7.1
13. Karanganyar	37.6	41.7	34.1	25.4	31.5	35.0
14. Sragen	60.0	59.1	67.1	61.1	32.3	24.7
15. Grobogan	53.9	65.0	79.0	73.4	18.7	20.4
16. Blora	78.1	75.2	81.4	75.4	19.2	14.3
17. Rembang	67.4	79.1	65.2	53.1	39.6	46.7
18. Pati	65.3	46.4	69.9	56.9	23.4	22.5
19. Kudus	53.8	50.2	26.9	16.3	23.1	27.4
20. Jepara	57.1	55.4	58.4	44.3	26.5	23.3
21. Demak	63.5	47.7	66.6	55.2	37.3	43.4
22. Semarang	62.5	58.4	52.4	38.5	19.3	23.4
23. Temanggung	62.5	49.3	48.2	40.4	28.6	29.3

**12 Housing Condition
by District,
1996 and 1999**

(continued)

Province District	Households with access to safe water (%)		Households with dirt floor (%)		Households without access to sanitation (%)	
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999
24. Kendal	52.7	51.4	72.6	60.0	45.3	52.4
25. Batang	45.7	29.3	57.8	50.9	56.4	59.2
26. Pekalongan	30.0	28.7	34.6	26.6	56.6	58.3
27. Pemalang	46.3	41.7	46.8	38.4	59.0	52.9
28. Tegal	35.7	29.1	26.1	20.4	43.6	41.8
29. Brebes	44.4	56.0	42.8	31.1	50.3	59.6
71. Magelang	72.5	81.9	8.6	4.9	11.2	5.6
72. Surakarta	47.7	61.0	7.9	3.9	1.8	2.5
73. Salatiga	82.9	83.2	7.7	7.2	0.5	2.8
74. Semarang	73.5	84.7	16.2	9.8	4.0	3.0
75. Pekalongan	42.3	37.5	12.3	5.7	12.2	19.3
76. Tegal	73.7	78.6	6.7	6.6	28.0	23.4
34. Yogyakarta	47.4	51.1	23.9	15.8	17.4	16.1
01. Kulon Progo	46.9	60.1	50.7	38.6	3.1	2.6
02. Bantul	44.0	46.3	16.6	11.1	33.8	29.2
03. Gunung Kidul	48.1	57.1	45.5	33.4	4.2	3.1
04. Sleman	45.8	53.6	14.0	6.2	29.0	28.1
71. Yogyakarta	54.7	39.5	4.2	1.7	0.5	0.9
35. East Java	61.3	57.0	34.6	28.3	36.2	31.9
01. Pacitan	58.6	52.2	53.4	44.2	6.8	5.6
02. Ponorogo	68.5	64.7	49.9	39.4	28.8	21.4
03. Trenggalek	58.6	51.1	50.4	41.0	37.4	38.0
04. Tulungagung	47.0	45.3	28.9	22.0	15.7	15.7
05. Blitar	47.7	47.8	27.8	20.5	25.0	22.4
06. Kediri	68.9	47.7	27.6	19.6	18.6	15.9
07. Malang	61.4	61.0	29.6	26.5	22.8	17.2
08. Lumajang	53.4	42.8	18.6	12.5	57.8	52.3
09. Jember	53.0	55.5	31.2	25.6	60.9	56.1
10. Banyuwangi	50.8	39.7	33.5	22.3	56.0	54.3
11. Bondowoso	70.5	53.3	51.4	43.6	70.5	67.3
12. Situbondo	45.3	39.3	43.2	44.6	69.2	63.4
13. Probolinggo	43.1	48.5	49.9	41.3	76.0	75.7
14. Pasuruan	61.6	34.3	26.2	17.4	64.2	61.1
15. Sidoarjo	62.6	73.4	4.3	1.9	35.5	17.2
16. Mojokerto	74.2	59.1	31.6	22.8	35.0	30.5
17. Jombang	52.8	50.6	27.4	21.7	32.9	31.1
18. Nganjuk	63.3	57.2	42.8	34.6	20.8	20.6
19. Madiun	55.2	55.4	59.7	53.1	22.7	19.0
20. Magetan	81.1	73.9	3.6	19.7	12.3	13.9
21. Ngawi	67.5	56.6	72.1	63.7	35.1	29.0
22. Bojonegoro	67.7	61.6	81.6	75.1	54.5	49.9
23. Tuban	59.4	61.5	77.8	66.6	56.3	51.5
24. Lamongan	50.3	55.8	68.9	53.8	23.5	20.4
25. Gresik	45.4	53.3	27.6	18.9	13.6	9.9
26. Bangkalan	64.1	56.7	38.3	28.0	24.5	23.3
27. Sampang	86.6	51.7	79.2	68.6	54.5	51.9
28. Pamekasan	63.2	56.2	49.8	38.6	45.4	38.2
29. Sumenep	60.6	55.4	9.4	8.0	44.8	41.7
71. Kediri	37.2	35.4	11.0	6.2	9.4	7.1
72. Blitar	41.1	29.8	8.8	4.8	18.6	18.7
73. Malang	51.2	57.9	7.3	3.6	13.9	5.7

12 Housing Condition by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Households with access to safe water		Households with dirt floor		Households without access to sanitation	
	(%)		(%)		(%)	
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999
74. Probolinggo	60.4	59.0	6.4	3.1	37.4	31.5
75. Pasuruan	74.2	73.4	12.3	4.8	41.6	35.4
76. Mojokerto	33.0	44.1	9.1	7.7	15.7	19.1
77. Madiun	50.8	50.7	7.3	2.5	5.1	0.2
78. Surabaya	94.4	95.5	1.5	2.5	1.3	1.0
51. Bali	62.6	65.8	7.7	5.6	32.2	24.9
01. Jembrana	60.7	56.1	15.8	10.1	40.7	35.0
02. Tabanan	61.8	74.1	3.7	1.9	18.5	14.7
03. Badung	46.1	37.0	1.4	3.1	14.9	11.2
04. Gianyar	75.8	76.2	3.6	3.8	32.9	17.5
05. Klungkung	64.8	72.9	5.2	3.0	31.8	27.2
06. Bangli	63.9	71.1	8.8	6.7	47.7	41.1
07. Karangasem	67.6	69.6	21.6	15.3	71.5	61.1
08. Buleleng	70.2	76.3	9.0	6.2	36.6	26.3
71. Denpasar	49.8	56.9	0.8	0.6	4.5	4.1
52. West Nusa Tenggara	37.2	37.5	27.0	19.3	56.1	56.9
01. West Lombok	29.3	35.3	24.8	14.6	52.0	62.5
02. Central Lombok	31.4	47.8	38.7	30.1	76.3	64.9
03. East Lombok	37.1	20.5	43.7	28.9	60.7	68.2
04. Sumbawa	48.0	41.1	11.6	10.6	54.5	47.3
05. Dompu	60.5	57.1	22.6	19.6	44.7	51.5
06. Bima	46.8	48.1	2.6	4.3	42.8	46.0
71. Mataram	30.1	38.4	7.0	5.7	26.8	20.7
53. East Nusa Tenggara	53.7	58.1	54.8	48.1	23.5	28.2
01. West Sumba	48.3	51.6	17.5	12.3	37.4	49.8
02. East Sumba	56.5	69.2	27.8	23.7	28.5	31.8
03. Kupang	56.6	52.5	52.2	59.7	24.0	41.4
04. Southern Central-Timor	46.3	55.3	84.7	74.6	1.8	2.9
05. Northern Central-Timor	52.6	69.6	80.6	74.5	1.2	7.2
06. Belu	57.7	62.1	70.1	63.5	37.4	33.7
07. Alor	48.1	59.2	67.3	63.3	22.4	23.2
08. Flores Timur	44.8	45.3	63.9	57.8	21.7	32.5
09. Sikka	33.7	44.6	54.9	42.6	40.1	40.4
10. Ende	40.9	45.4	35.0	30.1	29.3	33.4
11. Ngada	87.1	85.6	49.8	39.5	14.2	18.3
12. Manggarai	66.0	60.3	45.9	46.6	27.9	35.8
71. Kupang	-	75.2	-	11.3	-	0.3
61. West Kalimantan	17.5	21.6	2.4	1.3	40.7	36.9
01. Sambas	25.6	29.8	0.8	0.7	48.9	39.0
02. Pontianak	8.1	12.6	1.5	1.2	37.6	38.9
03. Sanggau	12.9	21.4	1.6	1.8	52.1	50.4
04. Ketapang	20.7	31.0	0.3	0.8	30.2	38.4
05. Sintang	21.7	24.7	12.1	3.9	57.6	42.1
06. Kapuas Hulu	10.6	14.2	0.0	0.0	47.5	51.8
71. Pontianak	21.5	14.6	0.0	0.0	2.8	2.4

12 Housing Condition by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Households with access to safe water (%)		Households with dirt floor (%)		Households without access to sanitation (%)	
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999
62. Central Kalimantan	26.5	31.8	2.6	1.9	41.1	19.0
01. West Kotawaringin	52.0	59.4	18.3	12.3	25.0	18.3
02. East Kotawaringin	26.8	19.5	0.0	0.0	31.4	20.1
03. Kapuas	10.1	28.6	0.5	0.0	57.8	11.4
04. South Barito	32.1	44.5	0.2	0.2	43.8	33.3
05. North Barito	21.5	26.9	0.0	0.0	72.4	45.4
71. Palangka Raya	41.3	28.7	0.2	1.1	3.9	2.6
63. South Kalimantan	52.8	53.3	3.3	2.5	27.9	18.1
01. Tanah Laut	50.3	47.0	16.1	13.3	15.3	17.2
02. Kota Baru	66.2	65.4	10.8	6.9	26.2	18.7
03. Banjar	37.5	41.1	0.1	0.3	20.5	6.6
04. Barito Kuala	15.5	9.6	0.3	0.2	50.5	22.3
05. Tapin	57.1	51.2	8.7	4.6	39.5	13.5
06. South Hulu Sungai	50.4	35.5	0.4	0.2	35.8	37.3
07. Central Hulu Sungai	41.3	42.3	0.2	0.0	30.9	17.8
08. North Hulu Sungai	43.0	50.4	0.0	0.1	53.2	41.8
09. Tabalong	48.1	56.3	1.5	2.4	20.8	23.5
71. Banjarmasin	91.4	95.2	0.2	0.0	9.7	5.2
64. East Kalimantan	63.5	64.2	2.1	1.4	15.5	11.4
01. Pasir	50.9	44.3	4.4	3.3	22.6	25.4
02. Kutai	56.1	56.6	3.4	2.7	21.6	9.7
03. Berau	48.3	48.0	0.1	0.2	32.1	33.4
04. Bulongan	37.2	37.8	0.2	0.0	18.5	26.7
71. Balikpapan	85.7	92.0	0.4	0.7	1.2	1.4
72. Samarinda	84.8	81.1	0.7	0.0	6.2	2.9
71. North Sulawesi	51.0	55.5	14.0	9.7	25.7	25.0
01. Gorontalo	35.7	35.0	18.9	15.5	55.5	56.0
02. Bolaang Mongondow	49.9	60.9	12.0	11.5	43.5	42.2
03. Minahasa	51.8	66.1	14.8	7.9	6.4	6.0
04. Sangihe Talaud	56.6	54.2	21.6	12.9	31.2	26.3
71. Gorontalo	47.5	53.9	4.7	3.3	18.7	11.8
72. Manado	67.0	61.6	5.3	3.0	2.7	2.7
73. Bitung	68.1	64.5	10.5	8.6	9.7	9.3
72. Central Sulawesi	45.1	48.3	18.2	13.8	49.6	47.4
01. Luwuk Banggai	50.9	64.0	42.1	31.4	58.1	50.9
02. Poso	47.0	54.2	21.9	15.6	43.4	36.5
03. Donggala	40.6	42.3	11.4	9.1	58.4	63.4
04. Bual Toli-Toli	53.3	45.7	6.8	4.6	53.8	49.9
71. Kodya Palu	34.8	29.9	2.5	2.4	17.2	12.8
73. South Sulawesi	49.0	50.9	4.5	3.5	39.0	36.4
01. Selayar	31.2	26.9	0.2	0.0	74.6	78.9
02. Bulukumba	48.5	51.5	1.3	0.9	52.6	44.7
03. Bantaeng	37.2	57.7	2.8	1.2	57.2	62.7
04. Jeneponto	31.8	33.4	1.2	1.3	65.0	59.5
05. Takalar	52.1	41.2	6.4	5.4	38.9	40.0

12 Housing Condition by District, 1996 and 1999

(continued)

Province District	Households with access to safe water		Households with dirt floor		Households without access to sanitation	
	(%)		(%)		(%)	
	1996	1999	1996	1999	1996	1999
06. Gowa	46.3	36.1	5.8	4.5	39.9	36.2
07. Sinjai	60.9	58.5	1.8	1.3	32.9	31.9
08. Maros	41.6	35.3	2.8	1.8	64.0	58.4
09. Pangkep	54.8	49.9	0.5	0.6	62.2	58.7
10. Barru	41.1	38.2	1.0	0.2	51.6	48.0
11. Bone	47.4	49.7	1.0	0.8	50.7	47.2
12. Soppeng	43.9	43.8	0.6	0.3	15.5	20.1
13. Wajo	36.2	32.8	2.3	1.7	26.5	25.7
14. Sidenreng Rappang	24.2	39.2	2.4	1.5	34.9	27.8
15. Pinrang	42.0	35.4	0.5	0.9	37.9	31.2
16. Enrekang	38.5	48.2	3.6	2.5	54.3	51.0
17. Luwu	38.8	55.1	17.1	12.8	42.3	37.3
18. Tana Toraja	64.5	77.7	3.3	4.2	12.6	9.6
19. Polewali Mamasa	41.7	48.0	6.1	4.0	57.9	55.7
20. Majene	49.1	42.9	2.3	0.8	76.9	62.1
21. Mamuju	39.5	31.9	17.1	12.9	47.2	56.3
71. Ujung Pandang	83.4	81.9	2.2	1.8	2.9	4.2
72. Pare Pare	50.4	49.0	2.6	3.4	18.1	13.6
74. South-east Sulawesi	58.5	56.4	17.0	14.2	37.0	35.0
01. Buton	61.9	56.8	5.0	3.1	59.1	46.3
02. Muna	49.9	58.8	8.3	6.6	46.2	42.0
03. Kendari	71.6	52.2	31.9	32.5	18.5	25.2
04. Kolaka	35.5	54.4	13.0	11.9	33.2	37.9
71. Kendari	-	68.7	-	7.6	-	14.5
81. Maluku	55.4	47.9	28.7	23.4	44.2	43.7
01. South-east Maluku	56.3	37.6	27.7	35.0	56.6	48.6
02. Central Maluku	51.8	41.8	35.5	25.3	55.6	61.5
03. North Maluku	49.0	45.3	32.1	24.7	43.2	43.9
04. Central Halmahera	54.2	57.8	38.1	31.9	41.5	27.9
71. Ambon	73.4	70.4	5.0	1.7	11.5	9.1
82. Irian Jaya	46.2	45.5	15.8	12.6	48.8	38.9
01. Merauke	43.3	34.2	14.6	20.7	51.4	46.2
02. Jaya Wijaya	42.8	55.8	15.0	12.7	79.3	54.5
03. Jaya Pura	41.6	55.4	16.5	6.8	40.0	40.4
04. Paniai	20.9	24.6	8.6	2.2	42.8	38.0
05. Fak Fak	37.5	40.9	30.3	16.8	54.1	40.2
06. Sorong	58.2	44.8	24.2	20.3	38.0	18.7
07. Manokwari	49.9	44.7	21.4	18.9	41.3	38.9
08. Yapen Waropen	52.3	30.6	10.1	13.7	55.6	56.3
09. Biak Numfor	41.5	50.0	15.9	7.3	41.4	22.7
71. Jaya Pura	82.6	74.5	6.2	1.9	12.4	14.5

Note:

The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.

Source: BPS special tabulation

13 Economic Performance by District, 1999

Province District	Real per capita GRDP in 1998 ^{a)} (Thousand Rupiah)		Annual growth in real per capita GRDP (%)							
	with oil and gas	without oil and gas	with oil and gas				without oil and gas			
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1995	1996	1997	1998
11. Aceh	2,548	1,509	-0.9	0.6	-1.9	-10.8	6.2	5.7	3.4	-7.4
01. South Aceh	1,277	1,277	6.6	5.9	4.4	-4.9	6.6	5.9	4.4	-4.9
02. South-east Aceh	1,150	1,150	6.1	6.3	3.9	3.7	6.1	6.3	3.9	3.7
03. East Aceh	1,516	1,443	4.2	3.9	-2.8	-10.5	7.0	6.5	3.5	-9.5
04. Central Aceh	1,916	1,916	4.4	4.6	2.4	-1.4	4.4	4.6	2.4	-1.4
05. West Aceh	1,297	1,297	6.5	6.7	4.1	-4.2	6.5	6.7	4.1	-4.2
06. Aceh Besar	1,782	1,782	7.6	7.5	4.4	-2.3	7.6	7.5	4.4	-2.3
07. Pidie	1,245	1,245	6.4	6.1	4.8	-5.7	6.4	6.1	4.8	-5.7
08. North Aceh	6,028	1,871	-4.1	-1.8	-3.9	-13.6	6.7	6.1	4.1	-10.2
71. Banda Aceh	1,187	1,187	1.6	-0.3	-3.0	-14.7	1.6	-0.3	-3.0	-14.7
72. Sabang	2,133	2,133	7.8	7.1	5.8	-2.8	7.8	7.1	5.8	-2.8
12. North Sumatera	1,976	1,964	9.2	6.7	4.2	-9.4	9.4	6.9	5.4	-9.4
01. Nias	1,164	1,164	8.8	5.0	2.5	-7.2	8.8	5.0	2.5	-7.2
02. South Tapanuli	1,589	1,589	9.8	6.0	3.5	-10.3	9.8	6.0	3.5	-10.3
03. Central Tapanuli	1,641	1,641	7.6	8.7	3.5	-6.2	7.6	8.7	3.5	-6.2
04. North Tapanuli	1,468	1,468	6.6	7.2	5.7	-7.2	6.6	7.2	5.7	-7.2
05. Labuhan Batu	2,460	2,460	6.8	9.3	7.1	-1.5	6.8	9.3	7.1	-1.5
06. Asahan	2,881	2,881	9.2	9.1	7.7	-0.8	9.2	9.1	7.7	-0.8
07. Simalungun	2,126	2,126	7.5	2.6	5.3	-3.6	7.5	2.6	5.3	-3.6
08. Dairi	1,428	1,428	7.8	9.6	5.5	1.6	7.8	9.6	5.5	1.6
09. Karo	2,441	2,441	11.3	8.0	7.5	-6.0	11.3	8.0	7.5	-6.0
10. Deli Serdang	1,486	1,486	24.3	4.1	5.8	-8.7	24.3	4.1	5.8	-8.7
11. Langkat	2,030	1,866	8.8	5.9	-9.7	-4.3	11.8	8.4	3.6	-4.1
71. Sibolga	2,665	2,665	16.9	16.4	4.5	-8.8	16.9	16.4	4.5	-8.8
72. Tanjung Balai	2,934	2,934	5.8	8.7	6.4	-8.7	5.8	8.7	6.4	-8.7
73. Pematang Siantar	2,762	2,762	5.9	4.3	5.3	-5.7	5.9	4.3	5.3	-5.7
74. Tebing Tinggi	2,217	2,217	8.5	4.8	1.7	-14.1	8.5	4.8	1.7	-14.1
75. Medan	2,322	2,322	5.0	7.5	5.6	-21.8	5.0	7.5	5.6	-21.8
76. Binjai	1,327	1,327	7.5	7.3	0.3	-14.9	7.5	7.3	0.3	-14.9
13. West Sumatera	1,678	1,678	6.9	6.1	3.5	-6.9	6.9	6.1	3.5	-6.9
01. South Pesisir	1,028	1,028	5.1	5.6	2.8	-6.1	5.1	5.6	2.8	-6.1
02. Solok	1,171	1,171	5.3	6.0	3.1	-5.3	5.3	6.0	3.1	-5.3
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	1,572	1,572	4.6	4.6	2.1	-6.0	4.6	4.6	2.1	-6.0
04. Tanah Datar	1,393	1,393	6.7	6.9	4.3	-5.3	6.7	6.9	4.3	-5.3
05. Padang Pariaman	1,438	1,438	6.9	7.2	3.8	-5.3	6.9	7.2	3.8	-5.3
06. Agam	1,519	1,519	9.8	6.9	3.9	-4.5	9.8	6.9	3.9	-4.5
07. Limapuluh Koto	1,745	1,745	6.3	6.6	3.6	-6.1	6.3	6.6	3.6	-6.1
08. Pasaman	971	971	3.8	5.1	2.2	-5.1	3.8	5.1	2.2	-5.1
71. Padang	2,980	2,980	6.2	6.4	3.7	-9.8	6.2	6.4	3.7	-9.8
72. Solok	1,951	1,951	5.1	4.6	1.8	-6.9	5.1	4.6	1.8	-6.9
73. Sawah Lunto	3,856	3,856	22.4	-2.5	0.9	-10.0	22.4	-2.5	0.9	-10.0
74. Padang Panjang	2,054	2,054	6.8	7.3	3.2	-5.7	6.8	7.3	3.2	-5.7
75. Bukit Tinggi	2,099	2,099	7.5	7.4	4.3	-7.9	7.5	7.4	4.3	-7.9
76. Payakumbuh	1,715	1,715	6.4	6.6	3.5	-5.6	6.4	6.6	3.5	-5.6

13 Economic Performance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Real per capita GRDP in 1998 ^{a)} (Thousand Rupiah)		Annual growth in real per capita GRDP (%)							
	with oil and gas	without oil and gas	with oil and gas				without oil and gas			
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1995	1996	1997	1998
14. Riau	4,773	2,096	0.5	3.8	0.8	-5.3	5.3	8.3	6.5	-2.0
01. Indragiri Hulu	1,371	1,355	12.1	6.1	4.3	-9.3	5.5	6.5	4.9	-5.6
02. Indragiri Ilir	1,596	1,596	6.1	7.1	5.3	0.1	6.1	7.1	5.3	0.1
03. Kepulauan Riau	5,182	2,264	2.7	5.5	2.5	-14.0	4.3	9.7	6.9	-1.3
04. Kampar	2,469	1,237	0.5	2.4	-0.3	-36.0	4.9	5.5	4.1	-3.8
05. Bengkalis	9,262	1,518	-0.5	2.0	-2.1	4.8	4.8	5.6	2.9	-0.3
71. Pekanbaru	1,778	1,778	-3.2	4.1	7.7	-7.2	-3.2	4.1	7.7	-7.2
72. Batam	11,686	11,686	-1.5	9.4	5.3	-4.3	-1.5	9.4	5.3	-4.3
15. Jambi	1,254	1,168	5.7	6.4	1.8	-5.7	5.9	6.0	1.3	-9.0
01. Kerinci	1,243	1,243	6.7	8.1	3.0	-5.5	6.7	8.1	3.0	-5.5
02. Bungo Tebo	837	837	4.7	5.8	1.4	-9.5	4.7	5.8	1.4	-9.5
03. Sarolangun Bangko	874	852	3.8	4.7	-0.3	-8.4	3.8	4.7	-0.3	-10.7
04. Batanghari	1,104	984	5.0	6.2	1.5	-8.8	5.9	5.1	1.5	-8.3
05. Tanjung Jabung	1,956	1,656	9.2	8.4	4.6	6.1	9.2	8.4	2.4	-8.2
71. Jambi	1,649	1,566	4.9	6.0	1.3	-10.3	4.9	4.9	1.2	-9.7
16. South Sumatera	1,692	1,431	5.2	6.6	2.4	-6.9	7.0	7.4	3.5	-8.3
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	1,081	1,014	6.4	5.6	1.3	-7.4	6.6	5.8	1.4	-7.9
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	1,151	1,151	7.0	8.3	3.4	-4.1	7.0	8.3	3.4	-4.1
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	2,938	1,883	4.7	6.5	1.2	-1.7	9.0	8.9	3.0	-3.5
04. Lahat	1,193	1,193	7.7	6.6	1.7	-3.7	7.7	6.6	1.7	-3.7
05. Musi Rawas	1,359	1,070	-2.0	5.8	5.6	-4.7	5.0	6.9	8.0	-6.8
06. Musi Banyuasin	1,868	1,271	2.9	4.3	-1.0	-5.8	5.9	5.7	1.1	-9.2
07. Bangka	1,941	1,941	6.2	11.4	6.0	-6.5	6.2	11.4	6.0	-6.5
08. Balitung	1,979	1,979	5.6	8.3	4.5	-5.4	5.6	8.3	4.5	-5.4
71. Palembang	2,011	1,824	6.1	6.0	3.1	-13.7	6.9	6.5	4.1	-14.8
72. Pangkal Pinang	1,445	1,445	13.3	7.1	6.7	-3.3	13.3	7.1	6.7	-3.3
17. Bengkulu	1,158	1,158	1.7	3.7	1.1	-4.4	1.7	3.7	1.1	-4.4
01. South Bengkulu	1,140	1,140	6.7	3.5	2.7	-1.6	6.7	3.5	2.7	-1.6
02. Rejang Lebong	1,415	1,415	6.3	6.7	3.4	-1.3	6.3	6.7	3.4	-1.3
03. North Bengkulu	866	866	-5.9	2.7	0.1	-4.3	-5.9	2.7	0.1	-4.3
71. Bengkulu	1,321	1,321	-0.7	0.9	-2.1	-10.4	-0.7	0.9	-2.1	-10.4
18. Lampung	952	952	8.0	6.1	2.8	-9.5	8.0	6.1	2.8	-9.5
01. South Lampung	812	812	11.2	6.8	2.3	-7.1	11.2	6.8	2.3	-7.1
02. Central Lampung	986	986	8.4	6.2	3.6	-6.2	8.4	6.2	3.6	-6.2
03. North Lampung	744	744	6.9	5.0	0.6	-9.0	6.9	5.0	0.6	-9.0
04. West Lampung	603	603	7.9	6.6	-3.8	1.4	7.9	6.6	-3.8	1.4
71. Bandar Lampung	1,683	1,683	4.1	4.7	3.6	-18.0	4.1	4.7	3.6	-18.0
31. Jakarta	5,943	5,943	7.3	7.7	3.5	-19.5	7.3	7.7	3.5	-19.5
71. South Jakarta	4,930	4,930	9.3	10.3	4.0	-21.3	9.3	10.3	4.0	-21.3
72. East Jakarta	4,359	4,359	6.1	5.9	0.2	-17.7	6.1	5.9	0.2	-17.7
73. Central Jakarta	15,820	15,820	11.4	11.6	6.5	-7.6	11.4	11.6	6.5	-7.6
74. West Jakarta	3,871	3,871	5.3	6.0	5.0	-25.9	5.3	6.0	5.0	-25.9
75. North Jakarta	7,236	7,236	6.8	7.7	4.5	-23.7	6.8	7.7	4.5	-23.7

13 Economic Performance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Real per capita GRDP in 1998 ^{a)} (Thousand Rupiah)		Annual growth in real per capita GRDP (%)							
	with oil and gas	without oil and gas	with oil and gas				without oil and gas			
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1995	1996	1997	1998
32. West Java	1,616	1,533	7.5	14.3	2.4	-17.2	8.2	13.1	3.2	-17.8
01. Pandeglang	845	845	5.2	5.4	2.2	-26.5	5.2	5.4	2.2	-26.5
02. Lebak	816	816	7.0	5.8	2.3	-20.2	7.0	5.8	2.3	-20.2
03. Bogor	1,105	1,105	5.2	8.3	1.7	-23.0	5.2	8.3	1.7	-23.0
04. Sukabumi	968	968	5.9	7.6	2.2	-11.7	5.9	7.6	2.2	-11.7
05. Cianjur	1,079	1,079	5.7	6.1	2.9	-6.6	5.7	6.1	2.9	-6.6
06. Bandung	1,839	1,839	9.3	9.6	4.1	-19.6	9.3	9.6	4.1	-19.6
07. Garut	1,089	1,089	6.1	6.1	2.4	-12.3	6.1	6.1	2.4	-12.3
08. Tasikmalaya	1,044	1,044	6.8	7.3	2.7	-9.0	6.8	7.3	2.7	-9.0
09. Ciamis	1,229	1,229	6.9	6.1	3.0	-9.9	6.9	6.1	3.0	-9.9
10. Kuningan	947	947	5.9	6.7	3.2	-5.8	5.9	6.7	3.2	-5.8
11. Cirebon	789	789	6.7	6.2	2.2	-21.8	6.7	6.2	2.2	-21.8
12. Majalengka	951	951	5.0	10.8	4.7	-10.7	5.0	10.8	4.7	-10.7
13. Sumedang	1,135	1,135	6.3	7.1	2.5	-12.1	6.3	7.1	2.5	-12.1
14. Indramayu	3,249	1,005	-1.0	30.6	-7.1	-5.9	6.4	6.3	1.4	-11.0
15. Subang	1,260	1,260	6.4	7.1	3.1	-8.8	6.4	7.1	3.1	-8.8
16. Purwakarta	1,419	1,419	6.2	6.5	1.1	-12.6	6.2	6.5	1.1	-12.6
17. Karawang	1,458	1,458	7.2	8.1	3.6	-19.6	7.2	8.1	3.6	-19.6
18. Bekasi	2,500	2,500	8.7	60.6	1.2	-25.0	8.7	60.6	1.2	-25.0
19. Tangerang	1,384	1,384	3.5	5.3	0.8	-13.6	3.5	5.3	0.8	-13.6
20. Serang	2,811	2,811	5.3	6.8	2.5	-15.4	5.3	6.8	2.5	-15.4
71. Bogor	2,698	2,698	63.2	8.9	4.2	-28.0	63.2	8.9	4.2	-28.0
72. Sukabumi	2,871	2,871	43.8	6.4	2.4	-31.1	43.8	6.4	2.4	-31.1
73. Bandung	2,081	2,081	8.4	6.7	2.3	-21.8	8.4	6.7	2.3	-21.8
74. Cirebon	3,064	3,064	1.3	8.0	7.4	-6.8	1.3	8.0	7.4	-6.8
75. Tangerang	4,106	4,106	12.0	12.1	5.9	-20.6	12.0	12.1	5.9	-20.6
33. Central Java	1,282	1,204	7.3	6.5	1.8	-8.4	7.9	7.1	1.5	-9.5
01. Cilacap	3,733	2,218	1.9	5.1	-4.2	10.7	4.3	11.8	-10.1	6.3
02. Banyumas	697	697	7.8	3.8	2.9	-7.5	7.8	3.8	2.9	-7.5
03. Purbalingga	768	768	11.3	6.2	-1.7	-6.0	11.3	6.2	-1.7	-6.0
04. Banjarnegara	1,009	1,009	6.4	6.2	-0.3	-5.2	6.4	6.2	-0.3	-5.2
05. Kebumen	741	741	5.9	5.6	2.1	-14.1	5.9	5.6	2.1	-14.1
06. Purworejo	913	913	6.6	6.9	1.9	-7.0	6.6	6.9	1.9	-7.0
07. Wonosobo	737	737	19.7	9.8	-1.4	-10.1	19.7	9.8	-1.4	-10.1
08. Magelang	953	953	5.2	5.9	0.6	-3.7	5.2	5.9	0.6	-3.7
09. Boyolali	1,004	1,004	6.4	5.9	1.5	-10.0	6.4	5.9	1.5	-10.0
10. Klaten	1,025	1,025	7.2	6.4	2.0	-12.0	7.2	6.4	2.0	-12.0
11. Sukoharjo	1,438	1,438	18.3	8.0	1.4	-12.5	18.3	8.0	1.4	-12.5
12. Wonogiri	747	747	7.1	7.0	1.9	-5.4	7.1	7.0	1.9	-5.4
13. Karanganyar	1,482	1,482	6.2	6.6	2.6	-11.4	6.2	6.6	2.6	-11.4
14. Sragen	771	771	6.9	6.8	1.8	-10.3	6.9	6.8	1.8	-10.3
15. Grobogan	565	565	3.0	2.3	-3.4	-10.7	3.0	2.3	-3.4	-10.7
16. Blora	851	851	4.3	2.9	2.1	-6.2	4.0	1.7	1.6	0.9
17. Rembang	826	826	4.4	2.7	3.0	-12.3	4.4	2.7	3.0	-12.3
18. Pati	834	834	4.2	-0.3	3.2	-4.7	4.2	-0.3	3.2	-4.7
19. Kudus	4,306	4,306	7.1	6.0	-1.8	-13.0	7.1	6.0	-1.8	-13.0
20. Jepara	1,023	1,023	6.6	5.8	2.8	-1.4	6.6	5.8	2.8	-1.4
21. Demak	754	754	6.6	5.7	3.1	-12.1	6.6	5.7	3.1	-12.1
22. Semarang	1,187	1,187	25.9	15.0	2.9	-18.5	25.9	15.0	2.9	-18.5
23. Temanggung	1,015	1,015	5.5	5.3	7.0	-11.3	5.5	5.3	7.0	-11.3

13 Economic Performance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Real per capita GRDP in 1998 ^{a)} (Thousand Rupiah)		Annual growth in real per capita GRDP (%)							
	with oil and gas	without oil and gas	with oil and gas				without oil and gas			
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1995	1996	1997	1998
24. Kendal	1,680	1,680	5.5	5.2	3.2	-12.9	5.5	5.2	3.2	-12.9
25. Batang	1,104	1,104	6.2	6.1	2.1	-10.9	6.2	6.1	2.1	-10.9
26. Pekalongan	1,102	1,102	6.5	5.9	2.9	-9.5	6.5	5.9	2.9	-9.5
27. Pemasang	857	857	5.8	5.5	3.3	-0.8	5.8	5.5	3.3	-0.8
28. Tegal	651	651	4.9	5.5	4.4	-8.4	4.9	5.5	4.4	-8.4
29. Brebes	737	737	5.0	4.6	3.6	0.5	5.0	4.6	3.6	0.5
71. Magelang	2,361	2,361	6.8	8.5	2.6	-7.8	6.8	8.5	2.6	-7.8
72. Surakarta	2,324	2,324	18.0	8.2	3.3	-14.7	18.0	8.2	3.3	-14.7
73. Salatiga	2,278	2,278	6.3	5.9	2.5	-2.6	6.3	5.9	2.5	-2.6
74. Semarang	3,333	3,333	9.8	10.8	7.8	-19.6	9.8	10.8	7.8	-19.6
75. Pekalongan	1,043	1,043	7.5	1.5	-2.5	-13.3	7.5	1.5	-2.5	-13.3
76. Tegal	939	939	2.4	2.6	-1.8	-11.0	2.4	2.6	-1.8	-11.0
34. Yogyakarta	1,554	1,554	6.6	6.4	2.6	-11.2	6.6	6.4	2.6	-11.2
01. Kulon Progo	1,199	1,199	-6.0	4.1	2.6	-15.2	-6.0	4.1	2.6	-15.2
02. Bantul	1,060	1,060	7.0	5.3	1.7	-13.8	7.0	5.3	1.7	-13.8
03. Gunung Kidul	1,285	1,285	8.7	6.8	3.6	-7.4	8.7	6.8	3.6	-7.4
04. Sleman	1,609	1,609	7.5	6.3	1.7	-9.6	7.5	6.3	1.7	-9.6
71. Yogyakarta	2,945	2,945	9.3	7.4	3.1	-12.6	9.3	7.4	3.1	-12.6
35. East Java	1,628	1,625	7.2	7.8	5.1	-10.6	7.2	7.9	5.0	-10.7
01. Pacitan	655	655	16.2	5.2	3.3	-6.6	16.2	5.2	3.3	-6.6
02. Ponorogo	756	756	6.4	6.3	3.7	-7.8	6.4	6.3	3.7	-7.8
03. Trenggalek	735	735	5.0	5.1	5.0	-8.8	5.0	5.1	5.0	-8.8
04. Tulungagung	1,136	1,136	7.5	11.3	4.4	-7.0	7.5	11.3	4.4	-7.0
05. Blitar	996	996	8.3	6.0	3.8	-0.4	8.3	6.0	3.8	-0.4
06. Kediri	1,005	1,005	6.6	6.2	4.0	-0.7	6.6	6.2	4.0	-0.7
07. Malang	1,098	1,098	3.0	5.9	3.6	-7.6	3.0	5.9	3.6	-7.6
08. Lumajang	956	956	5.8	6.6	4.6	-10.9	5.8	6.6	4.6	-10.9
09. Jember	983	983	8.3	8.2	4.1	-7.9	8.3	8.2	4.1	-7.9
10. Banyuwangi	1,087	1,087	0.1	5.5	6.0	-6.6	0.1	5.5	6.0	-6.6
11. Bondowoso	734	734	7.2	6.4	2.6	-15.3	7.2	6.4	2.6	-15.3
12. Situbondo	1,382	1,382	6.9	6.3	4.1	-5.7	6.9	6.3	4.1	-5.7
13. Probolinggo	1,327	1,327	6.6	6.7	2.8	-9.9	6.6	6.7	2.8	-9.9
14. Pasuruan	1,039	1,039	5.2	5.6	4.1	-14.8	5.2	5.6	4.1	-14.8
15. Sidoarjo	2,482	2,482	5.2	5.9	2.0	-18.3	5.2	5.9	2.0	-18.3
16. Mojokerto	1,416	1,416	5.9	6.0	3.8	-9.1	5.9	6.0	3.8	-9.1
17. Jombang	946	946	5.6	5.1	3.3	-13.5	5.6	5.1	3.3	-13.5
18. Nganjuk	1,127	1,127	1.3	11.0	-1.1	-1.2	1.3	11.0	-1.1	-1.2
19. Madiun	848	848	1.1	5.1	3.2	-6.7	1.1	5.1	3.2	-6.7
20. Magetan	945	945	5.6	5.8	4.1	-8.2	5.6	5.8	4.1	-8.2
21. Ngawi	818	818	5.5	6.6	3.6	-6.5	5.5	6.6	3.6	-6.5
22. Bojonegoro	835	835	6.2	6.2	4.3	-6.0	6.2	6.2	4.3	-6.0
23. Tuban	1,033	1,033	6.7	7.1	7.4	-10.6	6.7	7.1	7.4	-10.6
24. Lamongan	893	893	2.3	6.1	4.0	-5.7	2.3	6.1	4.0	-5.7
25. Gresik	3,287	3,287	7.6	9.4	5.5	-12.8	7.6	9.4	5.5	-12.8
26. Bangkalan	947	947	4.9	5.7	3.9	-0.8	4.9	5.7	3.9	-0.8
27. Sampang	680	680	4.1	3.9	1.8	-13.5	4.1	3.9	1.8	-13.5
28. Pamekasan	653	653	5.4	5.1	2.8	-14.6	5.4	5.1	2.8	-14.6
29. Sumenep	978	867	-8.2	-4.3	13.1	-1.7	-8.8	4.4	3.6	-10.8
71. Kediri	21,357	21,357	12.3	12.1	10.7	-3.4	12.3	12.1	10.7	-3.4
72. Blitar	1,309	1,309	10.0	10.5	2.5	-4.4	10.0	10.5	2.5	-4.4
73. Malang	2,851	2,851	6.8	6.7	3.0	-11.3	6.8	6.7	3.0	-11.3

13 Economic Performance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Real per capita GRDP in 1998 ^{a)} (Thousand Rupiah)		Annual growth in real per capita GRDP (%)							
	with oil and gas	without oil and gas	with oil and gas				without oil and gas			
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1995	1996	1997	1998
74. Probolinggo	2,117	2,117	6.1	5.6	1.0	-8.0	6.1	5.6	1.0	-8.0
75. Pasuruan	1,555	1,555	5.8	5.7	3.3	-7.3	5.8	5.7	3.3	-7.3
76. Mojokerto	1,985	1,985	8.0	5.6	2.2	-5.8	8.0	5.6	2.2	-5.8
77. Madiun	1,635	1,635	7.3	7.4	6.1	-5.9	7.3	7.4	6.1	-5.9
78. Surabaya	4,645	4,645	9.6	8.6	5.0	-17.4	9.6	8.6	5.0	-17.4
51. Bali	2,431	2,431	7.2	6.8	4.4	-5.2	7.2	6.8	4.4	-5.2
01. Jembrana	2,132	2,132	6.3	6.5	3.8	-4.9	6.3	6.5	3.8	-4.9
02. Tabanan	1,956	1,956	6.9	6.5	4.1	-4.8	6.9	6.5	4.1	-4.8
03. Badung	5,244	5,244	6.7	6.2	3.8	-7.4	6.7	6.2	3.8	-7.4
04. Gianyar	2,362	2,362	7.8	7.3	5.2	-3.4	7.8	7.3	5.2	-3.4
05. Klungkung	2,298	2,298	7.3	6.6	4.5	-3.4	7.3	6.6	4.5	-3.4
06. Bangli	1,921	1,921	6.7	6.3	3.4	-3.2	6.7	6.3	3.4	-3.2
07. Karangasem	1,456	1,456	6.5	6.3	4.0	-3.4	6.5	6.3	4.0	-3.4
08. Buleleng	1,574	1,574	7.1	6.6	4.7	-3.8	7.1	6.6	4.7	-3.8
71. Denpasar	3,021	3,021	6.7	6.4	3.8	-7.6	6.7	6.4	3.8	-7.6
52. West Nusa Tenggara	852	852	6.4	6.2	3.6	-4.3	6.4	6.2	3.6	-4.3
01. West Lombok	794	794	5.7	4.7	2.8	-7.6	5.7	4.7	2.8	-7.6
02. Central Lombok	661	661	6.6	6.5	2.2	-2.9	6.6	6.5	2.2	-2.9
03. East Lombok	699	699	7.0	6.7	4.1	-4.1	7.0	6.7	4.1	-4.1
04. Sumbawa	1,212	1,212	7.2	6.4	4.9	-2.4	7.2	6.4	4.9	-2.4
05. Dompu	979	979	3.4	3.9	1.5	-2.6	3.4	3.9	1.5	-2.6
06. Bima	960	960	4.6	5.8	2.9	-4.4	4.6	5.8	2.9	-4.4
71. Mataram	1,145	1,145	8.8	8.3	5.1	-4.8	8.8	8.3	5.1	-4.8
53. East Nusa Tenggara	712	712	6.8	6.0	3.8	-6.9	6.8	6.0	3.8	-6.9
01. West Sumba	501	501	0.2	2.7	0.5	0.9	0.2	2.7	0.5	0.9
02. East Sumba	899	899	4.4	5.9	1.5	-7.0	4.4	5.9	1.5	-7.0
03. Kupang	1,217	1,217	10.5	8.1	1.7	-8.3	10.5	8.1	1.7	-8.3
04. Southern Central-Timor	497	497	4.2	2.0	8.2	-10.5	4.2	2.0	8.2	-10.5
05. Northern Central-Timor	681	681	1.0	5.0	5.3	0.8	1.0	5.0	5.3	0.8
06. Belu	639	639	7.8	5.8	7.1	-7.2	7.8	5.8	7.1	-7.2
07. Alor	605	605	9.3	5.1	2.5	-15.6	9.3	5.1	2.5	-15.6
08. Flores Timur	575	575	12.1	8.1	2.8	-7.4	12.1	8.1	2.8	-7.4
09. Sikka	696	696	6.6	7.9	8.4	-4.1	6.6	7.9	8.4	-4.1
10. Ende	743	743	5.3	6.4	5.4	-10.9	5.3	6.4	5.4	-10.9
11. Ngada	682	682	8.6	3.3	5.3	-4.2	8.6	3.3	5.3	-4.2
12. Manggarai	519	519	3.0	4.3	3.1	-5.4	3.0	4.3	3.1	-5.4
61. West Kalimantan	1,871	1,871	7.3	8.6	4.8	-3.8	7.3	8.6	4.8	-3.8
01. Sambas	1,224	1,224	7.0	8.4	3.3	-0.1	7.0	8.4	3.3	-0.1
02. Pontianak	2,208	2,208	7.1	9.0	4.2	-7.0	7.1	9.0	4.2	-7.0
03. Sanggau	1,486	1,486	9.6	11.5	8.5	-0.8	9.6	11.5	8.5	-0.8
04. Ketapang	1,718	1,718	7.8	8.0	5.5	-4.6	7.8	8.0	5.5	-4.6
05. Sintang	975	975	7.5	8.9	4.2	-5.5	7.5	8.9	4.2	-5.5
06. Kapuas Hulu	1,515	1,515	8.4	7.2	4.5	-0.1	8.4	7.2	4.5	-0.1
71. Pontianak	4,035	4,035	6.6	7.8	4.9	-3.0	6.6	7.8	4.9	-3.0

13 Economic Performance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Real per capita GRDP in 1998 ^{a)} (Thousand Rupiah)		Annual growth in real per capita GRDP (%)							
	with oil and gas	without oil and gas	with oil and gas				without oil and gas			
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1995	1996	1997	1998
62. Central Kalimantan	2,350	2,350	6.9	8.7	5.0	-6.5	6.9	8.7	5.0	-6.5
01. West Kotawaringin	3,171	3,171	4.9	6.0	3.2	-7.5	4.9	6.0	3.2	-7.5
02. East Kotawaringin	2,406	2,406	6.6	9.4	4.3	-7.1	6.6	9.4	4.3	-7.1
03. Kapuas	1,561	1,561	5.6	8.7	4.7	-7.8	5.6	8.7	4.7	-7.8
04. South Barito	2,313	2,313	6.8	9.0	6.6	-5.4	6.8	9.0	6.6	-5.4
05. North Barito	3,650	3,650	15.9	16.4	7.4	-6.4	15.9	16.4	7.4	-6.4
71. Palangka Raya	2,298	2,298	1.7	-0.6	5.8	-1.7	1.7	-0.6	5.8	-1.7
63. South Kalimantan	1,975	1,943	7.5	8.8	2.3	-5.3	7.5	8.8	2.0	-6.2
01. Tanah Laut	1,411	1,411	3.6	5.4	-2.6	-16.5	3.6	5.4	-2.6	-16.5
02. Kota Baru	3,385	3,385	5.5	10.0	-1.3	3.3	5.5	10.0	-1.3	3.3
03. Banjar	1,513	1,513	8.7	7.3	1.8	-6.1	8.7	7.3	1.8	-6.1
04. Barito Kuala	2,499	2,499	5.8	3.2	1.6	-9.2	5.8	3.2	1.6	-9.2
05. Tapin	1,425	1,425	6.4	7.3	3.1	-2.5	6.4	7.3	3.1	-2.5
06. South Hulu Sungai	1,298	1,298	6.3	6.3	3.1	-4.8	6.3	6.3	3.1	-4.8
07. Central Hulu Sungai	874	874	6.1	7.5	1.5	-18.1	6.1	7.5	1.5	-18.1
08. North Hulu Sungai	1,652	1,618	12.1	19.2	0.8	-6.9	12.2	19.4	0.3	-7.8
09. Tabalong	2,230	1,710	14.5	12.4	13.2	27.5	15.7	13.8	8.5	14.4
71. Banjarmasin	2,222	2,222	7.4	7.8	5.2	-13.8	7.4	7.8	5.2	-13.8
64. East Kalimantan	8,401	4,502	2.2	7.5	2.4	0.3	9.7	9.1	3.1	-1.3
01. Pasir	2,841	2,841	7.8	6.2	2.2	-2.9	7.8	6.2	2.2	-2.9
02. Kutai	14,812	5,553	3.5	7.4	3.1	0.9	12.4	12.6	3.0	-2.2
03. Berau	7,212	7,212	29.9	11.6	-1.9	15.0	29.9	11.6	-1.9	15.0
04. Bulongan	4,187	3,767	-4.8	7.7	5.9	-1.8	1.5	6.9	5.3	-1.5
71. Balikpapan	8,059	3,661	-2.3	10.9	0.4	-3.3	19.5	10.8	6.1	-3.8
72. Samarinda	4,496	4,496	1.4	3.5	1.8	-0.4	1.4	3.5	1.8	-0.4
71. North Sulawesi	1,434	1,434	8.8	10.0	3.2	-1.5	8.8	10.0	3.2	-1.5
01. Gorontalo	1,068	1,068	10.3	8.3	3.2	-3.7	10.3	8.3	3.2	-3.7
02. Bolaang Mongondow	1,038	1,038	5.1	6.1	1.7	-9.2	5.1	6.1	1.7	-9.2
03. Minahasa	1,634	1,634	9.0	14.6	5.8	1.9	9.0	14.6	5.8	1.9
04. Sangihe Talaud	1,085	1,085	9.0	9.9	3.5	1.9	9.0	9.9	3.5	1.9
71. Gorontalo	1,352	1,352	9.9	7.9	3.6	1.0	9.9	7.9	3.6	1.0
72. Manado	1,939	1,939	6.7	6.8	-1.0	-3.2	6.7	6.8	-1.0	-3.2
73. Bitung	2,918	2,918	13.8	13.4	6.7	2.9	13.8	13.4	6.7	2.9
72. Central Sulawesi	1,070	1,070	5.5	5.6	1.3	-6.0	5.5	5.6	1.3	-6.0
01. Luwuk Banggai	1,003	1,003	5.3	6.5	2.7	-6.3	5.3	6.5	2.7	-6.3
02. Poso	1,160	1,160	6.9	7.7	4.5	-3.7	6.9	7.7	4.5	-3.7
03. Donggala	933	933	5.2	5.4	-1.6	-5.2	5.2	5.4	-1.6	-5.2
04. Bual Toli-Toli	991	991	5.1	5.8	2.0	-6.7	5.1	5.8	2.0	-6.7
71. Kodya Palu	1,507	1,507	5.2	0.7	0.6	-9.2	5.2	0.7	0.6	-9.2
73. South Sulawesi	1,207	1,201	6.8	7.1	3.0	-5.2	6.8	7.1	3.0	-5.7
01. Selayar	1,055	1,055	7.5	11.1	5.2	-1.8	7.5	11.1	5.2	-1.8
02. Bulukumba	930	930	8.3	8.7	-3.7	-1.3	8.3	8.7	-3.7	-1.3
03. Bantaeng	856	856	6.1	6.8	0.3	0.4	6.1	6.8	0.3	0.4
04. Jeneponto	678	678	14.0	10.9	5.2	-7.8	14.0	10.9	5.2	-7.8
05. Takalar	921	921	6.0	5.2	4.8	-5.1	6.0	5.2	4.8	-5.1

13 Economic Performance by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Real per capita GRDP in 1998 ^{a)} (Thousand Rupiah)		Annual growth in real per capita GRDP (%)							
	with oil and gas	without oil and gas	with oil and gas				without oil and gas			
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1995	1996	1997	1998
06. Gowa	942	942	5.8	5.1	4.5	-5.3	5.8	5.1	4.5	-5.3
07. Sinjai	914	914	7.1	5.8	1.9	-4.7	7.1	5.8	1.9	-4.7
08. Maros	1,158	1,158	3.4	4.5	3.2	-6.7	3.4	4.5	3.2	-6.7
09. Pangkep	1,423	1,423	4.7	5.2	10.7	-7.6	4.7	5.2	10.7	-7.6
10. Barru	987	987	4.4	5.2	4.3	-4.6	4.4	5.2	4.3	-4.6
11. Bone	1,257	1,257	6.1	5.9	2.1	-5.7	6.1	5.9	2.1	-5.7
12. Soppeng	1,032	1,032	8.8	9.0	0.1	-4.8	8.8	9.0	0.1	-4.8
13. Wajo	1,404	1,287	7.0	9.5	-7.0	6.8	7.0	9.5	-7.0	-2.1
14. Sidenreng Rappang	1,097	1,097	8.5	6.5	3.0	-9.0	8.5	6.5	3.0	-9.0
15. Pinrang	1,245	1,245	7.2	6.0	1.7	-3.2	7.2	6.0	1.7	-3.2
16. Enrekang	768	768	5.3	5.3	3.2	-3.9	5.3	5.3	3.2	-3.9
17. Luwu	1,038	1,038	5.8	6.1	-1.0	-4.0	5.8	6.1	-1.0	-4.0
18. Tana Toraja	754	754	8.4	8.2	3.8	-0.9	8.4	8.2	3.8	-0.9
19. Polewali Mamasa	846	846	6.7	7.1	6.8	-4.2	6.7	7.1	6.8	-4.2
20. Majene	1,192	1,192	1.8	9.9	3.9	-8.1	1.8	9.9	3.9	-8.1
21. Mamuju	717	717	3.3	6.0	3.8	-6.1	3.3	6.0	3.8	-6.1
71. Ujung Pandang	2,246	2,246	7.0	7.7	4.8	-8.4	7.0	7.7	4.8	-8.4
72. Pare Pare	1,327	1,327	9.1	6.9	6.7	-5.7	9.1	6.9	6.7	-5.7
74. South-east Sulawesi	907	907	4.0	3.6	3.0	-7.8	4.0	3.6	3.0	-7.8
01. Buton	769	769	1.1	4.3	2.2	-10.5	1.1	4.3	2.2	-10.5
02. Muna	829	829	6.6	5.1	1.3	-6.2	6.6	5.1	1.3	-6.2
03. Kendari	884	884	0.9	5.6	3.9	-8.2	0.9	5.6	3.9	-8.2
04. Kolaka	1,193	1,193	9.5	-1.5	2.6	-6.3	9.5	-1.5	2.6	-6.3
81. Maluku	1,339	1,333	4.1	5.5	1.9	-6.2	4.1	5.5	2.0	-6.2
01. South-east Maluku	987	987	10.9	6.8	-9.2	-5.0	10.9	6.8	-9.2	-5.0
02. Central Maluku	1,062	1,042	0.9	5.2	3.1	-6.2	0.7	5.2	3.4	-6.2
03. North Maluku	1,192	1,192	2.2	2.1	2.5	-6.6	2.2	2.1	2.5	-6.6
04. Central Halmahera	1,467	1,467	1.4	6.4	4.9	-7.5	1.4	6.4	4.9	-7.5
71. Ambon	2,499	2,499	7.2	8.2	4.1	-6.2	7.2	8.2	4.1	-6.2
82. Irian Jaya	4,074	3,948	16.2	10.1	4.8	13.0	18.5	10.9	5.0	13.2
01. Merauke	1,148	1,148	5.3	14.2	2.4	-13.2	5.3	14.2	2.4	-13.2
02. Jaya Wijaya	564	564	4.1	5.0	1.7	-4.7	4.1	5.0	1.7	-4.7
03. Jaya Pura	1,762	1,762	2.0	5.1	0.9	-11.2	2.0	5.1	0.9	-11.2
04. Paniai	1,470	1,470	6.0	6.3	23.3	-3.7	6.0	6.3	23.3	-3.7
05. Fak Fak	44,633	44,633	34.7	14.9	1.1	31.7	34.7	14.9	1.1	31.7
06. Sorong	3,936	2,899	-5.6	0.8	21.0	0.6	4.1	5.2	30.2	-1.4
07. Manokwari	1,960	1,960	3.9	5.0	3.1	-13.1	3.9	5.0	3.1	-13.1
08. Yapen Waropen	1,747	1,747	4.6	7.2	4.8	-12.9	4.6	7.2	4.8	-12.9
09. Biak Numfor	2,170	2,170	5.0	6.3	2.3	-3.5	5.0	6.3	2.3	-3.5
71. Jaya Pura	2,425	2,425	3.3	4.3	0.7	-12.5	3.3	4.3	0.7	-12.5

Note:

a) Based on 1993 prices

The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.

Source: BPS special tabulation

14 Labour Force and Poverty Condition by District, 1999

Province District	Labour force participation rate (%)	Open unemployment (%)	Employee working		Employment in informal sector (%)	Per capita expenditure		Poverty line (thousand rupiah/ capita/ month)	Poverty	
			<14 hours per week (%)	<35 hours per week (%)		Total (thousand rupiah/ month)	Food (% of total)		Number of poor people (thousand)	Poverty rate (%)
11. Aceh	67.8	6.8	12.9	48.8	75.4	123.5	73.8	72.3	602.1	14.7
01. South Aceh	63.0	5.4	7.6	45.5	82.1	121.6	75.7	70.3	47.1	12.2
02. South-east Aceh	77.8	2.7	11.5	61.2	85.2	104.2	75.4	72.7	56.8	28.9
03. East Aceh	59.1	8.5	7.3	39.9	59.8	124.3	73.1	71.0	125.5	17.5
04. Central Aceh	79.1	2.5	16.9	58.9	90.8	121.9	73.1	77.2	29.6	12.8
05. West Aceh	74.9	6.2	10.4	46.5	69.1	121.9	72.4	69.8	74.5	14.7
06. Aceh Besar	65.7	8.6	9.6	50.4	85.4	117.0	72.0	76.9	63.6	21.4
07. Pidie	71.0	8.9	18.5	50.9	76.4	130.4	81.5	69.2	12.2	2.6
08. North Aceh	70.2	5.8	17.9	53.3	80.7	109.7	74.4	72.7	180.2	17.7
71. Banda Aceh	55.5	12.8	7.4	28.3	41.9	197.9	63.9	78.7	7.5	3.1
72. Sabang	67.6	9.7	15.2	55.3	61.2	130.3	78.0	70.4	5.1	20.1
12. North Sumatera	68.0	6.6	7.8	37.6	67.3	136.8	70.9	81.0	1972.7	16.7
01. Nias	78.8	0.6	4.0	38.6	98.0	85.7	78.8	80.7	393.6	57.0
02. South Tapanuli	80.7	5.4	14.0	59.2	81.1	124.4	77.8	75.5	140.0	12.4
03. Central Tapanuli	70.6	3.1	11.6	49.5	79.5	108.6	79.3	73.9	54.5	21.1
04. North Tapanuli	82.7	2.0	11.1	51.9	94.1	135.7	78.8	75.7	101.9	14.0
05. Labuhan Batu	61.4	4.8	6.5	41.9	65.4	123.9	74.0	80.4	150.0	16.5
06. Asahan	67.0	4.1	10.7	34.6	63.1	130.2	72.3	79.0	167.4	17.5
07. Simalungun	72.5	5.5	8.7	46.2	63.9	107.2	76.1	81.0	180.9	20.8
08. Dairi	85.7	1.6	10.8	64.5	94.0	108.7	77.8	75.0	48.4	16.1
09. Karo	80.0	2.9	4.6	29.4	95.6	146.5	80.7	77.7	14.4	5.0
10. Deli Serdang	67.2	5.8	6.7	28.9	50.2	151.1	69.4	82.5	201.6	10.5
11. Langkat	65.3	7.1	9.4	43.8	59.7	122.6	76.2	80.1	174.2	19.5
71. Sibolga	58.2	12.3	9.0	31.7	61.8	166.5	69.8	84.2	10.8	13.3
72. Tanjung Balai	57.8	10.4	6.7	32.2	56.3	137.3	73.4	78.3	7.8	6.7
73. Pematang Siantar	54.7	13.4	2.3	18.8	50.1	129.6	71.9	85.2	49.9	20.9
74. Tebing Tinggi	57.9	16.2	2.4	17.1	68.4	129.3	73.6	81.9	17.8	12.9
75. Medan	57.1	14.4	2.6	15.5	40.7	181.0	58.9	87.9	240.0	11.8
76. Binjai	60.9	13.7	5.7	25.1	52.7	139.4	67.4	82.0	19.4	8.8
13. West Sumatera	65.4	5.9	15.1	46.7	73.0	151.6	71.2	86.5	601.5	13.2
01. South Pesisir	59.2	3.3	12.7	41.8	72.9	125.4	75.2	85.8	52.0	12.2
02. Solok	73.6	2.9	20.3	58.0	75.5	145.9	75.4	80.2	50.9	10.4
03. Sawah Lunto/Sijunjung	72.9	1.9	15.1	46.4	79.1	145.7	72.5	83.5	60.7	19.8
04. Tanah Datar	64.5	5.4	13.1	41.2	78.0	129.8	75.8	87.5	49.8	13.8
05. Padang Pariaman	61.9	6.2	24.8	55.2	80.8	143.9	73.7	87.3	122.8	23.0
06. Agam	68.0	2.8	17.1	53.7	79.6	145.8	73.6	85.2	55.2	13.0
07. Limapuluh Koto	71.4	3.4	13.1	50.4	70.8	142.1	74.2	85.2	24.4	7.7
08. Pasaman	72.6	3.4	17.1	59.3	81.4	138.7	74.8	82.6	89.9	16.6
71. Padang	56.6	15.0	6.3	26.1	53.5	197.2	62.2	92.8	58.6	7.5
72. Solok	59.9	7.3	3.8	22.9	62.9	171.8	67.5	87.7	4.8	8.7
73. Sawah Lunto	61.1	10.4	17.4	39.2	60.2	143.1	68.7	86.1	9.3	14.9
74. Padang Panjang	64.3	5.6	10.3	33.2	50.4	208.8	64.3	93.3	3.4	8.2
75. Bukit Tinggi	61.2	8.7	8.7	29.0	49.8	202.6	62.7	98.2	9.3	9.7
76. Payakumbuh	68.9	6.4	13.8	40.7	63.8	158.5	68.6	88.4	10.3	10.3

14 Labour Force and Poverty Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Labour force participation rate (%)	Open unemployment (%)	Employee working		Employment in informal sector (%)	Per capita expenditure		Poverty line (thousand rupiah/ capita/ month)	Poverty	
			<14 hours per week (%)	<35 hours per week (%)		Total (thousand rupiah/ month)	Food (% of total)		Number of poor people (thousand)	Poverty rate (%)
14. Riau	62.1	6.8	7.7	39.9	70.9	162.3	69.9	93.3	589.7	14.0
01. Indragiri Hulu	69.6	3.2	14.2	60.6	72.4	149.1	73.6	87.0	86.0	18.7
02. Indragiri Ilir	60.0	4.6	9.3	56.3	78.0	140.2	81.6	86.7	85.3	16.3
03. Kepulauan Riau	60.3	7.0	7.0	32.4	69.3	186.4	66.9	92.5	48.6	9.8
04. Kampar	65.8	3.6	9.9	49.1	87.3	144.7	72.5	89.2	108.7	15.7
05. Bengkalis	61.6	6.2	6.9	40.5	63.2	136.6	74.8	92.6	195.8	17.2
71. Pekanbaru	54.9	14.2	2.5	13.0	55.6	177.8	62.3	100.8	56.7	9.5
72. Batam	66.5	11.7	3.0	13.7	43.0	321.7	56.2	112.5	8.8	2.8
15. Jambi	62.4	4.2	8.0	42.6	73.9	127.2	73.2	84.0	677.0	26.6
01. Kerinci	67.2	7.1	8.5	47.0	78.2	122.7	74.0	87.3	51.8	16.7
02. Bungo Tebo	61.9	2.9	8.7	56.4	73.3	114.3	75.1	81.9	201.1	42.5
03. Sarolangun Bangko	68.6	3.2	7.2	52.0	79.9	130.4	77.2	80.3	81.8	16.8
04. Batanghari	65.9	4.9	9.8	42.1	74.9	131.5	74.6	82.6	115.6	27.2
05. Tanjung Jabung	60.5	4.8	8.7	34.4	89.2	101.6	78.0	81.6	151.7	37.0
71. Jambi	51.4	3.0	5.1	19.3	37.7	160.2	63.6	92.0	75.0	17.2
16. South Sumatera	66.2	5.5	8.3	42.8	68.3	120.9	72.9	81.6	1813.7	23.5
01. Ogan Komering Ulu	67.9	4.4	6.7	49.2	78.8	109.6	74.5	82.2	354.0	30.7
02. Ogan Komering Hilir	61.7	4.4	9.6	48.4	82.0	106.5	75.5	81.6	277.8	30.4
03. Muara Enim (Liot)	69.2	3.8	5.1	44.5	88.5	114.7	75.5	78.6	152.5	21.8
04. Lahat	72.1	4.5	9.1	51.2	88.1	125.1	77.6	78.7	124.9	17.6
05. Musi Rawas	71.9	3.3	8.9	52.7	81.7	108.6	72.4	78.2	99.6	15.3
06. Musi Banyuasin	74.8	2.2	8.8	39.1	79.7	89.5	81.4	78.2	459.9	39.3
07. Bangka	64.9	2.7	15.1	44.1	52.1	152.8	71.9	78.5	56.3	9.2
08. Balitung	57.5	6.2	8.4	35.7	70.9	128.2	76.7	82.0	28.8	12.5
71. Palembang	57.2	14.1	6.1	25.8	39.5	153.7	64.4	89.2	248.1	17.4
72. Pangkal Pinang	57.2	7.0	9.4	26.5	45.3	172.8	65.2	86.6	11.8	8.4
17. Bengkulu	70.8	3.8	7.1	34.9	78.7	141.0	68.3	80.5	302.3	19.8
01. South Bengkulu	71.6	2.1	9.0	40.9	85.9	102.0	74.8	77.6	107.9	33.1
02. Rejang Lebong	73.3	3.6	9.4	39.3	82.8	142.8	64.6	81.5	62.8	15.5
03. North Bengkulu	75.7	2.3	3.5	32.5	80.4	116.8	77.1	75.2	98.9	20.5
71. Bengkulu	59.7	9.0	8.2	24.3	64.2	205.9	61.1	90.4	32.7	10.4
18. Lampung	69.8	3.7	10.0	39.1	71.7	109.2	72.1	73.4	2037.1	29.1
01. South Lampung	68.9	3.8	14.4	44.3	69.9	106.2	73.1	73.1	481.6	25.7
02. Central Lampung	72.2	2.3	10.4	35.5	81.3	112.5	71.8	74.6	595.0	28.4
03. North Lampung	72.3	2.3	5.2	41.7	76.5	84.5	77.4	71.4	807.7	47.4
04. West Lampung	70.6	2.6	12.1	52.7	93.6	118.9	77.8	68.1	58.9	15.2
71. Bandar Lampung	62.2	9.9	8.0	25.4	51.8	166.7	61.2	77.5	93.9	10.0
31. Jakarta	58.8	13.2	3.5	12.4	38.6	344.3	42.8	109.3	379.6	4.0
71. South Jakarta	60.0	10.8	4.1	13.4	34.2	595.3	30.9	109.5	27.5	1.3
72. East Jakarta	57.3	15.0	2.6	10.1	35.8	276.1	49.4	110.3	70.9	2.8
73. Central Jakarta	58.9	14.0	4.8	15.8	39.0	287.3	49.5	109.1	112.4	11.9
74. West Jakarta	58.7	12.2	4.4	13.1	37.9	284.9	50.0	108.9	74.7	3.2
75. North Jakarta	59.9	14.7	1.7	11.5	48.0	241.7	52.8	108.2	94.1	5.7

14 Labour Force and Poverty Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Labour force participation rate (%)	Open unemployment (%)	Employee working		Employment in informal sector (%)	Per capita expenditure		Poverty line (thousand rupiah/ capita/ month)	Poverty	
			<14 hours per week (%)	<35 hours per week (%)		Total (thousand rupiah/ month)	Food (% of total)		Number of poor people (thousand)	Poverty rate (%)
32. West Java	61.2	9.0	9.3	36.0	58.9	142.2	62.9	82.7	8393.4	19.8
01. Pandeglang	65.8	5.4	13.1	41.5	84.9	109.1	77.8	75.5	180.7	18.7
02. Lebak	58.2	10.0	11.0	45.4	69.5	114.7	74.0	77.2	271.4	26.9
03. Bogor	59.2	12.4	8.2	28.5	46.8	184.6	55.6	87.4	735.2	15.2
04. Sukabumi	64.6	5.9	9.6	50.1	61.6	116.9	71.9	77.9	471.1	22.9
05. Cianjur	68.9	10.6	11.2	56.8	66.2	108.0	70.0	79.3	478.2	26.2
06. Bandung	59.3	9.9	4.1	25.3	40.5	136.8	60.9	85.6	890.0	25.3
07. Garut	60.6	7.0	9.1	44.6	71.4	103.6	70.2	79.0	642.9	33.8
08. Tasikmalaya	68.7	6.0	12.2	44.7	58.3	108.6	68.8	79.8	665.1	34.5
09. Ciamis	66.5	3.1	10.1	46.0	65.8	126.2	70.3	78.0	277.9	17.4
10. Kuningan	62.0	6.2	17.3	48.5	84.0	117.2	68.2	80.6	264.9	28.1
11. Cirebon	63.0	9.9	11.9	35.3	52.0	100.8	71.6	76.1	630.5	33.9
12. Majalengka	67.6	6.6	13.3	46.8	68.5	121.3	71.2	77.6	205.4	18.7
13. Sumedang	61.8	7.6	14.8	46.8	72.1	133.6	67.6	79.1	158.8	17.9
14. Indramayu	62.6	4.5	18.4	50.1	61.2	115.9	73.3	80.4	339.8	21.7
15. Subang	65.2	6.2	7.7	38.7	66.9	115.1	70.9	79.8	160.7	12.6
16. Purwakarta	66.0	7.7	11.7	40.8	63.3	144.4	65.1	78.2	76.5	12.1
17. Karawang	60.1	11.6	9.9	37.8	67.2	156.8	62.3	82.9	118.5	7.2
18. Bekasi	54.2	8.9	1.4	21.6	61.8	156.0	62.3	79.6	267.0	15.7
19. Tangerang	59.8	9.2	9.5	29.3	55.2	179.3	57.0	83.7	412.0	14.9
20. Serang	63.0	7.3	11.7	44.4	70.8	128.2	67.0	80.3	404.6	23.2
71. Bogor	52.1	11.9	2.7	13.2	43.0	139.5	59.5	88.5	87.5	13.1
72. Sukabumi	58.3	20.3	4.7	19.4	49.0	171.3	59.1	86.2	16.9	7.2
73. Bandung	56.7	13.4	6.6	21.1	39.1	229.2	51.2	89.8	227.5	8.9
74. Cirebon	60.2	12.6	8.4	22.2	53.0	154.9	60.7	84.5	52.5	19.7
75. Tangerang	56.4	8.7	6.0	17.3	43.1	184.8	59.7	88.4	105.6	7.6
76. Bekasi	55.9	13.5	2.3	9.7	59.8	155.3	52.9	98.4	252.2	16.2
33. Central Java	70.0	5.6	11.0	41.1	64.6	109.5	66.1	76.6	8755.4	28.5
01. Cilacap	67.7	8.6	17.5	50.6	73.3	102.7	67.6	76.2	469.3	29.7
02. Banyumas	66.1	7.2	8.4	34.5	57.1	129.1	64.4	77.0	624.1	44.0
03. Purbalingga	70.2	4.0	12.3	44.7	73.3	84.2	72.4	73.1	255.6	33.3
04. Banjarnegara	69.8	4.7	7.2	39.6	76.6	81.4	69.5	77.0	437.8	52.4
05. Kebumen	69.4	5.6	10.4	44.1	77.5	115.8	72.7	74.7	323.6	27.8
06. Purworejo	67.9	4.1	12.7	51.6	77.8	104.9	64.9	79.4	238.8	33.7
07. Wonosobo	72.7	3.6	10.2	40.9	68.9	82.0	71.0	78.7	249.7	35.4
08. Magelang	73.4	2.7	13.1	46.6	69.1	92.8	64.8	78.1	318.6	30.2
09. Boyolali	76.4	4.5	12.4	53.1	78.1	97.8	66.4	77.3	322.2	36.9
10. Klaten	67.8	5.4	13.6	38.0	61.2	108.0	68.4	76.9	262.8	23.6
11. Sukoharjo	69.3	7.0	11.2	33.6	66.1	128.7	64.3	76.7	98.8	13.4
12. Wonogiri	72.6	2.8	12.1	49.0	80.0	109.2	67.4	76.2	266.0	26.9
13. Karanganyar	75.2	3.8	6.7	29.0	62.5	119.2	64.2	77.8	113.0	14.8
14. Sragen	71.9	2.7	14.8	46.5	74.6	100.0	67.4	75.9	331.4	38.7
15. Grobogan	72.5	4.0	16.9	53.7	79.4	94.6	70.5	74.0	460.6	37.2
16. Blora	74.6	2.1	13.5	64.2	79.5	79.4	69.2	78.3	365.3	45.4
17. Rembang	69.6	3.8	18.3	58.4	72.6	118.7	71.9	73.1	88.2	15.7
18. Pati	71.8	4.9	9.7	39.1	60.5	98.2	69.3	77.4	346.6	31.4
19. Kudus	74.8	6.3	8.8	24.8	41.8	113.6	63.3	78.2	102.5	14.6
20. Jepara	71.1	3.7	10.3	34.1	50.3	138.0	64.5	74.8	69.6	7.6
21. Demak	71.3	7.7	10.4	36.8	60.0	105.5	69.7	76.8	208.5	22.2
22. Semarang	75.4	6.3	6.8	35.4	72.7	116.5	64.7	76.4	191.5	23.1
23. Temanggung	76.3	2.8	11.1	47.2	80.3	82.8	67.7	74.9	184.5	28.3

14 Labour Force and Poverty Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Labour force participation rate (%)	Open unemployment (%)	Employee working		Employment in informal sector (%)	Per capita expenditure		Poverty line (thousand rupiah/ capita/ month)	Poverty	
			<14 hours per week (%)	<35 hours per week (%)		Total (thousand rupiah/ month)	Food (% of total)		Number of poor people (thousand)	Poverty rate (%)
24. Kendal	70.1	7.3	14.6	47.1	51.3	101.0	67.0	75.0	149.1	17.3
25. Batang	70.7	5.4	6.2	41.1	57.1	94.4	72.6	78.0	205.5	32.7
26. Pekalongan	69.3	4.5	17.1	45.7	50.7	94.3	68.3	77.2	180.5	24.6
27. Pemalang	67.4	7.3	9.7	38.5	55.0	94.7	68.2	76.4	421.0	33.9
28. Tegal	64.2	9.2	8.6	39.2	58.1	108.2	67.7	76.1	388.1	29.3
29. Brebes	70.5	4.4	8.6	44.2	66.1	100.8	68.2	75.5	620.5	36.0
71. Magelang	60.6	12.9	10.1	26.6	43.0	153.1	62.5	79.4	16.1	12.8
72. Surakarta	65.4	7.9	5.0	18.8	47.5	150.1	58.1	77.6	91.3	17.2
73. Salatiga	59.9	14.5	4.3	15.9	49.7	185.1	58.3	81.3	8.0	7.6
74. Semarang	63.1	8.1	4.0	17.5	43.6	178.2	53.2	78.7	238.5	16.7
75. Pekalongan	66.2	9.7	4.0	18.5	39.4	128.6	60.1	77.7	86.4	22.2
76. Tegal	64.1	11.9	13.5	28.3	50.5	151.8	63.0	78.6	21.5	6.3
34. Yogyakarta	68.8	4.7	10.6	34.4	63.6	177.8	54.5	88.0	789.1	26.1
01. Kulon Progo	66.3	2.1	13.3	46.4	81.7	99.7	72.3	84.1	125.7	35.2
02. Bantul	73.5	3.9	11.3	31.4	63.7	132.8	61.2	88.2	222.0	30.0
03. Gunung Kidul	74.9	4.3	11.3	43.3	62.7	125.1	65.9	85.3	226.9	36.0
04. Sleman	67.1	4.6	9.9	31.4	56.8	242.6	47.1	89.6	158.6	18.5
71. Yogyakarta	58.3	9.6	6.8	20.3	52.5	245.9	50.0	91.9	55.9	12.8
35. East Java	67.4	5.0	15.3	46.6	61.1	118.0	66.9	79.4	10286.4	29.5
01. Pacitan	79.9	1.8	16.8	52.1	89.4	98.9	74.1	79.5	187.1	36.7
02. Ponorogo	70.8	3.9	14.3	54.1	75.7	92.8	67.2	78.5	419.4	48.4
03. Trenggalek	78.7	1.6	26.3	68.4	86.2	90.5	71.2	75.1	336.2	50.8
04. Tulungagung	68.4	6.0	23.1	51.5	65.5	137.5	61.0	80.1	249.9	27.2
05. Blitar	65.9	6.0	16.0	45.6	75.9	112.0	67.4	79.9	328.6	31.1
06. Kediri	67.2	6.1	16.3	48.2	60.2	107.3	66.5	78.1	494.4	35.1
07. Malang	66.9	2.9	14.0	44.8	61.4	98.3	68.2	78.2	899.7	37.4
08. Lumajang	64.0	3.9	15.2	50.7	50.8	102.3	72.0	77.3	327.6	34.6
09. Jember	66.1	3.2	18.9	56.4	46.6	95.8	69.7	77.9	987.3	46.1
10. Banyuwangi	68.0	4.0	18.9	52.9	57.4	122.6	68.3	80.7	351.2	23.6
11. Bondowoso	68.8	2.0	17.7	55.6	60.1	110.9	71.8	76.0	249.4	36.5
12. Situbondo	68.7	1.3	13.7	43.1	66.1	103.3	69.3	79.3	135.5	22.5
13. Probolinggo	69.3	3.1	18.6	58.6	65.1	102.8	66.8	81.8	345.4	34.9
14. Pasuruan	70.2	4.4	12.8	40.4	52.1	96.4	68.6	78.8	355.8	26.7
15. Sidoarjo	63.0	6.5	6.2	22.2	34.0	165.4	62.5	81.5	124.0	8.3
16. Mojokerto	69.6	5.5	12.8	36.2	54.0	112.7	67.6	78.3	195.0	22.6
17. Jombang	62.0	8.0	15.2	44.5	53.3	116.7	67.1	77.9	323.5	29.1
18. Nganjuk	65.0	7.3	17.7	51.6	65.5	114.6	71.7	75.9	205.2	20.9
19. Madiun	67.4	7.2	17.1	56.8	62.9	104.2	75.1	80.3	218.5	33.8
20. Magetan	74.7	3.5	15.1	44.2	78.1	102.0	68.5	79.9	202.4	32.0
21. Ngawi	68.1	5.2	16.3	53.1	72.2	106.8	72.4	78.3	262.3	32.4
22. Bojonegoro	64.4	4.7	12.9	51.4	79.4	86.6	73.5	77.8	439.3	37.5
23. Tuban	73.6	4.0	12.1	40.7	71.5	108.5	71.7	78.2	340.7	32.4
24. Lamongan	68.1	2.5	10.7	51.8	82.0	106.6	72.6	77.6	206.9	17.2
25. Gresik	65.5	4.3	7.6	35.0	55.3	147.3	66.6	80.0	149.6	15.6
26. Bangkalan	68.5	5.9	24.8	65.8	66.5	106.9	75.7	74.9	276.2	34.9
27. Sampang	73.2	2.5	27.9	72.3	77.8	84.9	78.1	72.8	432.0	55.3
28. Pamekasan	74.0	2.6	26.9	68.5	80.8	81.2	73.9	77.3	326.1	46.7
29. Sumenep	75.8	2.3	22.7	68.2	81.1	86.8	72.2	79.1	401.9	40.9
71. Kediri	61.2	10.1	5.2	20.2	47.1	145.5	63.1	82.7	27.0	10.1
72. Blitar	61.8	9.3	13.6	36.4	57.0	140.1	62.5	80.0	27.9	22.3
73. Malang	61.7	11.1	11.9	28.9	48.1	204.3	56.8	83.8	96.3	11.8

14 Labour Force and Poverty Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Labour force participation rate (%)	Open unemployment (%)	Employee working		Employment in informal sector (%)	Per capita expenditure		Poverty line (thousand rupiah/ capita/ month)	Poverty	
			<14 hours per week (%)	<35 hours per week (%)		Total (thousand rupiah/ month)	Food (% of total)		Number of poor people (thousand)	Poverty rate (%)
74. Probolinggo	58.5	8.1	11.3	30.4	52.9	137.0	63.3	81.7	20.9	10.5
75. Pasuruan	59.9	8.0	9.5	24.9	52.1	131.8	66.6	79.3	27.7	16.3
76. Mojokerto	61.0	12.1	8.5	25.3	44.4	135.2	63.7	83.4	20.3	18.1
77. Madiun	60.1	11.0	7.8	29.8	54.8	152.5	64.0	81.8	28.4	16.5
78. Surabaya	62.4	9.7	5.5	15.9	35.0	198.2	57.3	87.1	266.9	9.3
51. Bali	76.3	3.5	8.4	36.3	68.7	173.0	62.8	88.3	257.8	8.5
01. Jembrana	81.3	5.0	12.6	43.4	67.1	140.0	71.4	85.4	17.2	7.4
02. Tabanan	73.3	2.9	6.2	34.8	72.0	176.3	64.9	85.0	15.9	4.4
03. Badung	68.9	6.3	7.2	26.5	46.3	218.9	61.6	93.8	11.0	3.3
04. Gianyar	79.6	1.4	6.8	36.7	66.5	155.1	65.1	85.5	25.2	7.1
05. Klungkung	75.2	6.2	13.1	43.2	71.0	153.3	64.9	88.9	20.1	13.1
06. Bangli	86.3	1.1	5.8	45.3	84.4	154.6	62.3	87.4	25.4	13.9
07. Karangasem	83.5	1.7	11.3	43.4	84.4	125.5	68.0	85.9	70.1	19.6
08. Buleleng	76.5	3.4	9.7	44.1	67.4	130.9	66.9	87.0	67.7	11.8
71. Denpasar	70.5	4.9	5.7	17.9	44.8	278.2	54.0	93.7	5.2	1.1
52. West Nusa Tenggara	70.9	4.7	21.2	54.1	69.0	111.7	73.0	77.6	1276.8	33.0
01. West Lombok	69.4	5.9	19.5	53.0	63.6	104.0	73.9	77.7	253.2	36.0
02. Central Lombok	75.2	2.4	29.1	58.4	73.1	104.9	75.5	76.8	231.6	30.9
03. East Lombok	66.4	3.6	20.2	58.8	61.0	104.7	75.8	76.3	355.3	36.8
04. Sumbawa	77.6	3.7	23.9	54.4	77.6	120.3	73.4	77.0	132.1	31.1
05. Dompu	76.8	3.7	24.8	62.4	81.4	97.3	74.0	76.1	76.6	39.6
06. Bima	74.5	7.0	15.0	50.0	80.4	111.3	73.1	79.8	172.8	34.0
71. Mataram	60.8	9.5	9.8	30.3	47.8	164.5	61.7	80.8	55.2	16.6
53. East Nusa Tenggara	75.0	2.8	15.3	59.4	88.9	84.2	72.1	67.2	1779.0	46.7
01. West Sumba	78.5	1.9	16.6	60.7	88.5	88.1	72.4	66.2	191.2	53.9
02. East Sumba	76.1	3.6	14.3	53.3	89.5	102.7	72.9	64.4	49.9	27.2
03. Kupang	74.2	2.4	17.9	65.8	91.6	69.7	77.6	68.0	203.2	49.4
04. Southern Central-Timor	67.5	1.4	18.9	70.0	93.8	77.3	77.8	68.2	222.0	54.5
05. Northern Central-Timor	72.1	0.5	13.9	52.5	92.3	61.1	77.9	64.6	126.5	64.4
06. Belu	69.2	1.9	16.4	53.2	88.5	86.2	73.9	65.6	126.0	49.9
07. Alor	69.0	2.8	16.8	53.5	85.4	79.6	76.8	66.4	89.1	54.9
08. Flores Timur	75.8	1.1	16.0	53.1	81.5	84.6	73.4	69.9	146.3	52.5
09. Sikka	72.3	2.0	11.4	56.1	89.0	76.9	68.1	69.2	172.2	63.6
10. Ende	83.2	1.5	16.7	68.0	93.8	85.3	70.0	69.8	105.2	44.5
11. Ngada	80.1	0.9	17.3	67.3	92.4	105.9	70.0	69.5	50.1	22.7
12. Manggarai	87.7	3.5	12.2	61.3	91.7	70.5	68.2	63.7	279.4	46.3
71. Kupang	55.6	16.9	10.3	27.1	47.8	148.7	63.8	71.0	17.8	7.8
61. West Kalimantan	72.9	4.7	10.0	44.3	75.5	131.0	73.0	85.7	1016.2	26.2
01. Sambas	74.9	6.2	14.8	46.4	90.1	125.5	72.3	85.8	198.2	22.2
02. Pontianak	72.1	2.9	9.0	38.9	66.7	131.5	72.6	86.6	297.3	32.2
03. Sanggau	75.2	1.5	5.3	50.3	81.8	117.3	79.6	82.2	164.4	31.4
04. Ketapang	74.1	6.0	15.3	56.7	78.1	116.3	78.3	80.7	109.5	28.2
05. Sintang	79.7	1.7	7.4	43.5	76.2	109.8	79.3	82.2	181.2	36.7
06. Kapuas Hulu	78.6	3.9	5.2	52.3	82.6	111.4	82.2	82.6	33.9	18.3
71. Pontianak	59.5	12.7	9.5	27.4	39.5	196.7	61.5	96.4	39.6	8.3

14 Labour Force and Poverty Condition by Regency/City, 1999

(continued)

Province Regency/City	Labour force participation rate (%)	Open unemployment (%)	Employee working		Employment in informal sector (%)	Per capita expenditure		Poverty line (thousand rupiah/ capita/ month)	Poverty	
			<14 hours per week (%)	<35 hours per week (%)		Total (thousand rupiah/ month)	Food (% of total)		Number of poor people (thousand)	Poverty rate (%)
62. Central Kalimantan	68.1	4.0	5.3	34.9	76.2	147.4	75.4	93.5	261.7	15.1
01. West Kotawaringin	62.6	5.1	6.1	27.6	67.3	176.1	72.9	97.3	22.5	9.4
02. East Kotawaringin	61.5	4.4	3.6	32.2	80.4	146.3	76.6	92.5	57.1	11.9
03. Kapuas	76.4	2.9	5.0	36.0	82.1	114.9	79.7	89.6	109.1	20.8
04. South Barito	76.0	2.3	11.9	51.4	84.8	146.0	78.9	90.0	15.5	9.3
05. North Barito	72.9	2.5	1.5	34.7	87.9	134.5	76.2	98.6	48.5	30.4
71. Palangka Raya	57.7	8.7	5.5	27.6	48.9	217.1	66.3	101.8	9.0	5.3
63. South Kalimantan	71.9	3.9	11.4	43.9	78.1	139.7	72.6	77.7	440.2	14.4
01. Tanah Laut	72.7	2.1	16.0	48.7	84.6	123.9	76.1	77.8	27.1	10.9
02. Kota Baru	75.6	4.4	8.9	31.8	69.6	148.5	74.3	77.9	57.6	13.3
03. Banjar	67.4	4.5	11.0	46.8	80.0	138.9	73.2	77.6	93.4	18.1
04. Barito Kuala	81.7	1.4	16.8	52.2	85.1	119.6	80.2	73.1	48.2	17.7
05. Tapin	75.7	2.1	14.2	58.2	87.8	124.4	76.9	76.0	22.1	15.8
06. South Hulu Sungai	75.9	3.7	11.6	50.4	84.1	141.4	78.7	72.9	27.8	14.2
07. Central Hulu Sungai	79.1	2.5	10.3	48.7	91.8	119.6	77.8	75.6	46.8	20.1
08. North Hulu Sungai	76.9	2.5	9.8	50.0	85.8	108.4	76.4	73.6	45.7	15.5
09. Tabalong	79.7	1.1	14.5	61.7	83.2	113.6	74.0	75.8	40.8	23.6
71. Banjarmasin	58.5	8.5	7.4	21.3	46.3	195.0	62.0	85.7	30.7	5.5
64. East Kalimantan	64.1	7.7	7.6	31.2	66.4	164.2	64.3	93.9	509.2	20.2
01. Pasir	65.0	3.0	13.7	48.9	80.7	138.5	73.8	87.9	87.3	29.0
02. Kutai	67.8	5.2	6.1	32.3	77.0	155.9	69.3	89.1	163.9	19.7
03. Berau	69.4	3.9	6.2	37.5	78.6	174.7	68.5	89.4	6.1	8.1
04. Bulongan	63.0	7.3	11.7	48.4	81.8	139.8	62.0	93.8	76.1	28.0
71. Balikpapan	59.0	11.0	4.8	17.3	45.5	196.4	59.1	100.5	73.0	16.5
72. Samarinda	62.6	11.9	6.7	21.4	50.1	177.5	58.7	99.5	102.8	17.1
71. North Sulawesi	61.8	9.3	9.8	39.0	67.6	138.4	68.1	82.5	504.6	18.2
01. Gorontalo	59.8	8.5	14.2	44.8	79.2	89.5	78.5	77.2	268.2	40.1
02. Bolaang Mongondow	62.8	4.6	8.6	43.2	76.0	123.5	68.8	79.2	66.1	15.1
03. Minahasa	65.1	5.3	10.4	39.0	61.9	153.5	66.4	83.0	53.8	7.5
04. Sangihe Talaud	64.6	7.1	11.1	51.4	81.5	114.6	76.7	81.5	87.3	32.0
71. Gorontalo	56.8	18.0	4.8	30.3	54.7	143.6	70.0	83.2	8.6	6.2
72. Manado	59.8	19.5	4.0	23.2	47.8	210.7	59.7	93.1	17.3	4.0
73. Bitung	55.9	14.2	7.2	18.2	48.3	144.0	70.2	89.3	3.5	3.2
72. Central Sulawesi	67.3	4.0	12.8	45.3	78.1	115.9	70.1	79.1	599.4	28.7
01. Luwuk Banggai	74.9	3.2	14.2	49.7	84.1	98.5	72.5	79.4	133.1	31.9
02. Poso	70.5	3.6	11.0	43.7	76.9	120.9	69.6	76.9	121.9	29.1
03. Donggala	66.9	3.0	13.2	48.7	78.9	108.7	72.5	76.3	227.9	31.6
04. Bual Toli-Toli	63.8	6.1	14.2	45.9	81.4	101.9	73.9	77.3	77.7	28.2
71. Kodya Palu	54.5	7.0	10.5	27.4	55.6	173.3	61.9	91.7	38.8	15.1
73. South Sulawesi	58.2	6.4	17.5	53.5	78.3	123.2	70.2	76.1	1462.0	18.3
01. Selayar	64.1	4.1	17.6	60.3	81.6	98.0	77.3	73.7	29.3	29.3
02. Bulukumba	56.6	5.7	21.5	69.0	90.2	112.2	71.5	73.7	55.1	15.1
03. Bantaeng	63.8	3.4	21.6	62.1	88.5	94.2	75.1	74.6	45.7	26.9
04. Jeneponto	64.6	2.0	17.7	57.4	88.0	89.1	77.3	71.4	91.8	27.4
05. Takalar	59.2	3.1	22.5	58.1	83.8	104.5	76.1	71.1	33.2	14.0

14 Labour Force and Poverty Condition by District, 1999

(continued)

Province District	Labour force participation rate (%)	Open unemployment (%)	Employee working		Employment in informal sector (%)	Per capita expenditure		Poverty line (thousand rupiah/ capita/ month)	Poverty	
			<14 hours per week (%)	<35 hours per week (%)		Total (thousand rupiah/ month)	Food (% of total)		Number of poor people (thousand)	Poverty rate (%)
06. Gowa	54.8	5.5	16.3	45.9	72.6	106.2	73.6	74.8	58.4	11.7
07. Sinjai	56.1	1.1	20.9	57.8	75.6	71.8	77.5	69.6	81.6	37.9
08. Maros	57.5	8.3	18.2	48.5	86.8	126.4	74.2	76.4	49.7	18.1
09. Pangkep	51.6	5.8	15.9	59.6	81.5	140.0	71.9	76.1	58.6	21.9
10. Barru	52.0	7.1	12.2	43.4	74.2	132.0	73.1	71.0	24.0	15.3
11. Bone	58.0	7.6	18.3	61.2	87.2	106.1	72.5	80.7	137.6	22.3
12. Soppeng	52.8	3.5	12.1	56.2	75.9	125.5	66.6	78.0	40.9	17.7
13. Wajo	54.7	6.8	10.6	51.2	81.5	133.1	79.4	76.3	97.3	26.4
14. Sidenreng Rappang	54.3	6.7	16.2	49.1	83.8	116.9	69.9	76.2	45.8	18.1
15. Pinrang	58.5	5.4	24.7	65.5	94.1	111.5	72.7	79.4	49.8	15.5
16. Enrekang	67.2	1.3	15.8	66.3	87.4	94.6	75.9	71.8	34.0	21.6
17. Luwu	61.8	4.3	25.6	58.4	85.9	122.0	74.6	77.3	175.8	20.1
18. Tana Toraja	65.2	2.4	27.0	71.6	88.1	107.9	70.9	76.0	108.3	27.9
19. Polewali Mamasa	71.5	4.6	19.3	63.0	81.5	108.8	77.5	66.6	66.7	15.3
20. Majene	60.0	5.1	16.9	69.3	75.6	102.6	79.7	69.5	15.0	12.9
21. Mamuju	68.2	2.8	14.0	53.4	83.5	121.8	77.2	70.2	55.2	19.2
71. Ujung Pandang	51.3	15.7	6.3	21.9	42.8	185.1	55.9	83.2	104.5	8.8
72. Pare Pare	53.1	12.9	8.0	23.6	71.6	154.7	67.5	77.2	3.8	3.2
74. South-east Sulawesi	66.5	5.8	13.7	46.7	80.0	106.6	72.1	77.7	504.9	29.5
01. Buton	66.2	6.4	14.4	47.6	76.4	106.9	71.7	79.5	150.3	33.2
02. Muna	70.3	3.7	18.9	53.5	85.7	98.8	75.1	79.7	103.6	38.6
03. Kendari	72.2	6.0	12.6	45.5	82.7	79.0	77.8	77.5	176.1	35.9
04. Kolaka	61.2	1.9	14.0	49.2	88.3	140.7	70.4	76.2	46.0	14.1
71. Kendari	55.9	14.5	5.5	29.1	31.1	138.9	62.1	79.3	28.8	16.7
81. Maluku	61.2	7.6	13.4	51.7	79.4	110.4	68.8	100.2	1013.9	46.1
01. South-east Maluku	58.6	1.8	12.5	39.4	97.5	101.3	72.2	98.9	172.3	55.2
02. Central Maluku	62.5	4.9	14.5	60.4	80.1	91.9	74.4	98.1	454.5	64.5
03. North Maluku	64.3	7.1	14.9	57.2	80.6	105.5	64.4	99.6	244.8	36.2
04. Central Halmahera	67.4	3.1	11.9	51.2	89.9	96.1	76.5	100.3	99.4	56.5
71. Ambon	52.7	21.9	8.8	30.2	20.2	174.7	63.4	107.4	42.9	13.0
82. Irian Jaya	76.1	3.4	9.7	61.1	85.4	113.3	64.2	92.8	1148.6	54.7
01. Merauke	79.1	1.2	13.1	65.4	86.9	144.2	60.8	87.9	175.6	58.0
02. Jaya Wijaya	95.8	0.8	5.0	76.0	95.6	62.5	61.9	101.7	369.6	79.1
03. Jaya Pura	60.3	4.2	9.2	52.7	53.2	115.1	65.7	92.8	62.0	43.0
04. Paniai	86.0	1.5	13.2	69.7	97.9	70.8	72.0	88.1	224.1	80.1
05. Fak Fak	61.8	3.0	13.7	62.7	100.0	105.3	64.3	90.0	67.3	56.7
06. Sorong	71.5	6.3	10.0	43.2	56.5	136.3	64.4	92.6	107.8	41.9
07. Manokwari	75.4	3.2	13.5	52.3	76.3	109.4	69.2	87.0	69.2	40.5
08. Yapen Waropen	69.1	4.7	7.3	51.9	96.5	131.0	64.8	93.3	15.2	29.6
09. Biak Numfor	57.2	6.4	5.2	49.9	71.5	162.0	61.5	92.1	34.9	33.9
71. Jaya Pura	55.1	13.7	9.6	26.4	57.8	218.3	64.4	93.5	22.8	11.3

Note:


The number before each district is the official area code. District refers to both regency and City.

Source: BPS special tabulation

Technical Notes

Calculating the Human Development Indices

The diagram here offers an overview of how the four human development indices used in the Indonesia Human Development Report are constructed, highlighting both their similarities and their differences. A detailed explanation of the computation is presented in the following pages.



Computing the indices

The Human Development Index (HDI)

The HDI is based on three components: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by the combination of adult literacy rate (two-thirds weight) and mean years of schooling (one-third weight); and standard of living, as measured by adjusted per capita expenditure (PPP Rupiah).

The index is defined as the simple average of the indices of those three components:

$$\text{HDI} = 1/3 (\text{Index } X_1 + \text{Index } X_2 + \text{Index } X_3)$$

Where X_1 , X_2 and X_3 are longevity, educational attainment and standard of living respectively.

For any component of the HDI, individual index can be computed according to the general formula:

$$\text{Index } X_{(i,j)} = (X_{(i,j)} - X_{(i-\text{min})}) / (X_{(i-\text{max})} - X_{(i-\text{min})})$$

Where :

$X_{(i,j)}$: Indicator i th for region j

$X_{(i-\text{min})}$: Minimum value of X_i

$X_{(i-\text{max})}$: Maximum value of X_i

Longevity

Longevity is measured by using the indicator of life expectancy at birth (e_0). The e_0 presented in this report is based on the extrapolation of the e_0 figure based on end-1996 and end-1999 situation as the correspondence of the infant mortality rate (IMR) for the same period. For this publication, the estimation of IMR at provincial level is calculated based on data series from 1971 census, 1980 census, 1990 census, and the pooled data of 1995 survey between census (*SUPAS*) and 1996 socio-economic survey (*SUSENAS*). The calculation method follows the indirect technique based on two basic data - i.e. the average number of live births and the average number of children still living - reported from each five-year class of mother ages between 15 - 49 years old. By applying this technique, there will be seven estimation points for each time reference from each data source. As a result there are 28 IMR estimations for all time references from which the estimation of IMR is calculated. It is done after the omission of any unreliable figures reported by the eldest and the youngest maternal groups.

Table 1
Maximum and minimum value of each HDI indicator

HDI Component	Maximum Value	Minimum Value	Notes
Life Expectancy	85	25	UNDP Standard
Literacy Rate	100	0	UNDP Standard
Mean Years of Schooling	15	0	UNDP uses combined gross enrolment ratio
Purchasing Power	737,720 ^{a)}	300,000 (1996) 360,000 (1999) ^{b)}	UNDP uses adjusted real per capita GNP

Notes:

a) Projection of the highest purchasing power for Jakarta in 2018 (the end of the second long term development period) after adjusted with Atkinson formula. This projection is based on the assumption of 6.5 percent growth in purchasing power during the period of 1993-2018.

b) Equal to two times the poverty line of the province with the lowest per capita consumption in 1990 (rural area of South Sulawesi). For 1999, the minimum value was adjusted to Rp. 360,000. This adjustment is necessary, as the economic crisis has drastically reduced the purchasing power of the people. It is reflected by the increase in poverty level and the decrease in the real wages. The additional Rp. 60,000 is based on the difference between the "old poverty line" and the "new poverty line" that is amounted to around Rp. 5,000 per month (= Rp. 60,000 per year).

The estimation of IMR at regency/city level is based on the pooled data from *SUPAS* 1995 and *SUSENAS* 1996. This pooled data is considered to be a reliable data source because it covers around 416,000 households. However the indirect technique used in this estimation produces the estimate of four years before the survey time. To calculate the estimate points for 1999, the estimate figure based on the pooled *SUPAS* 1995 and *SUSENAS* 1996 data is projected after taking into account the provincial trend of the respected region and the inter regencies/cities variation within each respected province.

Educational attainment

The component of educational attainment in this publication is measured by using two indicators – literacy rate and mean years of schooling. The literacy rate is

defined as the proportion of population aged 15 years and over who are able to read and write in Latin script or in other script as a percentage of this age group. This indicator is given a weight of two-thirds. Another one-third weight is given to the indicator of mean years of schooling that is defined as the average years of formal schooling attended among the population aged 15 years and over. This indicator is calculated based on the variables of the current or achieved grade and the attainment of education level in the SUSENAS core questionnaire. Table 2 presents the conversion factor of the year of schooling for each level of education being completed. For someone who has not completed a certain level of education or drop out from school, the year of schooling (YS) is calculated using the following formula:

$$YS = \text{Conversion years} + \text{the current/achieved grade} - 1$$

For example, someone who drops out from the 2nd year of Senior High School:

$$YS = 9 + 2 - 1 = 10 \text{ (years)}$$

Table 2

The conversion years for the highest level of education being completed

Level of education completed	Conversion factor
1. Never attend school	0
2. Primary School	6
3. Junior High School	9
4. Senior High School	12
5. Diploma I	13
6. Diploma II	14
7. Academy/Diploma III	15
8. Diploma IV/Sarjana	16
9. Master (S2)	18
10. Ph D (S3)	21

Standard of living

This report is using the adjusted real per capita expenditure as the proxy for standard of living. In order to ensure inter-regional and time series comparability, the following procedure is applied:

1. Calculating the annual per capita expenditure from SUSENAS module data [=Y];
2. Mark up the Y with a factor of 20% [=Y₁], as various studies suggested that the SUSENAS figure underestimates by about 20%;
3. Calculating the real Y₁ by deflating Y₁ with the consumer price index (CPI) [=Y₂];

4. Calculating the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for each region as the relative price of a certain bundle of commodities, with the prices in South Jakarta as the standard;
5. Dividing Y₂ with PPP to obtained a standardized Ru-piah value [=Y₃];
6. Discounting the Y₃ using the Atkinson formula to get the purchasing power estimate [=Y₄]. This step is applied to accommodate the rule of decreasing marginal utility.

Consumer Price Index

In Indonesia, the CPI figure is available only for 54 cities. The calculation of purchasing power at regency/city level is using the CPI of the respected regency/city where the figure is available. For other than the 54 cities where the CPI data is available, the provincial CPI - i.e. the average of CPIs figure available in each province - is used.

Purchasing Power Parity

The calculation of PPP basically applies the same method used by the International Comparison Project in standardizing GDP for international comparison. The calculation is based on prices and quantities of selected commodities basket (27 items) available in SUSENAS consumption module. The prices in South Jakarta are used as the basic price. The formula for PPP calculation is:

$$PPP = \frac{\sum_j E_{(i,j)}}{\sum_j P_{(9,j)} Q_{(i,j)}}$$

Where:

E_(i,j): expenditure for commodity j in the province i

P_(9,j): the price of commodity j in South Jakarta

Q_(i,j): volume of commodity j (unit) consumed in the province i

The housing unit is calculated based on the housing quality index that consists of seven housing quality components in SUSENAS module. The score of each component is:

- 1) Floor: ceramic, marble, or granite =1, others = 0
- 2) Per capita floor width > 10 m² = 1, others= 0
- 3) Wall: cemented=1, others= 0
- 4) Roof: wood/single, cemented =1, others = 0
- 5) Lighting facility: electric=1, others= 0
- 6) Drinking water facility: piping=1, others= 0
- 7) Sanitation: private ownership=1, others= 0
- 8) Initial score for every house=1

Table 3
List of the bundle of commodities
used in the calculation of PPP

Commodity	Unit	Proportion from total consumption (%)
1. Local rice	Kg	7.25
2. Flour	Kg	0.10
3. Cassava	Kg	0.22
4. Tuna/cakalang	Kg	0.50
5. Anchovy	Ounce	0.32
6. Beef	Kg	0.78
7. Chicken	Kg	0.65
8. Egg	piece	1.48
9. Sweetened Milk	397 grams	0.48
10. Spinach	Kg	0.30
11. Snake Bean	Kg	0.32
12. Peanut	Kg	0.22
13. Tempe(Soybean cake)	Kg	0.79
14. Orange	Kg	0.39
15. Papaya	Kg	0.18
16. Coconut	piece	0.56
17. Sugar	Ons	1.61
18. Coffee	Ons	0.60
19. Salt	Ons	0.15
20. Pepper	Ons	0.13
21. Instant Noodle	80 grams	0.79
22. Clove Cigarette	10 pieces	2.86
23. Electricity	Kwh	2.06
24. Drinking water	M ³	0.46
25. Gasoline	Liter	1.02
26. Gasoline	Liter	1.74
27. Housing Rent	Unit	11.56
Total		37.52

The housing quality index is the sum of all scores with a range of 1 to 8. The quality of house consumed by a household is equal to the housing quality index divided by 8. For example, if a house has a housing quality index of 6, then the quality of house consumed by the household is 6/8 or 0,75 unit.

Atkinson Formula

The Atkinson formula used to discounted the Y3 can be defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 C(i)^* &= C(i) && \text{if } C(i) < Z \\
 &= Z + 2(C(i) - Z)^{(1/2)} && \text{if } Z < C(i) < 2Z \\
 &= Z + 2(Z)^{(1/2)} + 3(C(i) - 2Z)^{(1/3)} && \text{if } 2Z < C(i) < 3Z \\
 &= Z + 2(Z)^{(1/2)} + 3(Z)^{(1/3)} + 4(C(i) - 3Z)^{(1/4)} && \text{if } 3Z < C(i) < 4Z
 \end{aligned}$$

where:

$C(i)$: The PPP adjusted per capita real expenditure
 Z : threshold level of expenditure that is arbitrarily defined at Rp. 549,500 per capita per year or Rp. 1,500 per capita per day.

Calculating the HDI

This illustration of the calculation of HDI uses data for Aceh Province in 1999

Life expectancy	67.6
Adult literacy rate (%)	93.1
Mean years of schooling	7.2
Adjusted real per capita expenditure (Thousand Rupiah)	562.8

Life expectancy index
 $(67.6-25) / (85-25) = 0.71 = 71\%$

Adult literacy index
 $(93.1-0) / (100-0) = 0.93 = 93\%$

Mean years of schooling index
 $(7.2-0) / (15-0) = 0.48 = 48\%$

Educational attainment index
 $(2/3 \times 93) + (1/3 \times 48) = 0.78 = 78\%$

Income index
 $(562.8-360) / (732.72-300) = 0.469 = 47\%$

Human development index
 $HDI = (71+78+47) / 3 = 65.3$

Reduction Shortfall

The differences on the rate of change of any HDI score during a certain period can be measured by the annual rate of reduction in shortfall. This shortfall value measures the achievement ratio in terms of the gap between the 'achieved' and 'to be achieved' distance toward the optimum condition. The ideal condition to be achieved is defined as the HDI equal to 100. The higher the reduction in shortfall, the faster the HDI increases. This measure is based on the assumption that the growth of HDI is not linear. It is assumed to be diminishing as the HDI level is approaching the ideal point. The calculation of reduction shortfall is as follow:

$$r = \sqrt[n]{\frac{HDI_{(1+n)} - HDI_{(t)}}{HDI_{(ideal)} - HDI_{(t)}}} \times 100$$

where:

$HDI_{(t)}$ is HDI for the t^{th} year

$HDI_{(ideal)}$ is 100

n = year

The reduction shortfall could also be measured for each HDI component.

The Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

In principle, the GDI uses the same variables as the HDI. The difference is that the GDI adjust the average

achievement of each region in life expectancy, educational attainment and income in accordance with the disparity in achievement between women and men. The parameter ϵ is incorporated into the equation to take into account the inequality aversion that reflects the marginal elasticity of social valuation toward a certain achievement across gender. To express a moderate aversion to inequality, the parameter ϵ is set equal to 2.

To calculate GDI, one needs to first calculate the equally distributed equivalent achievement $[X_{ede}]$ using the following formula:

$$X_{ede} = (P_f X_f^{(1-\epsilon)} + P_m X_m^{(1-\epsilon)})^{1/(1-\epsilon)}$$

Where:

X_f : female achievement

X_m : male achievement

P_f : proportion of female population

P_m : proportion of male population

ϵ : inequality aversion parameter (=2)

The calculation of income distribution component is fairly complex. Based on wage data collected in the National Labor Force Survey (*SAKERNAS*) 1996 and 1999, the calculation follows the steps below:

- 1) Calculating the ratio between wage for female and wage for male in non-agriculture sector $[W_f]$;
- 2) Calculating the average wage using the following formula:

$$W = (Aec_f \times W_f) + (Aec_m \times 1)$$

Where:

Aec_f : proportion of women in the labour force (who are economically active)

Aec_m : proportion of male in the labour force (who are economically active)

W_f : ratio of female's wage in agriculture sector

- 3) Calculating the ratio between each gender group from the average wage above $[=R]$;
- 4) Calculating the income contributed by each gender group $[=IncC]$, where:

$$IncC = Aec_{(f/m)} \times R_{(f/m)}$$

- 5) Calculating the proportion of income contributed by each gender group $[\% IncC]$ using the following formula:

$$\%IncC = IncC_{(f/m)} / P_{(f/m)}$$

- 6) Calculating the proportion of X_{ede} from the $\%IncC$ $[=X_{ede} (Inc)]$

- 7) Calculating the index of income distribution $[= I_{Inc-dis}]$

$$I_{Inc-dis} = [(X_{ede}(Inc) \times PPP) - PPP_{min}] / [PPP_{max} - PPP_{min}]$$

The calculation of GDI follows the steps below:

- 1) Each index of the GDI component is computed using the formula described above with the maximum and minimum thresholds as stated in Table 4;
- 2) Calculating the Xede from each index;
- 3) Calculating the GDI using the following formula:

$$GDI = 1/3 [(X_{ede(1)} + X_{ede(2)} + I_{Inc-dis})]$$

Where:

$X_{ede(1)}$: Xede for life expectancy

$X_{ede(2)}$: Xede for education

$I_{Inc-dis}$: Index of income distribution

Table 4
The maximum and minimum thresholds of GDI components

	Maximum		Minimum	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Life Expectancy	82.5	87.5	22.5	27.5
Literacy Rate	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Mean Years of Schooling	15.0	15.0	0.0	0.0
Per capita Consumption	732,720		300,000	

Most data for computing GDI are from the same source as the data for computing HDI. Only wage data for computing GDI and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is from *SAKERNAS* (National Labour Force Survey) 1996 and 1999.

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

The GEM consists of three components: i.e. parliamentary representation, decision-making and income distribution. In calculating GEM one should first calculate the EDEP (the index of each component based on 'Equally Distributed Equivalent Percentage'). The calculation of income share for GEM is the same as the calculation of income share for GDI calculation described above. Then, the index of each component is the EDEP of each component divided by 50. 50 is considered to be an ideal share of each gender group for all GEM components.

The decision making component consist of two indicators: managerial and administration job, and professional and technical staff. For national figure, the index of decision-making is the average of the indices of these two indicators. This combination is necessary to avoid any misperceptions of the respondents in choosing between these two occupational categories. Data for

Calculating the GDI

As an example, the calculation of GDI for the province of Aceh 1996 is as follow:

Component	Female	Male
Proportion of population	0.499	0.501
Life expectancy	69.6	65.6
Literacy rate (%)	90.1	96.2
Mean years of schooling (MYS)	6.8	7.7
Percentage of the economically active population (Proportion of Labor Force)	38.4	61.6
Non-agricultural wage	271.929	383.423
PPP (Rp 000)	562.8	

Calculating life expectancy and educational indices

Life expectancy index:

- Female : $(69.6 - 27.5) / (87.5 - 27.5) = 0.70$
- Male : $(65.6 - 22.5) / (82.5 - 22.5) = 0.72$

If $\epsilon = 2$, then:

$$X_{ede}(1) = [((0.499)(0.70)^{-1}) + ((0.501)(0.72)^{-1})]^{-1} = 0.71$$

Literacy rate index:

- Female : $(90.1 - 0) / (100 - 0) = 0.901$
- Male : $(96.2 - 0) / (100 - 0) = 0.962$

Mean years of schooling index:

- Female : $(6.8 - 0) / (15 - 0) = 0.453$
- Male : $(7.7 - 0) / (15 - 0) = 0.513$

Educational attainment index:

- Female : $2/3(0.901) + 1/3(0.453) = 0.75$
- Male : $2/3(0.962) + 1/3(0.513) = 0.81$

If $\epsilon = 2$, then:

$$X_{ede}(2) = [(0.499)(0.75)^{-1} + (0.501)(0.81)^{-1}]^{-1} = 0.78$$

Calculating income distribution index Ratio to male non-agricultural wage:

- Female : $271.929/383.423 = 0.709$
- Male : 1

$$\text{Average wage: } (0.384 \times 0.709) + (0.616 \times 1) = 0.888$$

Ratio to average wage:

$$\text{Female: } 0.709 / 0.888 = 0.798$$

$$\text{Male : } 1 / 0.888 = 1.126$$

Share of earned income

$$\text{Female: } 0.798 \times 0.384 = 0.307$$

$$\text{Male : } 1.126 \times 0.616 = 0.693$$

Proportional income shares

$$\text{Female: } 0.307 / 0.499 = 0.614$$

$$\text{Male : } 0.694 / 0.501 = 1.384$$

If $\epsilon = 2$, then:

$$X_{ede}(\text{Inc}) = [(0.499)(0.614)^{-1} + (0.501)(1.384)^{-1}]^{-1} = 0.85$$

The income distribution index ($I_{\text{inc-dis}}$) is

$$I_{\text{inc-dis}} = [(0.85 \times 562.8) - 360] / [737.72 - 300] = 0.276$$

Gender Development Index

$$\text{GDI} = (0.71 + 0.78 + 0.276) / 3 = 0.59 = 59\%$$

Calculating the GEM

Using the case of Aceh province in 1999, the calculation of GEM is as follows:

Component	Female	Male
Proportion of population	0.499	0.501
Parliamentary Representation (%)	8.3	91.7
Proportion of manager, administration staff, professional and technical staff (%)	54.4	45.6
Percentage of the economically active population (Proportion of Labor Force)	38.4	61.6
Percentage of the economically active population (Proportion of Labor Force)	38.4	61.6
Non-agricultural wage	271.929	383.423
PPP (Rp 000)	562.8	

Calculating the parliamentary representation index and decision-making index with $\epsilon = 2$

Parliamentary representation index (I_{par})

$$\text{EDEP}_{(\text{par})} = [0.499(8.3)^{-1} + (0.501)(91.7)^{-1}]^{-1} = 15.25$$

$$I_{\text{par}} = 15.25 / 50 = 0.3$$

Decision-making index (I_{DM})

$$\text{EDEP}_{(\text{DM})} = [0.499(54.4)^{-1} + (0.500)(45.6)^{-1}]^{-1} = 49.61$$

$$I_{\text{DM}} = 49.61 / 50 = 0.99$$

Calculating income distribution index

Following the calculation of income distribution index for GDI above, the $I_{\text{inc-dis}} = 0.27$

Gender empowerment measure:

$$\text{GEM} = 1/3 (I_{\text{par}} + I_{\text{DM}} + I_{\text{inc-dis}})$$

$$= (0.3 + 0.99 + 0.27) / 3 = 52.4$$

decision-making component is from SUSENAS 1996 and 1999. Data for parliamentary representation is from “Lembaga Pemilihan Umum” (General Election Institute) and the parliaments at provincial and regency/city level.

The GEM is calculated as:

$$\text{GEM} = 1/3 [I_{\text{par}} + I_{\text{DM}} + I_{\text{inc-dis}}]$$

Where:

I_{par} : Parliamentary representation index

I_{DM} : Decision making index

$I_{\text{inc-dis}}$: Income distribution index

The Human Poverty Index (HPI)

The HPI combines several dimensions of human poverty that are considered as the most basic indicators of human deprivation. It consists of three indicators: people expected not having a long live, deprivation on educational attainment and inadequacy in access to basic

services. The first indicator is measured by the probability of the population not expected to survive to age 40 (P_1). The calculation of this indicator follows the method of calculating life expectancy for HDI measurement. The second indicator is measured by adult illiteracy rate (P_2). This is calculated based on SUPAS 1995 and SUSENAS 1996 data and covers population age 15 and above. While the limitation on access to basic services (P_3) consists of the following variables:

- Percentage of population without access to clean water ($=P_{31}$). P_{31} is defined as the percentage of household using water source other tap water, water pump and wheel that is located 10 meters or more from sewage disposal. This data is collected from SUPAS 1995 and SUSENAS 1998.
- Percentage of population without access to health services ($=P_{32}$). P_{32} is defined as the percentage of population lives in the location 5 km or more from health facilities. The data source is the same as above.
- Percentage of children under five years old with low nutritional status ($=P_{33}$). P_{33} is defined as the percentage of children less than five years old belong to the category of low and medium nutritional status.

Calculating the HPI

As an illustration, the following equation shows the calculation of HDI for Aceh province in 1999:

Probability of people not expected to survive to age 40 - P_1 (%)	12.7
Adult illiteracy rate - P_2 (%)	6.9
Population without access to safe water - P_{31} (%)	61.5
Population without access to health services - P_{32} (%)	37.6
Undernourished children under age 5 - P_{33}	35.6

The composite of deprivation variables

$$P_3 = 1/3 (61.5+37.6+35.6) = 44.9$$

Human poverty index

$$HPI = [1/3 (12.7^3 + 6.9^3 + 44.9^3)]^{1/3} = 31.4$$

For this publication, the calculation of HPI follows the HDR 1997 published by UNDP:

$$HPI = [1/3 (P_1^3 + P_2^3 + P_3^3)]^{1/3}$$

$$\text{Where } P_3 = 1/3 (P_{31} + P_{32} + P_{33})$$

Procedures for estimating time required to reach particular targets

The time required to reach particular targets in several human development indicators, as presented in this report, is estimated by assuming that the past speed of improvement in those indicators as being constant in the future. The speed of improvement here indicates the absolute changes, as referred to a simple average of annual increase (or decline), expressed in years. By comparing data in 1990 (I90), 1993 (I93), 1996 (I96) and 1999 (I99), thus, the annual speed of improvement (s) is given as:

$$s = [(I_{93} - I_{90})/3 + (I_{96} - I_{93})/3 + (I_{99} - I_{96})/3]/3$$

Then, the estimated time (T) to reach particular target or goal in human development indicators (G) can be simply calculated as follows:

$$T = (G - I_{99})/s$$

Definitions of Statistical Terms

Access to health facilities: the percentage of households whose place of residence is less than five kilometres from a health facility (hospital, clinic, community health centre, doctor, nurse, trained midwife, paramedic, etc.).

Access to sanitation: the percentage of households who have either their own private toilet or access to public toilet facilities.

Access to safe water: the percentage of households who consume mineral water, tap water, or water from water pumps, protected wheels, or protected springs.

Average duration of illness: the average number of days of illness of those who are sick.

Births attended by modern health personnel : the percentage of children aged 0-4 whose birth was attended by modern medical personnel (doctor, nurse, trained midwife, paramedic, etc.).

Consumer price index (CPI): an index that indicates a relative comparison between price level in the month of survey and price level in the previous month, weighted by values of consumption in both months. CPI is calculated using a modified Laspeyres formula.

Economic growth: the relative change in the real value of gross domestic product over a certain time period.

Education index: one of the three components of the human development index. This is based on the enrolment ratio and the adult literacy rate. The index value is between 0 and 100. For details on how the index is calculated, see the technical note.

Enrolment. The *gross enrolment ratio* is the number of students enrolled at a given level of education, regardless of age, as a percentage of the official school-age population for that level. The *net enrolment ratio* is the number of children of official school-age enrolled in school as a percentage of the number of children of the official school-age population. The official school ages in Indonesia are 7-12 for primary school, 13-15 for junior high school, 16-18 for senior high school, and 19-24 for tertiary education.

Expenditure on food: the proportion of total expenditure used to buy food.

Gender empowerment measure (GEM): a composite index using variables constructed to measure the decision-making power of women in political and economic activities. The GEM is based on three indicators: the percentage of those elected to parliament who are women, the percentage of professionals, technicians, senior officials and managers who are women, and women's share of earned income. The index value is between 0 and 100.

Gender-related development index (GDI): a composite index using variables constructed to measure human development achievement taking into account gender disparity. The GDI components are the same as the HDI components but adjusted to capture the disparity in achievement between men and women. The index value is between 0 and 100.

Gross domestic product: the total amount of gross value-added (total output of goods and services) produced by all economic sectors in a country during a certain period of time.

Gross domestic product at constant prices: a calculation of gross domestic product using on prices in a specific base year.

Gross domestic product at current prices: the gross domestic product presented in current prices for the relevant year.

Gross domestic product per capita: the value of gross domestic product divided by total mid-year population.

Households with earth/dirt-floor house : the percentage of households whose houses have mainly earth or dirt floors.

Human development index (HDI) : a composite index based on three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy and mean years of schooling; and standard of living, as measured by per capita expenditure (PPP Rupiah). The index value is between 0 and 100.

Human poverty index (HPI): a composite index that measures deprivations in three dimensions: longevity, knowledge and standard of living.

Illiteracy rate (adult): the proportion of adults who cannot read or write in Latin script or other scripts.

Infant mortality rate (IMR) : the number of infants who die before reaching one year of age per 1,000 live births.

Labour force: the working age population (15 and over) who are employed or looking for employment.

Labour force participation rate: the proportion of the working-age population who are in the labour force.

Life expectancy at birth : the average number of years that newly-born infants would live if the mortality patterns at the time of birth prevailed throughout the children's lives.

Life expectancy index: one of the three components of the human development index. The value of this index is between 0 and 100. A detailed explanation on how to calculate this index is presented in the technical note.

Literacy rate (adult): the percentage of people aged 15 years or over who can read and write in Latin script or other scripts.

Mean years of schooling: the estimated average (mean) years of completed schooling for the total population aged 15 or over who have any status of educational attainment. For a detailed explanation see the technical note.

Morbidity rate: the proportion of the population who suffered from health problems that disturbed their daily activities over the previous month.

Non-agricultural wages: the average remuneration received by workers (labourers or official employees) in the non-agricultural sector.

Open unemployment: the proportion of the labour force who are seeking employment.

Poor people: the population with a monthly per capita expenditure less than a certain threshold referred to as the 'poverty line'.

Population not expected to survive to age 40: the estimated proportion of population that will die before reaching the age of 40.

Population with health problems: the proportion of the population that has had one or more health problems during the previous month.

Poverty line: the Indonesian rupiah value of the monthly per capita expenditure required to fulfil a minimum standard of food and non-food basic consumption.

Professionals, technical workers, senior officials and managers: defined according to "Klasifikasi Baku Jabatan Indonesia (KBJI)".

Purchasing power parity (PPP): PPP rates allow a standard comparison of real price levels between provinces and districts, otherwise normal exchange rates may over- or under-value purchasing power as measured by adjusted real per capita consumption. At the PPP rate in the Indonesian context, one rupiah has the same purchasing power in each province

as it has in Jakarta. The PPP is based on real per capita expenditure after adjusting for the consumer price index and decreasing marginal utility using Atkinson's formula.

Purchasing power index: one of three components of the human development index based on purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted by Atkinson's formula. The index value is between 0 and 100. For details on how the index is calculated, see the technical note.

Self-medication: household efforts at self treatment for health problems using modern or traditional medicines, massage, or other traditional treatments.

School drop-out rate: the proportion of the population aged 7-15 who are not enrolled in education at any level and have not completed primary or junior high school.

School participation rate: the proportion of the population in a certain age group (7-12, 13-15, 16-18, and 19-24) who are attending school.

Total consumption: consumption of goods and services regardless of origin. This includes gifts and the household's own production. In this publication, total consumption refers to monthly consumption.

Underemployment: the proportion of the total labour force working fewer than normal working hours.

Undernourished children under five: also referred to as children underweight (suffering from moderate and severe malnutrition). Moderate malnutrition refers to the percentage of children under five who are below minus two standard deviations from the median weight for the age of the reference population. Severe malnutrition refers to the percentage of children under five who are below minus three standard deviations from the median weight for the age of the reference population.

Women's share of the labour force: the number of working women as a proportion of the total working age population (aged 15 and over).

Women's income share: the income contributed by women as a proportion of the total income of the population. For a detailed explanation on how to calculate this, see the technical note.

Women's representation in parliament: the proportion of parliamentary seats that are held by women.

Workers in the informal sector: the percentage of the labour force who are individual entrepreneurs, are working with the assistance of family members, or are paid or unpaid family workers.

